

Thomas Hörber

The Foundations of Europe

European Integration Ideas
in France, Germany and Britain
in the 1950s

BUNDESTAG GRUNDGESETZ POLITISCHES SYSTEM EUROPÄISCHE UNION
WAHLEN VERFASSUNG INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN POLITISCHE THEO
RIE PARTEIEN INSTITUTIONEN POLITISCHE KULTUR POLITISCHE ELITEN
PARLAMENTARISMUS DEMOKRATIE MACHT REGIERUNG VERWALTUNG FÖDER
ALISMUS POLITISCHE SOZIOLOGIE GLOBALISIERUNG POLITISCHE KOMMU
NIKATION PARTEIENSYSTEM RECHTSSTAAT BERECHTIGKEIT STAAT POLI
TISCHE ÖKONOMIE POLITIK BUNDESTAG GRUNDGESETZ POLITISCHES
SYSTEM EUROPÄISCHE UNION WAHLEN VERFASSUNG INTERNATIONALE
BEZIEHUNGEN POLITISCHE THEORIE PARTEIEN INSTITUTIONEN POLI
TISCHE KULTUR POLITISCHE ELITEN PARLAMENTARISMUS DEMOKRATIE
MACHT REGIERUNG VERWALTUNG FÖDERALISMUS POLITISCHE SOZIOLOGIE
GLOBALISIERUNG POLITISCHE KOMMUNIKATION PARTEIENSYSTEM RECHTS
STAAT BERECHTIGKEIT STAAT POLITISCHE ÖKONOMIE POLITIK BUNDES
TAG GRUNDGESETZ POLITISCHES SYSTEM EUROPÄISCHE UNION WAH

FORSCHUNGEN ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION



VS VERLAG FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN

Thomas Hörber

The Foundations of Europe

Forschungen zur Europäischen Integration
Band 19

Herausgegeben von
Ingeborg Tömmel

Thomas Hörber

The Foundations of Europe

European Integration Ideas
in France, Germany and Britain
in the 1950s



VS VERLAG FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der
Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
<<http://dnb.d-nb.de>> abrufbar.

1. Auflage August 2006

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2006

Lektorat: Monika Mülhausen / Tanja Köhler

Der VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften ist ein Unternehmen von Springer Science+Business Media.
www.vs-verlag.de



Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlags unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.

Die Wiedergabe von Gebrauchsnamen, Handelsnamen, Warenbezeichnungen usw. in diesem Werk berechtigt auch ohne besondere Kennzeichnung nicht zu der Annahme, dass solche Namen im Sinne der Warenzeichen- und Markenschutz-Gesetzgebung als frei zu betrachten wären und daher von jedermann benutzt werden dürften.

Umschlaggestaltung: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg

Druck und buchbinderische Verarbeitung: Krips b.v., Meppel

Gedruckt auf säurefreiem und chlorfrei gebleichtem Papier

Printed in the Netherlands

ISBN-10 3-531-15133-9

ISBN-13 978-3-531-15133-5

Acknowledgements

I was fortunate enough to make a number of friends during the work on this book, first and foremost Geoffrey Edwards, who has afforded me invaluable help and advice. His academic guidance in many meetings in Pembroke College led him to find one of my predominant characteristics in obstinacy. I am sure this has tested his patience to the limit, but then – as so many things in a friendship – this was a reciprocal experience.

Marina Terkourafi, Richard Dunn, Ulrich Adam and Jonathan Conlin have shared the academic experience of this work with me and have spent a substantial amount of their time and energy in advice and corrections on it. Last but not least in this row of distinguished friends I would like to thank Robert Hodgkinson. I will always hold dear the council and comfort he afforded me in many discussions day and night in Porters' Lodge. I am grateful to all of them for the time they allowed me to spend with them and for the trust and friendship which we experienced growing between each other.

I was also very fortunate in meeting good people along my road who were so generous as to offer me their help in many different matters concerning this book. Dr. Brendan Simms and Dr. Max Bergman were instrumental in getting the PhD on which this book is based underway. Jörg Tauss, MdB, helped me in facilitating one major step of research in the German parliament. I am grateful to Professor Maurice Vaisse and Professor Amy Verdun for their academic advice. All of them have never lost patience with me and my work and have acted as supporting pillars on which this work ultimately rests. Professor Dr. Ingeborg Tömmel has afforded me great support through her enthusiastic appreciation of my work, which eventually led to the publication of this book in the current form.

Three institutions were essential for gathering the primary sources for the PhD; firstly, the Service des Archives of the Assemblée Nationale at which I would like to thank, particularly, M. François Fretard for his generous help. Secondly, the Archiv des Deutschen Bundestages and, thirdly, the Official Publications' Room at the University Library, Cambridge, were crucial in assembling the German and the British parliamentary debates and other sources.

Two academic institutions have enabled me to pursue my studies, namely the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge University and L'Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris.

There were a number of funding bodies without which this PhD would not have been possibly, financially. In particular, I am grateful to the unexpected and very generous financial support from the Kurt Tucholsky Stiftung in Hamburg under Professor Dr. Raddatz and with the very forthcoming and open help of Fr. Sommer. In addition, the European Trust, Cambridge under Dr. Anil Seal has repeatedly extended the duration of their grant to me, well beyond what could reasonably be expected of them. I am especially grateful for the last *ex gratia* extension after a period of serious illness. The same goes for the grant from the Board of Graduate Studies, University of Cambridge, which covered the prolongation of the PhD due to this illness. Dr. Nicola Tooke, at the Board, deserves special thanks for her patience in giving advice and council to me. During my time in Paris, I had a scholarship from the Deutsches Historisches Institut Paris, which facilitated and supported my stay in this great city. Professor Dr. Paravicini and, especially, Mme. Martaguet deserve gratitude for their help in this respect.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my College, Trinity Hall, in Cambridge for providing a home for me for almost five years of my life and also for supporting my studies with considerable funds. Dr. Christopher Padfield has earned my respect as a hard but fair partner during my studies. Ms. Julie Powley deserves special thanks for her patience and fairness. She was the human face to a sometimes anonymous administration. She was there when going got tough and when help and advice was needed most. The Hall will always remain a reference point for me. It will always have a place in my heart and it will always be a place to which I will return should my travels carry me back to Britain.

Noch einen herzlichen Dank an meine Großmutter Katherina Hörber für ihre Unterstützung durch die vielen Jahre. Schließlich möchte ich noch meinen Eltern, Helga und Alfred Hörber, für Ihren unerschütterlichen Glauben an mich danken, der mich getragen hat und der an den vielen verschiedenen Orten an die mich meine Arbeit führte, mir immer wieder ein sicheres Fundament war. Für alles andere gibt es keine Worte.

Victoria (B.C.), 24th March, 2006

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	5
Table of Contents	7
Lists of Acronyms	13
1. Introduction	15
1.1 Methodology.....	17
1.1.1 Analysis of Speeches	18
1.1.2 Historiography	20
1.1.3 The Indicator Scheme	30
1.2 Research Questions	36
2. France	37
2.1 War Experience	42
2.1.1 War consequences	42
Allied Responsibility and the German threat	42
Occupational Rule in Germany	45
The Ruhr Statute	46
2.1.2 <i>La grande nation</i> finding its place in Europe.....	50
Anglo-French Alliance.....	50
Reconciliation with Germany.....	52
The European Ideal	55
2.2 National Security.....	59

2.2.1	Fundamentals	59
	Sovereignty	59
2.2.2	Internal Reform	60
	The Fourth Republic 1946-1958	60
	The Fifth Republic 1958-.....	64
2.2.3	Territorial Integrity.....	65
	The Saar	65
	The <i>Communauté Française</i>	68
	Decolonisation.....	70
2.2.4	Ideals and ideology.....	76
	The Communists	76
	The Socialist International.....	79
	Political Europe	80
2.3	Military Security.....	88
2.3.1	East-West Antagonism.....	88
	The Soviet Threat.....	88
	The Nuclear Age	91
	German Rearmament	94
2.3.2	Integrated Defences.....	96
	The Brussels Treaty.....	97
	The Atlantic Alliance	98
	The European Defence Community (EDC).....	100
	Western European Union (WEU).....	108
2.4	Economic Security.....	112
2.4.1	The Nation	112
	The Monnet Plan.....	112
	Nationalisation	112
2.4.2	Half-way Europe	114
	Marshall Aid and the OEEC.....	114
	The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)	115
2.4.3	European Integration	116
	The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).....	117
	The European Economic Community (EEC).....	123
	The Free Trade Area (FTA)	129

2.5	Preliminary Conclusions for France	132
3.	Germany	134
3.1	War Experience	138
3.1.1	War consequences	138
	The German threat and the Allied powers	139
	The Occupation Statute	141
	The Ruhr Statute	143
3.1.2	Western commitment	144
	Reconciliation with France	144
	The distant partner Britain.....	146
	The European Ideal	147
	The United Nations (UN).....	149
3.2	National Security	151
3.2.1	Fundamentals	151
	From Sovereignty to Interdependence.....	151
	Peace Treaty - Petersberg Accords - General Treaty	153
3.2.2	Internal Reform	157
	A new administration.....	157
	West-Germany becomes Germany	158
3.2.3	Territorial Integrity.....	159
	The Saar	160
	The lost territories.....	164
	Reunification and the Soviet Occupation Zone	166
	Berlin	170
3.2.4	Ideals and ideology.....	171
	The Communists	171
	The Socialist International.....	174
	Political Europe	175
3.3	Military Security.....	181
3.3.1	East-West Antagonism.....	181

	Neutrality.....	182
	The Soviet threat.....	184
	Rearmament.....	188
3.3.2	Integrated Defences	192
	European Defence Community (EDC).....	193
	West European Union (WEU).....	198
	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).....	200
3.4	Economic Security	203
3.4.1	The Nation.....	203
	Economic Policies	203
	Magnet Theory.....	204
3.4.2	Half-way Europe.....	205
	Marshall Aid and the OEEC	206
3.4.3	European integration	209
	The Schuman-Plan (ECSC)	210
	The European Economic Community (EEC)	215
3.5	Preliminary Conclusions for Germany.....	224
4.	Britain	226
4.1	War Experience	228
4.1.1	War consequences	228
	Allied Responsibility and the German Threat	228
	Occupational Rule in Germany.....	231
4.1.2	The Status Quo	232
	Imperial Defence	232
	The last remaining European World Power	234
4.1.3	The hope for a peaceful future.....	237
	Franco-German reconciliation	237
	The Saar.....	239
	The German Question.....	239
	The European Ideal.....	244
	The United Nations (UN).....	245
4.2	National Security	248

4.2.1	Fundamentals	248
	Sovereignty	248
4.2.2	Internal Reform	249
	Class struggle.....	249
4.2.3	Territorial Integrity.....	251
	Empire and Commonwealth.....	251
	Decolonisation.....	254
4.2.4	Ideas and ideology.....	256
	Communism.....	256
	The Socialist International.....	257
	Political Europe	259
	The special Relationship to the US.....	264
4.3	Military Security.....	267
4.3.1	East-West Antagonism.....	267
	The Soviet Military Threat.....	268
	The Nuclear Age.....	271
4.3.2	The national armies of Europe	273
	German Rearmament	273
	The French	275
	British Rearmament	277
4.3.3	Integrated Defences.....	280
	The Brussels Treaty.....	280
	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)	281
	The Pacific Pact Proposals	284
	The Baghdad Pact	285
	The European Defence Community (EDC).....	285
	Western European Union (WEU).....	288
4.3.4	Crises	290
	The Korean War.....	291
	The Suez Crisis	293
4.4	Economic Security.....	299
4.4.1	The Nation	299
	Primary Defence: Economic Stability.....	299
	The Magnet Theory	299
	Nationalisation.....	300
	The maintenance of the arms industry.....	301

4.4.2	Imperial Preference	303
	The Sterling Area	303
4.4.3	Britain and the European organisations	304
	Marshall Aid and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).....	304
	The Schuman Plan (ECSC).....	306
4.4.4	Britain in Europe	311
	The European Economic Community (EEC)	311
	The Free Trade Area (FTA).....	317
	The European Free Trade Area (EFTA).....	321
4.5	Preliminary Conclusions for Britain.....	323
5.	Conclusions	325
5.1	Discourse Theory and European Refinements.....	325
5.2	Conclusions by Country.....	330
5.2.1	France	330
5.2.2	Germany.....	333
5.2.3	Britain	336
5.3	Concluding Remarks.....	341
6.	Bibliography	348

Lists of Acronyms

1. France

DOM Département d'outre mer
TOM Territoire d'outre mer

Institutions

CED EDC (European Defence Community)
OTAN NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)

Parties

CRPS Centre républicain d'union paysanne et sociale et des
 démocrates indépendant
ED Entente démocratique
FI Français indépendant
IOM Indépendants d'outre-mer
MRP Mouvement républicain Populaire
Pay Paysan ou Paysans d'action sociale
Ipay Indépendant et Paysans d'action sociale
PC Partie Communiste
PRL Partie républicain de la liberté
PS Partie Socialiste
RGCR Rassemblement des gauches républicaines et du centre
 républicain
RI Républicain Indépendant
RP Républicains progressistes
RPF Rassemblement du Peuple Français
RRS Républicain radical et radical socialiste
RS Républicain sociaux
UDSR Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance
UFF Union et fraternité française

UNR	Union pour le nouvelle République
UR	Unité de la République
URR	Union Républicain et Résistante

Sources

JO	Journal Officiel
----	------------------

2. Germany

Parties

CDU	Christlich – Demokratische Union
CSU	Christlich – Soziale Union
DA	Demokratischer Arbeitsgemeinschaft
DP	Deutsche Partei
DRP	Deutsche Reichspartei
GB-BHE	Gesamtdeutscher Block – Bund der Heimatvertrieben und Entrechteten
FDP	Freiheitlich – Demokratische Partei
FU	Föderalistische Union
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SRP	Sozialistische Reichspartei
WAV	Wirtschaftliche Aufbau Vereinigung
Z	Zentrumspartei

3. Britain

CAP	Cabinet Papers
FO	Foreign Office
PREM	Papers of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

1. Introduction

The 1950s can reasonably be called the foundation period of Europe. At the start of the decade pioneering institutions such as the OEEC, the Council of Europe and NATO were already in place. By the end of the 1950s all the major European communities, the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom had been established. 1954 saw a serious crisis for European integration when the European Defence Community treaty was rejected. The replacement in West European Union gave new impetus to European cooperation and new hope for full British involvement. Nevertheless, throughout the decade, it was not at all clear that European integration would be a success, particularly with Britain outside and a colonial alternative open to France, too.¹ One reason for focusing on the early integration period must, therefore, be seen in the wide divergence between Britain, France and Germany with regard to their concept for Europe. Britain's accession to the ECs in 1973 marked the end of the fundamental disaccord whether European integration should happen at all, notwithstanding the continued existence of greatly different opinions on the shape and the way cooperation should take. Not so earlier in the 1950s; British intergovernmental preference and the continental European supranational choice, could not be reconciled and kept Britain away. The supranational aspiration survived, even with de Gaulle in power. This is another reason for analysing the whole of the 1950s – not just the Fourth Republic until 1958 – because it will enable us to consider developments in the Fifth Republic in France towards the end of the decade. Thus, the 1950s are an appropriate timeframe in which the national positions of the three countries towards the European integration process can be analysed. In geographic terms France and Germany were among the founding members of the European integration process and the European communities. For France, the importance of national pride, particularly under de Gaulle, was a major hindrance to commit the country even stronger to the European integration process.² However, before the General came back into office in 1958, people like Robert Schuman had the foresight and the European commitment to overcome the Franco-

¹ Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution - The European Political Community, 1952-1954*, Federal Trust, London, 2000, p. 108, see also, Gérard Bossuat, 'The French Administrative Elite and the Unification of Western Europe, 1947-58', in: Anne Deighton (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe - National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63*, Macmillan, London, 1995, p. 24

² See R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977, p. 324

German enmity. Later, de Gaulle acknowledged the immense importance of Franco-German friendship, closely connected to the European integration process which because of this well founded understanding came to be seen as a guarantee for peace in Europe.

Adenauer had made the settlement of West Germany into the Western bloc one of his key policies. For him the rejection of the old Germany – in its middle position between East and West – was a necessary precondition to building a new Germany. The early success of the European integration effort supported Adenauer's position of unreserved German participation. Such peaceful cooperation opened up a new way for Germany to regain the position in Europe which it forfeited in the first half of the century. A European Germany offered a positive outlook for the future and economic and political prospects which Germany could not achieve on its own.

Therefore, France and Germany are clear choices for analysing early European integration. However, what reason is there for looking at Britain, which distanced itself from the whole integration process? The reason why I want to look at Britain is precisely because of this marked difference. Despite its distinguished record of early initiatives for European cooperation in OEEC and the Council of Europe, Britain was opposed to the European integration process, when it gained momentum on the continent from 1950 onwards. In 1945 Britain emerged victorious from World War II. It was still a world power. It had not experienced invasion, occupation and total economic collapse like France and Germany, which can well be seen as a reason why Britain stayed out.³ By the end of the 1950s the picture is markedly different. Britain had clearly lost ground compared to the other two. France – which had only stood very shakily among the victors – recovered more quickly than Britain from the war. Germany had not only caught up, but had actually overtaken Britain and France in the economic field where the main post war competition took place.

This outcome could hardly have been expected immediately after the war. Economic integration, which was arguably one reason for the German success, in the form of the “economic miracle”, served one of the key objectives of the European integration effort, i.e. prosperity. The second was the wholly idealistic aim of peace. The missed opportunities of peace in Europe before World War II had a considerable impact on the political leaders of the post-war period. World War II was clearly the great divide and at the same time one of the reasons for the founding fathers to commit their nations to closer cooperation for peace and prosperity in Europe. The pressing questions for them were, nevertheless, what they could expect from Europe; which national needs could be provided for by Europe, but also

³ See Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2039, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1406

which national positions would be compromised by a closer European commitment? The answers to these questions were different in each nation state, as were the ideas on the future of Europe. The different motives, opinions and visions will be one analytical focus; the development of national positions on European integration projects and the influence of such positions on the development of the integration effort will be another. Sources and methodology really set this thesis apart from previous research. Sometimes this combination may only support the conventional wisdoms of European Studies, but on the other hand the classical questions of European research, of the type mentioned above, need to be posed from a different angle from time to time. Through the following sources and methodology I hope to add to the historical picture of European integration and provide a different perspective where necessary.

1.1 Methodology

Although the concept of the nation state as such had been somewhat discredited by World War II – most strikingly put by Spinelli – it was initially the only political tool available to post-war politicians.⁴ It meant that the nation state was still predominant and that a European perspective had yet to be developed. “Europe” was still more a term for cultural similarities and territorial proximity, rather than political unity. The nation state was therefore the only political reality in the immediate post war years, not least in the field of developing a new European power structure and an institutional framework in order to prevent disasters like the last war, which arguably had their origin in the limitedness of the national perspective and the antagonism between the nations. On these grounds, I will base my research on the national perspective and on respective national sources. To be sure, the comparison of national sources from Britain, France and Germany will not provide an all-encompassing picture of the European integration process, but a detailed analysis of motivations, opinions and visions of the major actors on this European integration process, nevertheless.

⁴ See A. Spinelli, *Il manifesto di Ventotene*, Naples, 1982

1.1.1 *Analysis of Speeches*⁵

Ideas of European integration usually entail far-reaching and fundamental changes to the way national politics are conducted. Parliament is the forum to develop such ideas into more concrete concepts, national expectations and positions on Europe, because there is sufficient time and a wide range of political opinion in which such European ideals compete. In that sense, the parliamentary process reflects the soul-searching process of the nation to arrive at national positions on Europe, institutionalised in the parliamentary deliberations and the decision-making process. Parliamentary speeches inform the government parties as well as those of the opposition as to the intentions of the government. More than that, the mutual relationship between government and parliamentary parties – government parties and opposition alike – is an essential element of the parliamentary process. The facilitation of this process is one purpose of having three “readings” of every bill, e.g. the ratification process of all the European treaties. Therefore, parliamentary debates reflect the greatest variety of political positions on European integration as well as the deliberation process leading to a national position.

In addition, as regards the legitimisation of European integration, it is essential to look at the institution where this usually happens in representative democratic systems.⁶ With respect to the people, parliaments play a twofold role. On the one hand, parliament constitutes the legitimate arena of representation of the people. On the other hand, they fulfil a leadership role towards the people exercised in the deliberation and decision-making process. It is the place where ultimately binding national positions are finally sanctioned. This becomes particularly clear in parliamentary debates and decisions on international treaties such as the European ones. Therefore, the parliamentary process can be seen as essential for the development of general national positions on Europe, and parliamentary debates give a unique insight into the process of their development.

Moreover, we have established that in the 1950s the three national parliaments were where the ultimate binding decisions on European integration were sanctioned. On the one hand, this is the main difference from journalistic sources,

⁵ The references to parliamentary debates and particular speakers have been substantially reduced from the original research thesis in order to make the book more accessible. A copy of the original thesis with all primary references can be obtained from the author

⁶ Although there has to be a qualification to this argument insofar as for example the British accession to the ECs or later the Maastricht treaty in France were legitimised through referenda, in the 1950s the national parliaments were at the heart of the political process. All the original treaties on the European communities, i.e. ECSC, EDC, EEC and Euratom, went through the French and the German parliaments and all decisions on British participation in European integration went through the House of Commons. Therefore, parliamentary debates give a comprehensive picture of the legislative process on European integration in the 1950s

which are detached from the decision-making process, at least institutionally. Where they had an impact on the decision-making process journalistic sources are usually reflected in parliamentary debates. The most important excerpts of newspaper articles are not rarely quoted and directly built into a parliamentary argument. Therefore, the indirect influence exercised by the press also finds its reflection in parliamentary discourse. On the other hand, my main criticism of conventional political history is that it has been confined to an unduly limited set of sources, i.e., mainly government files and foreign office documents.⁷ As a result, governmental positions have been looked into very thoroughly. However, such files do not reach far beyond an inner circle of ministers, civil servants, and advisers.⁸ For a detailed analysis of government policy this is a valuable approach, but that is also its limitation. Parliamentary speeches go beyond these limits. They include the positions of the opposition. They are not bound up in ministerial mindsets and, therefore, they may give a broader perspective not confined to the limits of government memos keynote papers. Even ideas originating in closed government circles will eventually emerge in parliamentary debates, not least because they have to be endorsed by the parliaments. Therefore, parliamentary speeches form a middle ground between a somewhat detached angle of journalistic sources and a sometimes too narrow perspective of government papers.

Furthermore, parliamentary debates shift the analytical emphasis a bit more towards backbench MPs who might not have received the attention of prominent politicians such as government ministers, party leaders or glamorous political figures. Nevertheless, backbench MPs such as Hans Joachim von Merkatz and Carlo Schmid in Germany, Richard Crossman and Robert Boothby in Britain and Jean Le Bail and Alfred Coste-Floret for France were key figures for the development of progressive ideas on Europe. The ideas of these backbench MPs will find a reflection in the parliamentary debates discussed in this thesis.

Finally, in the 1950s European integration is still very much a venture with an uncertain future. Although the debate about European integration has been described as being restricted to the 'political elite', it was not just the national governments involved in this process. The parliamentary debates show clearly that a wider discourse took place, which included MPs of all calibres and which was formed at all levels of parliamentary activity. In the 1950s, there was no permissive consensus which sanctioned European integration and let it happen.⁹ The ways and

⁷ See Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical perspectives on integration*, MUP, Manchester, 2004, p. 36

⁸ See Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 155

⁹ For reference to European elitism and the permissive consensus argument, see R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, Ch. 12, esp. p. 324, see also, L.N. Lindberg, S.A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity – Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Prentice-Hall, London, 1970, p. 41, for a reference to the 'permissive consensus' in the 1960s see Ch. 8

means and not least the ultimate ends of European integration remained highly controversial.¹⁰ This is another reason to see parliamentary debates as a valuable source for understanding the national positions towards European integration, because they also reflect arguments in the discourse which did not prevail in the end, i.e. mostly those of the opposition.

1.1.2 Historiography

The particular advantages of parliamentary debates and their revealing potential with regard to the European integration process have been shown in the section 'Analysis of Speeches'.¹¹ In order to set this into perspective a few words on the existing historical literature, the merits and weaknesses of other works on the chosen topic seem due.

In doing so one comes inevitably across Alan Milward's work which, in contrast to this thesis relies heavily on previously secret ministerial files and governmental documents in general. The most influential contribution where he used this approach has been *The rescue of the Nation State*.¹² His work is very much in contrast to functionalist¹³, e.g. David Mitrany, who suggested that integration should be a gradual process towards peace and prosperity based mainly on an idealistic motivation, which seemed a logical consequence after the horrors of World War II¹⁴ and which can often be found as a political motivation of founding fathers such as Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer. Milward suggests that the European integration process was really built on the selfish strivings of the war ravaged European nation states to maintain themselves and their legitimacy towards their citizens. Not only because of Milward's inadequate use and interpretation of sources – an argument which this thesis supports – but because of the actual misrepresentation of the historical reasons and development of the European integration process, Milward met his harshest critic in Michael Burgess. An avowed federalist Burgess

¹⁰ The Communist opposition to the European project is one example of uncompromising opposition against European integration, although Communist parliamentary influence declines steeply through the decade, Socialist opposition to a capitalist Europe of the ECSC type is another example. The opposition of continental conservative parties, mainly the French MRP, to intergovernmental features adds another example which contradicts the idea of a permissive consensus

¹¹ See Introduction/Methodology/Analysis of Speeches, For argument of a similar nature used for the analysis of the European parliament see Julie Smith, *Europe's elected parliament*, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, 1999

¹² A. S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, 2nd Ed., Routledge, London, 2000

¹³ For an introduction into different integration theories see Introduction/Methodology. A very good summary of integration theories is also given in Walter Mattli, *The logic of regional integration*, CUP, Cambridge 1999 and Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2000

¹⁴ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1966, p. 92

takes up an uncompromising opposition against Milward in his book, *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000*.¹⁵ He brings to bear the one criticism against an historian which really hits hard: "(...) there is relentless pursuit of 'facts' – facts, facts and more facts – as if they existed in objective isolation from their political and historical context."¹⁶ Milward, Burgess claims – with good reason – that Milward forgot that with Spinelli there was a push for the disappearance of the nation states altogether. There was also the awareness of leading politicians that economic co-operation, now, could be the basis for a much larger unification process in the future. Decision makers at the time accepted that not as a necessary side effect or a risk one had to take, but as a prospect for a better Europe.¹⁷

This thesis is by no means an evaluation, let alone a wholesale rejection of Milward's work, or any other for this matter, although in later sections criticism on Milward's theory can be found where primary sources clearly challenge his arguments.¹⁸ Despite some criticism, one of Milward's achievements is that he provides a comprehensive theory of the European integration process on the basis of his sources – something Andrew Moravcsik called for in his *Choice for Europe* instead of warming up old Grand Theory or "(...) a theoretically unstructured amalgams of causes."¹⁹ Classical political history clearly has an advantage in that respect, because by definition it does not follow a master theory, only the trail of its primary sources. And Milward's work is by no means the only applying this method. Martin Dedman also used a historical approach in trying to explain, in particular, the early European integration process.²⁰ However, he does so with rather less explanatory and analytical potential than Paul A. Chilton in his *Security Metaphors* which is an authoritative account on Cold War logic and the dynamics between the superpowers during that time.²¹ Richard Griffiths', *Europe's First Constitution* also applies primary source work to its most revealing potential with regard to the European Defence Community, the European Political Community and what he and many contemporaries called the first European constitution in the early 1950s.²² In addi-

¹⁵ Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000*, Routledge, London, 2000

¹⁶ Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, p. 60

¹⁷ Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, p. 62

¹⁸ For further analysis of Milward's works and criticism on it see: Germany/Economic Security/European Integration/The Schuman Plan

¹⁹ A. Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*, UCL Press, London, 1998, p. 17

²⁰ M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, Routledge, London, 1996

²¹ P. Chilton, *Security Metaphors: - Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 1996

²² Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution The European Political Community, 1952-1954*, Federal Trust, London, 2000

tion, Susan Strange's work on monetary relations and, more generally, economics is probably still the best around for these matters²³, although Amy Verdun's work in the same areas is much more understandable for non-economists.²⁴

Bringing some order into the different perspectives on and understandings of the European integration process, Oliver Daddow has given a comprehensive and structured literature review of historical writing on it. He introduces the idea of different 'schools of historians'.²⁵

He begins with the 'orthodox school' in the foundation period of the European integration process in the 1950s. Daddow sees it very much in the federalist tradition putting forward the myth of missed opportunities captured in metaphors of European buses or boats leaving without Britain.²⁶ Miriam Camps is the most prominent author there.

The 'revisionist school' took over at some point in the 1980s.²⁷ It advocated rationality behind British foreign policy choices, and the need to balance Europe against the Commonwealth and the special relationship with America.²⁸ In view of this wider angle, the revisionists argued that supranationalism could not be the right arrangement for Britain.²⁹ Stephen George³⁰, David Gowland³¹, John Young³² and Sean Greenwood figure as the prime representatives of this school.

A 'post-revisionist school' is seen by Daddow as trying to unite both, insofar as it injects a 'sense of messiness' and uncertainty about the final motivations and direction of British foreign policy.³³ The inability to decide whether to wreck or to lead Europe and the doubt whether the government has always been in control of its European policy³⁴, supports the authors claim and main criticism against unquestioned historical truths.³⁵ Instead, he prefers to think of history as a variety of in-

²³ Susan Strange, 'International Monetary Relations', in: Andrew Shonfield (ed.), *International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959-1971*, OUP, London, 1976

²⁴ A. Verdun, *European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002

²⁵ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 50

²⁶ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, pp. 60-7

²⁷ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 19

²⁸ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 29

²⁹ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 116-8, 134

³⁰ S. George, *An Awkward Partner – Britain in the European Community*, 3rd ed, OUP, Oxford 1998

³¹ David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans – Britain and European Integration, 1945-1998*, Longman, London, 2000

³² J.W. Young, *Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999*, 2nd edition, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1984, see also, J.W. Young, (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-1955*, Leicester UP, Leicester, 1988

³³ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 20, 172

³⁴ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 166, 174-5, 184

³⁵ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 191

terpretations of primary sources which is contingent on the social environment and not least the historian. ‘Muddling through’ is the most striking metaphor that this school suggests.

In this work biographies are intended to support the political discourse given in parliament with a more personal angle in order to get a fuller picture of the politicians engaged in the European integration effort and their convictions. This can, however, work only for the more prominent political leaders, because normally biographies will only be available for them and also because this thesis is not intended to be a collection of personal perspectives, but an analysis of the development of *national* positions towards European integration. Therefore, they are not meant to be the primary access to the political storyline, but to flesh out the picture provided by parliamentary debates.

Starting off the review of literature of the British perspectives on the integration process with two biographies, Brian Brivati’s biography of Hugh Gaitskell as well as Edward Heath’s autobiography are not the best examples of this *genre*³⁶ Neither of them reaches beyond a personal perspective of the politician in question without shedding much light on anything else, let alone an idea of the bigger historical picture. Very much in contrast to that Roy Jenkins’ biography of Winston Churchill is one of the most important personal accounts on Britain’s position towards the European integration process.³⁷ It is just as informative and eloquently written - similar to Kenneth Harris’ biography on Clement Attlee³⁸ - as Jenkin’s statements in the House of Commons used to be. The crunch point of more stringent European engagement fell to the second Churchill government. And Churchill found it particularly difficult to unite his strongly pro-European stance in opposition³⁹ with the British requirements caught up in his three foreign policy circles, i.e. Britain hovering between the Commonwealth, the US and Europe.⁴⁰ Jenkins shows with much eloquence that Churchill’s intention to commit Britain to the European unification process and to have it play a decisive role in it was genuine.⁴¹ He was strongly critical of the Labour party’s insular line.⁴² However, Jenkins also shows clearly that when he got back into office he did not change Labour’s policy towards

³⁶ Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, Richard Cohen Books, London, 1997, and Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life: My Autobiography*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1998

³⁷ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, Macmillan, London, 2001, Another insightful and concise biography of Churchill - with important sections on Churchill’s position towards European integration - is see Paul Addison, *Churchill - the unexpected hero*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005

³⁸ Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1995

³⁹ See for example the 1946 Zurich speech on a European Army, in: Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 813-814, 816-817

⁴⁰ Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, p. 506-507

⁴¹ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 815, 816, 818

⁴² Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 816

Europe. Just like with Labour under Attlee, there were, objectively, two political commitments which diffused attention, to say the least: Firstly the Special Relationship with the US⁴³, and, secondly, the Commonwealth.⁴⁴ Eden – then Foreign Secretary – is referred to in David Dutton’s biography of his as ‘cold’ towards Europe, which was best captured in his own words that full membership was “(...) something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do.”⁴⁵ Europe seemed too small and in relation to the Commonwealth⁴⁶ and the ‘Special Relationship’ with the US. Europe also seemed to strengthen US disengagement and isolationism. Europe was also too small to incorporate the grand WWII alliance with Russia and was implicitly poised against it – particularly hard for Eden, as he was one of the last to abandon the Soviet alliance.⁴⁷ Dutton’s work gives a good and comprehensive picture of these relatively complex political connections which made up Eden’s mindset and characterised his political life. Richard Lamb’s, *The Macmillan Years, 1957-1963: the emerging truth*, lies somewhere between a biography and a monograph on British politics under Eden’s successor Macmillan.⁴⁸ Just like Lamb, George Wilkes sees Macmillan as more positive towards the European integration process than his predecessor.⁴⁹ Wilkes discerns a general change of trend in British politics in favour of turning towards the European communities in the mid to late 1950s, which became clear with Britain’s application for full membership in 1961 – a chain of events which will be dealt with in this thesis, too.

Probably the most influential contributions to a historical understanding of France in the 1950s are de Gaulle’s powerful *Mémoires d’espoir (Memories of Hope)*⁵⁰ which make the reason for de Gaulle’s dominance of French politics obvious in the pervasive clarity of his arguments. It gives de Gaulle’s perspective on all major topics of the post war period, from his scathing criticism of the Fourth Republic⁵¹ to the colonial wars and Algeria. Just like the founding fathers of the European integra-

⁴³ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 857

⁴⁴ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, 817-818, an excellent analysis of British imperial politics can be found in L.J. Butler, *Britain an Empire. Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World*, I.B.Tauris Publishers, London, 2002, the traditions on which such policies was built as well as a brilliant portrait of the service of Royal Navy for them provides Arthur Herman, *To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy shaped the modern world*, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2004

⁴⁵ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 297, quotation from New York Times 12.1.1952; Charlton, Price of Victory, p. 160; J.W. Young, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime Administration 1951-1955*, Leicester, 1988, p. 85, see also, p. 313

⁴⁶ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 282-283, quotation from a Churchill paper on ‘United Europe’, p. 292, 300, 301

⁴⁷ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 283, 284, 318, 320

⁴⁸ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years, 1957-1963: the emerging truth*, J. Murray, London, 1995

⁴⁹ G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, Cambridge, 2002

⁵⁰ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, Plon, Paris, 1970

⁵¹ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, Ch. 1

tion process de Gaulle was convinced that “(...) the truly vital interest is peace.”⁵² De Gaulle did not see NATO as the means for that purpose, but as a tool to subordinate Europe militarily to the US.⁵³ In doing so it established the US as the leader of the West, just like the USSR for the East. De Gaulle saw defence, however, as a sovereign task of the nation state. To put it in de Gaulle’s words: “(...) la défense de la France soit française.”⁵⁴ Whoever determined the defence of a country determined its politics, because this is what constitutes the freedom to act.⁵⁵ From this basis it is obvious that France could not accept NATO’s integrated command structure, but would stick to the Western alliance, if the unlikely case arose that the East attacked.⁵⁶ The rejection of the supranational integration ideology follows the same pattern. De Gaulle’s amazing question is: ‘What is the most prominent and biggest supranational organisation you can think of in our times?’ The answer: ‘The Soviet Union or rather the idea connected to communist ideology that national boundaries have to be overcome and that the working classes should unite internationally.’ Just as the SU turned this ideology into a tool for Russian domination of the East, West European supranationalism was instigated by the US, was directed against the nation state which was essentially the only barrier to supranational totalitarianism. Therefore, the rejection of supranationalism is for de Gaulle a rejection of US influence and a manifestation of his belief in the nation state.⁵⁷ Therefore, a truly European Europe should not just fuse all European people together, but should take place through a rapprochement of these people on the basis of their historical realities of which the nation state is the most important one.⁵⁸ This shows the logic behind de Gaulle’s perspective in a truly convincing manner.⁵⁹

Gaullist politics find one of their best reflections in secondary literature in Maurice Vaisse’s, *La Grandeur – Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle 1958-1969*, as well as in Dorothy Pickles’, *The Fifth French Republic*, which has, however, more of an institu-

⁵² Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, p. 132, original : « (...) l’intérêt proprement vital est, évidemment, la paix. »

⁵³ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, p. 134

⁵⁴ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, p. 161, see also p. 165

⁵⁵ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, p. 158

⁵⁶ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, p. 160, 162, 165, 169

⁵⁷ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, p. 136

⁵⁸ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, p. 137

⁵⁹ More details can also be found in: Charles G. Cogan, *Charles de Gaulle A Brief Biography with Documents*, St. Martin’s Press, Boston, 1996, Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, Abacus, London, 1996 and E. Roussel, *Charles de Gaulle*, nrf Gallimard, Paris, 2002, the last with almost an excessive use and references to primary sources. For a good analysis of Gaullism as a social movement as well as other brands of political groupings and their social roots see Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*

tional perspective.⁶⁰ Although it is clearly extremely hard to neglect de Gaulle, Vaïsse puts an even greater emphasis on the influence of de Gaulle as a person and brings out the glamour of 'Grandeur' and portraying de Gaulle as the helmsman of France.

Naturally, Jean Monnet or Robert Schuman would not agree with either with this analysis or with de Gaulle's arguments, because they run counter to all their life's work stands for. Unfortunately there is no good biography on Robert Schuman, only the rather flawed one by René Lejeune which overemphasises the Christian zeal, therefore lacking analytical potential for the overall political motivations of Schuman.⁶¹ Monnet's perspective and his achievements are brought out in his *Memoirs*.⁶² They shed light on his ideas and his role in the early years of the integration process, such as in his function as the President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. François Duchêne's biography of Monnet adds a valuable secondary perspective to Monnet's own perspective in the *Memoirs*.⁶³ Christian Bougeard's biography of René Pleven is particularly helpful with regard to Pleven's role in the instable coalition governments of the Fourth Republic, his role in the Indochina crisis and the detrimental effect this had on the ratification of the European Defence Community.⁶⁴ As a secondary source Jean Doise, Maurice Vaïsse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, is also very informative in that respect and brings out the problems the instability of the Fourth Republic had for French defence planning, i.e. that there was no possibility that a coherent defence strategy could be developed with a change of government roughly every half year.⁶⁵ The Mendès-France government was one exception to the short-lived Fourth Republic governments. Jean Lacouture's biography of Mendès-France provides useful insights into the policies of the second most charismatic leader of France after de Gaulle and one of the most influential politicians of the Fourth Republic.⁶⁶ The most interesting turn in his career was his turn from a tentative supporter of de Gaulle into a staunch opponent on the basis of fears that his authoritarian regime might turn into another fascist dictatorship, this time in France. His role as a social reformer and as head of government, during the time when the EDC was rejected, are also

⁶⁰ Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur – Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958-1969*, Fayard, Paris, 1998 and Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic*, Methuen&Co, London, 1960

⁶¹ René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, Fayard, Paris, 2000

⁶² J. Monnet, *Mémoires*, Fayard, Paris, 1976, for the English translation see J. Monnet, *Memoirs*, translation by Richard Mayne, Collins, London, 1978

⁶³ François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet - The first statesman of interdependence*, Norton, New York, 1994

⁶⁴ Christian Bougeard, *René Pleven Un Français libre en politique*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 1994

⁶⁵ Jean Doise, Maurice Vaïsse, *Politique étrangère de la France: Diplomatie et outil militaire 1871-1991*, Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1992

⁶⁶ Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, Seuil, Paris, 1981

grippingly described by the bestselling author Lacouture. No authoritarian dictatorship, but a presidential democracy is what Michel Debré drafted in his constitution of the Fifth French Republic – commissioned by de Gaulle. Debré was the natural choice as a brilliant lawyer and for a long time during the Fourth Republic really the only Gaullist voice with weight which sometimes seemed to throw thunder and lightning from the French Senate, where Debré was housed, onto the Assemblée Nationale, accusing it of weakness, corruption and sometimes treason. Patrick Samuel's biography of this man, his work and his influence on the fate of France is a thorough work which provides all this information in detail and with some eloquence.⁶⁷

More generally, a good introduction into the French perspective on the European integration process can be found in Pierre Gerbet's, *La Construction de l'Europe*.⁶⁸ Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber sees the reason for this European integration in *The American Challenge* – his bestselling book, in which American dominance in all areas is seen as a threat to European identity which can really only be countered by a common effort of all Europeans blocking American hegemony.⁶⁹

In a German context Helmut Schmidt's latest book, *Die Selbstbehauptung Europas, Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert (Europe's Survival in the 21st Century)*⁷⁰ features similar arguments and also sees great potential for the European integration process, interestingly and before Schmidt's background sometimes surprisingly outspoken against American dominance in the world, where it remains the last superpower. Although there are some historical aspects to Schmidt's role as a leading SPD politician from the 1950s and later as chancellor, his main focus in this book is clearly on a later period and resembles more a summary of the visions of an elder statesman than an academic and historical analysis. His brief biography of Carlo Schmid – one of the founding fathers of the Federal Republic and often regarded as the brains of the SPD in the early post war years – is much better in this respect.⁷¹ Just like for Egon Bahr's, *Der Nationalstaat: überlebt und unentbehrlich (The Nation State, outmoded, still vital)*⁷², Willy Brandt's, *Erinnerungen (Memoirs)*⁷³ or indeed Rainer Barzel's autobiography, *Ein gewagtes Leben Erinnerungen (A Daring Life-Memoirs)*⁷⁴, both of Schmidt's contributions could be seen to support the opinion

⁶⁷ Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré: L'architecte du Général*, Arnaud Franel Editions, Suresnes, 1999

⁶⁸ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, 3rd ed., Imprimerie Nationale Éditions, Paris, 1999

⁶⁹ Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, translated from French by Ronald Steel

⁷⁰ Helmut Schmidt, *Die Selbstbehauptung Europas: Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert*, Ullstein, Munich, 2002

⁷¹ Helmut Schmidt, *Carlo Schmid 1896 -1979 : Vortrag vor dem Gesprächskreis Geschichte der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 1996

⁷² Egon Bahr, *Der Nationalstaat: überlebt und unentbehrlich*, Steidl, Göttingen, 1998

⁷³ W. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, Siedler, Frankfurt a.M., 1989

⁷⁴ Rainer Barzel, *Ein gewagtes Leben Erinnerungen*, Hohenheim, Stuttgart, 2001

that good politicians are not always good academics, although Barzel added some entertaining and informative details, in particular from his time as a Minister for Expellees. An exception to this rule might be Josef Felder and his autobiography, *Warum ich Nein sagte Erinnerungen an ein langes Leben für die Politik (Why I said No - Memoirs from a long Life for Politics)*.⁷⁵ With the authority of the last survivor of those SPD MPs who voted against emergency legislation which gave Hitler almost absolute power in Germany in 1933, he outlines very grippingly the problems Germany faced in the post war period as a result of this political failure - rubble everywhere in the minds and in the streets. In general, short biographies such as the companion of German politicians from 1949 to 1969 (*Deutsche Politiker 1949-1969*) edited by Torsten Oppland, seem more promising, some of which were very helpful in serving as a starting point for historical analysis, such as Beatrix Bouvier, *Erich Ollenhauer (1901-1963)* – leader of the SPD’s parliamentary group, Thomas Hertfelder, *Theodor Heuss (1884-1963)* – first Federal President, *Gustav Heinemann (1899-1976)* – CDU Interior Minister and Third Federal President for the SPD, Dirk Kroegel, *Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1904-1988)* – Third Chancellor, Gertrud Lenz, *Willy Brandt (1913-1992)* – Fourth Chancellor, Matthias Seikmeier, *Walter Scheel (1919-)* – Fourth Federal President, *Thomas Dehler (1897-1967)* – Minister of Justice, or Daniel Koerper, *Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977)*.⁷⁶ Volker Hentschel gives a much more detailed analysis of Adenauer’s successor, the second chancellor of the Federal Republic, i.e. Ludwig Erhard.⁷⁷ Erhard et al’s concept of the ‘social market economy’⁷⁸ is probably what he is most remembered for and was a very important component of the CDU’s success in the immediate post war years. The idea was to find a middle ground between free market economy and command economy. The employers would be legally bound to social responsibility in the Basic Law by their very ability to wield economic power. The state would provide a social network, which would be the welfare state of later times, and would also provide framework rules e.g. interest rates, for the economy so that free economic activity could be checked for the good of society.⁷⁹ Hentschel brings out this socio-political aspect of Erhard’s political activities very well.

The well-being of the people and the general good of society was also the main concern of Kurt Schumacher who brought out his extremely powerful personality in leading the Social Democrats in opposition until his death in 1952. It is very hard to think of a better representation of his life and work than Willy Albrecht’s

⁷⁵ Josef Felder, *Warum ich Nein sagte. Erinnerungen an ein langes Leben für die Politik*, Rowolth, Hamburg, 2002

⁷⁶ See, Torsten Oppland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker 1949-1969*, Vol. 1, 2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999

⁷⁷ Volker Hentschel, *Ludwig Erhard: Ein Politikerleben*, Ullstein, Berlin, 1998

⁷⁸ Volker Hentschel, *Ludwig Erhard*, p. 100

⁷⁹ Volker Hentschel, *Ludwig Erhard*, p. 101

biography, *Kurt Schumacher – Reden - Schriften - Korrespondenzen 1945-1952 (Kurt Schumacher – Speeches - Writings - Correspondence 1945-1952)*.⁸⁰ The very extensive appendix of primary sources gives a comprehensive picture of the political activities of Schumacher and illustrates his political positions brilliantly. It brings out Schumacher's formative importance for the young West German state, similar only to Adenauer as its first chancellor.⁸¹ Peter Merseburger's biography of Schumacher, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher (The difficult German Kurt Schumacher)*⁸², which is a solid academic work and provides a good analysis of Schumacher's politics and personality, is overshadowed by the revealing potential which Albrecht shows in the application of selective primary sources.

Finally, there are two very influential biographies of Adenauer. Firstly, just like in his biography on Charles de Gaulle, Charles William's work on Adenauer is an excellent and well-written work which makes the topic accessible to a broader audience than just academics.⁸³ Secondly, there is Hans-Peter Schwarz's book, *Adenauer Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967 (Adenauer The statesman 1952 – 1967)*⁸⁴ Both, Schwarz's and Charles Williams's work clearly have biographic aspects, too.⁸⁵ In general it does not seem as well founded and researched as Schwarz's work. In Williams's work, there is more opinion and less historical evidence to support it. That makes his analysis more critical in terms of historical objectivity. However, from a hermeneutic point this is more stimulating, because the personal insights of the author are more mind-provoking.

Pertti Ahonen's work on the expellees from the Eastern German territories is a good analysis of one of the most pressing problems Adenauer had to face.⁸⁶ Their claims for regaining their homeland put a new and suspicious gloss on the idea of European integration insofar as the early German enthusiasm for it was sometimes attributed to the potential of peaceful re-conquest of the East. Based on more martial expellee rallies the Western Allies had initially some doubts whether the

⁸⁰ W. Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, Dietz, Berlin, 1985

⁸¹ Stephen Padgett's book, *Adenauer to Kohl The Development of the German Chancellorship* is more of an introductory nature, but might still serve the purpose of giving an overview over the most important political institutions in Germany, such as the chancellorship. The essays by Stephen Padgett, 'The chancellor and his party', William Paterson, 'The chancellor and foreign policy', and Roland Sturm, 'The chancellor and the executive', were particularly helpful in that respect. See S. Padgett (ed.), *The Development of the German Chancellorship Adenauer to Kohl*, Hurst & Company, London, 1994

⁸² Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1995

⁸³ Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2000

⁸⁴ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1991, for a closer analysis and criticism on Schwarz's work see Germany/National Security/Territorial Integrity/ Reunification and the Soviet Occupation Zone

⁸⁵ Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York, 2000

⁸⁶ Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, OUP, Oxford, 2003

Federal Republic could withstand the tension from those more malign strains of German nationalism thinly veiled in a European façade. Government policy for European integration is shown to be different from this, not least because of Adenauer's Western commitment. And Ahonen's work supports this picture of tensions from the far right and expellee representatives, on the one hand, with the majority conservative position, mainly of the CDU, on the other hand which is evident in the early debates of the Bundestag. A well founded analysis of the remnants of the expellee problem in Eastern Europe, in particular, in Poland can be found in Steve Wood, *Germany and East-Central Europe - Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural Relations in the Era of EU Enlargement*.⁸⁷

Beatrice Heuser's book on the Atlantic alliance, Britain's, France's and West Germany's role in it fits the same bill for Western Europe and the Western alliance system. It is very good analysis of NATO strategy and the emphasis in this book is more on the immediate post war period.⁸⁸ Similar to Fursdon's authoritative work on the European Defence Community, its military, political and diplomatic aspects⁸⁹, Heuser gives a comprehensive understanding of NATO, its purpose, the foundation process and the contributing countries' roles and expectations. In particular the aspect of NATO's nuclear strategy has been dealt with by Heuser comprehensively, which sheds more light on an issue at the forefront of parliamentary debate in the 1950s, not least in Churchill's prominent call for an 'supreme effort' to avoid the nuclear apocalypse.⁹⁰ This book closes the circle of helpful secondary literature which in addition to primary sources have informed this study.

1.1.3 *The Indicator Scheme*

Four indicators, i.e. War Experience, National Security, Military Security and Economic Security will be the main underlying structure in the chapters on France, Germany and Britain and the main comparative threads between the countries. There were several reasons why these indicators have been chosen.

Firstly, the tentative theoretical underpinning is Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory. One of its core concepts is 'Hegemony', referring to the political contest

⁸⁷ Steve Wood, *Germany and East-Central Europe - Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural Relations in the Era of EU Enlargement*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004

⁸⁸ Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG - Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000*, Macmillan, London, 1998

⁸⁹ E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community - A History*, Macmillan, London, 1980

⁹⁰ For the reference to parliamentary debates on the topic and Churchill's position in this debate, see Britain/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/The nuclear Age

within society for superiority over other political parties.⁹¹ ‘Nodal points’⁹² are the second core concept in discourse theory. Nodal points gather the political contest, i.e. strife for hegemony, around core issues with political relevance.⁹³ This is exactly what the indicators – designed for the analysis of the national discourse on European integration – do.

Secondly, the indicators cover all major fields in which the post war state of the 1950s was active. Post-war Europe was clearly characterised by shortage and insecurity in every area of society. “No European country can now, within its own borders, satisfy its needs or resolve its internal problems through its own military or economic resources. A fragmented Europe has become an anachronism, a nonsense, a heresy.”⁹⁴ Schuman underlines that post war European integration was based on the inadequacy of the nation state and the necessity to find other ways to provide for their peoples’ needs. On the basis of this realisation I would like to adapt discourse theory to my analytical requirements. The needs of the post-war nations are reflected in their striving for security in different areas so that the indicators – or nodal points - ‘National Security’, ‘Military Security’ and ‘Economic Security’ reflect this. ‘War Experience’ covers the impact of the past on the politics of the 1950s. It influenced and to a large extent shaped the issues dealt with under the three ‘Security’ indicators, i.e. National, Military and Economic Security. Sub-headings such as ‘Occupational rule’ and ‘Allied responsibility and the German threat’ are key examples of how post war policy was influenced by past experience. Thirdly, the indicators serve as an ordering scheme for the primary sources. Hence, all references in parliamentary speeches would initially be put under one of the six indicators. Obviously this can only be a rough ordering scheme, which is why

⁹¹ For ‘nodal points’, ‘hegemony’ and ‘antagonism’ see Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Verso, London, 1985, for the concept of hegemony in particular see Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, Verso, London, 1993, particularly, p. 151, The third core concept of Discourse Theory, i.e. antagonism, will be dealt with in the Conclusion of this thesis, because it has, on the one hand, not been used as an analytical concept in the empirical part of the PhD, but finds, on the other hand, some reflection in the picture the primary sources provide of post war reality, for example in ‘Historical Antagonism’ which can clearly be shown to exist in the French and the German society as regards the rejection of the post war generation of previous regimes as Vichy and the Third Reich. Along those lines some refinements to Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of antagonism will be suggested in the conclusion, which is another reason why it was put there

⁹² Also referred to as ‘floating signifiers’ which signifies the stage before hegemonisation while nodal points are already the product of the same process

⁹³ See D. Howarth et al (eds.), *Discourse theory and political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change*, MUP, Manchester, 2000

⁹⁴ Quotation from a speech by Robert Schuman at the Conference of Ambassadors, 2 March 1951, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman, Père de l’Europe*, Fayard, Paris, 2000, p. 151, original: « Aucun pays européen n’est plus capable (...) à l’intérieur de ses frontières, de satisfaire [ses] besoins et de résoudre [ses] problèmes intérieurs par [ses] propres ressources économiques et militaires. Le morcellement de l’Europe est devenu un anachronisme, un non-sens, une hérésie. »

subordinate headings, corresponding to the issues in the parliamentary debates, were introduced. One of them, German rearmament, might serve as an example for their contribution. Initially the question was whether the heading 'German rearmament' should be put under the 'War Experience' indicator or under 'Military Security'. The often very emotional arguments connected to this issue rather linked it to the generally backward-looking and psychologically charged 'War Experience' indicator. However, while reading through the speeches and assembling references to German rearmament, it became clear that it had stronger links to issues such as NATO, the EDC and military overseas commitments in the French case; to the Franco-British balance against Germany on the continent and Western unity against the Soviet threat for Britain; and to the peace movement and the democratic reliability of the army in West Germany. Therefore, it ended up in 'Military Security' where all the related issues mentioned above are dealt with.

Fourthly, it turned out that the subheadings actually refined the comparative angle between the three nations. Importantly, they are not artificially drawn up, but they developed out of the collection of primary references from the debates. Issues such as 'East-West antagonism' and 'Integrated defences' were discussed in all three states. Further down the line of subheadings, topics such as 'German rearmament' can also be found in all three national discourses. They can be directly compared and form a valuable hierarchy of comparative layers below the four indicators.⁹⁵ At the same time, there are subheadings which are specific to the individual nation, such as 'British rearmament'. They form important parts of the national discourse, which are not as directly comparable, but which, nevertheless, contribute to the larger picture of the national position towards Europe and often constitute more tentative links such as the strengthening of the Western defences and European defences as in the case of the British rearmament programme.

On the basis of these arguments the Indicator Scheme will be the second major tool – after the Lists of Speeches – which will bring out a sophisticated analytical and comparative structure for the historical research. This historical analysis will be given in three main chapters, one on each country, with the Lists of Speeches and the Indicator Scheme applied to each of them as shortly outlined in the following.

War Experience

World War II formed the watershed between isolationism and nationalism, on the one hand, and interdependence and integration, on the other. Isolationism and, in particular, autarky had led the nations, in particular Germany, into the war. The

⁹⁵ For the clearest presentation of this hierarchy of comparative layers see 'Contents' and compare the structure below the four indicators

subheading 'War Consequences' will deal with the repercussions of the war in all three countries. A very large part of the momentum for integration and especially for the European movement can be explained by the recognition that purely national approaches could not deliver adequate solutions to formidably intractable problems, such as the rebuilding of the ravaged continent. The alternatives to European integration will be discussed under the subheadings 'Western commitment' for Germany, '*La grande nation* finding its place in Europe' for France, and 'The Status Quo' for Britain. Under 'The hope for a peaceful future' the early British plans for Germany and Europe will be summarised. The subheadings themselves suggest the varying emphases and differing views on similar problems between the three countries. They are intended to maintain the comparative angle while allowing for national divergences, which resulted from the different roles the three nations played in post-war Europe. Hence, the indicator 'War Experience' has an important psychological component. There is an idealism informing the new start after the war and a great commitment to making it better this time. The European ideal embodied the early idealism and will, therefore, be reflected in 'The European Ideal' at the end of each War Experience chapter.⁹⁶

National Security

The indicator 'National Security' is intended to analyse the internal fabric and stability of post war society. The core idea of this indicator centres on the discourse surrounding the consolidation of the state after the war. Ideology was clearly used as a weapon against external opponents such as the Soviet Union, but importantly it was also used to strengthen the internal persuasiveness of the political and economic system. Reliability of the state and its effectiveness in delivering the people's needs in turn underpinned the internal political, administrative and economic system and turned it into a consensus the society was built on. Especially in France and Germany, the European integration process progressively came to be part of this post war internal consensus and made up for the lack of trust resulting from the breakdown of the state in the last war. Therefore, this indicator has an ideological component which will reflect the trust of citizens in their own system i.e. the state. After the war, trust in the State as well as physical structures, needed rebuilding. Under 'Fundamentals' the core concept of sovereignty will be discussed. 'Internal reform' will deal with the remains of the Nazi problem in Germany and France and with the issue of class struggle in the British case. The changeover from the Fourth to the Fifth French Republic will also fall into this

⁹⁶ In contrast to this, the subheading 'Political Europe' in the chapter 'National Security' rather reflects the rational approach to organising the developing Europe

section, because of the fundamental internal hiatus that had to be bridged in France. 'Territorial Integrity' refers to the imperial legacy of Britain and France. For Germany, issues such as reunification and the lost territories in the East are important, but also that of the Saar. The latter also found a strong reflection in French debates on territorial integrity. 'Ideas and ideology' refers to the Socialist International and Communism in all three countries, although the Communists were mainly an external threat for Britain while for France they had a strong and lively domestic representation.

In sum, 'National Security' gives predominantly an inward perspective which analyses the process of securing internal legitimacy. As pointed out before, the European integration process contributed to the rebuilding of legitimacy of the nation state, in France and Germany. Therefore, the subheading 'Political Europe' will analyse the role of Europe as a pillar of internal legitimacy and a wider perspective beyond the nation state for these two countries, mainly reflected in the Council of Europe, before the supranational integration was initiated in the Schuman Plan. For Britain, Europe also had this reference of a wider framework. However, in contrast to providing national legitimacy, as in France and Germany, Europe seems to have been a defining factor of what Britain did not want or need. In that sense European integration fulfilled a defining function in British post war politics and self-understanding, although a negative one.

Military Security

From an ideological point of view, the indicator 'Military Security' very much reflects realism as against the idealistic angle in 'War Experience'. Frontiers, troops, attackers, defenders and alliances on both sides are important issues, which are dealt with under 'East-West antagonism', with some consideration given to neutrality, particularly in Germany. The Cold War is the predominant issue under this subheading. Germany and France were much more concerned by German rearmament and its impact on East-West antagonism than Britain. This is why I have introduced an extra subheading, 'The national armies of Europe', in the British chapter in addition to 'East-West Antagonism' and 'Integrated Defences' in order to mark the somewhat greater distance Britain had with regard to the continental European security problem and, in particular, its less emotional approach towards German rearmament. The European military integration process is captured under 'Integrated Defences'. For Germany Integrated Defences initially meant first and foremost the French initiative of the European Defence Community (EDC), until its rejection by the Assemblée Nationale. Western European Union (WEU) and finally the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) re-established the German

army, much to the initial dismay of many elements in the German and French political establishment. At the same time, it brought Germany back to a level of parity with the Western Allies. Again, Britain was an exception in its role as the last remaining European world power. The world-wide responsibilities resulting from this role and the dilemmas Britain had to face because of this position are reflected in an additional subheading 'Crisis' in the British chapter, which will discuss the Korean War and the Suez crisis. Because of the close relation to the Algerian conflict and the integral importance of Northern Africa for France, the Suez crisis is dealt with under National Security/Territorial Integrity/The *Communauté Française*/Decolonisation in the French chapter.

Economic Security

The need to rebuild national economies posed a major challenge from 1945 onwards. Again, this was not just a question of material destruction, but also of the loss of traditional markets, in Eastern Europe, among others. Economic policies were first and foremost concerned with 'The Nation'. Reconstruction and proactive national economic investment programmes, such as the Monnet Plan, sought to overcome the economic consequences of the war. For Britain, 'Imperial Preference' played an important role in meeting economic needs. On a European level national efforts were supported by the American Marshall Plan and its administrative arm, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). These organisations will be dealt with under 'Halfway Europe'. To reflect the distance Britain took from Europe, the subheading for these organisations is called 'Britain and the European organisations'. This also includes the Schuman Plan, rejected by Britain. The British rapprochement with Europe is reflected under 'Britain in Europe', which features the Free Trade Area (FTA), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and the European Economic Community (EEC). These areas are covered under 'European integration' for France and Germany, which in turn includes the Schuman Plan.

The 'Economic Security' indicator indicates the importance of economic well-being within national politics and particularly the trust built up vis-à-vis the state through stable economic development. How much the European economic integration process contributed to this and which institutional and structural elements were most important will also be dealt with in this chapter.

1.2 Research Questions

In sum, an adapted version of discourse theory will be applied to an historical analysis of the three major Western European powers in the 1950s. An Indicator scheme, will structure and guide the historical analysis of the parliamentary sources. The historical potential of parliamentary sources will provide a more rounded understanding of European integration for the chronological and geographical setting sketched out above.

New insights into what national politicians expected from Europe; which national needs could be catered for by Europe, but also which national positions would be compromised by a closer European commitment. These motivations, opinions and visions will be different in France, Germany and Britain and will, therefore, be an analytical issue in the comparison between the three states. The development of a national position on Europe and in turn the evolution of European concepts will be another.

2. France

The French parliamentary and party system was particularly complicated and fragmented during the Fourth Republic, i.e. until 1958. Because of this I do not intend to give an account of the political positions of every single parliamentary group. For issues referring to the European integration process this will be done in the main chapter, insofar as important contributions to the French discourse on Europe are given with the respective MP and the party affiliation in the footnotes. The following paragraph is rather a reflection on major political currents and their leading figures.

The political spectrum in the Fourth Republic is somewhat peculiar and different from that of the other Western Europe democracies. There were a considerable number of splinter groups in each section of the political spectrum. The Socialists (PS), first under Ramadier, but also under Mollet, Moch, Pineau and Lacoste, and the Mouvement républicain Populaire (MRP), with Bidault, Schuman and Teitgen, were the main pillars of the Fourth Republic. In addition, there were two looser groupings which usually supported the republican consensus. Firstly, there were parties which reflected classical conservative values such as the 'Républicain Indépendant' (RI) with Antoine Pinay and Paul Reynaud championing the European cause, but also characters such as General Aumeran. He had put forward the most horrendous ideas on keeping oppressive colonialism¹ and was one of the most outspoken advocates of anti-German sentiment², as well as a radical nationalist.³ The 'Partie Républicain de la Liberté' (PRL) with Josef Laniel is another example of a similar conservative party. Secondly, there were the Radicals. The main representatives were the 'Républicain Radical et Radical Socialiste' (RRS) with such leaders as Marie, Queuille, René Mayer, Edouard Herriot and later Edgar Faure, and Mendès-France, and the 'Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance' (UDSR) with René Pleven and later Mitterrand. All radicalist parties embraced

¹ See Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/10/53, p. 454111

² One example : "Hitler said: 'If the Jews didn't exist one would have to invent them.' Adenauer and his people must think: If the Soviets didn't exist, we would have to invent them.", original: Hitler disait: « Si les juifs n'existaient pas, il faudrait les inventer. » Adenauer et ses hommes doivent penser : Si les Soviets n'existaient pas, il faudrait les inventer. », Aumeran (RI), JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 713611

³ Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1981, p. 199

policies along simple but compelling values and practices, such as social order under bourgeois rule, guaranteed markets for agricultural products, and anticlericalism.⁴ Radicalism itself was split up in a conservative and the progressive current. During the Fourth Republic the former is represented by figureheads such as Edouard Herriot and Edouard Daladier.⁵ Pierre Mendès-France became the most prominent representative of the progressive faction.⁶

The extremes of the political spectrum were made up on the left by the Communists and on the Right of the Assemblée by the Gaullists.⁷ These sections represented a fundamental opposition against the political system of the Fourth Republic. For the Communists, on the one hand, this was a matter of ideology. On the other hand, de Gaulle saw the interests of France being eclipsed by the fragmentation and the pettiness of the parties.⁸ Even his own creation, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF), fell prey to party political intrigue. Hence, he wound it up in 1953.⁹ Both the Gaullists and the Communists were, therefore, usually counter-productive to government policy.

The ratio of seats in parliament and the following list of governments and their constituent parties provides an impression of the balance of power in the Assemblée Nationale. The first major shift in political weight occurred on 4th May 1947 when the Communists, led by their general-secretary Maurice Thorez, left the Socialist Ramadier government.¹⁰ From then on the PS and the MRP were the main constituents of government. In addition, the Radicals, i.e. mainly the RRS and the UDSR¹¹, made up the third part of the government majority at the end of the

⁴ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, OUP, Oxford, 1994, p. 211

⁵ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 211

⁶ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 212, 214

⁷ The Gaullist influence varied widely throughout the lifetime of the Fourth Republic. They were at the height of their power after the landslide victory in the local elections of 1947 with over 40%. In the same election the Communists also got one of their best results at just under one third of the votes, which is a reasonable benchmark, notwithstanding fluctuations, highs being in the late 1940s and 1950s and lows in the early to mid 1950s

⁸ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, Plon, Paris, 1970, p. 19, see also, Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 267, for a reference to the 1946 Bayeux speech which is de Gaulle's main and comprehensive public criticism against the party system of the Fourth Republic, see Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General de Gaulle*, Abacus, London, 1993, p. 325

⁹ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 264, 267

¹⁰ The results of the November 1946 election are as follows: PS 16.5% and 90 seats; PC 28.6% and 166 seats; MRP 29% and 158 seats out of a total of 544 seats see T.T. Mackie, R. Rose (eds.), *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 3rd ed., Macmillan, London, 1991, table 7.4b,c

¹¹ Those two parties are the most prominent examples of a electioneering coalition of right-wing Socialists and radical parties which achieved 10.1 an 55 out of 544 seats in the 1946 November election. See S. Rokkan, J. Meyriat (eds.), *Guide international des statistiques électorales*, Mouton, Paris, 1967, p. 141-2, footnote #1

1940s.¹² The UDSR, with their helmsman René Pleven, soon became a major player in the politics of the Fourth Republic. Pleven held the Ministry of Defence in the second Bidault cabinet at the end of 1949 and later became President of the Council. The early 1950s are remarkable in that respect. Many Presidents of the Council come from smaller parties and not from the PS or the MRP, which make up the majority of government support in parliament.¹³ There are several obvious reasons for this: Firstly, none of the two big parties wanted to accept the predominance of the other embodied in the Presidency of the Council. The ideological conflict between the Socialist current and the conservative current reflected in the MRP can be seen as one underpinning reason. Secondly, the usual competition before the 1951 parliamentary election increased such partisan tendencies. Thirdly, the UDSR and the RRS had leaders of high reputation and personal integrity who also had the essential characteristics of mediators, able to find compromises within the complex politics of the Fourth Republic. The 1951 election saw a revolution on the right of the political spectrum. The votes for the MRP were halved. Smaller conservative parties such as the RI and the PRL increased their proportion of the vote and the Gaullists achieve a landslide victory.¹⁴ On the left, the Socialists departed from government.¹⁵ Until the 1955 elections there is a radical-conservative majority of MRP, UDSR, RRS, RI and PRL in power.¹⁶ After the RPF was disbanded, some Gaullist MPs cooperated with the government, for example Chaban-Delmas, Fouchet and General Koenig in the Mendès-France government.¹⁷ After the 1956 elections the Socialists return to power in the Mollet government, which

¹² 1st Cabinet Ramadier (PS) 22nd January 1947-; 2nd Cabinet Ramadier (PS) 22nd October 1947-; 1st Cabinet Schuman (MRP) 24th November 1947-; Cabinet Marie (RRS) 26th July 1948-; 2nd Cabinet Schuman (MRP) 5th September-; 1st Cabinet Queuille (RRS) 11th September 1948-; 2nd Cabinet Bidault (MRP) 28/29th October 1949-

¹³ 2nd Cabinet Queuille (RRS) 2nd July 1950-; 1st Cabinet Pleven (UDSR) 12th July 1950-; 3rd Cabinet Queuille (RRS) 10th March 1951-; 2nd Cabinet Pleven (UDSR) 11th August 1951-; 1st Cabinet Edgar Faure (RRS), 20th January 1952-

¹⁴ The results of the 1951 election are as follows: MRP 12.5% and 82 seats; Conservatives 14% and 87 seats; RPF 21.8% and 107 seats out of a total of 544 seats. The Gaullists came from 1.6% and 5 seats in the November 1946 election, see T.T. Mackie, R. Rose (eds.), *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, table 7.4b,c

¹⁵ The results of the 1951 election are as follows: PS 14.5% and 94 seats. Mainly because of a change in the election system in favour of pro-regime parties the Communists lost 69 seats despite having almost the same ratio of votes as in 1946. See S. Rokkan, J. Meyriat (eds.), *Guide internationale des statistiques électorales*, p. 134-5, PC 26.7% and 97 seats out of a total of 544 seats, see T.T. Mackie, R. Rose (eds.), *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, table 7.4b,c

¹⁶ Cabinet Pinay (RI) 8th March 1952-; Cabinet René Mayer (RRS) 8th January 1953-; Cabinet Laniel (PRL) 28th June 1953-; Cabinet Mendès France (RRS) 19th June 1954-; 2nd Cabinet Edgar Faure (RRS) 23rd February 1955

¹⁷ Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 211, 302

lasted for almost one and a half years.¹⁸ They remain a constituent part of government until the end of the Fourth Republic in coalition with the RRS, the UDSR.¹⁹ In the last two governments before de Gaulle's arrival, the feeling of crisis was increasing, which is probably the reason why the PS and the MRP came back to support the republican consensus together, with the usual support of RRS and UDSR.²⁰ De Gaulle took over on 1st of June 1958 still under the constitution of the Fourth Republic and as its last President of the Council. The 1958 election brought a massive swing to the right of the political spectrum. Conservatives and Gaullists won landslide victories, while the left was almost wiped out. The MRP was again reduced substantially.²¹ Most of this swing to the Right must be attributed to the fall of the Fourth Republic, the loss of credibility for the parties which supported this regime and the Gaullist saviour of France from a civil war as a result of the Algerian insurrection. However, de Gaulle was received with great suspicion by large sections of the Assemblée Nationale. One of the prominent opponents was Pierre Mendès-France. He saw a fascist danger in the authoritarian regime²² and considered de Gaulle's inaction against the insurgents not just as complacency, but as a form of complicity.²³ Although the connection between the Algerian generals and de Gaulle seemed to cast dark shadows over his role during this episode²⁴, de Gaulle countered criticism with sarcasm: "Do people really think that I am going to start a career as a dictator at 67 years of age?"²⁵ The army came into line once de Gaulle took office and the danger of civil war abated. He got almost unlimited emergency powers to deal with the situation, ruling for half a year by decree; and

¹⁸ The results of the 1956 election are as follows: PS 15.2% and 88 seats; Radicals (RRS, UDSR) 15.2% and 73 seats; PC 25.9% and 147 seats; Conservatives 15.3% and 95 seats; MRP 11.1% and 71 seats; Gaullists (under the name of 'Républicain sociaux' RS) 4% and 16 seats out of a total of 544 seats, see T.T. Mackie, R. Rose (eds.), *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, table 7.4b,c

¹⁹ Cabinet Mollet (PS) 1st February 1956-; Cabinet Bourges-Maunoury (RRS), 13th June 1957-

²⁰ Cabinet Gaillard (RRS) 6th November 1957-; Cabinet Pflimlin (MRP) 14th May 1958

²¹ The results of the 1958 election are as follows: PS 15.5% and 44 seats; Radicals 9.7% and 23 seats; PC 18.9% and 10 seats; Conservatives 20% and 133 seats; MRP 11.1% and 57 seats; Gaullists (under the name of 'Union pour le nouvelle République' UNR), 20.6% and 198 seats out of a total of 465 seats, see T.T. Mackie, R. Rose (eds.), *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, table 7.4b,c, for another reference to all the statistical figures see also, S. Rokkan, J. Meyriat (eds.), *Guide internationale des statistiques électorales*, p. 125-6

²² Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 433, 440

²³ Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 437, 439

²⁴ for the conspiracy line of argument and de Gaulle's involvement in the insurrection see Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 375-6

²⁵ Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré: L'arbitre du Général*, Arnaud Franel Editions, Suresnes, 1999, p. 155, original: « Croit-on qu'à soixante-sept ans, je vais commencer une carrière de dictateur ? »

under those powers he had a new constitution drawn up by Michel Debré and then was elected first President of the Fifth Republic.²⁶

As can be seen in this short account, the parliamentary life in France was very eventful. Through it and its reflection in parliamentary debates the post-war history of France and, in particular, its position towards European integration can be illuminated.

²⁶ The new Constitution was approved in a referendum by 80% of the French people. see Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 171, see also, Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 342, 377

2.1 War Experience

2.1.1 *War consequences*

France's greatest worry, Germany, was the starting point and a continual reference point for French post war policy. In the following section 'Allied Responsibility and the German threat' this will become clear insofar as the emphasis in French discourse was very much focused on the German threat, at least initially. However, from this fear France took the strength and the insight to look to reconciliation. The political process leading there will be described in the following and will find its first and mainly idealistic peak in the last section 'The European Ideal'.

Allied Responsibility and the German threat

The German threat was France's main and immediate post-war concern, as Le Bail, one of the pre-eminent backbench Deputies, summed up for the moderate sections of the *Assemblée*:

“Are the German people capable of change? Are they able to condemn their faults of yesterday? These Germans, to whom we offer our hand, have they, at the bottom of their souls, abandoned Hitler and the horrors of national socialism?”¹

Some more extreme forms of outright hatred against Germans were also expressed.² Such entrenched hatred of past wars as well as the indoctrination which had made the Germans the arch-enemy was not going to disappear overnight and it was used – mainly on the extremes of the political spectrum – against ideas of cooperation.³ However, the Germans were almost universally seen as an inherently belligerent people.⁴ Deceit and the German proneness to rebuilding their armed

¹ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6284II, original : « le peuple allemand est-il capable de changer ? Est-il capable de désavouer nettement les fautes d'hier ? Ces Allemands qui nous tendent la main, au fond, abandonnent-ils complètement Hitler et les horreurs du national-socialisme ? »

² See Aumeran (RI), JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7136II, « I do not believe in the good German, in the reasonable German who has learned his lesson. », original: « Je ne crois pas au « bon Allemand », à l'Allemand raisonnable qui a compris. »

³ For examples of such hatred see Schell (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7189I, see also, Gaston Palewski (RPI¹), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5193II

⁴ See Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7327II, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6284II-III, see also, Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 87

forces clandestinely meant that they remained a danger.⁵ Particularly with regard to the ensuing German rearmament debate, deeply emotional arguments were raised along the lines of: ‘What have we won the war for, if we, now, give them back their weapons to try again?’⁶ The consequent political demand was: ‘No army and no arms.’⁷ Germany was still regarded as the first threat to French security by the majority of Deputies, at the end of the 1940s. ‘(...) for two reasons there cannot be a German army. Firstly, there is a kind of sentimental veto of France, because when a Frenchman sees a German with a rifle in his hands, he hesitates a bit to consider him a European.’⁸ The second reason was that although the Germans might be behaving for the time being, the old fear of German militarism and expansionism was still very vivid. The German urge to expansion was widely considered to be still alive. It would probably first be directed against the East. Later, however, France would be in grave danger, again.⁹ Even by moderate and very reasonable deputies, it was considered more likely that Germany would turn aggressive, again.¹⁰ And there were good reasons for it. Firstly, Germany had lost all its territories in Eastern Europe.¹¹ Secondly, it had a huge influx of expellees from these areas who would drive future German policy towards regaining these lands.¹² Thirdly, even the German core territory was divided in occupation zones which took more and more the form of real borderlines and not just provisional arrangements. The foundation of the two German states strengthened the impression that the division was here to stay and would not easily be resolved.¹³ Reunification, however, was seen as the most important German policy objective with the re-conquest of the Soviet occupied zone regarded as an option on the German mind.¹⁴ Fourthly, there was the loss of Berlin.¹⁵ Fifthly, Hitler’s old reason for the *Lebensraum* policy was still there, i.e. the population density in Western Germany

⁵ Rosenblatt (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6281III, III, see also, Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7121II

⁶ See Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 577II

⁷ Lapie (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6319III, original : « Pas d’armée et pas d’armes. »

⁸ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6249III, original: « (...) il ne peux pas y avoir d’armée allemande, pour deux raisons. La première, c’est une sorte de veto sentimental de la France, car lorsqu’un Français voit un Allemand avec un fusil à la main, il hésite un peu à le prendre pour un Européen. »

⁹ Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7192I

¹⁰ Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7144I, see also, Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p.5207I

¹¹ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6237III

¹² Gaborit (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7367III, see also, Bonnefous (UDSR), President of the Foreign Policy Commission, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8917II

¹³ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7327III, see also, Bardoux (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8938I

¹⁴ Pierre André (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8951I

¹⁵ Quilici (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6336II

was higher than anywhere else in Europe.¹⁶ And finally, tendencies of revenge and hurt national pride were considered a threat.¹⁷ All these reasons were seen as a pretext on the basis of which future German aggression against the East could be undertaken.¹⁸

In order to prevent this from happening it was widely accepted – not least among all Allies – that Germany would have to be cleansed of militarism and fascism.¹⁹ The first option for France was to support the American Morgenthau Plan, which would render Germany militarily and economically completely impotent and leave it in a state of permanent subservience.²⁰

The second way – the one which the French government took - was to try and get Germany to assume its responsibilities among the peaceful nations of Europe.²¹ There were several hopeful signs: Importantly for France, there was no indication of a revival of nationalism or militarism in West Germany.²² Moreover, by the end of 1949 the complete disarmament of Western Germany was undeniable.²³ The most promising sign was a real change of spirit in Western Germany, which broke with militarism and subscribed to liberal values.²⁴ On the basis of those positive signals, the realisation settled in that the age-old archenemy Germany was no longer the threat.²⁵ Hence, France chose the policy of cooperation with Germany and tied it into its primary foreign policy objectives of peace and stability in Europe.²⁶

¹⁶ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7327II, see also, André (PRL), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5274II

¹⁷ Croizat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5962I, 5963I, see also, Lebon (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5298I, 19/11/53, p. 5268I, see also, Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5298I

¹⁸ Quilici (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6335II, see also, Edgar Faure (RRS), President of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 706I, see also, Soustelle (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6819II

¹⁹ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7329II, see also Allied declaration after the Yalta conference, 11/2/45, in: Bonte (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7127II, 7131I

²⁰ See, Gouin (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5223I

²¹ See, Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7343II, 24/11/49, p. 6231I, see also, Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 16/1/57, p. 77II

²² Gaborit (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7367II, Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7192I

²³ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6231II, III, Maurice Schumann (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5983I

²⁴ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6231II

²⁵ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7327I, see also, Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7186II, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 648I-II, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur- Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958-1969*, Fayard, Paris, 1998, p. 31

²⁶ See Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7328I, see also, Kuehn (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7348II, III

Occupational Rule in Germany

At the insistence of Churchill, France became the fourth occupying power in Germany. This position was undoubtedly a symbol that France could once again aspire to great power status.²⁷ Accordingly, it had a seat on the Allied High Commission which had taken over German sovereign rights under occupational rule, e.g. in foreign policy. In 1947 the USSR introduced the Soviet system in their occupation zone without consulting the Western Allies. In stark contrast to this unilateral action, the Soviets claimed a right of veto for all activities in the Western zones. This was an unacceptable state of affairs and led to the final break between the Soviet Union and the three Western Allies.²⁸

This setback led to the relatively independent administration of the occupation zones in the immediate post-war years. During that time material concerns such as reparations were the most immediate consequence of the war. Firstly, the policy of dismantlement was initially seen as a way of claiming outstanding reparations. This policy was discarded, because the economic benefit did not warrant the effort.²⁹ It was also accepted that dismantling should only be used against the German armament industry. However, this objective was kept among the Allies, largely due to French pressure, in order to destroy the physical potential for rearmament.³⁰ Secondly, there was a practice of confiscating current production. Initially it was a form of reparations, but ultimately it was regarded as no longer in line with the general line of fostering German recovery.³¹ Although the impact on the smooth running of economic life in Germany was one concern, the psychological damage was the main reason for stopping this practice. The policy smacked of revenge and was open to accusations of injustice and did not reflect the much wanted understanding between equal partners.³² Thirdly, there was an element of justice in the argument about reparations. Most French parliamentarians had first hand experience of the destruction the war had left in France. It seemed only right that the

²⁷ Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 29

²⁸ For the French position on the split with the USSR see Schuman (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5291II

²⁹ Kaufmann (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6342I, see also, M-F. Ludmann-Obier, 'Les prélèvements unilatéraux en zone française d'occupation (1945-1946)', in : J. Jurt (ed.), *De la période d'occupation à la coopération franco-allemande*, Rombach, Freiburg, 1993, p. 113, 116

³⁰ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7343III, 7345II, 24/11/49, p. 6232III

³¹ See Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7343III, see also, M-F. Ludmann-Obier, 'Les prélèvements unilatéraux en zone française d'occupation (1945-1946)', p. 110, 120

³² Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6232III

Germans paid for the destruction they had left.³³ The right wing opposition, but also the Communists, wanted German reparations to make up for all the destruction endured by France.³⁴ In addition, they demanded that Germany should not be granted absolution for its deeds so easily.³⁵ However, on the basis of the policy decision by the government in favour of German recovery, reparations were effectively left to run out.³⁶

The Ruhr Statute

The Ruhr was the region from which most of the reparations came. The area was, however, not in the French occupation zone, but in the British and the American zones which were administered independently. The foundation of the Bizone, which merged the American and the British zones into a single economic area, left France on the sideline and without much influence on the Ruhr which was seen as the industrial machine which had enabled Germany to equip large armies; it was the vast conglomerate of intertwined heavy industries facilities ranging from the simple coal pit to sophisticated steel factories and the even more sophisticated shipyards and tank-production plants, which fed the German military machine.³⁷ The Ruhr alone accounted for two thirds of the steel production of pre-war Germany.³⁸ The French perception of the Ruhr's power and frightening potential is captured in the following lines: "There are as many differences between the French coal and steel industries and those of the Ruhr as between a Renault 4 CV and the steam engine of a freight train."³⁹ Driven by their fear of the war-feeding potential of the Ruhr, and again most fervently advocated on the extremes and among anti-German Deputies, the initial French reaction was to curtail production, the rebuild-

³³ Bonte (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7361III, see also, Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6249II

³⁴ In fact only FF50 billion had been received, which amounted to about 1% of the envisaged sum under the Potsdam agreement. See de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7352II, see also, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6287II, 6289II

³⁵ Kuehn (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6279I, 6281II, see also, Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 579I, see also, Rieu (PC), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3382I

³⁶ Terrenoire (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6254I, see also, Inter-Allied agreement on reparations, 25th May, 1952 as quoted in: Liautey (FI), Rapporteur of the Committee for Finances, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6677I,II

³⁷ Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4451II

³⁸ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6233II

³⁹ Bardoux (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8938I, original: « Il y a autant de différences entre les industries françaises du charbon et de l'acier et celles de la Ruhr, qu'il peut y en avoir entre une 4 CV Renault et une locomotive à vapeur d'un train lourd. »

ing and the redevelopment of the Ruhr.⁴⁰ In addition, the internationalisation of the Ruhr became therefore the primary aim.⁴¹ The Ruhr Authority was established under the 1948 London Agreement, in which all the Western Allies, plus the West German government⁴², were represented. It meant that Germany was prevented from exercising national sovereignty over the Ruhr, i.e. the occupation powers decided about the use and the future development of the Ruhr.⁴³

The most important structural issue which France raised in respect of the predominantly military use of the Ruhr industries was the existence of cartels. Decartelisation became one of the key French policy aims in the Ruhr. It was agreed on all sides of the political spectrum that the industrial power structures should be broken up.⁴⁴ Occupation law No. 27 named decartelisation as a core aim of Allied policy, too.⁴⁵ It also became one of the formal aims of the Ruhr Statute. The whole process was only partly successful, because only the most prominent cartels such as the IG Farben were actually broken up. Especially the parties on the extremes were not satisfied with the outcome of the decartelisation policy.⁴⁶

A corollary of the cartels was the powerful industrial magnates ruling these complexes. The Krupp family figures very prominently and the left-wing suspicion that these people had helped Hitler to power had gained credibility in the immediate post war years.⁴⁷ Particularly the Communists saw them as the real criminals, while Hitler was only a puppet carrying out their plan for war to increase production and, therefore, the profits of their plants.⁴⁸ The Krupps and Thyssens should never be in a position of influence, again, and their industrial empires should be broken up. Nevertheless, it came to be seen among all non-Communist parties as imperative to use the industrial potential of the Ruhr against Soviet expansionism; or to put it in a more positive way: the Ruhr should be used for the security of the peoples of Europe, as eloquently summed up by Teitgen of the MRP: "For us the Ruhr is not the arsenal of war. For us it is an opportunity to try the foundations of Europe and

⁴⁰ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7352II

⁴¹ Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 31

⁴² Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7347II, see also, Occupational law No. 75

⁴³ See Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7327III, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7331III

⁴⁴ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7346III, 24/11/49, p. 6232II

⁴⁵ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8953II

⁴⁶ Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7120I, see also, Duclos (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6713II

⁴⁷ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7347I

⁴⁸ Duclos (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9024I, see also, Fajon (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 595I

to begin its construction.”⁴⁹ Although on the far right safeguards against German resurrection were demanded⁵⁰, the Gaullists, too, agreed on the pivotal importance of the Ruhr in any endeavour to bring Europe together.⁵¹ “(...) only the development of the industry of the Ruhr solely for peaceful ends can deliver the solution for the question of the Ruhr, in the interest of peace and security for the peoples of Europe.”⁵²

This quotation shows that the concerns about the *political* development of Germany became quickly more important than material interests in the occupied territories. Firstly, denazification became one of the main concerns of France as an occupational power.⁵³ It was well understood in the government coalition that caution was needed. “(...) victory creates rights, but it also creates responsibilities. Hence, we – together with the free peoples – are prepared to live up to the task of detoxifying Germany. From then on we want to give them a future and hope.”⁵⁴ The trials at Nuremberg were the beginning of that process.⁵⁵ The corruption of the general German public by Nazi ideology cast doubt on their ability to overcome it and come to a true settlement with France.⁵⁶ Therefore, a detailed and sophisticated denazification procedure was introduced covering the whole spectrum of Nazi supporters and associates. For the extreme right- and left-wing parties the denazification process was much too lax and in the end unsatisfactory. Too many middle- and high-ranking Nazis were still working in public and pursued political activities when the process was finally called off.⁵⁷ Further to the centre,

⁴⁹ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7330III, original : « La Ruhr, ce n'est pas pour nous l'arsenal de guerre ; c'est pour nous l'occasion de mettre à l'épreuve la constitution de l'Europe et de commencer cette constitution. »

⁵⁰ de Chambrun, (RP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4617I,II

⁵¹ Kuehn (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7349I, see also, Vendroux (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5957II

⁵² Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7347II, original: « (...) le développement de l'industrie de la Ruhr uniquement dans des fins pacifiques, peuvent seuls rendre possible la solution de la Ruhr dans les intérêts de la paix et de la sécurité des peuples d'Europe. » The economic repercussions of this kind of thinking found concrete form in the later Schuman Plan , see Economic Security/ The European Coal and Steel Community. The linkage between ECSC, EDC and German rearmament show the military connection of the industrial potential of the Ruhr. See Military Security/ The European Defence Community and German Rearmament

⁵³ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7345II

⁵⁴ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7205II, original: « (...) la victoire crée des droits, mais qu'elle crée aussi des responsabilités. Nous sommes donc prêts à assumer en commun, avec les peuples libres, la tâche de la désintoxication de l'Allemagne et, dès lors, nous voulons lui donner un avenir et un espoir. »

⁵⁵ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7205II

⁵⁶ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6331III, III, see also, Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7122I

⁵⁷ Rosenblat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5995II, see also, Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 579I

this was considered a serious danger for democracy and the integrity of the Federal Republic.⁵⁸ Secondly, one institutional provision which was in high regard in France was federalism.⁵⁹ Prussian centralism was seen as one of the reasons why Hitler had been able to seize power so easily, because of the lack of checks and balances. It was also regarded as an essential component of German efficiency which had been perverted into militarism. Having been the victim made France particularly sensitive to this issue and led it to promote federal structures for any future German state.⁶⁰ The wide distribution of powers seemed the best way to moderate and channel often violent German energy. To the dismay of the French government the Basic Law did not reflect those federal currents strongly enough.⁶¹ War experience and the German threat were, therefore, reflected in the French drive to implement policies under occupational rule which could guarantee the security of France.⁶² For a time security meant holding Germany down. Equality was not *en vogue* and the German claim for it was often used as a counter-argument against attempts to try and find a settlement with the Germans.⁶³ However, the government recognised that cooperation between Germany and the former occupying powers was the only constructive way forward. Occupational rule could not continue indefinitely and policies such as reparations, dismantling and hostage-taking⁶⁴ were out of line with this more progressive policy line. Schuman's long-term plan was equal partnership with Germany.⁶⁵ Hence, Germany should be included in local and regional cooperation schemes. Germany's accession to European institutions was the concrete beginning of this policy which the Assemblée Nationale supported in its majority.⁶⁶ Finally, in 1955 the last elements of the occupation regime were wound up in the Treaty of Bonn.⁶⁷

⁵⁸ Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7191I-II

⁵⁹ Kaufmann (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6351III

⁶⁰ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7344II, 24/11/49, p. 6235II

⁶¹ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6230III, the first draft of the basic law was rejected by the Allies on these grounds. The uncompromising position of the SPD to stick to the first draft was successful in that the Allies published an alternative note after the initial rejection in which they agreed to the largest extent with the draft Basic Law., see W. Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, Dietz, Berlin, 1985p. 140-5

⁶² Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7343III, 7344I

⁶³ See, Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5937II, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7121II

⁶⁴ In the early years of occupation, under General de Lattre (until July 1945), such methods were applied to achieve the compliance of the German population with French orders in the French occupation zone, see F.R. Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1967*, OUP, Oxford, 1968, p. 33-4

⁶⁵ See also, Bidault (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5355I

⁶⁶ 340 Yes to 222 No, in Scrutin (No. 1940), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6391, 325 Yes to 249 No, in Scrutin (No. 1942), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6394

⁶⁷ See also, Germany/National Security/Fundamentals/Peace Treaty – Petersberg Accords – General Treaty

2.1.2 *La grande nation finding its place in Europe*

Anglo-French Alliance

It was almost universally agreed that Britain was the best French ally: "In this Europe we find ourselves side-by-side with Great Britain. Without her there would be no Europe."⁶⁸ It was Britain which had stood alone against the Nazis, which had kept up the resistance which finally allowed the re-conquest of France. And it was Britain which kept faith with France in its darkest hour.⁶⁹ After the war it was Churchill who insisted on making France the fourth Allied power.⁷⁰ On the basis of such memories, the reliance on this alliance was unquestioned.⁷¹ Even a full political, financial and economic union between both countries, along the lines of the 1940 Churchill proposal, was suggested in the post-war era.⁷²

The old alliance was also that of the two major colonial powers. The fact that this had often been the reason for conflict between them in past centuries was not regarded as important as the mutual understanding of what it meant to have colonial responsibilities.⁷³ This was a uniting bond between them, in the twentieth century, when their colonies gradually broke away.⁷⁴ Plans for bringing Europe, the Commonwealth and France's associated territories together under one roof followed the same idea. They emerged now and again in both countries, but were never realistically considered.⁷⁵

Notwithstanding the friendship between these two and their war-proven alliance, there were voices which accused Britain of betraying precisely those old and deep-

⁶⁸ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6235II, original: « Dans cette Europe, nous nous trouvons aux côtes de la Grande-Bretagne. Sans elle, il n'y aurait pas d'Europe. »

⁶⁹ Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 589II

⁷⁰ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6820II, see also, Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, Macmillan, London, 2001 p. 780, 834, see also, Stuart Croft, 'British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51', in: Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe – European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991, p. 79

⁷¹ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6333II, see also, Ramadier (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5979I

⁷² Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6333II, see also, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5352II

⁷³ See for example the equal split between Britain and France of former German colonies in Africa and former Ottoman territories in the Middle East, after the First World War. L.J. Butler, *Britain an Empire, Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World*, I.B.Tauris Publishers, London, 2002, p. 2, 15

⁷⁴ Ramadier (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5979I

⁷⁵ See Gouin (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5223I, for Eden's longstanding plans to bring the Commonwealth and Europe together see G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 33

rooted commitments.⁷⁶ The disappointment about British reservations as regards involvement in European integration was obvious, in particular among Euro-enthusiasts.⁷⁷ The psychological impact of this betrayal can hardly be overestimated.⁷⁸ It was a betrayal of the European cause or rather a refusal by Britain to help build it.⁷⁹ Prudence and some wisdom in a slower integration process, which Britain seemed to suggest, were given full credit.⁸⁰ The Commonwealth connection was welcomed in France as bringing additional value to British membership in Europe. Suitable arrangements could surely be made.⁸¹ Politically the Conservative opposition was seen as much more Europhile in Britain than the Labour government. This impression emanated much from Churchill's prominent role in the European Movement.⁸² A change in government was, therefore, expected to bring Britain around to the European cause. This hope, however, was disappointed when the Conservatives regained office in October 1951.⁸³ On a very sombre note Schuman saw not much hope that Britain's abstention would change: "England will not agree to become integrated into Europe, only if so compelled by events."⁸⁴ However, France saw an opportunity to settle the German problem once and for all in European integration.⁸⁵ The consequence was hard to accept, but if Britain was not minded towards an integrated Europe, then, the only viable option left to France was an exclusively continental European integration: "(...) we will make Europe without England, because to say: 'I will not make Europe except with England', that means, nowadays, 'I don't want Europe at all.'"⁸⁶ Despite major

⁷⁶ See Bonnefous (UDSR), President of the Foreign Policy Commission, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8917I

⁷⁷ See Pierre André (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8951II

⁷⁸ Fernand Chevalier (PRL), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6223I

⁷⁹ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7126I, see also, Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8958II, see also, Moch (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 615II, see also, Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/10/53, p. 4531II, see also, Maurice Schumann (MRP), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5356II-5357I

⁸⁰ Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7188I, see also, André Denis (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51

⁸¹ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6333I, see also reference to conversation between R. Butler and H. Spaak in November 1955, in: Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan years, 1957-1963: the emerging truth*, J. Murray, London, 1995, p. 106, see also, p. 111

⁸² Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7123I-II

⁸³ See Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 702I

⁸⁴ Robert Schuman, Pour l'Europe, p.111, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, p. 229, original : « L'Angleterre n'acceptera de s'intégrer à l'Europe que sous la contrainte des événements. »

⁸⁵ Lapie (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6319II, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6329II

⁸⁶ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7126I, original : « (...) nous ferons l'Europe sans l'Angleterre, car dire : je ne ferai l'Europe qu'avec l'Angleterre, cela signifie aujourd'hui : je ne veux pas de l'Europe. » , see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, 3rd ed., Imprimerie Nationale Éditions, Paris, 1999, p. 139

doubts about this arrangement, such as: “Such a Europe will very quickly become a Europe for Germany and against England.”⁸⁷ for the time being, it was accepted that Britain would stay out of the European integration process.⁸⁸ The hope for later gradual integration remained.⁸⁹ At the end of the 1950s, the disappointment about the British refusal to join the European integration process had settled in among the French political establishment: “It remains that England has not understood that she can come back to us, again, and that we can have a common policy.”⁹⁰ De Gaulle saw the realities a bit differently: His main worry over Britain was that they did not see through the smoke screen of the Western alliance, which was only a tool for US domination. More malignly Britain could have struck a deal which gave them a privileged position in this scheme.⁹¹ The consequence was clear either way. They were not ready or not suited to be a party of the French European integration process. That is the basis of de Gaulle’s repeated rejection of British admission to the European Communities.

Reconciliation with Germany

Despite the obvious distrust in the early 1950s, there was a genuine will by the French government and in particular Schuman to try and try again with the Germans, not least because of the experience of the last wars:

“We desire a rapprochement between the two countries. We can achieve this only through cooperation in a large framework, where we all can show good will (Renewed applause from the same [centre and from various benches on the left and the right] benches), and where an atmosphere of trust is created.”⁹²

⁸⁷ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6331III, original: « Une telle Europe serait très vite une Europe pour l’Allemagne et contre l’Angleterre. », see also Léon Blum (PS), in *Populaire*, 19/11/49, as quoted in: Leenhardt (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6218III, see also, Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8958II

⁸⁸ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7126II, see also, Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9003II

⁸⁹ Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 698II, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 526

⁹⁰ Albert-Sorel (IPay), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3691I, original : « Il reste que l’Angleterre n’a pas compris qu’elle pouvait se rapprocher de nous, que nous pouvions avoir une politique commune. »

⁹¹ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’espoir*, Plon, Paris, 1970 p. 137, 153, 158

⁹² Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6234I, original: « Nous désirons le rétablir entre les deux pays. Nous ne pourrions y parvenir que par une coopération dans un cadre plus large où nous serions plusieurs à faire preuve de bonne volonté (Nouveaux applaudissements sur les mêmes [centre et sur divers bancs à gauche et à droite] bancs), où se crée un climat de confiance. »

'Europe' it was called and it should be for the benefit of both countries.⁹³ It was indeed the long past enmity with England which served as an example that enemies could become allies.⁹⁴ The recognition was that one needs to change and one needs to trust in order to be fit for the future. That was the policy finally taken by the French government – slowly and in steps:

“The policy that we want to practise in Germany, with the support of its government, is that of a structured as well as prudent progress towards a regime with increased responsibilities. This increase should take place in steps and lead, finally, to the conclusion of a peace treaty.”⁹⁵

This plan of action shows that confidence in German democracy was growing and with it grew the trust in Germany itself.⁹⁶

It was generally recognised that one major precondition for such a lasting Franco-German understanding was a peace treaty. However, no such agreement could be concluded, because Soviet Russia did not consent. This left the three Western Allies in the peculiar situation of actually working with their part of Germany, but still being in a state of war.⁹⁷ There was no precedent and there were no rules of international law for such a situation. The legal position was that apart from sovereignty being exercised by the four occupying powers, a peace treaty could be concluded only with a whole people or the respective state of the vanquished. However, post war Germany was hardly the normal situation for which provisions under international law had been drawn up. New situations required clearly new responses and, in particular, practicable solutions. Therefore, the call for a separate

⁹³ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6750II, for illustration Teitgen used the following story: “A common wall separated my house from that of my neighbour. He used his right as owner, his sovereignty as owner to stop me interfering with the wall and I invoked my property, my sovereignty as owner, to do the same to him. And both of us lived in the shadow. One day we understood. We agreed to destroy and reconstruct the wall and now we both have the sun.”, original: « Un mur indivis séparait ma maison de celle de mon voisin. Il invoquait son droit de propriétaire, sa souveraineté de propriétaire pour m'interdire de toucher à ce mur, et moi j'invoquais ma propriété, ma souveraineté de propriétaire pour l'en empêcher. Et nous étions l'un et l'autre dans l'ombre. Un jour, nous avons compris ; nous nous sommes mis d'accord pour détruire et reconstruire le mur et maintenant nous avons l'un et l'autre le soleil. »

⁹⁴ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6284III, see also, Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7125I

⁹⁵ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6234II, original: « La politique que nous voulons pratiquer en Allemagne, en accord avec son gouvernement, est celle d'un acheminement méthodique bien que prudent vers un régime de responsabilités élargies, élargies par étapes successives, en vue d'aboutir finalement à une traité de paix (...) »

⁹⁶ Le Bail (PS), JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6754I

⁹⁷ Although all hostilities ceased with the unconditional capitulation of the German Reich, legally the state of war remained between the Allies and Germany, see Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7343II

peace treaty between West Germany and the three Western Allies became stronger and stronger.⁹⁸ The problem with this position was that by making a separate peace treaty the Western Allies would officially recognise the German Democratic Republic, not to mention the acceptance of the permanent division of Germany.⁹⁹ Moreover, there was a serious problem of legal security in the current position which resulted from the differences between the Allies, for only after a peace treaty could a united German state enter into binding arrangements.¹⁰⁰ In France this sounded like a perfect excuse for the Germans to misbehave in the meantime, exploiting the situation of uncertainty as to the law.¹⁰¹ The counter-argument to such doubts was that any peace treaty would have to be signed by all the Allied powers, including France, which would give them a fairly strong bargaining position to hold the united Germany true to its obligations.¹⁰²

The alternative to the policy of cooperation was the isolationism of the Poincaré type, which implied self-sufficiency in economic terms¹⁰³, national defences along the lines of the Maginot Line doctrine¹⁰⁴, and a military alliance system, which encircled Germany.¹⁰⁵ No rapprochement with Germany would be necessary, rather a preparedness in case Germany did not live up to its treaty obligations or even embarked on renewed militarism. This was not considered to be a serious policy alternative, as Schuman clearly pointed out: “(...) I tell you very clearly that the history of 1920 to 1939 is enough for me. I don’t have any intention of starting that all over again.”¹⁰⁶

In respect to European integration, it is very important to realise that Franco-German reconciliation was the driving force. The rapprochement of the two countries was seen as the healing of an old wound and the foundation of European integration and finally peace in Europe, not least for France.¹⁰⁷ Even in those early

⁹⁸ Pierre André (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6803I-II

⁹⁹ Couve de Murville (UNR), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3669I

¹⁰⁰ Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3372II

¹⁰¹ Noël (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p.5204II; One example was that Germany would get rearmament out of the EDC and could later reject all the controls, checks and balance built into the defence community. See Mendés-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4425II-4426II , 4433II

¹⁰² René Mayer (RRS), Vice-president of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8943I

¹⁰³ See Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5926II, economic self-sufficiency would mean a reliance on the economic support structure of the *Communauté Française*, see National Security/Territorial Integrity/ The *Communauté Française*

¹⁰⁴ Loustaunau-Lacau (FI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 656II

¹⁰⁵ Russia and Poland would be essential as allies. See Cot (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6322III

¹⁰⁶ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5945I, see also, Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 140

¹⁰⁷ See Daladier (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7198II, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 40, 229

days one can already see the beginnings of the Paris-Bonn axis which would turn into the real power base of the new Europe.¹⁰⁸ The realisation on the French side that Germany had become dangerous only in isolation can be seen as the root of this healing process.¹⁰⁹ Dovetailing Germany into an integrated Europe would give France the concrete security guarantee which it still needed. This European commitment was much more concrete than any occupational rights, safeguards and guarantees on paper.¹¹⁰ By the end of the 1950s France had grown used to trusting its German ally. No doubt this trust was founded by then to a large extent on the relationship between de Gaulle and Adenauer.¹¹¹ The political implications, however, went far beyond that, perfectly reflected by de Gaulle's Foreign Minister: "A strong and unified Western Europe, which is particularly associated with proper relations between France and Germany, constitutes this important part of an equilibrium without which our continent could well go under."¹¹² And de Gaulle himself regarded European integration as one of his greatest achievements, not least because of the peace it brought to the continent.¹¹³

The European Ideal

In the early days the European idea was seen in some respects as the French Revolution of modern times. It had the historic roots, it had the idealistic potential and it had the potential to develop into something bigger.¹¹⁴ There were also indica-

¹⁰⁸ Terrenoire (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6253II

¹⁰⁹ René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, p. 170, see also, Robert Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, p.110, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, p. 229

¹¹⁰ Jaquet (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5200II, see also, Schuman (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4631II, see also, Legaret (UDSR), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6702II

¹¹¹ The meeting in Colombey and the return visit to Bad Kreuznach can be seen as the personal foundation of Franco-German axis. Adenauer was the first foreign politician to be invited to de Gaulle's private mansion. See Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 168, 226, 228, 229, 234, see also, A. Grosser, 'Die Rolle Konrad Adenauers in der jüngsten deutschen und europäischen Geschichte', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belser, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 19, see also, M. Couve de Murville, 'Konrad Adenauer und Frankreich', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belser, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 62

¹¹² Couve de Murville (UNR), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3670II, original : « Une Europe occidentale forte et unie, associant en particulier de manière étroite la France et l'Allemagne, constitue ce facteur d'équilibre à défaut duquel notre continent risque d'être submergé. », see also, Mahias (ED), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3688I, see also, Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 92, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 226

¹¹³ See Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 232

¹¹⁴ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 9002II

tions that it was based on a genuine European sentiment of unity which came to the fore in the Strasbourg rally, for example.¹¹⁵

Even before that there was talk of Europe becoming a ‘Third force’¹¹⁶ between the developing two blocs. Against the background of the declining influence of Europe in the world, some even went as far as saying that the divide which split Europe and the development of the great blocs could have been prevented if Europe had only ‘got its act together’ earlier and had united as a whole. The immediate post war European idealism should have been used to build a Europe from East to West which included all countries.¹¹⁷ The following quotation sums up early aspirations for European unity:

“(…) between the two camps [the Soviet and the American bloc], there is definitely another solution: Europe can become a strong, respected and independent entity. And in this Europe, France has an important role to play.”¹¹⁸

Nothing came of it, but some of this lost political dream¹¹⁹ was saved in the economic field. The re-launch of the European integration efforts in the EEC and Euratom revived those ideas of an independent Europe.¹²⁰ Europe was seen as having the potential for a third way. The shortcomings and unsatisfactory ‘side effects’ of a command economy, on the one hand, and the cut-throat free market economy, on the other, were the reason to look for something better.¹²¹ Economic integration instead of outright political integration was the way chosen and it solved some of the most fundamental problems of Europe, not least the German problem.¹²² Although it should definitely be a ‘European Germany’, the European ideal also had the potential to supersede the old suspicions against Germany – at

¹¹⁵ Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 694II

¹¹⁶ In contrast to Britain the third force discussion was led from a European perspective rather than seeing Europe as an additional power base for Britain – be it for the sake of fulfilling its responsibilities as a world power. That is why for France ‘Third force’ was put under the headline of ‘The European ideal’. The question of leadership in Europe is crucial insofar as British aspirations are much more concrete and that respect, see Britain/War Experience/The Status Quo/The last remaining European World Power/The Third Force

¹¹⁷ Bonnefous, (UDSR), President of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5916I

¹¹⁸ Kuehn (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7349II, original: « (...) entre ces deux tendances, il existe certainement une autre solution : l'Europe pourrait être une entité forte, respecté et indépendante. Et, dans cette Europe, la France doit jouer un rôle important. »

¹¹⁹ See Mahias (ED), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3689I

¹²⁰ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 216II

¹²¹ Pleven, President of the Council, (UDSR), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9015I

¹²² see also, Economic Security/Europe/ECSC, EEC

least for the government coalition.¹²³ “We have chosen. We have chosen to realise Europe and to settle the German problem through it.”¹²⁴ The idea was to have a completely parallel development of a European institutional build-up on the one side and German emancipation from its current subordinate status on the other. Linkage of both was essential, otherwise it was still widely feared that Germany would use any gaps to escape and regain its hegemonic position on the continent, with all the past ordeals restaged.¹²⁵

Because there could not be an integrated Europe without Germany and Germany could not be stable without Europe, the German problem was equated with a European solution. Both became core French policies in the post war period.¹²⁶

“(…) successive governments have taken decisive initiatives which resulted, on the one hand, in the OEEC, and, on the other hand, in the creation of the Council of Europe. We have done that to facilitate the general restoration of Europe, but we also did it, more specifically, to provide a lasting solution of the German problem through the progressive integration of Germany into a united and peaceful Europe.”¹²⁷

This exemplifies the main idealistic driving force behind European integration. It was the idea of coming together and living together, very much in the spirit of *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité*.¹²⁸ In addition, the European ideal was an aspiration which gave hope and lifted the people out of the moral decay and the misery of the war years. “These two peoples, the French people and the German people, need to be shown larger horizons, if their moral sickness is to be cured. They need a new song. Only a unified Europe can give it to them.”¹²⁹ Finally, it was the embodiment

¹²³ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7328III, 7329I, see also, 25/11/49, p. 6329I

¹²⁴ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7329III, original: « Nous, nous avons opté. Nous avons opté pour réaliser l'Europe et régler par moyen le problème allemand. »

¹²⁵ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7331I, 25/11/49, p. 6330I

¹²⁶ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6246II, 6248II, see also, Moch (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 616I, see also, Bidault (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5355I

¹²⁷ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6234I, original: « (...) gouvernements successifs ont pris des initiatives déterminantes qui ont abouti, d'une part, à l'organisation européenne de coopération économique, d'autre part à la création du conseil de l'Europe. Nous l'avons fait pour faciliter la restauration générale de l'Europe, mais plus spécialement aussi pour préparer une solution durable du problème allemand par l'intégration progressive de l'Allemagne dans une Europe unie et pacifique. »

¹²⁸ See Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 681II, see also, Ulla Holm, 'The Struggle between the Political Nation and the Cultural Nation', in: J. Peter Burgess (ed.), *Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern Europe*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1997, p. 395-414

¹²⁹ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7126I, original: « Ces deux peuples, le peuple français et le peuple allemand, ont besoin, pour se guérir de cette maladie morale, qu'on leur montre des horizons plus larges. Ils ont besoin d'un chant nouveau. C'est l'Europe unifiée qui, seule, peut le leur apporter. »

of peace, which everyone was longing for in the post-war years.¹³⁰ The will for peace on the German side was well recognised.¹³¹ As Schuman put it – to considerable applause from all sides of the chamber:

“This Europe will be the edifice on which we will try to build permanent peace. We have to do it together or not at all. Security is no longer a matter of a single country flexing its muscles (...) Hence, the European solution for peace: the European solution for the German problem; the European solution for the Ruhr; that is our vision for the future.”¹³²

¹³⁰ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7330III, original: « Et nous voulons faire l'Europe (...) dans un but : assurer la paix. »

¹³¹ Kir (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4638I

¹³² Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7347III, original: « Cette Europe sera l'édifice dans lequel nous nous efforcerons d'installer définitivement la paix. Celle-ci sera une œuvre commune ou elle ne sera pas. La sécurité n'est plus l'affaire d'un seul pays quelle que soit sa puissance. (*Applaudissement au centre, à gauche et à droite*) (...) Donc : solution européenne du problème de la paix, solution européenne du problème allemand, solution européenne pour la Ruhr, telle est notre vision d'avenir. »

2.2 National Security

As was pointed out in the introduction the indicator ‘National Security’ focuses on the internal perspective of each nation. Ideological points on national sovereignty, the impact of the Socialist International and Communism in France will be discussed along with the strengths and weaknesses of the Fourth and the Fifth Republic and territorial issues of France in Europe and the world. This section will be rounded off by a subheading ‘Political Europe’ on criticisms and strong-points of Europe, but – in contrast to the idealistic angle taken under ‘War Experience’ – will more concretely be dealing with institutions and concepts in the European integration process.

2.2.1 *Fundamentals*

Sovereignty

By European enthusiasts nationalism was seen as the reason for past conflict and an obstacle to a peaceful settlement for Europe.¹ It had brought disaster to the entire European continent.² Consequently, national segregation which rendered Europe impotent had to be overcome.³ Destructive competition and national selfishness had to be curtailed.⁴ That meant facing the daunting question of sovereignty. The claim that national sovereignty ought to be transferred to a European level in the right areas and in a responsible way was supported by a considerable section of the French political establishment, provided that the benefits such as peace and prosperity outweighed the loss in national power – which was of course a hard and finally a subjective call.⁵

One of the most convincing arguments for European integration, related to sovereignty, came from economic interdependence. World War II could be seen as the

¹ See Terrenoire (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 625311

² Edgar Faure (RRS), President of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 7061

³ Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 61911, see reference to Monnet putting forward such a position in : Charles G. Cogan, Charles de Gaulle, p. 161, see also, Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, in particular, ‘America’s Cold Warriors’, p. 76-86

⁴ René Mayer (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 530711, 53081

⁵ René Mayer (RRS), Vice-president of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 89401

last big effort to implement a policy along the lines of autarky.⁶ The German Reich had failed in its attempt to implement this policy.⁷ Hence, such isolationism had been discredited. European economic integration was seen as the alternative, even among the RPF: “Western Europe is an absolute economic necessity.”⁸ Clearly no longer a RPF position, spill-over into political interdependence was considered only the next step. From the perspective of Euro-enthusiasts, interdependence – in both the economic and political area – also meant that Germany could not easily leave such a European economic alliance, because it would run counter to its own vital interests of economic and political security.⁹

Again, on the far right and among the RPF, the counter argument saw French interests best served through the highest possible degree of independence and self-government, i.e. national sovereignty.¹⁰ Fervent nationalists argued that sovereignty had never been given up freely, which was evidence that it was a rather foolish thing to do that before the pretext of European integration.¹¹

Therefore, the battle lines between French nationalists and Europeanists were clear and during the Fourth Republic the balance was usually in favour of the latter and supranational integration.

2.2.2 *Internal Reform*

The Fourth Republic 1946-1958

In the Republican tradition, which had its roots in the French revolution, the Assemblée Nationale was the powerhouse of the Fourth Republic and had full sovereignty, under the Constitution, over all matters of politics.¹² This was often referred to as the root cause of instability which was so often lamented and which contrib-

⁶ Billotte (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6640II

⁷ Vendroux (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5956II-5957I

⁸ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6328II, original: « L'Europe occidentale est une nécessité économique absolue. », see also, Pleven, President of the Council, (UDSR), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9014I

⁹ Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5941II, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 680II

¹⁰ de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 600II

¹¹ Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5928II, see also, de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 598II

¹² See Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic*, Methuen&Co, London, 1960, Ch. 1, see also, O. R. Taylor, *The Fourth Republic of France: Constitution and Political Parties*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1951, p. 25, 33-4, 51

uted substantially to the downfall of the Fourth Republic.¹³ The weakness and instability of the Fourth Republic had repercussions on foreign policy, for example that the political weakness of successive French governments was considered a major reason for the military defeat in Indochina.¹⁴ More generally, it was recognised that this instability undermined the confidence in France as a reliable ally, for example in Britain.¹⁵

One obvious sign of instability of the Fourth Republic, which is clearly discernible in parliamentary debates, was the frequent use of the vote of confidence by the government.¹⁶ It was mostly employed on matters of national importance where a big majority was meant to reflect the will of the nation. The problem with this kind of practice was that the vote of confidence became just another political means to get a majority. The exceptionality and the disciplinary function were lost, causing repercussions on the credibility and the authority of the governments. It became increasingly difficult to build a majority in the *Assemblée Nationale* for controversial decisions, which again reflected badly on the authority of governments and in turn on their stability, which was clearly recognised among Deputies with government experience.¹⁷ As right-wing conservatives put it: “(...) our ministerial instability can spell the death on France (...) our regime is the laughing stock of the world (...) one doesn't rule a great country without a strong executive power.”¹⁸ De Gaulle's obituary on the Fourth Republic is a sad reflection on its most obvious weakness: “From Mollet to Bourgès, from Bourgès to Gaillard, until the breakdown (...) That was the twenty fifth government of the Fourth Republic: it was to last five months and ten days.”¹⁹

Undoubtedly the Fourth Republic had to cope with many serious problems of post war France. Arguably the most sensitive one was that of Nazi-Collaborators. It was

¹³ See, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 426, 502

¹⁴ Quilici (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6617II

¹⁵ Albert-Sorel (IPay), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3691I-II, see also, Britain/Military Security/The national Armies of Europe/The French

¹⁶ Taylor points out that the use of the vote of confidence was not as frequent as during the Third Republic, which had the same problem of governmental instability, and that the constitution of the Fourth Republic actually obliged the government not to use it 'recklessly'. However, there was every reason for it as the fate of the Third Republic showed and in the reality of the Fourth Republic the vote of confidence was still very frequent, which is reflected in the large number of governments tottering over it. See France/Introduction, see also, O. R. Taylor, *The Fourth Republic of France: Constitution and Political Parties*, 51-2, 54

¹⁷ Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5335I, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 503

¹⁸ Pierre André (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6804I, original : « (...) noire instabilité ministérielle peut devenir mortelle pour là Franco, (...) notre régime est la risée du monde (...) on ne dirige pas un grand pays sans un exécutive fort. », see also, Reynaud (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6804I

¹⁹ Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 145, original: « De Mollet en Bourgès, de Bourgès en Gaillard, jusqu'à l'abîme... commente le Général de Gaulle. C'est le vingt-cinquième gouvernement de la IV République : il va durer cinq mois et dix jours. »

a chapter of indignity and personal failing, although involving only a handful of people, as de Gaulle put it.²⁰

Most of the lower ranking collaborators went free under the amnesty of 22 February 1947.²¹ A final settlement of all open cases was implemented through a general amnesty in 1950. One of the main reasons given was that the country needed inner peace; the major cases had been dealt with, and that should draw a line under the past.²² These were the trials of senior representatives of the Vichy regime, immediately after the war. Those of Pierre Laval, former President of the Council, and of Marshal Pétain, the victor of Verdun and Vichy president had most publicity and the most impact on French public opinion.²³ In view of the general amnesty, conservative and right-wing parties pleaded for national unity underlining the heroic effort of the French people and their heavy losses, not least in their resistance to the Nazi occupiers. Mainly among conservative and right-wing parties, the myth of uncorrupted French people was held dearly.²⁴ On the Left, the amnesty and the mild treatment of collaborators was considered a scandal, particularly with regard to the gravity of the charges, which included murder, torture and deportation to the concentration camps.²⁵ The numbers of charges brought and of convictions were considered too low on the Left.²⁶ Objectively, a fair judgement had to be made on the severity of the collaboration in the sense of a criminal act.²⁷ This objectivity was suspected by the far Left to be a right-wing conservative conspiracy in favour of a conservative clientele.²⁸ The Left complained that Communists did not get off that easily even for 'crimes' committed while in the Resistance, e.g. against collaborators.²⁹

²⁰ See Deshors (CRPS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7111III, see also, E. Roussel, *Charles de Gaulle*, p. 512-7

²¹ 187.582 cases were dropped, see, Chapin (MRP), Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7103I

²² Chapin (MRP), Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7104I

²³ Laval was condemned to death. Pétain, too, but de Gaulle granted a reprieve and the sentence was changed to lifelong confinement. See Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 308. For an overview over Nazi collaborators see R. O. Paxton, *Vichy France – Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, particularly Ch. 3

²⁴ See, Chapin (MRP), Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7102II

²⁵ Vaillant-Couturier (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7105I, II, 7107II

²⁶ Numbers for the whole of France: 60.000 convicted; 5.587 actually went to prison; the rest were pardoned, in: Vaillant-Couturier (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7105I, for a more detailed account see: Deshors (CRPS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7111I-II, see also, E. Roussel, *Charles de Gaulle*, nrf Gallimard, Paris, 2002, p. 516

²⁷ Chapin (MRP), Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7103I, Punishments included imprisonment, curtailment of active and passive voting right, prohibitions to work in a profession, e.g. civil servants, and the termination of pension rights, see Chapin (MRP), Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7103II

²⁸ Rosenblatt (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6344I

²⁹ Vaillant-Couturier (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7107I-II

Just as in Germany, there was the serious problem with civil servants and leading businessmen who had worked under the Vichy regime. They were experts and the state as well as the economy needed such people with expertise. The question was whether they could be trusted with the running of a new state. The Communist answer was a resounding 'No'.³⁰

In sum, the collaborator question had a serious impact on the psychological composure of the Fourth Republic and indeed on national self-esteem, with such deep inner wounds only healing very slowly.

The collaboration issue and the defeat in 1940 contributed to the French inferiority complex.³¹ In addition, the war had not changed German industrial power and prowess which added to French anxieties across the political spectrum.³² This also cast some doubt on whether France could stand its ground in a continental European alliance on its own.³³ The fear was strong that Germany would become dominant in Europe, again.³⁴ In such an emotionally charged atmosphere the inferiority complex was often used as domestic political weapons.³⁵ The government could clearly not admit to any inferiority complex.³⁶ However, it was widely seen as the characteristic and, indeed, a stigma of the Fourth Republic which was really only overcome by the return of de Gaulle and his policy of '*grandeur*' which "(...) convinced a sizeable proportion of the electorate that France had become a great nation again."³⁷ In that respect the inferiority complex is a feature of the Fourth Republic which added to the instability of the regime on a psychological level.³⁸

Closely interlinked with the Algerian problem, the Fourth Republic fell over political instability and weakness most obvious in military defeat and the usurpation of

³⁰ Bonte (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7130I

³¹ The issue of the inferiority complex was well summed up in: Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 284

³² Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7327 III, see also, Lebon (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4445I

³³ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4569I

³⁴ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7328II, 25/11/49, p. 6285III-6286I, see also, Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6248II, see also, Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8936II, 8937II

³⁵ See for example "The truth is that the opponents of the European Defence Community suffer from an inferiority complex (...)", in: Gaborit (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5281I, original: « La vérité est que les adversaires de la communauté européenne de défense ont un complexe d'infériorité (...) »

³⁶ Edgar Faure (RRS), President of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 705I, see also, Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6819II

³⁷ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 278, see also, p. 284

³⁸ See Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic*, p. 12

important political function, not least leadership in such situations, by the Army.³⁹ The Fourth Republic came effectively to an end, with the Pflimlin government in May 1958.

The Fifth Republic 1958-

The 1958 revolt of French officers in Algeria, and the threat of civil war with the imminent arrival of French-Algerian parachute regiments on the French mainland, was the pretext under which the war hero General de Gaulle was called upon to settle the situation. He re-established the stability and the authority of the government, and ultimately also of the State, by placing a strong executive on a solid constitutional foundation.⁴⁰ In order to achieve this, parliamentary sovereignty had to be curtailed.⁴¹ The pivotal importance of de Gaulle as a leader in this process is pretty undisputed.⁴²

On an ideological level, Gaullist politics were founded on the idea of the nation and national virtues.⁴³ It had an emotional quality which contrasted with the bureaucratic image of the Fourth Republic.⁴⁴ Through the reinvigoration of these national values, France would be led back to its former greatness. The military had always played an important role in that concept: “(...) we know very well that to remain a great people it takes a great military effort.”⁴⁵ However, the Army had assumed a role so strong that it compromised the political freedom of the government, particularly in military engagements, such as in Algeria. It became one of the main problems of the Fifth Republic which can best be seen in several attempted *coups d'états* by French officers in Algeria.⁴⁶ De Gaulle was successful, putting the

³⁹ Christian Bonnet (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 42831, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 502-3, see also, Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 267, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 15, 20

⁴⁰ Roux (UNR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3682II, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 503, see also, Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 266, see also, Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendes France*, p. 434

⁴¹ See Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 80

⁴² See Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic*, p. 197

⁴³ Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 24, see also, Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 415, see also, Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political traditions in modern France*, p. 276

⁴⁴ Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p.109, The same criticism, of a lack of emotional attachment, is levelled against supranational Europe by Debré, see also, National Security/Political Europe

⁴⁵ Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 622I, original : « (...) nous savons bien que, pour rester un grand peuple, il faut un grand effort militaire. »

⁴⁶ The most prominent was under General Challe, one of France's most highly decorated soldiers. To counter it, de Gaulle went on air: “Banging his fist on the desk, he forbid every Frenchman, and above all every soldier to ‘execute any of their [the rebel officers in Algeria] orders.’ This is an example of his authority, but also of the power the Army thought it had to stage such a coup. See Charles Williams, *The*

Army back into its place as a servant of the state and the civil authorities and as a strong but non-political tool at the service of the French nation.

2.2.3 Territorial Integrity

It was often pointed out that France did not have any outstanding territorial claims. It was interested in maintaining the status quo and peace, nothing more.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, France became embroiled in several territorial disputes in the post war era; initially, most of them related to Germany. Border regions such as Alsace-Lorraine or the Saar had often changed hands and still held potential for conflict.

The Saar

Before this historical background, the Saar was in danger of becoming a second Alsace-Lorraine insofar as it engendered the potential for territorial and political disagreements between the two countries.⁴⁸ The Saar had always experienced divided loyalties as a border region between France and Germany. During the occupation, the French authorities in the Saar tried to strengthen its links with France. In 1947, the Saar population had, indeed, voted for the Saar constitution and a Francophile Saar government with an overwhelming majority (91.5%).⁴⁹ In France, that was often interpreted, in particular on the Right, as a first step towards political autonomy from Germany. However, unlike in Alsace-Lorraine, there had always been a distinctly stronger current of German national identity in the Saar. The result of the 1935 referendum – before which the Saar was under a League of Nations mandate – had been too clearly in favour of reattachment to Germany to be underestimated.⁵⁰ A referendum after World War II was long postponed until October 1956, mainly in order to give alignment initiatives towards France time to take effect. Initially the government relied on the result of the 1947 Moscow conference, where the French claim over the Saar was supported by the other two

last great Frenchman, part 7, Ch. 3, pp. 394–407, see also reference to television broadcast by General de Gaulle on 29th January 1959, in: Charles Williams, *The last great Frenchman*, p. 402, see also, p. 382, 383

⁴⁷ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4653I

⁴⁸ See Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5194I

⁴⁹ Report about the treaty between the Saar and France of 3rd March 1950 in: Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7080I, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 91

⁵⁰ Liautey (FI), Rapporteur of the Committee for Finances, in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6679II

western Allies, not the Soviet Union.⁵¹ At the time, it was seen as a kind of reparation for France.⁵² The Saar was attached to the French economy during the occupation period.⁵³ Politically it had a semi-independent status i.e. sovereignty over internal affairs plus a parliament and a government. The Saar constitution provided for the independence of the region from Germany⁵⁴, with its foreign representation undertaken by France⁵⁵ along with its defence.⁵⁶ The decision as to territorial attachment was reserved for a settlement in a future peace treaty.⁵⁷ The official French policy did not follow the route of trying to incorporate the Saar into France.⁵⁸ However, the political detachment of the Saar from Germany and its economic union with France was an objective, the advocacy of which was at the very least tolerated by the government.⁵⁹ In a meeting with Adenauer in October 1948, Schuman said that a return of the Saar was not out of the question, but that French economic interests in that region had to be preserved.⁶⁰ In this respect, the coal mines were the single most important issue.⁶¹ Firstly, the French steel industry was dependent on coke imports from the Saar.⁶² Secondly, the policy of France towards the Saar had to be seen from a perspective of economic equilibrium in Europe. The industrial capacity of France was objectively inferior to that of Germany. Inclusion of the Saar industry in the French economy was meant to lessen that disparity.⁶³

⁵¹ Report about the treaty between the Saar and France of 3rd March 1950 in: Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7080I, see also, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6654I

⁵² Soustelle (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6697II

⁵³ Schuman (MRP) Foreign Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8936I, see also, War Experience/Occupational Rule in Germany

⁵⁴ Vendroux (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6655I

⁵⁵ Report about the treaty between the Saar and France of 3rd March 1950 in: Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7080II, see also, Schuman (MRP) Foreign Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8936I

⁵⁶ See Art. 9 of the Saar Convention as quoted in: Vendroux (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4579I

⁵⁷ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6260II-6261I

⁵⁸ Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7082I

⁵⁹ See, Vendroux (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6655I

⁶⁰ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 296, French economic interests in the Saar were formally recognised by Germany in the ECSC treaty. See Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 575II

⁶¹ Report about the treaty between the Saar and France of 3rd March 1950 in: Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7080II, 7081II, for further details about the economic union see, Report about the treaty between the Saar and France of 3rd March 1950 in: Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7080I

⁶² Reynaud (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4578I

⁶³ Vendroux (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6260II, see also, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4578I,

Some parliamentarians took up much more extreme positions. On the extreme right, the German territorial claim to the Saar was seen as simply unacceptable.⁶⁴ On the one hand, the full incorporation of the Saar into France was considered desirable.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the full detachment of the Saar from Germany was the least that should be done.⁶⁶ This was essentially the claim for an independent Saar state, which, picking up on the van Naters Plan⁶⁷, was equated with the Europeanization of the Saar, in the French debates.⁶⁸ Later, the acceptance of the detachment of the Saar from Germany and the economic union between France and the Saar were considered preconditions for Franco-German reconciliation. German interference into Saar affairs was closely monitored by all parties.⁶⁹ Again most vocally on the far Right and the far left, the revival of ideas which promoted the unity of the German Reich, including the Saar, were seen as inappropriate nationalism.⁷⁰

Despite strong criticism from nationalistic forces, both the French and the German government agreed that the Saar issue should not be allowed to develop its conflict potential.⁷¹ In a decisive meeting between Pierre Mendès-France – President of the Council from June 1954 to January 1955 – and Adenauer, the Saar Convention was concluded, which provided for a referendum in the Saar to decide on its territorial and political attachment.⁷² When the referendum came, the result was decisively in favour of a return to Germany, again. Nevertheless, the Saar Convention and particularly the way in which both governments dealt with the Saar problem, in the

⁶⁴ Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 59361

⁶⁵ Vendroux (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 62591, II, 6260II

⁶⁶ Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7081I –7082I

⁶⁷ Marinus van der Goes van Naters, Dutch Social Democrat, Member of the Council of Europe, Member of the Constitutional Committee of the EPC, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1953-1955*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 372, see also, Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution*, p. 75, 89, 135

⁶⁸ Soustelle (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6697I, for a reference to the van Naters Plan see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1953-1955*, pp. 372, for the problems with the term 'Europeanisation' see Germany/National Security/Territorial Integrity/The Saar

⁶⁹ See Gérard Bossuat, 'The French Administrative Elite and the Unification of Western Europe, 1947-58', p. 24

⁷⁰ Report about the treaty between the Saar and France of 3rd March 1950 in: Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7079II, The connection to Nazi-ideology and Nazi-provocateurs finding their way into the Saar heightened fears of a revival of German nationalism. See Capitant (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7365I, Partly because of that the French occupation authority withheld full democratic freedoms and liberties for quite some time. The Communists were found in the strange position of arguing for civil right and liberties, because some of their party cadres were among the arrested provocateurs, see Schell (PC), JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5998II

⁷¹ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4652II

⁷² The Saar Convention settled the Saar problem until the time when a peace treaty could be concluded. It would be supervised by a European Commissioner, see Vendroux (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6653II- 6655I

spirit of reconciliation and understanding, became one of the concrete proofs of the trust which had grown between them – a solid foundation for good Franco-German relations.⁷³

The *Communauté Française*

There were also several territorial issues in France's overseas holdings. Memories of a glorious colonial past allowed some Deputies to believe in a strong future of the colonialism: "We can create an independent economic bloc with the *Union Française*, better than England perhaps, which can rival the three blocs which exist: the US, Western Europe and the Commonwealth."⁷⁴ Despite this being unrealistic dreams there was a wide spread political consensus to mould the colonial Empire into the *Communauté Française*.⁷⁵

France saw one of its main tasks in bringing about the development of the *Communauté Française*.⁷⁶ One prominent idea to achieve this was through the trade of commodities in exchange for development, support and money from metropolitan France.⁷⁷ Despite those high ideals, the economic importance of the 'DOM-TOMs' lay in real terms in their natural resources.⁷⁸ This meant exploitation in human terms as well as natural resources.⁷⁹

Among the Socialists, the well-meaning intention of raising the living standards overseas was linked to the European idea, in that they saw no way to integrate the overseas territories into the European economy or even the Common market, straightaway. Their economies would not be able to stand up to the comparatively intense competition.⁸⁰ On the other hand, preferential import treatment from these

⁷³ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 213I, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 336

⁷⁴ Fernand Chevalier (PRL), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6223II, original: « Mieux que l'Angleterre peut-être, nous pourrions nous permettre de créer avec l'Union française un bloc économique indépendant susceptible de rivaliser avec les trois blocs qui se sont formés : les Etats-Unis, l'Europe orientale et la Commonwealth. »

⁷⁵ The President of the Republic represented the Community and carried out the decisions of the High Council. The Assembly was where all the representatives from the overseas departments (DOM) and the overseas territories (TOM) came together. Constitutionally, France formed an indissoluble entity with its overseas holdings, with 43 million subjects, under these arrangements. See Maurice Lenormand (IOM), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8966I

⁷⁶ See Paternot (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5277II

⁷⁷ Terrenoire (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6253III

⁷⁸ René Mayer (RRS), Vice-president of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8943II

⁷⁹ Césaire (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 26/3/54, p. 1316II-1317I

⁸⁰ Silvandre (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5294II

territories into the Common market would help in their development.⁸¹ More generally, a share of European riches could be diverted there to support French civilising efforts.⁸² By the mid 1950s and under the EEC, an overseas development fund was established.⁸³ One of its purposes was to share the burden resulting from France's engagement in those underdeveloped areas of the world and to make particularly Africa a European concern. The positive side of such an association was brought out in ideas such as Franco-African union or France being the bridge between Europe and Africa.⁸⁴ This policy was however discarded, at the latest, by the departure of France from Northern Africa in the early 1960s.⁸⁵

At the beginning of the 1950s, however, the picture was different. A closer European commitment of mainland France should not be allowed to have the consequence of loosening bonds with the overseas territories.⁸⁶ Particularly the EDC, which would have institutionalised a split in the French military forces, and indeed in the *Communauté Française* itself, was seen as endangering these connections.⁸⁷ When the French course into European integration was set, suitable arrangements had to be found for the overseas territories.⁸⁸ The Socialists in opposition already showed the commitment to the *Communauté Française* and their belief that it could adapt to new challenges such as European integration. Cooperation and also integration had worked before in the case of French membership in the UN for example.⁸⁹ In addition, representatives from France's overseas holdings, themselves, were very much in favour of integration of these territories into the European economy, first into the ECSC and later in the EEC.⁹⁰ Due to their longstanding close association with France they argued that it was hardly justifiable to have different economic or indeed political arrangements for mainland France, on the one

⁸¹ Defferre (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5211I-II

⁸² René Mayer (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5308II

⁸³ Ninine (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3375II, for counter-argument that the other member states would not agree to use money of the European investment bank in the overseas territories, see, Plantier (RGCR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3377II

⁸⁴ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4287II

⁸⁵ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 215II, see also, Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3374II, see also, Susan Strange, 'International Monetary Relations', in: Andrew Shonfield (ed.), *International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959-1971*, OUP, London, 1976 p. 56-7

⁸⁶ Maurice Lenormand (IOM), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8965II

⁸⁷ de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 598I, see also, Cot (RS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 200II

⁸⁸ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4223II, The strife to come to an acceptable arrangement was appreciated by the other partners in Europe, in the ad hoc committee for the European Constitution, for example. See René Mayer (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5308I

⁸⁹ Silvandre (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5293II

⁹⁰ Maurice Lenormand (IOM), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8966II

hand, and for them, on the other.⁹¹ Not to incorporate the overseas territories into the Common market would be the first step for their separation from France. Therefore, there was considerable pressure to find a suitable accommodation for France's colonial dependencies in the early European integration process.

Decolonisation

The wars in Southeast Asia and North Africa were widely published and defended across the political spectrum not as colonial wars, but as a defence of the western world against Soviet encirclement.⁹² The ideological war of which Africa was only one theatre had to be won by keeping the overseas territories in the Western camp.⁹³ It became apparent that France could neither counter the Soviet threat nor live up to its responsibilities in the *Communauté Française* drawing on national resources alone.⁹⁴

The problems of France's fading empire in South-East Asia encompassed Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The last became the most violent example of decolonisation. Isolated riots turned into a full-blown uprising supported by Communist insurgents instigating the claim for national independence.⁹⁵ By sending troops, France got dragged into an ideological war, which ended in the defeat at *Điễn Biên Phủ*⁹⁶ and total budgetary dependency on the US, because the immense defence budget was heavily subsidised by America.⁹⁷ Parliamentary debates show a feeling of panic in the air and it became clear that this was simply too much for France.⁹⁸

⁹¹ Devinat (RRS), Rapporteur of the Committee for the Overseas Territories, in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6682II, Initially it was even envisaged to extend the suffrage to France's overseas territories, logically following the constitutional line that these territories were constituent parts of the French Republic. see Devinat (RRS), Rapporteur of the Committee for the Overseas Territories, in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6683I, The representation of these territories in the European communities' institutions was claimed. see Bocoum (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3402I

⁹² Monteil (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 586II, see also, Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 622II

⁹³ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 20/12/56, p. 6177I, see also, Debré (UNR), Prime Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 30/4/59, p. 411I

⁹⁴ Mutter (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4220I, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3364II

⁹⁵ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6619II

⁹⁶ This major defeat cost the French army 15.000 of their best soldiers, see Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6619II, the rejection of the US to bail France out of the *Điễn Biên Phủ* disaster was received as a major betrayal. See Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG – Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000*, Macmillan, London, 1998, p. 16

⁹⁷ Giovoni (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/10/53, p. 4545I

⁹⁸ Several attempts of negotiations, such as in the Geneva system or the Manila treaty, did not achieve a service victory settlement in Indochina, see Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO,

In June 1956, the last French troops left Indo-China which had already gradually been replaced by American forces.⁹⁹ The fact of the matter was that the military campaigns of the decolonisation period, and in particular those in Indo-China, pinned France down financially and paralysed its domestic and European development.¹⁰⁰

The Suez campaign was not much better. The official reason for the invasion of Egypt – given by the President of the Council – was not to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces, as in Britain – but the breach of international law in the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.¹⁰¹ The seizure threatened the lifeline of European trade, particularly in oil, and handed the Nasser regime the capacity to blackmail the West.¹⁰² France's approach against Nasser's defiance was explicitly martial. In Paris, the government recognised that the attack upon Egypt was a preventative war.¹⁰³ The commitment to due UN process appears rather as lip-service.¹⁰⁴

The Algerian conflict clearly made its weight felt in France's decision to participate in the invasion of Egypt. There were strong indications of material support, in the form of arms, for the Algerian rebels by Egypt.¹⁰⁵ More generally, Egypt had one of the biggest military forces in the region, giving it the means for aggression, on the one hand.¹⁰⁶ And it had, on the other hand, the intention to use these forces. The Nasser regime publicly supported northern African nationalism with the aspiration of becoming the leader of the pan-Arab world in the Middle East.¹⁰⁷ Aggressive plans of expansionism against its neighbours, particularly Israel, were explicit. This made the Nasser regime a concrete threat in the Middle East. The underpinning of Pan-Arab ideology was conceived by the French government as nothing short of Hitler's pan-Germanic dreams and Stalin's expansive Communism.¹⁰⁸ The

2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6619II, 6623II, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 66 32II, see also, Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 193

⁹⁹ Quilici (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6617I, see also, Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France : Diplomatie et outil militaire 1871-1991*, Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1992, p. 552 ; The overall cost of the war was 60,000 dead and FFr 2.5 billion. See André-François Mercier (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 5/7/56, p. 2902II

¹⁰⁰ Frédéric-Dupont (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6630I, see also, Christian Bougeard, *René Pleven, Un Français libre en politique*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 1994, p. 260, 267

¹⁰¹ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4285II, France also had a considerable stake in the Suez Canal company. see David Dutton, *Anthony Eden, A Life and Reputation*, Arnold, London, 1997, p. 389

¹⁰² Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4283II-4284I,

¹⁰³ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4283II-4284I, 4285I

¹⁰⁴ See Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4284I

¹⁰⁵ Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4217II

¹⁰⁶ Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 538-9

¹⁰⁷ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4283II

¹⁰⁸ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4283II, 4285I, see also, JO, 3ème Lég., 20/12/56, p. 6175I,II. In relation to Hitler the Munich complex played an important psy-

marriage between these totalitarian ideologies became obvious in Nasser tentative link to the Soviet bloc.¹⁰⁹ The big picture was that the whole of the Middle East was considered under threat from totalitarian and Communist forces.¹¹⁰

The link to NATO is interesting, since Algeria had entered the Atlantic pact with metropolitan France;¹¹¹ the Egyptian contribution to the Algerian uprising could be seen as triggering the mutual assistance clause in the NATO treaty. In the eyes of the French government, Nasser's attack upon the lifeline of Western economies, in the Suez Canal, was another reason which should trigger NATO defence provisions.¹¹² Open American resistance to apply Art. 6 of the NATO treaty, which provides for common defence efforts, was considered to be badly informed, opportunistic and finally misguided.¹¹³ Maurice Vaisse put the French perspective on US behaviour most strikingly:

“For the French the analysis was simple. The Americans, who had triggered the crisis by withdrawing their offer to finance the Aswan dam¹¹⁴, had then abandoned allies engaged in the same fight against the Egyptian dictator. Their reticence detectable during the diplomatic phase of the affair, led to actual betrayal during the time of open crisis and war.”¹¹⁵

Ultimately, Kennedy's statement in 1957 that in the long run Algeria would have to become independent was seen as another American betrayal across the French political spectrum.¹¹⁶

One major consequence of the Suez crisis was France's alienation from Britain.¹¹⁷ Although it had been the intention to draw France closer to the FTA (Free Trade

chological role and was one of the main arguments not to give in to another dictator, i.e. Nasser, see Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 20/12/56, p. 6175I

¹⁰⁹ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4283II

¹¹⁰ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 20/12/56, p. 6175II

¹¹¹ René Mayer (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5308I

¹¹² Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 20/12/56, p. 6175II

¹¹³ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4285I, 4290II

¹¹⁴ The withdrawal of 270 million dollars of US, British and World Bank aid for the Aswan Dam project was seen as a major reason for the Suez crisis. see Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaiskell*, Richard Cohen Books, London, 1997, p. 250

¹¹⁵ Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 17, original : « Pour les Français, l'analyse est simple . Les Américains, responsables du déclenchement de la crise par le retrait de leur offre de financement du barrage d'Assouan, ont ensuite abandonné leurs alliés engagés dans le même combat contre le dictateur égyptien. Cette absence de solidarité, manifeste au cours de la phase diplomatique de l'affaire, est devenue un véritable « lâchage » lors de la crise ouverte et guerrière. »

¹¹⁶ Conte (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3673I, see also, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 18

¹¹⁷ See, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p.16, 17, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans - Britain and European Integration, 1945-1998*, Longman, London, 2000, p. 109, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 20

Area) through the Franco-British alliance against Egypt¹¹⁸, this was no longer an option after the military disaster.

France instead reoriented its political outlook towards Europe.¹¹⁹ The Europhiles saw their earlier belief vindicated in that the Suez affair would not have been possible if the EDC had been in place. Suez was considered another fatal repercussion of the rejection of the European defence community.¹²⁰ It added to the momentum of the Messina conference to re-launch European integration¹²¹, not least because the reactions of the European partners, at the time of the Suez crisis, were very measured, which was appreciated in France.¹²²

As I have already said, Suez was ultimately linked to the Algerian conflict. Of those three Maghreb countries, i.e. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, the last was the most important to France. Constitutionally, it was part of metropolitan France and a large number of French people had settled there.¹²³ Their representatives in Parliament demanded the protection and defence of their rights in the face of growing unrest.¹²⁴ The threat of suicide bombers was only the most striking example.¹²⁵ The dissoluble link between France and Algeria was the creed of the French Algerian Nationalists' political agenda and remained so, for the French government, too, for the longest part of the conflict.¹²⁶

The massive military engagement in Algeria was portrayed justified on the basis that the insurgents used guerrilla tactics and terrorism.¹²⁷ The restoration of law and order was the main objective, which was carried out under emergency rule from May 1955.¹²⁸ A large number of young recruits were drafted and sent to Algeria, psychologically utterly unprepared for the brutality of the war.¹²⁹ Atrocities were frequent and the ideals of French democracy slowly blurred in the African

¹¹⁸ G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community*, 1956-63, p. 32

¹¹⁹ See, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 16, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 309, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 109

¹²⁰ Mutter (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4219I

¹²¹ Roclore (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4228II, see also, Savary (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3134II

¹²² See Savary (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3134II

¹²³ Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 20

¹²⁴ The number of casualties, killed by the nationalist rebels, was roughly 400 a month just among the Muslim population, see Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4216II

¹²⁵ Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4217I-II

¹²⁶ Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4218I, see also, Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4287I, see also, Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendes France*, p. 347

¹²⁷ Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4217I

¹²⁸ Edgar Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/6/55, p. 3178II

¹²⁹ Bône (UFF), in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4215I, see also, Ansart (PC), in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4238II

sun and the heat of battle.¹³⁰ Although large amounts of money were spent on this military intervention¹³¹, it was increasingly realised – at least in Paris – that there was no military solution.¹³² Several steps of emancipating the indigenous population were initiated, such as admitting them to the civil administration of Algeria.¹³³ However, the rebel leaders did not want emancipation, but independence from France.¹³⁴ And the Fourth Republic eventually fell over this issue. Only de Gaulle prepared the way for Algerian independence, which had become the only viable solution.¹³⁵ In the referendum in January 1961, he won, in a landslide victory, all the democratic legitimacy needed for this hugely controversial step.¹³⁶

Because decolonisation is a very wide and fragmented issue, some general concluding remarks on the decolonisation process should round off this paragraph. Firstly, France's colonies had been an important element in its claim to world power status.¹³⁷ Secondly, in a nuclear world, the wide expanses of the *Communauté Française* – just as with the British Commonwealth – were considered of strategic importance, because they could spread out vital military, economic and political installations.¹³⁸ Thirdly, there was always a Cold War component to decolonisation. Just like in Suez, Algeria was regarded a Cold War theatre, where the West had to halt Communist expansion.¹³⁹ Hence, the reference to NATO intervention was made.¹⁴⁰ NATO did not intervene, which resulted in the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from the NATO integrated command as one of the first actions of the new Gaullist government in 1958. The main reason given was, on the one hand, the recognition that NATO was not responsible for the defence of North African territories, such as Algeria. Nevertheless, French troops were in-

¹³⁰ Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France: Diplomatie et outil militaire 1871-1991*, p. 576

¹³¹ Ramadier (PS), Minister for Economics and Finance, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4282I

¹³² Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4287I

¹³³ Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4216II

¹³⁴ quotation of rebel demands, in: Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4217II-4218I, see also, Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4287I

¹³⁵ See Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 62, "The Algeria of their fathers' that is what the militants and those who survive them want: to preserve, the Algeria of their forefathers. But the Algeria of their forefathers is dead! We will die just like this past Algeria, if we do not understand that.", original: « Ce que veulent les activistes et ceux qui les suivent, c'est conserver « l'Algérie de papa ». Mais « l'Algérie de papa » est morte! On mourra comme elle si on ne le comprend pas. » see also, Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 400

¹³⁶ Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 590, see also, Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 400

¹³⁷ Maurice Lenormand (IOM), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8966I

¹³⁸ Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4438I, for a similar argument on the Commonwealth see Britain/War Experience/The Status Quo/Imperial Defence

¹³⁹ Lacoste (PS), Minister Resident in Algeria, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4217I

¹⁴⁰ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4285I

volved in hostilities there. And they depended on the French Navy, not least for their supplies. Hence, if North Africa was solely a French affair, it would need all the French forces involved in that conflict to be under French command.¹⁴¹ Some protests in favour of NATO were of course raised, but not with too great enthusiasm and not to much avail.¹⁴² This was probably the most serious repercussion and the most direct link between the Cold War setting, the decolonisation process, European integration and the alienation from the US, for France.

Vietnam was another link between these issues and the military disaster, there, was the first obvious step towards the moral collapse of the colonial system.¹⁴³ The problems with decolonisation provided further material for stinging moral criticism from the Soviets.¹⁴⁴ Corruption, terror and fraud were often commonplace and rather disenchanting colonial subjects, not only with their local elites through which France preferred to rule, but also with France itself.¹⁴⁵ All this called for radical change of the French colonial policy which would give the former dependencies a say.¹⁴⁶ De Gaulle did exactly that: "I deliberately put an end to colonialism, which has been glorious, but which in the end was ruinous."¹⁴⁷ The times for such colonial practice were over. European and French mindsets would have to get used to that. The alternative was clearly put: France would have to concede the emancipation of its overseas territories and consider them as equal partners, if it wanted to keep them in the *Communauté Française* or at least remain on good terms with them.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴¹ Couve de Murville (UNR), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3670I

¹⁴² Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 30/4/59, p. 402II, see also, Mahias (ED), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3689II

¹⁴³ See Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendes France*, p. 192, 196

¹⁴⁴ Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 14, 50

¹⁴⁵ Boutbien (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/10/53, p. 4549I-II, see also, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 15

¹⁴⁶ Dronne (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/10/53, p. 4546I, see also, Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendes France*, p. 189

¹⁴⁷ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 71, original : « (...) je mets délibérément fin à une domination coloniale, jadis glorieuse, mais qui serait désormais ruineuse. », for de Gaulle's drive to end the Algerian war as the last decolonisation war, see also Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 588

¹⁴⁸ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3301II, for the position of the Socialists towards colonial emancipation see Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic*, p. 149

The Communists

This section will give the perspective of the French Communists on the post war situation. Just as in Germany, the Communists saw the legal basis of any post war regime in Germany in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.¹⁴⁹ The fact that they were not implemented revealed Western imperialism, which must inevitably lead to aggression against the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁰ Allied support for German economic and military revival was seen by the Communists as a major step in this conspiracy.¹⁵¹ The Marshall Plan and the Ruhr authority combined the integration of Germany into the Western bloc with the dominance over its natural resources by the Americans.¹⁵² The Schuman Plan, the Plevan Plan, WEU and ultimately NATO catered for the military aspirations.¹⁵³ Capitalist imperialism would therefore use the Germans and their natural drive towards the East as a tool against the USSR, just like the French recruits.¹⁵⁴ The claim that the French government was harbouring ideas of German rearmament to use German soldiers for aggressive ends against the East was raised early.¹⁵⁵ In the eyes of the Communists the government was, therefore, deliberately contributing to a new Greater German Reich.¹⁵⁶ Whether the French government actively supported German rearmament or whether they were merely failing to oppose it did not matter. The conclusion was clear: "The American imperialists give orders; the neo-Nazis in Bonn propose and the French government executes (...)"¹⁵⁷ This accusation carried psychological leverage with a broader spectrum among the population and the parliamentarians than only the

¹⁴⁹ See quotation of Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, in: Rosenblat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5996I, see also, Bonte (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7131I

¹⁵⁰ Rosenblat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5995II, see also, Bonte (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7128I

¹⁵¹ Fajon (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 595I, see also, Guérin (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 634I

¹⁵² Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7216I, see also, Duclos (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6709II

¹⁵³ Biscarlet (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5933I, see also, de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5983II

¹⁵⁴ Rosenblat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7350III, 7351III, see also, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6282I, II

¹⁵⁵ Fajon (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 595I, see also, Rieu (PC), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3380II

¹⁵⁶ Fajon (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 596II, see also, Duclos (PC), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5301I

¹⁵⁷ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6242I, original: « Les impérialistes américains ordonnent, les néo-nazis de Bonn proposent et le Gouvernement français exécute, (...) »

Communists themselves.¹⁵⁸ And in their eyes, general American policy as well as West European integration perpetuated and deepen the division of Europe, with the divided Germany as the most obvious example.¹⁵⁹

The ECSC and the EEC were regarded as another capitalist exercise at the expense of the working class, a cartel of the big and heavy industries whose profit would be much more important than the well-being of the ordinary worker.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the European integration process was seen as an American tool to subdue Western Europe within its hegemony.¹⁶¹

West Germany became the reincarnation of the well-known enemy. The Communists built on entrenched suspicion in France against German domination in Europe.¹⁶² German rearmament was seen as a threat, in any shape and form.¹⁶³ With regard to EDC, WEU and NATO, the main question was not about a European defence dilemma, but about agreeing or refusing German rearmament.¹⁶⁴ The threat to French territorial integrity, not least in the form of Alsace-Lorraine, was portrayed very strongly.¹⁶⁵ Following their nationalist line, the Communists rejected European integration out of hand and with all the argumentative force they still had in the *Assemblée Nationale*. “(...) the creation of Europe is not a new idea. It was Hitler’s idea.”¹⁶⁶ Such claims of a revival of Nazism and accusations against leading politicians in West Germany of Nazi links or Nazi methods in their current policy often served that purpose.¹⁶⁷ Mainly in the second half of the 1950s, Catholicism, links to the Vatican and generally religious connections replaced the Nazi accusation as a propaganda tool against the German Christian Democratic government (CDU/CSU).¹⁶⁸ By the end of 1953 the Communists had, however,

¹⁵⁸ Billoux (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 700II-701I

¹⁵⁹ Casanova (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4583I, see also, Duclos (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6709I

¹⁶⁰ Patinaud (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 89

¹⁶¹ Croizat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6309III, see also, Fajon (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 597I

¹⁶² Sportisse (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4620II, see also, Duclos (PC), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 220II

¹⁶³ Fajon (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 594I-II, see also, Billoux (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 699I, II

¹⁶⁴ Billoux (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 700II, see also, Duclos (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6711I

¹⁶⁵ Schell (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7190I, see also, Rosenblatt (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6833I

¹⁶⁶ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7215II, original : « (...) faire l’Europe n’est pas une chose nouvelle. Faire l’Europe c’est l’invention de Hitler. » , see also, Duclos (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9022I

¹⁶⁷ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6237II, 6241III, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7217II

¹⁶⁸ Marzin (PC), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3399I

lost most of their credibility in the Chamber, because their arguments were manifestly in conflict with reality.¹⁶⁹

However, mainly before this happened, the French Communists had tried to advocate an alternative in the Soviet system. Beyond the reliance on patriotism¹⁷⁰, the rapprochement with the East was advocated.¹⁷¹ In particular, the 1944 pact with the Soviet Union was one of the main building stones towards an alliance with the East and therefore an alternative to the Western commitment.¹⁷² The re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the East and a revival of trade should follow.¹⁷³ The peoples' republics in the East were seen as a shining example. Progressiveness, human development and fair political and economic arrangements showed the superiority of this system.¹⁷⁴ The newly founded people's republic of Germany i.e. the Soviet occupation zone, was advocated as the best example of how things should develop and how the Germans could live up to their responsibilities as a peaceful people.¹⁷⁵ This German Democratic Republic (GDR) was seen as a partner for France.¹⁷⁶ This cooperation should be based on disarmament, neutralisation and reunification of Germany.¹⁷⁷ A collective security system would guarantee peace in Europe.¹⁷⁸ Any accusations of Soviet expansionism or attempts

¹⁶⁹ See Bidault (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5302II, see also, Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3374II

¹⁷⁰ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6243II, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 699II

¹⁷¹ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7216I

¹⁷² Bonte (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7361III, Immediately after the Allied landings in Normandy, with the Germans still in France, de Gaulle signed the alliance with Russia. The Russians were the greatest continental European power and undoubtedly the best potential ally. On a realistic note, the alliance put France back into the circle of great powers. As Art. 2 and 3 of the Treaty show, the Germans were the common enemy, the uniting bond, and the reason for the treaty. The climate changed quickly in the post war years, not so much because de Gaulle was no longer in office, but because of the dawning Cold War. Because of Stalin's veto France was not called to the Allied conference in Potsdam – which concerned exclusively the future of Germany. After that the Franco-Russian alliance was practically dead. With the rearmament of the East Germans the Soviets broke the spirit of the Franco-Soviet pact, again. Russia being the only power to refuse France the Saar as spoil of war only added to the growing enmity. The post war provisions in the pact were, however, still legally binding: Only when the WEU entered into force, the end for the Franco-Soviet pact had finally come, empty of all substance, as it had been for years. For references to the end of the 1944 Franco-Soviet alliance see René Mayer (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5309II

¹⁷³ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6246I, see also, Rechet (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6258II

¹⁷⁴ See Michel (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6344III

¹⁷⁵ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6235III, 6237III, 6238I, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7217II

¹⁷⁶ Quotation of Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, in: Rosenblat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5996I, see also, Schell (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7190I

¹⁷⁷ Schell (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7190I, see also, Casanova (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4583II

¹⁷⁸ Duclos (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6708I

of subversion were strongly rejected.¹⁷⁹ However, such fears were common among everyone apart from the Communists.

The Socialist International

Particularly the Socialists warned of the Communist danger¹⁸⁰, because they knew what was coming from their comrades in Eastern Europe. Such information came from the still existing links of the Socialist International.¹⁸¹ The old Socialist links had been kept up, although mainly on a personal basis. They were quickly revived in an institutional manner at conferences and other gatherings after the war.¹⁸² The lessons of the war and economic issues played the leading part:

“Finally with regard to the Socialist International we – like our Labour comrades and our German Social-democrat comrades - have to remember that pooling primary resources of Europe is our constant ideal and has to be theirs; we have to remember that the Ruhr is the example for that and we have to remember that a substantial part of internationalism, far from narrowing down our idea of the motherland, actually scales up the idea of the French motherland and of its security to the necessary and constructive dimensions of Europe and of Peace.”¹⁸³

The issue of Europe was not new in the discourse of the Socialist International, but the idealism and enthusiasm of the immediate post war years sparked an intense discussion about the direction and the structure of this new Europe. Along Socialist ideals, it should be built for the people, it should provide for their needs and it should be guided by their reason, not by chaotic market forces. The French Socialists saw themselves as Euro-enthusiasts who were not afraid of renouncing parts of national sovereignty. They supported all European integration initiatives such as the Brussels Treaty and NATO, the EDC, the ECSC and the EEC.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁹ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6242II, 25/10/50, p. 7215II,

¹⁸⁰ For an example see Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5943I

¹⁸¹ See Moch (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 615II

¹⁸² Leenhardt (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6214III

¹⁸³ Lapie (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7367II, original: « Enfin, dans l'ordre du socialisme international, nous devons, à l'égard de nos camarades du Labour, comme à l'égard de la Social-démocratie allemande, rappeler que la mise en commun des matières premières de l'Europe demeure notre constant idéal et devrait être le leur, que la Ruhr en est l'exemple même et que beaucoup d'internationalisme, très loin de rétrécir notre idée de patrie, élargit au contraire la notion de la patrie française et de sa sécurité aux dimensions nécessaires et constructives de l'Europe et de la paix. »

¹⁸⁴ See France/Economic Security/Europe/ECSC and EEC

Traditionally the European ideal had been the real strongpoint of the Socialist International, but the war had changed things: “We all know that painful experience between the two wars has induced the proletariats to abandon the road of internationalism.”¹⁸⁵ Not only in Germany the war had destroyed, or at least severely weakened, this ideal of internationalism.¹⁸⁶ And for the first time ever, the Conservatives had a more positive and more integrative concept for Europe to show.¹⁸⁷

Political Europe

The European Movement – dominated by conservatives – brought about the Council of Europe. As the Preamble sets out, the aim was to “(...) bring European States into closer association.”¹⁸⁸ It was not meant to be an economic or political union, as The Hague Congress, for example. Neither was it the idea of an integrated Europe of integration, of the Schuman Plan brand. The key word was ‘association’, following the traditional methods of international co-operation.¹⁸⁹ Nevertheless, it was the first institution where constant political practice could be exercised on a European level. And it was meant to be the place where European creativity could work to generate new ideas for a better Europe.¹⁹⁰

Firstly, the harmonisation of national law codes was generally accepted as an important precondition for further European integration.¹⁹¹ The Council could recommend legislation to the member states, but the national parliaments finally had to consent. One additional step in this direction was the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), signed on 4 November 1950.¹⁹² It was arguably the greatest achievement of the Council of Europe, because it established the European

¹⁸⁵ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6284II, original : « Nous savons que des expériences douloureuses d’entre les deux guerres ont amené des prolétariats à abandonner la voie de l’internationalisme. »

¹⁸⁶ Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6303I

¹⁸⁷ Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6302III

¹⁸⁸ Preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe, as quoted in A. H. Robertson, *The Council of Europe, Its Structure, Functions and Achievements*, Stevens & Sons, London, 1961, p. 10

¹⁸⁹ A. H. Robertson, *The Council of Europe, Its Structure, Functions and Achievements*, p. 13-4

¹⁹⁰ See, Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6300I, see also, C. M. de Molènes, *L’Europe de Strasbourg: Une Première Expérience de Parlementaire International*, Éditions Roudil, Paris, 1971, p. 16-7

¹⁹¹ See, Fernand Chevalier (PRL), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6222I

¹⁹² Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l’Europe*, p. 86

Court of Human Rights and gave in the Convention a coherent legal basis to all members of the Council.¹⁹³

Secondly, the Council was the trial arena for a political project which would become known as Western integration. The admission of West Germany was an important step. The first step back into the European family was as much a test for Germany as for the French policy towards Germany. “Through agreeing to send representatives to the consultative Assembly of Europe, next spring, the Federal Republic will opt for Western Europe, as it has with its entry into the OEEC.”¹⁹⁴ Implicitly, that meant that in 1949 the Council was regarded as the most effective way available of re-integrating Germany into Europe.¹⁹⁵ The second step was the Saar problem. The Saar was admitted to the Council of Europe as an associate member, just like the Federal Republic.¹⁹⁶ Despite criticism from all sides¹⁹⁷, the arrangement under the Council of Europe worked, insofar as both Saar representatives and German representatives were both admitted as associated members to the Council of Europe. This became the first step for a joint settlement of the Saar and, indeed, for the German problem, in that the Council of Europe provided a forum where these disputes could be discussed, where all parties were present and where they would hopefully be settled in the end.

However, soon it was conceded that the Council of Europe was not fulfilling all the expectation, the idealism and the enthusiasm put into it.¹⁹⁸ The Council became condemned to be oblivious to its own weakness, except perhaps as a forum for ideas.¹⁹⁹ A good example for that is the suggestion to establish a European steel authority – similar to the Schuman Plan – by Paul Reynaud in December 1949.²⁰⁰ In the Council, however, nothing came off it and Reynaud became one of the main supporters of the later Schuman plan. The conclusion was commonly drawn that mere consultation was not enough, particularly when faced with the possibility of a

¹⁹³ For an in depth analysis of the ECHR see Ralph Beddard, *Human Rights and Europe: a study of the machinery of human rights protection of the Council of Europe*, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973, see also, A. H. Robertson, *The Council of Europe, Its Structure, Functions and Achievements*, Ch. 9 ‘Human Rights’

¹⁹⁴ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6234II, original: « En acceptant d’envoyer, au printemps prochain, des délégués à l’Assemblée consultative européenne, l’Allemagne fédérale optera pour l’Europe occidentale, comme elle l’a déjà fait en entrant dans l’organisation européenne de coopération économique. »

¹⁹⁵ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6246II

¹⁹⁶ Vendroux (RPF) Rapporteur, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 20/10/50, p. 7082I

¹⁹⁷ See National Security/Ideas and Ideology/ Political Europe for France, Germany and Britain, see also, National Security/Territorial Integrity/The Saar for France and Germany and, Britain/War Experience/The hope for a peaceful future/The Saar

¹⁹⁸ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6333III

¹⁹⁹ Mutter (IPay), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4219I

²⁰⁰ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 333

national veto on any decision.²⁰¹ This led to the claim for more powers for European institutions. Paul Reynaud was one of the early Europeanists in France. He demanded a European Assembly elected under universal suffrage as early as 1948 in the Hague and later in Strasbourg.²⁰² The basic rationale was that if Europe was to be built, it must have proper democratic structures. The early supranational European integration schemes such as the ECSC had clearly a weak point there, as comes out in a comment on the Coal and Steel Community: "I apologise for saying so, but we will not create Europe with the club of wealthy bourgeoisie in Strasbourg. Certainly, the European notables have an important role to play, but if the idea is to win the day, we must speak to the peoples."²⁰³ The proposals for a European parliament under the auspices of the Council of Europe never got off the ground.²⁰⁴ However, the treaties on the ECSC, and later the EDC and WEU tried to make up for their shortcomings and gave the idea of a public representation new impetus in that the High Authority, as the supranational executive, was at least formally made accountable to the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.²⁰⁵ When the Treaties of Rome entered into force, one Assembly with increased powers was set up for all three European communities, i.e. the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom.²⁰⁶ Although the Assembly could only be seen as falling short of all serious expectations in terms of representation²⁰⁷, control²⁰⁸ and legislative function²⁰⁹, the claim for a European parliament elected under universal suffrage across Europe remained a central political demand.²¹⁰

This idealist argument was carried over into the European Political Community (EPC). The concrete reason for its emergence was, however, the EDC. The main problem which arose immediately with the proposal of a European army was the question of responsibility and accountability.²¹¹ In 1950, the existing European

²⁰¹ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 333, 413

²⁰² For early French initiatives for a European assembly and Bevin's sceptical position towards it see David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 36

²⁰³ Terrenoire (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6254III, « Nous ne ferons pas l'Europe, je m'excuse de le dire, avec la club des bons bourgeois de Strasbourg. Les grands notables européennes ont un rôle important à jouer, certes, mais pour que l'idée fasse la trouée, il faut s'adresser directement aux peuples. »

²⁰⁴ Bonnefous (UDSR), President of the Foreign Policy Commission, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8916I

²⁰⁵ Bonnefous, (UDSR), President of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5917II

²⁰⁶ July (RGCR), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3144II

²⁰⁷ The members of the Assembly were only delegates from the national parliaments and not directly elected for the work in Europe

²⁰⁸ Initially, the assembly of the ECSC only met once a year to approve the outgoing High Authority

²⁰⁹ See Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5944II

²¹⁰ See Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p.5208II

²¹¹ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7123II

political institutions were clearly not up to the task and as a consequence it was suggested that the experience gained from the Council of Europe could be forged into a European Political Community.²¹² It was suggested that the EPC should have political institutions comparable to the ones on the national level.²¹³ This was, firstly, a European parliament before which a European Defence Minister would be held accountable.²¹⁴ Secondly, important decisions could be referred to the Council of Ministers which would be the final decision-making body, with the main task of reconciling national positions in that such decisions of major importance would be taken by unanimity.²¹⁵ Thirdly, there would be a nine-member Commission independent of influence from national governments, which would be the embodiment of the supranational principle and which would be responsible for day-to-day management, i.e. general administration of the Community.²¹⁶ However, in the EPC it was already proposed that the Commission would have the function of initiating legislation and of representing the Community in international relations.²¹⁷

For the critics the whole project was flawed because of the inadequacy of European political institutions.²¹⁸ Firstly, they were in no position to shoulder responsibilities like discharging troops or giving orders for the defence of Europe.²¹⁹ Secondly, there was no common foreign policy which could guide the use of the armed forces.²²⁰ Thirdly, the well known arguments of unanimity versus qualified majority voting were raised. Unanimity was just as critical in the Council of Ministers as qualified majority voting (QMV), particularly in a crisis situation when quick decisions and action was necessary. Unanimity meant that the defence of Western Europe could effectively be blocked by one state or a minor disagreement.²²¹ Fourthly, the Assembly would have only a right of consultation. And it would not be an elected chamber, but consisting of representatives from national parlia-

²¹² Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7177II

²¹³ de Félice (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5339II, for the guiding principles of the EPC see the Luxembourg Resolution of September 1951 as quoted in: Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution*, p. 66

²¹⁴ The idea of a European defence Minister was dropped in later drafts of the treaty. For the Draft Statute of the EC see Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution*, p. 189-226

²¹⁵ Pleven (UDSR), President of the Council, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7119I, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7220II

²¹⁶ Mendés-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4428I, see also, Art. 27 in the Draft Statute of the EC, in: Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution*, p. 197

²¹⁷ See Art. 33 and 34 in the Draft Statute of the EC, in: Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution*, p. 199

²¹⁸ Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7194II

²¹⁹ Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7122II

²²⁰ Jaquet (PS) in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 627I

²²¹ Jaquet (PS) in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 627I, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5201I

ments.²²² Sixthly, a formal, but none the less severe criticism was that the treaty was unlimited in time and that there were no exit clauses. That would bind future generations and future French parliaments, which obviously raised a compatibility problem with the doctrine of the sovereignty of this institution.²²³ In addition, the EPC was clearly designed as the first European constitution, it was drafted in this sense and would have given the Six a truly federal supranational level of governance. However, the time was not ripe for such a step. With the rejection of the EDC by the Assemblée Nationale in August 1954, nothing could save the EPC.²²⁴ Another severe criticism was that of ‘little Europe’. More effort, it was said across the political spectrum, should have been put into getting more European states to sign up to the integration process. The Europe of the Six missed Britain and Scandinavia, to say nothing of Eastern Europe.²²⁵ The possibility of a widening of the gap between the Six and the other 12 OEEC states was often used to underline that.²²⁶ For many parliamentarians the European ideal embraced the whole of Europe. The “little Europe” of the Six was simply too small.²²⁷ The least one had to do was to keep the door open for the accession of other European countries, which was done.²²⁸ The EEC and Euratom were no exception to that and one always hoped for an early accession of Britain.²²⁹ Keeping the door open would also give hope to Eastern Europe in the prospect that one day they would be members of this European community.²³⁰ As a long-term perspective the European Community should, therefore, become comprehensive for all Europe.²³¹ Out of the criticism of ‘little Europe’ grew one of the strongest arguments for supranationalism. Firstly, it was manifestly very hard to get the 18 OEEC countries – the biggest existing European framework – to agree on anything. Secondly, the efficiency and effectiveness of a supranational authority, such as the High Authority under Jean Monnet, became obvious early on.²³² Particularly Euro-enthusiasts

²²² Triboulet (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 628II

²²³ Noël (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p.5203I

²²⁴ Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution*, p. 93-94, 165

²²⁵ Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 589II

²²⁶ Viard (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5960II, see also, Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7194II

²²⁷ Bonnefous, (UDSR), President of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5919II

²²⁸ Naegelen (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 9001I

²²⁹ See quotation from the speech of the President of the Council of January 31st, 1956, in: Gouin (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 5/7/56, p. 3253II, see also, Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 213II, 214II

²³⁰ Bonnefous (UDSR), President of the Foreign Policy Commission, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8918II

²³¹ Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3375I

²³² Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5942I

suggested that supranationalism was the one practical concept to make the 'new Europe' work.²³³ None of the old intergovernmental procedures had delivered integration results in past decades.²³⁴

Nevertheless, intergovernmental procedure was precisely what the mainly Gaullist concept of 'Europe des patries' fell back on.²³⁵ It was based on a strong scepticism against 'Europhoria'.²³⁶ In their eyes Europe was not a political reality. It was only an ideal.²³⁷ If at all, con-federal structure, leaving national sovereignty intact, should be used to organise Europe, according to the Gaullists.²³⁸

The Gaullists saw a supranational Europe as a threat to French independence, sovereignty and to its cultural divergence, customs, habits and peculiarities which finally found their reflections in the stately arrangements of France.²³⁹ "The French people want to get on with other people, but they want to stay French."²⁴⁰ In de Gaulle's mind, the only political reality was the nation states.²⁴¹ Michel Debré countered the argument that World War II had discredited the nation state by saying that it had indeed discredited nationalism, but not the nation which was an organically grown historical fact.²⁴² Europe should be built on the reliable strength of the nation states, which had to be the constituent parts of such a Europe which in turn had to serve the needs of the nations.²⁴³ That became the basis of the Gaullist idea of Europe, summed up in the expression of 'Europe des patries'.²⁴⁴ More moderate voices in the French Chamber agreed that the nation state was the current political reality. It was also the expression of the national differences between the peoples of Europe and by ruthless judgment of history the most effec-

²³³ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7331I

²³⁴ René Mayer (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5307II

²³⁵ Triboulet (RS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3368II, Ultimately, this found its reflection in the later Luxembourg compromise which allows for a national veto in the Council in matters of extraordinary national importance. see Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 446

²³⁶ Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8934II

²³⁷ Triboulet (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5335II

²³⁸ Triboulet (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5336I

²³⁹ Krieger (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8912I

²⁴⁰ Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 578I, original: « Les Français veulent bien s'entendre avec les autre peuple, mais ils veulent rester des Français. », see also, Cot (RS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 22/1/57, p. 201I-II

²⁴¹ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 136, see also, Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 110

²⁴² Quotation speech of Michel Debré in the French Senate, November 1953, in: Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5332II, see also, Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p.109-10, see also, Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 137

²⁴³ Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8937I

²⁴⁴ Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/10/54, p. 4671II, see also, Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 155, see also, Charles G. Cogan, *Charles de Gaulle, A Brief Biography with Documents*, St. Martin's Press, Boston, 1996, p. 136

tive way of administering them.²⁴⁵ However, there was always the possibility of change, not least through politically shaping reality.²⁴⁶ Robert Schuman pointed that out: “[European] Political unity does not mean the absorption of the nation.”²⁴⁷ The Gaullist ideology of *Europe des patries* was seen by the Socialists as dangerous neo-nationalism.²⁴⁸ Conservative realists came to the same conclusion: “(...) that ‘Europe des patries’ must not be confused with the ‘Europe of states’.”²⁴⁹ National isolation of this type was no option when cooperation was the only way to provide for need and ultimately the survival of the European peoples.²⁵⁰

The one thing that could politically justify a common political structure for different peoples living together under one authority was federalism such as in Switzerland, for example.²⁵¹ However, there was no sign of the introduction of such a thing on a European scale.²⁵²

“Federation would be compatible neither with our particular situation nor with the common [European] interests: Federation is characterised by the existence of an agency superior to the States which are placed under its authority, and which takes over part of their internal sovereignty, while wielding exclusively the exercise of external sovereignty.”²⁵³

As this quotation of Maurice Schmann shows, federation was not even supported by Euro-Enthusiasts. Following his ideas, Europe and the European institutional structure were something new. And the fact that no one yet knew how it would work did not mean that it would not work, it was indeed the hallmark of the new. Rather than trying to find easy answers in old concepts one had to work hard on new solutions for present problems. The political structure would result from

²⁴⁵ Quotation of Robert Schuman, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, p. 171, see also, Robert Schuman, Pour l'Europe, p.23-4, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, p. 227

²⁴⁶ Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5332I-II

²⁴⁷ Quotation from the Charter for a unified Europe by Robert Schuman, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, Annex 2, p. 220, III.7, original : « L'unité politique ne signifie pas l'absorption de la nation. »

²⁴⁸ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5226I

²⁴⁹ Caillemer (IPay), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3681II, original: « (...) cette Europe des patries, il ne faut pas la confondre avec l'Europe des Etats. »

²⁵⁰ Albert-Sorel (IPay), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3692I

²⁵¹ See Gaborit (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5280II

²⁵² Monteil (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 586II, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 682I

²⁵³ Maurice Schumann (MRP), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5361II, original: « Une fédération ne serait pas, elle non plus, compatible ni avec notre situation particulière, ni avec les intérêts communs. La fédération se caractérise en effet par l'existence d'un organisme supérieur aux États placés sous son autorité, et qui, tout en absorbant une partie de leur souveraineté intérieure, se réserve, à titre exclusif, l'exercice de leur souveraineté extérieure. »

that.²⁵⁴ Founded on this assumption, one realisation was that limited and specialised integration seemed to work, e.g. the ECSC. Such communities had their own institutions and could work as independent entities. The conclusion was to use this model as a blueprint for other limited integration efforts such as the EDC and only put an overarching political authority in place only when those limited communities added up to a European whole.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Maurice Schumann (MRP), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5361I-II

²⁵⁵ Monteil (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 585II, see in particular Economic Security/ECSC and EEC

2.3 Military Security

This chapter will be divided in two main sections. Firstly, I am going to sketch out important aspects of the Cold War, under East-West Antagonism, which had an impact on European defences. In the second part, I am going to have a closer look at these European defence arrangements, under 'Integrated Defences'.

2.3.1 East-West Antagonism

The developing Cold War was a whole new ball game to past centuries. France was in the West, no doubt, but the major decisions were neither taken in Paris nor in Berlin. Not only mindful backbench Deputies realised that where once France and Germany were the main protagonists, during the Cold War they became minor players in the conflict between the superpowers.¹

The Soviet Threat

This scenario posed America as the great ally and the USSR as the great threat.² Nevertheless, the memory of German invasion weighed heavily and it was a fairly common argument that one should not lose sight of the danger of a revived German militarism while dealing with the immediate Soviet threat. Right-wing parliamentarians in particular, were suspicious as to the possible benefits of the Soviet threat for Germany.³

More moderate voices argued that it was precisely this fear of invasion which should be a reason for making the best preparations to prevent it from happening again, this time at the hands of the Soviets.⁴ However, one particular component of

¹ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7326III, see also, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6285II

² Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6327III, see also, Gouin (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5222I

³ The best part of all arguments warning of the German threat has already been dealt with under War Experience/War Consequences/ Allied Responsibility and the German threat. Most of these arguments were repeated in parliament in reference to the Soviet threat and the resulting German rearmament debate

⁴ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7326III, , see also, Bastid (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7231II

the Soviet threat lay in the fear of an alliance between Germany and Russia.⁵ The early rearmament of East Germany by the Soviets raised such anxieties in the West, because it combined Soviet military might with German military prowess.⁶ The government clearly recognised an element of fear in the Soviet strategy of rearming the East Germans.⁷ However, this time the East Germans were only the tool in Stalin's hands.

Soviet imperialism was seen as the main source for tension in the world, proven in the Korean War.⁸ It was seen as the trigger to set in motion the overwhelming number of Soviet conventional forces. Soviet Russia had never scaled down the Red Army back to a peacetime level.⁹ Between 150 and 180 divisions were considered to be ready for immediate action.¹⁰ Up to 500 war-time Russian divisions were mentioned.¹¹ The USSR had the longest national service in the world.¹² And it spent at its height 18.5% of the budget on national defence.¹³

Actual quantification of the Soviet threat was as unreliable as in the other Western countries.¹⁴ However, the territorial conquests of the USSR spread fear as well as a general feeling of insecurity in France.¹⁵ The submission of Eastern European countries under direct Communist rule heightened the feeling of aggressive expansionism from the East. Warning voices – mainly with a Socialist background and connections¹⁶ – raised the spectre that the application of subversion, terror and brute force in the process of sovietisation in Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, were a blueprint for the rest of Europe.¹⁷

1953 held the chance for change in the East or, at least, not to have West Europe see the same fate as the East:

⁵ For a closer analysis of the possibility of a post war alliance between West Germany and Soviet Russia see German Rearmament

⁶ Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7187II, 7188I, see also, Plevin (UDSR), President of the Council, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7220I, see also, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 580II

⁷ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6231III

⁸ Scherer (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7182I

⁹ Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4449I-II

¹⁰ Moch (PS), Defence Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7180II

¹¹ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6250I

¹² See Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7174I, between two and four years depending on the service branch

¹³ See Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7174I, the USA spent 5.9% of the budget on defence

¹⁴ See Military Security/East-West Antagonism/The Soviet Threat in the German and the British chapters

¹⁵ Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7175I

¹⁶ See National Security/Ideas and Ideology/The Socialist International

¹⁷ René Schmitt (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5300I

“Since Stalin’s death Soviet policy has profoundly changed and now we can come to an understanding with the Kremlin’s new masters; you must give up all projects which have become an obstacle to effective negotiations.¹⁸ (...) Believing that, we have to pursue unwaveringly a double strategy, consisting, on the one hand, in showing the totalitarian forces that we remain resolved to resist any threat of intimidation or blackmail, by continuing, as is, alas, still necessary, the drive to equip our countries properly for their defence. On the other hand, we have to continue to put forward concrete and constructive proposals which will, if accepted, allow of the achievement of genuine détente.”¹⁹

In that respect, four-power talks seemed most promising. Despite their reservations against Communism, for French left-wing parties negotiations with the USSR seemed to hold the solution to the German problem, i.e reunification, disarmament and the settlement of territorial disputes.²⁰ If four-power talks did not work it would be clear to everyone that tension and conflict were due to Soviet intransigence.²¹ After numerous unsuccessful initiatives, 1955 was the year when things began to move and the heads of government of the four Allied powers met for the first time in ten years.²² The meeting was unsuccessful, and the perception that ‘co-existence’ was just another word for the continuation of the drive towards ‘world revolution’ was confirmed, in the second half of the 1950s.²³ Therefore, nothing came of the well-meaning intentions to reduce tension between the blocs, neither after Stalin’s death in 1953 nor in 1955.

The easy way out of this Cold War dilemma would be to side with neither of the developing antagonistic camps.²⁴ However, neutrality in any form and shape was finally regarded as intending to divide the West. For the majority of Deputies,

¹⁸ The particular reference to an obstacle for East-West understanding is German membership of WEU, see Moch (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6741I

¹⁹ Jaquet (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5200I, original : « depuis la mort de Stalin, la politique soviétique s’est profondément modifiée et il est désormais possible de s’entendre avec les nouveaux dirigeants du Kremlin ; abandonnez donc vos projets qui deviennent désormais un obstacle à une négociation véritable. (...) Nous devons, à mon sens, poursuivre sans relâche un effort qui consiste, d’une part à montrer aux forces totalitaires que nous sommes toujours décidés à résister à toute menace d’intimidation ou de chantage, en poursuivant la mise, en état de défense, hélas ! encore nécessaire, de nos nations, d’autre part à présenter sans nous lasser des propositions concrètes et constructives qui permettraient, si elles étaient acceptées, de créer une détente véritable.»

²⁰ Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7194I

²¹ Monteil (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 588I, see also, Britain/War Experience/The hope for a peaceful future/The German Question

²² Edgar Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/6/55, p. 3178I

²³ See Maurice Faure (Independent), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 30/4/59, p. 398II

²⁴ Naegelen (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 633II

neutrality was not considered a serious option against the Soviet threat.²⁵ The proposal for the neutralisation of Germany – to be guaranteed under international law and by all the Allies including the USSR – for the sake of European peace also had some advocates.²⁶ But, again, neutralist tendencies in Germany – mainly under Gustav Heinemann – were not considered constructive or realistic.²⁷ They were fostered by the Soviet Union dangling the bait of a reunited Germany.²⁸ It was, however, widely accepted that, once neutralised, Germany would in fact fall gradually under Soviet tutelage²⁹, leaving France the next victim on this road of Soviet expansion.³⁰ The resolve settled in that, faced with the Soviet threat, one should not flinch. Among Deputies with government experience the opinion was popular that the action in Korea and the Berlin air lift showed that Soviet aggression could be stopped if the West formed a united front.³¹ Mainly in the conservative centre-right of the Assemblée Nationale, French rearmament which was predominantly dealt with in connection Western or European military integration, was also justified on the grounds of arriving at a position of strength to finally reach the stage where negotiations with the Soviets would be constructive, because there was no prospect for them to win the war.³²

The Nuclear Age

The nuclear age brought a number of new developments. One of them was nuclear naval engines.³³ Particularly in the field of nuclear-powered submarines, this new development was ground-breaking.³⁴ These new types of vessels could deliver nuclear warheads close to the target remaining effectively undetectable, which

²⁵ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7330III, see also, Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 620I

²⁶ Cot (URR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7181I, 7205I, 7206I

²⁷ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7126I, see also, Germany/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/Rearmament

²⁸ Schuman (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6810I

²⁹ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7205I, see also, Monteil (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 587I

³⁰ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7326III, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7207I

³¹ Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 621I

³² Fredet (PRL), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7202II, see also, Bastid (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7215I

³³ Brusset (RS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3113II

³⁴ See Louis Armand, Committee for nuclear equipment, in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/56, p. 3269I, see also, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 49

made them a very important component of the nuclear attack potential and the defensive deterrence. Another new weapon was of course the nuclear bomb itself. Military experts in the Assemblée were agreed that the existence of such weapons seemed to render conventional forces completely useless. In the event of a nuclear conflict, these troops would be destroyed almost instantly.³⁵

Hence, the American nuclear shield was recognised as the main guarantee against Soviet invasion for France and, indeed, all Western Europe.³⁶ It gave western defences the psychological credibility which they did not have in conventional forces.³⁷ The corresponding NATO strategy of nuclear defence for Western Europe caused, however, outrage across the political spectrum. Using the bomb, effectively meant destroying Europe and with it the territories of allied powers, not least of France.³⁸

When the Soviets also acquired their nuclear strike force, the picture became even more grim in that even nuclear deterrence was no longer a comprehensive guarantee against the Soviets. The US had to consider nuclear retaliation as soon as it released nuclear weapons against Soviet targets. The Sputnik shock, which showed that the Soviet Union had the first intercontinental rocket delivery system, drove home the message that America was not invincible.³⁹ This posed grave questions for European security and cast the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella into doubt. What American President would take the responsibility for retaliation with nuclear weapons, if only Europe were attacked and the US itself were not threatened?⁴⁰ Hence, merely by their existence, Soviet nuclear weapons had the potential to split the Western alliance. This dilemma was another factor which convinced France to develop its own nuclear capability.⁴¹ Equally important to develop French nuclear weapons was the Soviet threat of a nuclear bombardment of Paris during the Suez crisis, which made the vulnerability of

³⁵ See Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4436II

³⁶ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7124I, see also, Montel (PRL), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7180I

³⁷ Quote from a speech by Marshal Montgomery, in Duclos (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6710II

³⁸ Rosenblat (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7351I, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 678I

³⁹ Villon (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3699II, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 13

⁴⁰ Jean Doise, Maurice Vaïsse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 541, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 31

⁴¹ See Cogniot (PC), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3120II, The actual decision to develop French nuclear weapons was taken in 1954. see Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 93

France obvious. In addition, American refusal to share nuclear secrets with France was not well received. It was taken as another sign that America treated one of its oldest allies not as an equal.⁴²

Although France had committed itself to a solely peaceful utilisation of nuclear research before the United Nations in 1946⁴³, calls for a French A-bomb were never really silenced among defence experts in parliament.⁴⁴ France felt in a position of weakness, because it neither had nuclear arms nor the necessary delivery system.⁴⁵

“(…) those who have nuclear arms will [have them] above all to serve their own interest. There will be states which have the atomic bomb (which won't use it among themselves). There will be states which do not have the atomic bomb and they will be the nuclear battlefields. We need our atomic weapons, for our own security, for our negotiations. We need, for ourselves, our own possibility of an atomic response.”⁴⁶

De Gaulle fully agreed with this analysis. The establishment of the French nuclear strike force was therefore not primarily seen as of military importance, but judged on its political implications, which essentially meant to give France more freedom of action on the international stage by taking it back into the circle of great powers.⁴⁷ His rationale was simple: “France is a great power; all great powers have nuclear weapons; therefore France must have them.”⁴⁸ That did not mean that France wanted to rival the superpowers.⁴⁹ In the end the small French nuclear strike force was expensive enough.⁵⁰ However, France *was* one of the leading Western powers. Not just the aspiration, but the claim to this status was embodied

⁴² Conte (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3673I, see also, Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 599, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 16

⁴³ Gouin (PS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/56, p. 3256II

⁴⁴ See Moch (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6740I

⁴⁵ Chelha (UNR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 30/4/59, p. 395II

⁴⁶ Quotation of General Georges Catroux in the Defence Council of the French government on 10 September 1954, in: Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 93

⁴⁷ Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 595, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 94, see also, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 45, 47, 237, after coming into office de Gaulle, however, suspended the nuclear cooperation between France, Italy and Germany. see p. 227, 234, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 148

⁴⁸ Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 411, quoted from Pierre Messmer – then Defence Minister - in an interview with Williams, 3 April 1992

⁴⁹ Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 51

⁵⁰ de Chevigné (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6755I

by the General and the *force de frappe* was the proof of this leading position, for all the world to see in the first French nuclear test in the Sahara in 1960.⁵¹

German Rearmament

There were clearly very serious concerns about German rearmament among French Deputies. Apart from serious doubts about German reliability, militarism and extreme nationalism⁵², which has been shown to be very much at the fore of the French perception of post-war threats, there were some more worries connected to the issue of German rearmament.

Firstly, it seemed unwise in the Cold War context to give all the trump cards to the Soviet Union in that the Soviet Union alone could take off the military pressure from the German Eastern frontier. It could stop the influx of refugees by stopping the expulsions. It could free the prisoners of war who were still held in labour camps. It could resituate Germany's traditional markets in the East.⁵³ And it could finally give back the lost territories in the East⁵⁴ and facilitate German reunification.⁵⁵ All these reasons would make the West German government think very seriously about changing sides if the Soviet Union asked it, and they surely would.⁵⁶ If West Germany had an army by that point, this might turn into the greatest military disaster the West had seen, uniting the Red Army with the Wehrmacht.⁵⁷ The Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939 was only the most striking example that this was not at all impossible.

Secondly, the old grudge against America from the time of occupation rule was still there, when the US pushed through the German economic emancipation while France still tried to keep the lid on.⁵⁸ This time in the rearmament debate, the

⁵¹ Sportisse (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4620II, 4621I, The Sahara was the last military connection to the Algerian conflict. Because of its importance for the French nuclear arms programme the Sahara was split off Algeria and France kept certain privileges, in particular over its nuclear research facilities in the area. This was a *sine qua non* for Algerian independence. see Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 103

⁵² See War Experience/War Consequences/Allied Responsibility and the German threat

⁵³ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4575I

⁵⁴ Terrenoire (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6252I, see also, Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7217I

⁵⁵ Barrès (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 687II, see also, Viallet (RS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 192I

⁵⁶ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4575II

⁵⁷ Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7187I, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6777I

⁵⁸ See War Experience/War Consequences/Occupational Rule in Germany

Americans were again forgetting about French security and the internal power balance in Europe. Extreme views in the Assemblée suggested that they were only interested in the number of German divisions to replace theirs', reviving German militarism.⁵⁹ With American backing, the German army might become the main continental European military force.⁶⁰ And among the same Deputies, there were some worries about a 'Bonn- Washington Axis' which would leave France isolated in Europe.⁶¹

Thirdly, serious doubts were raised in that the new German Wehrmacht would inevitably be manned by those best qualified, i.e. former Nazi soldiers. These were clearly not the people France wanted to see back in military positions, again. Quite a few of them were already serving in the Foreign Legion, though. More worrying than the individuals mentioned above was, however, that Germany referred to them as 'their soldiers' in the protests against them serving in the Foreign Legion, for example. All alarm bells rang when German claims for equality arrived – one of Hitler's most important political claims on the international stage of the inter-war years – which meant equal rights and representation in the high command of any future coalition army.⁶² Germany envisaged a standing army of 500,000 men⁶³, with 2,000,000 reservists and an all-German general staff on top⁶⁴, which was regarded among the political establishment out of the question.⁶⁵ Particularly the general staff had been not only a military instrument, but had exercised also political powers. It had never been used beneficially, neither for the German people nor for its neighbours and it was certainly a threat to democracy.⁶⁶

Fourthly, the reaction of the USSR to a German rearmament was unpredictable and likely to be hostile.⁶⁷ "(...) German rearmament is perhaps tomorrow's war; it is certainly a problem in the immediate future."⁶⁸ A militarily charged atmosphere

⁵⁹ Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4438I

⁶⁰ Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 5791I, 580I, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4437II

⁶¹ de Chambrun, (RP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4617I

⁶² Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7175II

⁶³ 400,000 in the Army, 80,000 in the Air Force, and 20,000 in the Navy, see Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/10/54, p. 4675I

⁶⁴ Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5296I-II, as a comparison the Versailles Treaty allowed a German army of 100,000 men under arms.

⁶⁵ Bastid (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7214I, see also, Moch (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 616II

⁶⁶ Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7143II, see also, Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7191I, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 30, see also, Charles de Gaulle, *La Discorde chez l'ennemi*, Paris, Pion, 1934, nouvelle édition, 1972

⁶⁷ Pierre André (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9006I

⁶⁸ Cot (URR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7179II, original: « le réarmement de l'Allemagne c'est peut-être la guerre demain ; certainement la difficulté dans l'avenir immédiat ; »

was not considered to increase general security.⁶⁹ It was thought that the least the USSR would do was to set up a number of troops in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany equal to the ones mustered in the West.⁷⁰

In France, all the previous arguments were thought to be quite strong reasons that the West should better keep West Germany impotent, at least militarily.⁷¹ However, the straightforward question was posed mainly by the Americans that, if France did not want German troops, how should Germany be defended? If the French decided to do it themselves, there would be consequences, such as a four-year compulsory military service for Frenchmen⁷² while young Germans could follow business careers and stand by idle, in the event of war. This was unacceptable for responsible politicians.⁷³ As a result, the French position slowly shifted from an outright rejection of a German army to a reluctant toleration under certain conditions.⁷⁴ The German rejection of a national army was the first step from the German side towards a European solution of the security problem and was also suited to build up trust on the French side. This effort was well recognised in France and was seen as a basis of cooperation by the government.⁷⁵ The conclusion reached, was that West Germany could not be defended without German troops.⁷⁶ With this change of attitude the French isolation among the other NATO members – resulting from France's uncompromising rejection of German rearmament – was broken.⁷⁷

2.3.2 Integrated Defences

In real terms, 'Integrated Defence' was, from the perspective of France and the other European nation states, the recognition that apart from the superpowers

⁶⁹ Daladier (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7198II, see also, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5297II, 5298II

⁷⁰ Cot (URR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7181I, see also, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6825I

⁷¹ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 583I, see also, de Chambrun (URR), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 26/3/54, p. 1321I, see also, Barrès (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 687II

⁷² See Roclore (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7212II, see also, Moch (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 618II

⁷³ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7124II, see also, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4576I-II

⁷⁴ See Integrated Defences/The European Defence Community (EDC)

⁷⁵ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 575I

⁷⁶ Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7192I, 12 German divisions were agreed, i.e. 6 armoured / 300 tanks, and 6 infantry / 12.500 men, plus a tactical air force of 75.000 men, in: Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/2/52, p. 590I,

⁷⁷ See Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7124I see also, Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 621II

none could afford the immense costs of a modern military.⁷⁸ No European nation state could defend itself on its own anymore.⁷⁹ The French government agreed that to make the defence of their territories effective, the Europeans had to come together under a common defence scheme which would share out the costs and which would effectively split up the tasks.⁸⁰ The US had realised that, too, and had hence always pushed hard for European integration, which would give the European nation states a solid economic basis, so that they could make a meaningful contribution towards European defences.⁸¹

The Brussels Treaty

The 1948 Brussels Treaty was the first step into that direction. It remained true to the defensive character of the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty⁸², but, particularly on the far Left there were serious doubts about its ultimate purpose.

“Through concluding the military pact of Brussels with Great Britain and the Benelux countries you have signed a formal alliance of a completely different nature. It is no longer exclusively directed against Germany. An Anti-Soviet bloc is being put together in the world and you have happily agreed to join it.”⁸³

The Brussels Treaty became a precautionary measure against Soviet expansionism, instead of a security pact against Germany, which the the Dunkirk Treaty had been.⁸⁴ At the time, it was the first concrete European integration effort.⁸⁵ And it

⁷⁸ Sec, Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 695I

⁷⁹ Gouin (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5222I

⁸⁰ Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 696I

⁸¹ Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6308I, see also, Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7125I, 7126I

⁸² W. E. Beckett, *The North Atlantic Treaty, The Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations*, Stevens & Sons, London, 1950, p. 23-4, for the text of the Dunkerque Treaty see appendix 2, p. 48-50, for the text of the Brussels treaty see appendix 4, p. 59-64

⁸³ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7353III, original : « En concluant, avec l'Angleterre et le Benelux, le pacte militaire de Bruxelles, vous avez signé une alliance formulée d'une manière tout à fait nouvelle. Elle n'était plus seulement dirigée contre l'Allemagne. Un bloc antisoviétique se constituant dans le monde, vous avez accepté allégrement d'en faire partie. », see also, Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6692I

⁸⁴ Billotte (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6640I, see also, W. E. Beckett, *The North Atlantic Treaty, The Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations*, p. 18-20

was also the preliminary step to the larger Western integration effort of the Atlantic Alliance.⁸⁶

The Atlantic Alliance

As the biggest component of the Western defence network, NATO was seen, by most deputies, as the solution to the European security problem.⁸⁷ Its defensive nature was stressed over and over again, in particular by the government.⁸⁸ This strategic concept was based on the political commitment of all the participants to use their forces for the defence of any other partner in the case of aggression, although each state retained discretion as to the scale of its commitment.⁸⁹

This alliance would ultimately include Germany⁹⁰, which meant that the old strategies such as peripheral defence had to be dropped, i.e. holding defensive positions on the fringes of Europe, such as Britain, Spain and North Africa for an eventual re-conquest, was no longer seen as credible.⁹¹ In reference to the defence of mainland Europe, there was another rationale at work, particularly on the Socialist benches: The defence imperative arose from the Soviet military threat. The Socialists did not deny this, but they were rather uneasy about the reason behind it, which was generally given as Soviet aggression. They tried to rationalise Soviet security concerns and would have preferred a course more open to discussion and understanding with the East instead of a black-and-white picture which painted the USSR as the enemy.⁹² Despite these efforts for understanding of the Soviets or rather because of their failure, the inclusion of West Germany into the Western defence system became acceptable. Shifting NATO borderlines from the Rhine to the Elbe meant that Germany would be the main battleground, but

⁸⁵ Billotte (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6640I

⁸⁶ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7354I, for a closer analysis of the Brussels Treaty see Britain/Military Security/Integrated Defences/The Brussels Treaty

⁸⁷ de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 600I, see also, Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 512, for the text of the North Atlantic Treaty see W. E. Beckett, *The North Atlantic Treaty, The Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations*, appendix 5, p. 65-9

⁸⁸ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4573II

⁸⁹ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 576I

⁹⁰ Acheson, US Secretary of State, in a meeting of the Atlantic Council in September 1950, in: Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 589II, see also, de Beaumont (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 615I

⁹¹ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7124I, see also, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 9002II

⁹² See for example Daniel Mayer (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7194I

also that either French soldiers would have to defend German territory⁹³, or that there would have to be a German army.⁹⁴

Under the impression of the unfolding Korean War, the US had demanded ten German divisions to relieve US troops in Europe and strengthen European defences.⁹⁵ Recruitment was to take place under NATO auspices. However, the French vetoed it and instead suggested a supranational army, i.e. the European Defence Community (EDC)⁹⁶, because in the early 1950s the admission of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance was still inconceivable for the French government.⁹⁷ The main argument used by all political factions was Germany's territorial claims in the East, which were irreconcilable with the defensive nature of NATO.⁹⁸ A more subtle one was the fear that NATO membership would hand Germany the permission to develop and own nuclear arms.⁹⁹ Another one was that by taking Germany into NATO one had to concede a national German army, because they were the constituting elements of NATO. However, a national army for Germany was clearly unacceptable across the political spectrum, too.¹⁰⁰

The rejection of German NATO membership changed in 1952 when the Assemblée Nationale accepted the final aim, in principle, of bringing Germany into NATO.¹⁰¹ Apart from the French fear of German military resurgence within NATO, the American commitment to Europe was appreciated in France. The Atlantic Link meant that an attack on Europe would include American forces, which would trigger all-out war.¹⁰² That was the most effective deterrence and although there were some isolationist tendencies in the US which pleaded for

⁹³ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7203II ; If one took this assumption one step further, as some opposition Deputies on the Right and Left did, it meant that French soldiers could end up in a situation where they were defending Germany's old claims in the East. See Rosenblatt (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6282III

⁹⁴ Monteil (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6316I, see also, Cot (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6324I

⁹⁵ Barrès (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 690I-II

⁹⁶ Barrès (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 687I

⁹⁷ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6324III

⁹⁸ Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7176II

⁹⁹ Gouin (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5224I, see also, Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4438I

¹⁰⁰ Mutter (IPay), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7226I, see also, de Félice (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5339I

¹⁰¹ See Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/10/54, p. 4670II

¹⁰² Soustelle (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9007II-9008I

'bringing the boys home'¹⁰³, the lessons from the inter war years had been learned, i.e. to preserve peace in Europe, America had to stay there in force.¹⁰⁴

NATO turned out to be an effective barrier to Soviet expansionism.¹⁰⁵ However, in de Gaulle NATO found its fiercest critic. He thought that NATO's purpose was to subordinate Europe militarily to the US.¹⁰⁶ In doing so it establishes the US as the hegemonial power of the West, just like the SU for the East. In his eyes, however, defence was a sovereign task of the nation state. To put it in de Gaulle's words: "(...) the defence of France must be French."¹⁰⁷ More critically, he was convinced that whoever determines the defence of a country determines its politics, because this is what constitutes the freedom to act.¹⁰⁸ From this basis it is obvious that France could not accept NATO's integrated command structure. However, de Gaulle was also very clear on that France would stick to the Western alliance if the unlikely case arose that the East attacked.¹⁰⁹

Despite such controversy about the purpose of NATO, and despite its importance for French security it did not nearly receive the same attention in parliament, which the following European Defence Community got.

The European Defence Community (EDC)

Germany was again the first and main concern: "Perhaps the Americans will suggest to us, surely not a German army (...), but perhaps German collaboration in a European army commanded by a French, American or British general."¹¹⁰ Following Churchill's initiative, the Council of Europe had discussed the proposal for a European army from the 9th to the 11th August 1950.¹¹¹ The French government under René Pleven faced isolation among the NATO allies, with its

¹⁰³ Daladier (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7196II, see reference to Herbert Hoover in: Reynaud (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 9002II

¹⁰⁴ de Beaumont (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 613I

¹⁰⁵ René Mayer (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4448I

¹⁰⁶ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 134

¹⁰⁷ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 161, original : "(...) la défense de la France soit française.", see also p. 165, see also, Jean Doise, Maurice Vaïsse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 584

¹⁰⁸ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 158

¹⁰⁹ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 160, 162, 165, 169

¹¹⁰ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6250II, original: « Peut-être nous proposeront-ils [les Américains], non certes une armée allemande (...), mais peut-être une collaboration allemande à une armée européenne sous le commandement d'un général français, américain ou britannique. »

¹¹¹ See recommendation of the Council of Europe of 11th August 1950, see also, Quotation from René Pleven, President of the Council, in: Serre (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7120II

uncompromising rejection of German rearmament.¹¹² And it found the solution to the German problem and the defence imperative in the European army.¹¹³ “I propose the creation of a European army, for common defence, which would be attached to the political institutions of Europe.”¹¹⁴ The first and foremost concern of the Pleven Plan was to combine the American call for a German military contribution with the prevention of independent German rearmament.¹¹⁵

The critics of the European army were often the same who had previously displayed a deep distrust against the Germans.¹¹⁶ They did not buy into to distinction drawn up by Europhile deputies that the German soldier would be turned into a European soldier. They were and would remain Germans, with or without a European superstructure.¹¹⁷

Robert Schuman realised that particularly because of the old outstanding problems between France and Germany, the European army project would have to develop a spirit along the lines of ‘European patriotism’ in order to fulfil its defence purpose.¹¹⁸ On the Gaullist side of the parliament the government initiatives in this direction were questioned and Gaullist deputies remained rather doubtful whether it could be done at all.¹¹⁹ What would those European soldiers fight for? Where was the common ideal?¹²⁰ The nation, one’s own country and family had been good reasons to fight for. From the French revolution onwards this had been considered the psychological backbone of any successful army. In the Gaullist’s eyes, a European army would have none of this, which must render it ineffective or at least less effective than national forces.¹²¹ It would also turn soldiers into mere fighting machines in contrast to responsible citizens wearing a uniform for good

¹¹² See S. Dockrill, *Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955*, CUP, Cambridge, 1991, p. 35-6, see also, E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community – A History*, Macmillan, London, 1980, p. 78-87

¹¹³ Pleven (UDSR), President of the Council, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7118II

¹¹⁴ Pleven (UDSR), President of the Council, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7119I, original: « Je propose la création, pour la défense commune, d’une armée européenne rattachée aux de institutions politiques de l’Europe. »

¹¹⁵ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l’Europe*, p. 121, 128, 129; for a reference to the extra-parliamentary negotiation process leading to EDC see E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, part II, for the hopeful phase, i.e. in which it seemed likely that problems could be overcome and the Treaty would be ratified, up to the signing of the Treaty on 27 May 1952, see Ch. 4

¹¹⁶ See War Experience/War Consequences/Allied Responsibility and the German threat

¹¹⁷ de Chambrun (URR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7182II

¹¹⁸ See quotations of Robert Schuman in : Triboulet (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 628II, 629II

¹¹⁹ Triboulet (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 628II, see also, Billotte (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 653I

¹²⁰ de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5350I

¹²¹ Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 37

reasons.¹²² The bottom line was that defence, one of the noblest reasons for the existence of the state, must keep its vital link to the nation.¹²³ Because of that the underlying principle of the EDC - the abolition of national armies - was seen as a lethal threat to France itself by its opponents.¹²⁴

Firstly, there was no way out, if integration failed to tame the Germans. There would not be a French army and, therefore, no defence against a German danger in the future.¹²⁵ The fear of Germany becoming dominant within the EDC followed the same argument.¹²⁶

Secondly, the structural changes which the EDC meant to the French army came exactly when it needed to be firm and strong, faced with German rearmament. Therefore, a European army meant bringing a German army back and creating chaos in the French army.¹²⁷ This must inevitably lead to volatility and insecurity in Europe.¹²⁸

Thirdly, signing up to the European army effectively meant giving up French world power status, because it meant giving up the French army.¹²⁹

Fourthly, there were constitutional objections, e.g. under the Treaty the period of national service would be determined by the European authorities; the payment of the soldiers would also fall under their remit, which would take the budgetary right away from the French parliament. The generals would no longer be appointed by the president of the French Republic. And the mobilisation order would be given by the EDC.¹³⁰ In addition, the 50 years duration of the EDC treaty was considered too long, because it would bind future generations unduly.¹³¹

Fifthly, through membership in the EDC France would lose its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy, particularly overseas, mainly in the *Communauté Fran-*

¹²² de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 598I, 599I, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5349II, see also, Pierre Montel (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5334II, see also, Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 119

¹²³ de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 598II-599II, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5349II, see also, Billoux (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 699II

¹²⁴ Duclos (PC), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5300I

¹²⁵ Cot (URR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7181I, see also, André (PRL), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7223I

¹²⁶ Kuehn (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7201I, see also, Monteil (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 587I

¹²⁷ Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 586I

¹²⁸ Noël (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p.5204II

¹²⁹ Billotte (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 652I

¹³⁰ Lapie (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4416II, see also, Herriot (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4464II

¹³¹ Herriot (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4468I

çaise.¹³² From the outset, one of the French preconditions for a European army was that the German contingents in it would be smaller than the French corps.¹³³ This became impossible to uphold with the French military engagement in Indo-China drawing more and more troops to South-East Asia.¹³⁴ Hence, keeping 14 divisions in Europe under the EDC might have prevented France from discharging its responsibilities in its colonial holdings. Provisions to have national troops serving overseas, while the integrated French EDC contingents fulfilled their European duties were therefore written into the first draft of the Pleven Plan.¹³⁵ However, also right from the start critics thought that this concept would run into trouble for two reasons: on the one hand, it would split the French army into two kinds of troops – EDC and national forces – which would threaten the unity of the corps.¹³⁶ On the other hand, it must appear as a half-way house which essentially lacked the full commitment of France to European defence.¹³⁷ The implications for the *Communauté Française* became one of the main objections to the EDC. Sixthly, language was seen as one of the most serious technical problems in an integrated army.¹³⁸ Because of this, integration should take place only above divisional level, leaving the division as the basic combat unit under one tongue. However, for the opponents, that meant independent German divisions, which were big enough to pose a serious military threat to France.¹³⁹ Seventhly, the EDC did not just have military repercussions, but also threatened the economic and scientific independence of France, through the integration of research laboratories and the arms industries.¹⁴⁰ Finally, the issues of the European Defence Community and the French defeat in Indo-China are closely connected to America, its Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and ultimately to the French Defence minister René Pleven. Both were highly positive of the European Defence Community and they were seen

¹³² Barrès (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 688I, see also, Herriot (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4464II, see also, Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 120. For a closer analysis of the *Communauté Française* see National Security/Territorial Integrity/ The *Communauté Française*

¹³³ 14 French to 12 German divisions in Europe was agreed, see Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7188I, see also, Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4431I

¹³⁴ Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 590I-II

¹³⁵ Cayeux (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7221II, see also, Daladier (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 590I

¹³⁶ Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 577II, see also, Monteil (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 588II

¹³⁷ See Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7125II

¹³⁸ Billoux (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7218I

¹³⁹ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 582II

¹⁴⁰ Lapie (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4416II, 4419I

responsible for the defeat in Indochina, Pleven through his mismanagement¹⁴¹, America and Dulles by not showing solidarity with French troops, particularly at Diên Biên Phủ.¹⁴² When the EDC eventually came to a vote in the Assemblée Nationale, animosities against Pleven and resentment of America, which had put extensive pressure on the French government to ratify the EDC¹⁴³ had become reasons to vote against.

In addition, the opposition of Marshal Juin, the most highly decorated French officer in active service had a strong impact in the Assemblée Nationale.¹⁴⁴ His verdict was that the EDC would leave the French army and any future European army ineffective and highly inefficient. The army was hoping for a convergence towards the European defence force without the destruction of national military structures.¹⁴⁵

There were two constructive suggestions of the opponents of the Treaty. Firstly, one could imagine Germany participating in the defence of the Western world simply by financial means.¹⁴⁶ Secondly, stressing their idea of the nation as the basic constituent unit, the Gaullists suggested having national contingents under a unified command structure.¹⁴⁷

By that time, the EDC had developed into a fully fledged political argument with its own ideology, not least on the side of the supporters.

Firstly, for the most fervent advocates of the European defence solution the focus on German rearmament was the wrong way of putting the problem. It did not solve the French need for peace and security. The right answer would not be a 'No' to Germany, but a 'Yes' to Europe.¹⁴⁸ This was based on the reasoning of giving up

¹⁴¹ Christian Bougeard, *René Pleven*, p. 275

¹⁴² Discussions about an American aerial bombardment of the positions of Viet Minh fighters were finally aborted. See, Christian Bougeard, *René Pleven*, p. 267-9, see also Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 217

¹⁴³ John Foster Dulles had threatened an 'agonising reappraisal' of America's European defence arrangements, which effectively meant the withdrawal of American forces. See Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4435I, see also, Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 533, see also, E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, p. 230-4, see also, David Weigall, 'British perceptions of the European Defence Community', in: Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe – European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991, p. 96-8

¹⁴⁴ de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 599I, see also, Christian Bougeard, *René Pleven*, p. 261- 4, see also, Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France*, p. 532

¹⁴⁵ Christian Bougeard, *René Pleven*, p. 261

¹⁴⁶ André (PRL), in JO, 2ème Lég., 19/11/53, p. 5274I, see also, Aumeran (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4438II

¹⁴⁷ Billotte (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 653II

¹⁴⁸ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7207I, II

national armies completely and to create a complete merger of military forces, equipment and command structure.¹⁴⁹

The agonising 'equality of rights' argument was effectively finished in that under the EDC the Germans would have the same rights as all others.¹⁵⁰

Secondly, in realist terms this was a much safer way than having national armies facing each other. Germany would only have troops integrated into the EDC and none under exclusive national command. Hence, the EDC would avoid the risk of renewed German militarism.¹⁵¹ And the EDC arms control regime was seen as the one and only available instrument to properly supervise German rearmament.¹⁵²

Thirdly, the security of France and Western Europe was the main objective of the EDC. The strategic aim would be to prevent another invasion. And this could not be done by French forces alone.¹⁵³ The EDC was seen as the defensive alliance for France and Western Europe in conjunction with the Atlantic Alliance.

Fourthly, a lesson from recent history was used as a positive example of an integrated army. It was such an army which had re-conquered France from the Wehrmacht under the Allied high commander and an integrated command structure. This arrangement had not made a single French soldier fight less vigorously for the liberation of France. Neither would that be the case under the EDC, when the fight was about the defence of Europe and ultimately of France.¹⁵⁴ Countering Gaullist criticism, EDC supporters highlighted that after all the fatherland was only one reason why men had fought in the past. Other factors, such as great ideas, for example freedom, could be much more important.¹⁵⁵ That would obviously also apply in a fight of European defence troops versus a Soviet invader.

Fifthly, the issue of different languages was not seen as a major problem by the government. Practical experience in manoeuvres showed that given time, proper

¹⁴⁹ Plevin (UDSR), President of the Council, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7119I

¹⁵⁰ Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 697II

¹⁵¹ de Beaumont (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 12/2/52, p. 613I, see also, Mendés-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4434I

¹⁵² Maurice Schumann (MRP), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5358I-II,

¹⁵³ Edgar Faure (RRS), President of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 704I, 708I

¹⁵⁴ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 679II

¹⁵⁵ Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 13/2/52, p. 695II

organisation and the will and opportunity to work together, multinational combat teams worked well.¹⁵⁶

Sixthly, there was the positive example of working European integration. In the spirit of the ECSC, the EDC was not meant to be merely one of the classical alliances: "We constitute a community. That is something very different to a military alliance; that is different from a promise of assistance; that is different from the results of conversations between general staffs."¹⁵⁷ Politically it was meant to be one further step on the way to European unification.¹⁵⁸ The same European enthusiasm it was hoped would carry the EDC endeavour to the success its predecessor, the ECSC, was already showing.¹⁵⁹ In addition, the EDC would bring the German soldier into line, where the ECSC had already made the German coal and steel industry docile.¹⁶⁰

Seventhly, some saw prudence in Britain's hesitation to join the EDC.¹⁶¹ Britain's participation in the European military balance was, however, considered essential.¹⁶² The formal association of Britain with the EDC accounted for one of the main preconditions of the Socialist party to support the project.

Eighthly, was the EDC not just a matter of self-respect for the Europeans being able to mount their own defence? And would not that also prove them more worthy in the eyes of their American Allies?¹⁶³

Finally, the alternative to the EDC was an independent German army with their well known prowess. In any choice between that and a European army it had to be the latter.¹⁶⁴

All these arguments were developed in parliament over four years. More and more protocols, diplomatic exchanges and binding interpretations were tacked on to the original treaty.¹⁶⁵ To the dismay of Euro-enthusiasts, the seed of European idealism

¹⁵⁶ Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 696I

¹⁵⁷ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 576II, original: « Nous formons une communauté. C'est bien autre chose qu'une promesse d'assistance, autre chose que le résultat d'une conversation d'états-majors. »

¹⁵⁸ Plevin (UDSR), President of the Council, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7119II, see also, Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 576I, see also, Bidault (MRP), Vice-President of the Council and Defence Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 697II

¹⁵⁹ Scherer (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7183I

¹⁶⁰ Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4451II

¹⁶¹ Naegelen (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 630II

¹⁶² Montéil (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/2/52, p. 586II, see also, Moch (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/2/52, p. 617I

¹⁶³ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 679II

¹⁶⁴ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 681I

¹⁶⁵ For a detailed reference to all the protocols see E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, Ch. 5

soon disappeared under them.¹⁶⁶ With each of them, European idealism and the initial purpose of preventing a national German army, became more blurred.¹⁶⁷ The bill was rejected in the French chamber in its various versions several times. Ultimately, all the military and technical arguments had been exhausted.¹⁶⁸ The mass of deputies who made up the majority against the EDC came from the Communists and the Gaullists.¹⁶⁹ However, there were important exceptions, such as Edouard Herriot, former President of the Assemblée Nationale and highly respected elder statesman. His outburst against the EDC, in a strong parliamentary speech and in the very session when a final decision on the EDC was called, was a body blow.¹⁷⁰ To the applause, mainly from the extremes of the Assemblée Nationale, but also with considerable support from the more moderate Left and Right, Herriot said: “(...) for us this is not a question of detail; this is not a question of changing the commas; it is not a few words tacked on; for us this is a question of life and death for France.”¹⁷¹ This performance broke the back of the EDC treaty. Although Herriot rejected any idea that refusing the EDC could be interpreted as the rejection of Europe¹⁷², he shifted the balance from a government majority to defeat by taking his personal political following into opposition.¹⁷³ In personal terms, it was a huge disappointment to Mendès-France, then President of the Council, because Herriot was from the same party, the RRS, and one of the elders Mendès-France was dependent on and had looked to for support.¹⁷⁴ In addition, none of the seven former heads of government – all champions of the EDC – such as Paul Reynaud, Antoine Pinay, Robert Schuman and René Plevén mounted a proper defence for their brainchild.¹⁷⁵ Only the Socialists and the MRP

¹⁶⁶ See Lapie (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4419I, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 464

¹⁶⁷ The last two of those protocols under the Mendès-France government, firstly got rid of all the supranational elements in the treaty. Secondly, only troops stationed in Germany would become of the integrated type, which effectively meant that no German troops would be stationed on French soil. see Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 306, see also, E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, ‘The additional Protocols’, p. 207-9, see also, Ch. 8

¹⁶⁸ See quotation of statement of Plevén (UDSR), Defence Minister, in the Defence Committee in: de Monsabert (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 26/3/54, p. 1319I,II, see also, Plevén (UDSR), Defence Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 26/3/54, p. 1321II

¹⁶⁹ Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York, 2000, p. 416, see also, David Weigall, ‘British perceptions of the European Defence Community’, p. 97

¹⁷⁰ See Herriot (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4464I-4468II

¹⁷¹ Herriot (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4467I, original: « (...) pour nous, c’est n’est pas une question de détail, ce n’est pas un question de changement de virgule, ce n’est pas une addition de phrase ajoutée. Pour nous, c’est la question de la vie ou de la mort de la France. »

¹⁷² Herriot (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4467I

¹⁷³ See Christian Bougeard, *René Plevén*, p. 277

¹⁷⁴ See Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 314-5

¹⁷⁵ Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 315

voted for, which meant that it was rejected by 319 votes, with the absolute majority being at 292 deputies.¹⁷⁶ The EDC was rejected, this time for good.¹⁷⁷ Mendès-France refused to have his government broken up over this issue, like several others before.¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the non-ratification of the Treaty was regarded as a catastrophe. It did not just bring the European defence efforts to a standstill; it also dealt a serious blow to Franco-German rapprochement and to the credibility of the French government on the international stage.¹⁷⁹

Western European Union (WEU)¹⁸⁰

From the very outset, the fear that WEU, too, would be rejected by the French parliament was very palpable.¹⁸¹ The main reason was that problems of Western defence and the German question were still the same and were now solved within NATO, which meant the re-establishment of the loathed Wehrmacht.¹⁸²

After the rejection of the EDC, France's reorientation towards Britain was swift.¹⁸³ Britain promised a permanent commitment of forces on the continent, which was what France had tried to get for ages.¹⁸⁴ British troops would serve under the same

¹⁷⁶ See, voting list, in: JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4471I, 4473II-4474II, reactions in the chamber: "Hence, the Bill is rejected. (Loud applause on the extreme right, the extreme left, and various benches on the left and the right. - on these benches the MPs assemble and sing the Marseillaise. The members of government rise.", original: « En conséquence, le projet de loi [EDC Treaty] est rejeté. (Vifs applaudissements à l'extrême droite, à l'extrême gauche et sur divers bancs à gauche et à droite. – Sur ces bancs, les députés se lèvent et chantent La Marseillaise. MM. Les membre du Gouvernement se lèvent. », in : M. le président, in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4471I, see also, Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, p. 303, The loss of influence of the two major French parties, i.e. PS and MRP, was crucial for the failure of the EDC, see David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 64

¹⁷⁷ See, Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4423I-4424I, 4435II

¹⁷⁸ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4462I, for an example of a government toppled over the EDC see voting results and the vote of confidence posed by Edgar Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 13/2/52, p. 708II, 709II, 718I-722II

¹⁷⁹ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 30/8/54, p. 4462II

¹⁸⁰ WEU was based on the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and is sometimes referred to under this name, by French Deputies. It is also referred to as the London Accords. For the historic development see Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4569II, 4470I

¹⁸¹ See Paul Aubury (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/10/54, p. 4669I, see also, Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6820I, 6822I

¹⁸² Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 29/8/54, p. 4451II

¹⁸³ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4574I

¹⁸⁴ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4569II, 4571I, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4647I,II, Three armoured and one flying division would permanently

institutional arrangements as all the other members.¹⁸⁵ This was also seen as a political commitment, not least because the final decision over these British troops lay with the WEU Council of Ministers under majority voting.¹⁸⁶ This was truly seen as a historic decision by the French government.¹⁸⁷ This was the Europe of the Seven.¹⁸⁸ With British membership, the French security need was satisfied and the whole Western defence project was given definite credibility. The American guarantee supported that even further and the Treaty was, therefore, the best guarantee for peace in Europe, in the eyes of the government.¹⁸⁹ There were no supranational elements in WEU, which meant that the national character of the individual armies remained.¹⁹⁰ Hence, there were no problems with France's extra-European commitments.¹⁹¹ Moreover, there was an automatic assistance clause against aggression from outside or inside the alliance.¹⁹² And there would be the right of veto on internal changes, such as the increase of troop strength in Germany, for example.¹⁹³ With the exception of Britain all member states would be subject to a control regime for the production and stocking of arms.¹⁹⁴ Taken from the EDC arrangements, this remained a very important element in the eyes of France as a way of monitoring German rearmament.¹⁹⁵ It was recognised that the claim for equality was important for the German side, the principle of which was accepted in the Treaty.¹⁹⁶ The German contribution to the Western defence system took the form of the Bundeswehr. These troops would

be stationed on continent. See Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4571I

¹⁸⁵ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4571I

¹⁸⁶ See Billotte (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6641II

¹⁸⁷ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4571II, 4573II

¹⁸⁸ Reynaud (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4574II, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 12/10/54, p. 4669II

¹⁸⁹ Schuman (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4629II- 4630I

¹⁹⁰ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4570I

¹⁹¹ Devinat (RRS), Rapporteur of the Committee for the Overseas Territories, in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6682II

¹⁹² Billotte (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6643I

¹⁹³ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4570I, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6772II

¹⁹⁴ Badie (RRS), Rapporteur of the Committee for National Defence, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6658I

¹⁹⁵ Schuman (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4630II, for references to Germany's agreement not to produce weapons of mass destruction and heavy arms, see Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4570II, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6819I

¹⁹⁶ Vendroux (RPF), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6653I,II

ultimately be under NATO high command, which was another barrier to German militarism.¹⁹⁷

In favour of Germany the Treaty supported the claim for reunification and it was accepted by the Western Allies that the Federal Republic was the successor of the German Reich and only rightful representative of the German people.¹⁹⁸ On the other hand, Germany committed itself not to use its forces in pursuit of outstanding territorial claims.¹⁹⁹ Taken together, all this was generally accepted as a major step towards Franco-German reconciliation.²⁰⁰

EDC advocated raised the point that undoubtedly the military independence of Germany was much greater under the WEU arrangements than it would have been under the EDC.²⁰¹ Because of that and despite France considering the creation of a national German army and its accession to NATO dangerous, political blockage on these grounds did not have much credibility after the rejection of the EDC Treaty.²⁰² Nevertheless, much to the relief of France, the Western allied occupational forces turned into garrison forces and remained in Germany indefinitely.²⁰³ In these troops the binding of Germany to the West in partnership was hoped to solve the problem for good.²⁰⁴ However, the divide between the government and those MPs who stuck uncompromisingly to their principle of 'no arms and no army for Germany' opened up again.²⁰⁵

Particularly the MRP, which held this conviction of reconciliation and caution with the greatest consistency, abstained from voting for WEU.²⁰⁶ The EDC was still seen as the ideal by European enthusiasts – dominant in the MRP.²⁰⁷ Firstly, they thought that the controls on German rearmament were insufficient, in comparison with the provisions under the late EDC treaty.²⁰⁸ Secondly, British participation was not complete, e.g. in the arms control scheme. Their national sovereignty was

¹⁹⁷ Bardoux (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6695II

¹⁹⁸ Isorni (CRPS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6651II

¹⁹⁹ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4572II

²⁰⁰ Isorni (CRPS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6652II

²⁰¹ Teitgen (MRP), JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4650I

²⁰² Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/10/54, p. 4573I

²⁰³ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6231II

²⁰⁴ Isorni (CRPS), Rapporteur of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6651II

²⁰⁵ Apart from extremist rhetoric, similar positions as in the EDC debate resurfaced, such as objections against a German general staff and *de facto* military inferiority because of French overseas commitments, and doubts about the effectiveness of the control regime. See Teitgen (MRP), in , JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4635II

²⁰⁶ de Chevigné (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6756I

²⁰⁷ Pflimlin (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/10/54, p. 4676I

²⁰⁸ Simonnet (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4639II

still sacrosanct.²⁰⁹ For the MRP the whole accord was unsatisfactory: “(...) in fact, the London Accords give us, under the smokescreen of a European organisation, a German army, a (mainly) British supervisor and an American general.”²¹⁰ Thirdly, the intergovernmental brand of European integration in the form of WEU split the European effort in half. The most obvious outward sign of that were two Councils of ministers and everything else doubled.²¹¹ By losing the supranational element, the WEU was seen as a regression into the old ways of military alliances.²¹² In conclusion, although it did not fulfil all European hopes²¹³, WEU had the merit of preserving the possibility of the unification of Europe – important for Euro-enthusiasts.²¹⁴ It was by no means ideal, but it was much better than the alternative of completely independent German rearmament, which was bound to happen, if WEU failed.²¹⁵ On a vote of confidence, the WEU treaty was accepted by the Assemblée Nationale.²¹⁶

²⁰⁹ Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6721I

²¹⁰ Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6750I, original: « (...) les accords de Londres nous apportaient en réalité, derrière l'apparence 'une organisation européenne, une armée allemande, un I contrôleur principalement britannique et un général américain. »

²¹¹ Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 21/12/54, p. 6721II

²¹² Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6751II, 6752I

²¹³ See Mollet (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 4643II

²¹⁴ André Hugues (RRS), Rapporteur of the Committee for Economics, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6659II

²¹⁵ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6814I, 6820I

²¹⁶ See voting result, in JO, 2ème Lég., 12/10/54, p. 4678II, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6644-5, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6844I-6845I, 6862II-6869II, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 27/12/54, p. 6892I, see also, JO, 2ème Lég., 27/12/54, p. 6901I-6902I

2.4 Economic Security

2.4.1 *The Nation*

The rebuilding of the economy and in turn the issue of economic security were initially national concerns, at least on a practical level.¹ In the French case the Monnet Plan was the primary example of an economic investment programme initiating economic recovery in order to increase economic security.

The Monnet Plan

The French Economic Recovery Plan – as it was officially called - was drawn up to bring the economy back to its feet. Jean Monnet was the head of the Plan and the one to actually implement it, which is why it is best known under his name, as the Monnet Plan. At the time, Monnet was only a civil servant, nevertheless, one whose economic genius had been spotted and one with a wide network of international connections. The Plan was, firstly, meant to rebuild what the war had destroyed and to bring the French economy back to a peace-time footing.

Secondly, the main competitor to the French economy was still Germany. Expectations ranged from a revival of cut-throat competition between them, to the hope of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation. One worry which underlay the possibility of harsh competition was that Germany was still potentially a powerful industrial nation, despite military defeat. It had also lost its traditional markets in the East. Reorientation towards the West followed as a logical consequence. Hence, stronger competition with the Germans over Western markets was almost inevitable.² In this sense, the Monnet Plan was also meant to make the French economy fit for competition with German products. So, the competitive stance in the French national economic recovery programme is still clearly discernible.

Nationalisation

One of the most contentious issues in the ideological struggle between liberal and planned economies was that about nationalisation. The main concern of the Social-

¹ See Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, Ch. 10, see also, Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Ch. 2

² Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6285III

ists was the chaotic development of the economy in the immediate post war years. A return to the anarchic concepts of liberalism and free market economy was unacceptable to them.³ Not the greed of the few, but the needs of the many should be the driving rationale for economic decisions.⁴ An intelligently planned economy would be a much more sensible way of organisation.⁵ Nationalisation would therefore bring key industries under state control, which would in turn guide them to provide for the needs of the people. In addition, nationalisation was seen as a way by which the ordinary worker could participate in decisions taken in his company. Participatory rights became a key claim in this context, in order to represent the working class and to give them a way of pursuing their interests in the economy. Socialist doctrine conveyed that in the end one would arrive at an equilibrium which would help to foster a stable social fabric underpinning the formal structures of the state.

This argument in favour of nationalisation was in part implanted into the European discourse. “We are on the eve of a complete transformation of the economic structures of our European continent.”⁶ The reference in this quotation is to the nationalisation of key industries, but this time at a European level. One example was the suggestion of overcoming the problem of the Ruhr by placing it under the control of the European working classes in collaboration with the respective capitalists, in the late 1940s.⁷ By the mid-1950s, Socialist ideas developed into the direction of a European commissariat for economic planning.⁸ However, not all countries participating in European integration had Socialist governments and not all were, therefore, keen on socialist ideas, such as nationalisation. Because of that, the ECSC left the question of ownership untouched. The High Authority would not become the nationalisation tool for Europe. And the conservative right-wing deputies were agreed that Europe should not become technocratic and bureaucratic, guided by uncontrollable dirigisme.⁹ The High Authority got only the negative power to prohibit certain economic activities, such as mergers or undue national subsidies¹⁰, but the High Authority did not have the power to steer the economy in

³ Leenhardt (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6215III, 6218II, III

⁴ Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6304III

⁵ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6330II, see also, Piette (PS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3325I

⁶ Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6304II

⁷ Leenhardt (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6217II, III

⁸ Lapie (PS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3316II, see also, Piette (PS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3325I

⁹ Viard (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5960II, see also, Krieger (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5965II

¹⁰ René Mayer (RRS), Vice-president of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8942I

a proactive sense, such as initiating economic activity through investment programmes. To the relief of Conservatives, it would not take over the classical right of intervention of the state in the economy. It would only monitor them to prevent a distortion of competition by their undue intervention.¹¹

Although nationalisation ideas were never implemented on a European level, the Socialist ideals of equal representation and social responsibility left their mark on the European institutions, such as in trade union representatives in the High Authority of the ECSC and later in the European Social Charter.

2.4.2 *Half-way Europe*

Marshall Aid and OEEC

The Marshall Plan widened the gap between the Eastern and Western blocs in that the Soviets saw it as an encroachment upon their national sovereignty.¹² This was the official reason for Molotov to walk out on the other Allies and rejected the Marshall Plan also on behalf of their satellite states in Eastern Europe. This made the dividing line between the developing blocs for the first time obvious.¹³ The key preconditions put by the US to the recipient countries were that by 1952 Europe would have sorted out its economic affairs and, in addition, work for progress in cooperation and ultimately for the unity of Europe.¹⁴ In the American mindset, unity or federation was the only real way to lift Europe from the rubble.¹⁵

In those early days, however, the rivalry towards Germany could still be felt in France when it came to sharing out precious American resources: “I believe – and we are all agreed on this – that no one in his right mind would deny France its right of priority before Germany for rebuilding funds.”¹⁶ Much as Marshall Aid was welcomed in the early post-war years, it also had some more unpleasant implications. Firstly, it resulted in a permanent deficit in the dollar balance. Secondly, it was evidence that none of the recipient countries was currently economically vi-

¹¹ Coste-Floret (MPR), Rapporteur, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8913II, see also Articles 54 and 86 ECSC Treaty

¹² Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 68

¹³ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 68-9

¹⁴ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 69

¹⁵ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 322, 401

¹⁶ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7345I, original: « Je crois – et, à ce propos, nous devons tous être d'accord – qu'aucun homme sensé ne saurait contester à la France son droit à la priorité dans le relèvement général par rapport à l'Allemagne. », see also, Reynaud (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6249I

able.¹⁷ The latter point, of course, had rather serious implications for the political independence of the recipient countries and of Western Europe, because it might mean that the European nation states were not viable at all in the post-war period. The following quotation pointed rather into that direction: “As our first concern we have to rebuild our economy. Marshall Aid is indispensable for us as well as for Europe.”¹⁸ The suggestion, however, that the Marshall Plan was the economic basis for political unification of the western bloc which ultimately had aggressive aims against the East was firmly rejected by the government.¹⁹ This reflected the position of the centre-right in parliament. Only the far Right saw Marshall Aid as the basis of a western bloc against Soviet expansionism.²⁰ The Socialists were much more critical. Although they appreciated American help, they saw exactly this danger that the Marshall Plan entailed, in effect, signing up to a Western alliance against the Soviet Union.²¹ And indeed, one of the fundamental motivations was that the US needed a strong Europe, not least economically, to secure the Western camp.²² Sometimes Marshall Aid was even seen as bribing France into an economic alliance with Germany in order to form that Western European bloc against the Soviets. The Communists were, of course, firmly opposed to any Western integration along such lines.²³

The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)

Beyond paying out Marshall Aid, the OEEC was hoped to become the basis for future European co-operation in the field of economics.²⁴ One of the primary problems in Europe was seen in tariffs and export and import quotas.²⁵ Early on it was recognised that these would have to go. Although it was stressed that the actual function of tariffs and quotas was ideally to create a level playing field between

¹⁷ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6331I, see also, speech of Robert Schuman at the Conference of Ambassadors March 2nd, 1951, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, p. 151, see also, Robert Schuman, ‘Pour l'Europe’, p.29-30, in : René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, p. 224

¹⁸ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7347III, original: « Nous avons, avant tout, à restaurer notre économie. L'aide Marshall nous est indispensable comme elle l'est pour l'Europe »

¹⁹ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7354II

²⁰ Capitant (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7364I

²¹ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7326III, for the American perspectives see reference to Secretary of State in: Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 77

²² Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 106, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 314-5

²³ Rochet (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6258III

²⁴ Courant (IPay), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3295II

²⁵ See quotation from M. Hoffman, Administrator of the Marshall Plan, in Rochet (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6255I

home produced goods, on the one hand, and imported goods, on the other²⁶, provisions were made to abandon trade restrictions in the Franco-Italian tariffs union.²⁷ The project was later called Fritalux, and included Luxembourg as well as possibly Germany. The whole plan did not make much headway, except that the basic idea had some input on the Schuman Plan.²⁸ For Monnet – the spiritual father of the Schuman Plan – the greatest problem in the OEEC lay in the rule of unanimity. He was of the opinion that no ‘daring’ political project was possible under those preconditions.²⁹ Euro-enthusiasts were convinced that political integration and the renunciation of parts of national sovereignty in favour of European institutions was absolutely necessary.³⁰ In Monnet’s mind, at least, closer European co-operation than under the OEEC had to take the form of economic integration of the supranational kind.

2.4.3 *European Integration*

One very fundamental realisation after the Second World War was that all previous wars had been economic wars, i.e. wars driven by an economic profit rationale. The internal reason was often connected to social upheaval, which found its release and compensation in these wars. What used to be a traditional Socialist explanatory pattern won wide acceptance in France.³¹ The logical consequence was that there was no national solution and that economic integration was the only way forward.³² It was, however, also clear that economics did not tell the whole story. All the past wars may have had an economic rationale behind them, but the order for war came from national political authorities. The call for European political integration was a direct consequence and followed the same idea of preventing another war in Europe once and for all.³³ In 1948, France considered its own authority in Europe strong enough to initiate the European integration process which should find its first major initiative some time later in the Schuman Plan.³⁴ Back in the avant-

²⁶ Devinat (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6350I, see also, Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5925II

²⁷ Leenhardt (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6216I, see also quotation from M. Hoffman, Chief administrator of Marshall Aid, in: de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6291II-III

²⁸ See Gouin (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5222II, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1984, p. 128

²⁹ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 333, 413, see also, Gérard Bossuat, ‘The French Administrative Elite and the Unification of Western Europe, 1947-58’, p. 26

³⁰ Leenhardt (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6218I

³¹ See Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6750II

³² Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 22/12/54, p. 6750II

³³ Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8956II

³⁴ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7345II

gardistic Socialist reasoning, Guy Mollet went one step further and considered economic integration unlikely to succeed without a European political authority guiding it.³⁵ Economic structures would not be changed without a supporting political will.³⁶

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)

Another Socialist, Jean Le Bail sketched out the Franco-German dilemma over natural resources long before the Schuman Plan.³⁷ Giving up sovereignty over coal and iron ore and pooling it would solve the problem of an age-old conflict and it would unite Europe: “We would now be making only the elementary observation that iron and coal are necessary for the production of steel, itself necessary for a united Europe.”³⁸ For the Socialists, however, steel was only one of the fields where it became clear that the solution for Europe’s problems was internationalisation. The project harboured the great hope for a united and peaceful future.³⁹ It was also the transformation of vague internationalist ideas – which envisaged integration on a world level⁴⁰ – into more concrete plans for European integration.⁴¹ For French Socialist, the new European integration fitted well into their ideological framework, while the main initiative came from the conservative centre represented by Robert Schuman’s MRP. He had been commissioned in a meeting between the three Allied Foreign ministers to draft a proposal for the reintegration of West Germany into the European family.⁴² In order to do that, the most essential step in Schuman’s eyes was to overcome the conflicts between national interests.⁴³ This statement must be qualified by the following: “The purpose of the pool is

³⁵ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6330III

³⁶ Bonnefous, (UDSR), President of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5917I

³⁷ For a similar suggestion by another Socialist, Carlo Schmid (SPD), in Germany see Germany/Economic Security/The Schuman-Plan

³⁸ See Léon Blum (PS), at the conference of the European Socialist parties on 25th April, 1948, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6309III Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7328I, original : « On ne ferait plus que cette constatation élémentaire que le fer et le charbon sont nécessaire à la production de l’acier, nécessaire lui-même à une Europe unie. » , see also, Devinat (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6349III, 6350II

³⁹ Le Bail (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7328III, see also, Devinat (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6349III

⁴⁰ Lapie (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6319III

⁴¹ See Piette (PS), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3324II, for a criticism see Krieger (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8911II

⁴² René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l’Europe*, p. 145

⁴³ See also, Gouin (PS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8928II

precisely not to bring the national interests into opposition, but to facilitate cooperation between them.”⁴⁴ The classical means of trying to do this via bilateral agreements had to be abandoned in favour of multilateral agreements. What was really new was the supranational component.

“We have to solve this problem by taking a European approach. If we are threatened by overproduction and by a kind of economic hegemony by Germany, the solution will not lie in unilaterally imposed limitations. We have to find the solution in common, collective European structures.”⁴⁵

Managing coal and steel under the High Authority was the first and concrete step towards that objective.⁴⁶ As usual, Germany was at the forefront of French political considerations. Germany’s steel production was steadily rising, to a degree that France could once more consider a threat. However, picking up earlier Socialist ideas in accordance with Schuman’s ideas, the French response was different from that of the inter-war years. “(...) we have to create an official inter-European steel authority, now, this year!”⁴⁷ The idealism was founded in the new Europe, initiated in the ECSC, and the possibility this provided for solving the oldest problems of the continent.

Clearly discerned by its principle architect, the Schuman Plan held, firstly, the tangible prospect of lasting peace, in that it would make aggression between France and Germany ‘materially impossible’ by merging their war-important industries.⁴⁸

Secondly, the strategic objective was to prevent the Soviets from getting their hands on precisely this German human, industrial and, indeed, war potential.⁴⁹

Thirdly, it would facilitate reconciliation, which had to be the psychological basis for peace.⁵⁰

Fourthly, the ECSC would cement the decartelisation of German heavy industry, which had been one of the main French policies under occupation rule.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8958I, original : « Le but du pool est précisé-ment, non pas d’opposer les intérêts nationaux, mais de réaliser la coopération entre ces intérêts nationaux. »

⁴⁵ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6351II, original: « C’est sur le plan européenne qu’il faut résoudre le problème. Si nous sommes menacés de surproduction, d’une espèce d’hégémonie économique de la part de l’Allemagne, la solution ne résidera pas dans des limitations unilatéralement imposées. C’est dans une structure commune, collective, européenne que nous devons la trouver. »

⁴⁶ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5943II

⁴⁷ Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6306III, original: « (...) il faut créer maintenant, cette année, une autorité publique intereuropéenne de l’acier. »

⁴⁸ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6234I, see also, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5943II

⁴⁹ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l’Europe*, p. 89

⁵⁰ Gaborit (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5945II

Fifthly, there was a certain dynamism built into the ECSC, as a common market could not reasonably be limited indefinitely to just two products. Therefore, an enlargement towards a comprehensive common market was anticipated and the ECSC was seen as the first step towards political and economic unification of Europe.⁵²

Finally, there was the grave danger that all other European projects would falter, if the Schuman Plan failed.⁵³

There were also strong material reasons for economic integration of the coal and steel: "(...) without the Schuman Plan, that means without the Community, without the shared market, it is Germany which will dictate prices on the French steel market."⁵⁴ This would have repercussions on several key sectors of the French economy:

Firstly, the steel industry was a matter of life or death for France. It was widely accepted as an economic axiom that the steel industry was the key industry for the well-being of a country. It was also directly connected to prosperity and overall standards of living. The simple formula was: higher steel production means a higher standard of living.⁵⁵ The conclusion drawn particularly by the Europhiles was that French economic security would be much enhanced by the ECSC under the following rationale: It was indeed the coke from the Ruhr which was essential for French steel production.⁵⁶ There was an issue of quantity, as well as quality. Ruhr coal was of better quality than the French coal. Hence, the efficiency in processing coal into coke, which is necessary for the production of high quality steel, was higher in Germany.⁵⁷ Moreover, output of coal was also much higher than in France. The projected increase in French steel production was bound to make

⁵¹ Alfred Coste-Floret (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8954I, see also, War Experience/War Consequences/Occupational Rule in Germany

⁵² Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5943II, see also, Pleven (UDSR), President of the Council, JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5986II, see also, quotation from the announcement of the Schuman Plan, in: Bonnefous (UDSR), President of the Foreign Policy Commission, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8918I, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 382, 389, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 100, 106

⁵³ Delbos (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9003I, see also, Rollin (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9003I

⁵⁴ Quotation of Jean Monnet before the Commission for Economic Affairs of the Assemblée Nationale, in: Krieger (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8911II, original: « (...) sans plan Schuman, c'est-à-dire sans la communauté, sans le marché unique, c'est l'Allemagne qui dictera le taux de marche de la sidérurgie française. »

⁵⁵ René Mayer (RRS), Vice-president of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8941II

⁵⁶ Couston (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8930I

⁵⁷ See Pierre André (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8953I

France more dependent on coke imports.⁵⁸ The Schuman Plan offered a long-term solution to this need.⁵⁹

Secondly, rising energy consumption could, again, be covered only through coal imports. Before the ECSC, imports from the US burdened the dollar balance to an unsustainable degree.⁶⁰ This dollar imbalance was a very strong economic incentive to find a European solution for the coal imports which essentially included Germany.⁶¹ Germany had one of the lowest production costs which meant lower import prices. The result was, on the one hand, a better balance of payments. On the other hand, the dependency on American coal imports was reduced.⁶²

Thirdly, ECSC was considered to have the potential to trigger a much larger European economic recovery: “If Europe moves into boom conditions – as could well be the case, you can easily imagine the political, psychological, economic and monetary consequences which this will have.”⁶³ The ECSC would be the third biggest producer of coal and steel after the US and the USSR and before Britain.⁶⁴ The related economic potential was considered to be very strong.

Finally, even opponents of European integration agreed that the French and the German economies were complementary, particularly in the primary sector of coal and iron ore.⁶⁵ Put together in an economic union the different structures would support each other and alleviate their respective weaknesses.

Much to the disappointment of France the supranational principle led Britain to abstain even from the negotiations on the ECSC treaty.⁶⁶ The government expressed the following opinion: “We regret that Great Britain remains outside and does not participate in the preliminary talks, but we look forward to its early acces-

⁵⁸ Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7335I, II

⁵⁹ Maurice Faure (RRS), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8957I

⁶⁰ René Mayer (RRS), Vice-president of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8940II

⁶¹ See reference to statement of Jean Monnet before the Commission for Industrial Production, in: Furaud (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8922I, see also, Bardoux (RI), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8937II

⁶² Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 3^{ème} Lég., 17/1/57, p. 100II

⁶³ Bonnefous, (UDSR), President of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5920I, original : « Si l'Europe, comme il est vraisemblable, est associée à un renouveau d'activité industrielle intense, vous pouvez facilement imaginer les conséquences politiques et psychologiques, économiques et monétaires que cela aura. »

⁶⁴ René Mayer (RRS), Vice-president of the Council and Finance Minister, in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8939II

⁶⁵ Vendroux (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5957I

⁶⁶ “Given the choice Schuman finally confirmed that controlling Germany and beginning a European federation were more important than British membership of the plan” He set a deadline for 2nd June for a final decision by Britain to participate in the negotiations, which was rejected. See J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 155, 157

sion, because personally it seems difficult to me to sign a Treaty of such importance without Britain being an integral part of the coal and steel pool.⁶⁷

The opponents, in contrast, show the abstention of Britain as a prime argument against the Treaty.⁶⁸ The historic step of moving forward with Germany and without Britain was not easy to take. Most parliamentarians, in the beginning, found it hard to accept equality of rights with Germany⁶⁹, but many also saw that, eventually, equality would have to be conceded in order to arrive at a stable post-war settlement.⁷⁰ Only the opposition at the extremes considered that to be a betrayal and a surrender of French positions. Most parliamentarians and the French government chose the lesser evil, i.e. the path of integration with Germany on the basis that: "A European economy without Germany is no longer possible."⁷¹ If this could not be helped, then the recovery of German economic strength should at least be harnessed to the benefit Europe and thus also France.⁷²

The opponents of the ECSC, however, also had a whole array of arguments. In some circles the ECSC was seen as giving Germany the opportunity to wriggle out of its obligations under the occupation statute and put the capitulation of 1945 behind it.⁷³ In combination with any unilateral rearmament the ECSC was, therefore, regarded by some, again mainly on the extremes, as a serious threat to French security.⁷⁴

Apart from these classical anti-German arguments of suspicion⁷⁵, there were very concrete material considerations.

Firstly, there was the commonsense question as to whether economies as different as the French and the German could be linked in this way.⁷⁶

⁶⁷ Gaborit (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5946II, original: « Nous regrettons que la Grande-Bretagne se soit abstenue et ne participe pas aux travaux préliminaires, mais nous voulons espérer son entrée prochaine, car il me paraîtrait personnellement difficile de signer un traité de cette importance sans qu'elle fût partie intégrante du pool charbon-acier. », see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 157

⁶⁸ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5983II

⁶⁹ See, Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8936II

⁷⁰ See, Gaborit (RRS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5947I

⁷¹ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6234II, original: « Il n'y a pas, non plus, d'économie européenne possible sans l'Allemagne. »

⁷² Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7329III, see also, 7331I

⁷³ Aumeran (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5922II-5923I, see also, JO, 2^{ème} Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5189II

⁷⁴ Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7176II

⁷⁵ For a closer analysis see War Experience/War Consequences/ Allied Responsibility and the German threat

⁷⁶ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7354I, see also, Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5925I

Secondly, there was obviously the competitive stance of both industries in the essential field of steel production. The fear of German competition and whether the French economy could stand up to it shaped this argument.

“France is industrially less powerful than Germany. With a stimulated appetite from the Schuman Plan, the German federal government will certainly demand a common market; it has demanded that already. It is obvious that the common market will establish its total industrial dominance over the Europe of the Six.”⁷⁷

Germany would turn into the biggest exporter in Europe, unhindered by old quotas, production restrictions and protective tariffs.⁷⁸

Finally it was a surrender of interests in the Saar, because the French economic interests would be swallowed up in the ECSC and would therefore fall under German control, again.⁷⁹ Thus, the French steel industry was initially not in favour of the Plan.⁸⁰ Needless to say that the Communists called it total capitulation.⁸¹

Furthermore, there were some arguments against the ECSC on grounds of principle. Firstly, Article 15 of the French Constitution provided for the transfer of sovereign rights to common organisations for peace and defence purposes. Reciprocity on the parts of other states was a precondition. Rather than ceding sovereignty, the Gaullists saw Germany gaining it through the Schuman Plan, because, as a matter of fact, it was not sovereign under the current occupational rule. This argument never reached beyond political polemic, but shows the reserve against Germany in certain sections of the *Assemblée Nationale*.⁸² Secondly, the strongest fear lay in the close link with Germany, which seemed to hold the potential to deliver France under German tutelage.⁸³ In the eyes of the far Right the ECSC was driven more by a desire for reconciliation and airy dreams of cooperation i.e. by political reasons, rather than by a realistic evaluation of the economic repercussions for France.⁸⁴ That was the main reason why the Gaullists, i.e. the RPF, rejected the

⁷⁷ de Chambrun (RP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 17/11/53, p. 5227I, original : « La France est moins puissante industriellement que l'Allemagne. Mis en appétit par le plan Schuman, le gouvernement fédéral allemand demandera certainement un marché commun ; il l'a déjà demandé. Il est évident que ce marché commun établira sa maîtrise industrielle totale sur l'Europe à six. », see also, Vendroux (RPF), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5957I, for details see also, Bonnefous (UDSR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/10/50, p. 7176I : steel: 8,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons; coal: 50,000,000 to 180,000,000 tons per year all in favour of Germany

⁷⁸ Pierre André (RI), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8952I

⁷⁹ Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8934II

⁸⁰ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 108

⁸¹ Schell (PC), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5999II

⁸² Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8934I

⁸³ Krieger (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8911II

⁸⁴ Couston (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8930I-II, see also, Cot (RP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8965II

Schuman Plan.⁸⁵ One could also turn this argument on its head and accuse the government of trying to achieve political ends with economic means, which reduced vital French interests, like its security, to commercial negotiations.⁸⁶ Along such lines the right-wing opposition argued, on principle, against European integration in limited and specialised pools, communities and unions, of the ECSC type.⁸⁷ Finally, strong reservations were raised against any revival of the cartels, which had dominated the inter-war heavy industries at national levels.⁸⁸ The ECSC seemed to be just one such cartel.

In conclusion, the Schuman Plan was widely recognised as the beginning of real European integration.⁸⁹ “(...) we need to take risks and we need enterprise, the merit of the Schuman Plan is that it shows daring.”⁹⁰ The vote on the Schuman Plan was constitutionally connected to a vote of confidence⁹¹ which brought the full force of government commitment to bear. As a result, it was supported by a large majority in the French parliament.⁹²

The European Economic Community (EEC)

The ECSC had been successful in increasing both the productivity and the absolute output of French coalmines. In contrast to the early 1950s, coal was available in abundance by the end of the decade.⁹³ The success of the common market for coal and steel was a strong encouragement to those looking forward to a general economic community, the EEC.⁹⁴ However, the rejection of the EDC still weighed heavily on the French parliament and in particular on the government, which can

⁸⁵ Furaud (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8923II

⁸⁶ Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 2/12/48, p. 7334II, III

⁸⁷ Gaston Palewski (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 89337II

⁸⁸ Gouin (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8928I, for a Gaullist angle see Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 242

⁸⁹ Vuillien (PC), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 122I

⁹⁰ Bonnefous, (UDSR), President of the Committee for Foreign Policy, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5920I, from a quotation of Herriot, original: « (...) il faut risquer, il faut entreprendre, et c'est l'honneur de la proposition Schuman d'avoir osé. »; The German Zollverein of the 19th century was often cited to as an historic example for European integration and how such economic integration of the ECSC type could spill over into political unity. See Schneiter (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9010I, see also, Le Bail (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 108I

⁹¹ Pleven, President of the Council, (UDSR), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9030II, see also, le Troquer (PS), Vice-President of the Assemblée Nationale, in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9030III

⁹² Pleven, President of the Council, (UDSR), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9014I, see also, Pierre Martin, President of the general confederation for agriculture, Bordeaux, 10/12/51, quotation in: Mutter (CRPS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 11/12/51, p. 9011I

⁹³ Lauriol (UR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3685I

⁹⁴ Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 98II, 100I, 101I

be seen as one reason why the initiatives towards the EEC were so enthusiastically welcomed as a 're-launch' of the European project, as expressed in the Messina resolution.⁹⁵ The EEC initiative was driven by the Netherlands and was fervently pressed forward by its Foreign Minister Jan-Willem Beyen.⁹⁶ It was hoped that economic integration would give more substance to the European integration effort, in general. He suggested a comprehensive common market, not least because partial integration had not really triggered a feeling for unity and solidarity.⁹⁷ The economic integration imperative was obvious in the example of the ECSC and in the limitations of the national economies.⁹⁸ Larger, freer, more productive, less expensive and easier export procedures, these were the aims in the beginning.⁹⁹ Mass production was seen as one, if not the only, effective means to achieve higher productivity, i.e., lower prices and higher living standards were key objectives across the political establishment.¹⁰⁰ Economies of scale became an important argument along these lines.¹⁰¹ Protectionism and isolation were seen as ineffective and discredited by past experience.¹⁰² The logical consequence was to put all the little European national industries together to one large common market, for all products, not just coal and steel as under the ECSC.¹⁰³ That in itself was considered a major achievement. It was anticipated that greater economic stability would result from this greater economic area.¹⁰⁴ The European Economic Community should rely on three core principles of good practice – put forward by its supporters. Firstly, there was the idea of freedom, which meant mutual unhindered access to national markets.¹⁰⁵ That meant a customs union and the gradual abolition of internal frontiers.¹⁰⁶ The aim of realising freedom of movement of workers, capital,

⁹⁵ Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 5/7/56, p. 3279I, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 171

⁹⁶ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 169

⁹⁷ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 169, see also, Savary (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3136II

⁹⁸ Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6305I

⁹⁹ Schuman (MRP), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/11/49, p. 6234III

¹⁰⁰ Philip (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6304III, see also, de Félice (RRS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5337I

¹⁰¹ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 70II, see also, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, translated from French by Ronald Steel, p. 128-131

¹⁰² Billotte (RPF), Rapporteur of the Commission for Foreign Policy, in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/12/54, p. 6640II

¹⁰³ Mollet (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/11/49, p. 6331I, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 468

¹⁰⁴ Engel (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 91I, see also, Vassor (Pay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 97I

¹⁰⁵ Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 101II

¹⁰⁶ Lacoste (PS), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8919I

goods and services was fundamental for the establishment of the common market.¹⁰⁷ Hence, discrimination on grounds of nationality was prohibited after the end of the transition period.¹⁰⁸ Despite some fears that, in particular, the free movement of workers would create chaos for national economies¹⁰⁹, it turned out to be not at all disruptive for the French economy. The government saw the danger for the economy coming rather from the *immobility* of workers, for which nationality, language problems and strong family bonds were compelling reasons to stay put.¹¹⁰ Secondly, there was the rule of fair play, which meant competition in the sense of increased competitiveness, but no cut-throat tactics.¹¹¹ The coordination and harmonisation of national investment programmes in the common market was considered sensible.¹¹² Common social and economic legislation in order to create a level playing field between the member states was advocated, too.¹¹³ An equal number of working hours, i.e. 40 as in France, was the example most often used for a level playing field.¹¹⁴ A common transport policy was provided for in the Treaty, as well.¹¹⁵

And thirdly, common investment was seen as an objective, in particular in Socialist circles, which meant the implementation of the supranational principle, insofar as European funds should be guided toward where they would be most effective, on the one hand.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, the government saw social principles implemented in the common investment funds by fostering poorer areas of the community in order to help them catch up.¹¹⁷ The European Investment Bank was set up for this purpose.¹¹⁸ These social and restructuring funds were already based on the principle of Additionality, i.e. European subsidies had to be matched by the same proportion of national funds going towards the common project.¹¹⁹

¹⁰⁷ Financially the training and freedom of movement of workers were underpinned by a European fund set up for that purpose, see Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 72I

¹⁰⁸ Gozard (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3154II, see also, Lefebvre (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3156I

¹⁰⁹ Ribeyre (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 113II

¹¹⁰ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 212I

¹¹¹ Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 101I, 102II

¹¹² Billotte (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 20/11/53, p. 5340II

¹¹³ Boisdé (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4221I,II, see also, Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 23/10/56, p. 4286II, see also, Giscard d'Estaing (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 93I

¹¹⁴ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 74I

¹¹⁵ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 72I

¹¹⁶ Ramadier (PS), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 26/7/50, p. 5979II

¹¹⁷ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 210I

¹¹⁸ For this purpose it was endowed with a capital equipment of \$ 1bn, see Gozard (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3154I

¹¹⁹ Savary (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3140I-II

Undoubtedly, the transfer from national economies to the supranational market was not an easy step to take and the critics put forward serious objections.

Firstly, one great concern was that the arrangements under the EEC were irreversible, regardless of whether the whole idea worked or not.¹²⁰ They were also unlimited in time.¹²¹ The counter-argument was that a normal development of the common market would hardly be possible, if any member could quit at any time.¹²² Secondly, another great fear was that the lifting of national protective tariffs would lead to the collapse of one or the other of the national economies.¹²³ Cut-throat competition could take place without any moderating barriers and safeguards.¹²⁴

Thirdly, for some critics, in particular on the Left, the liberal element was too strong in the Treaty. The principle of the market economy was accepted, while the Socialist principle of income redistribution was not.¹²⁵ Finally, the Community's Budget was initially made up by direct contributions from the member states. One could always criticise apparently quite large sums going to a 'foreign' organisation.¹²⁷

These problem areas were dealt with by a number of safeguards. Firstly, transition periods would give time to adapt and cushion against negative side effects. The government reassured that they were also meant to provide manoeuvring space for the gradual adaptation of the economies of each other.¹²⁸

Secondly, safeguards were put in place, for example to meet national emergencies such as balance of payments crises. In such cases national governments would be free to take decisive action for the protection of their national economies.¹²⁹ However, it was clear that all safeguards and transition periods would only protect the French economy for a few more years after 1958. Among the political establishment the realisation became clear that for better or worse the French economy had to become competitive.¹³⁰ The same was true for the French financial and eco-

¹²⁰ de Baillicourt (RRS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 119I

¹²¹ Dorgères (Independent), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3355II

¹²² Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3374II

¹²³ Marin (RI), in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 25/7/50, p. 5925I, see also, Furaud (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8923I

¹²⁴ Cot (RP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8960I, see also, Cot (RS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 197I

¹²⁵ Mendès-France (RRS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3383I, 3384II

¹²⁷ See, Lauriol (UR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3685I

¹²⁸ Mendès-France (RRS), President of the Council, in JO, 2ème Lég., 23/12/54, p. 6817I, 6819I

¹²⁹ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4223II

¹³⁰ Louvel (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 116I,II, see also, Cot (RS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 200II

conomic policy.¹³¹ Thirdly, institutional safeguards were added. In the Council of Ministers, most of the decisions would be taken by qualified majority voting. A vote of unanimity would be reserved to the most fundamental decisions. “Unanimity, that is the veto; that is standstill.”¹³² In addition, supporters clearly saw the Commission already as the motor for European integration.¹³³

A common currency, which was envisaged for a while, was seen as a concrete addition to the common market. As early as 1951, the need for a European currency was seen as one of the fundamental preconditions for developing any common market, i.e. the ECSC, Euratom or the EEC, firstly, into a working entity and, secondly, into a unifying instrument in the economic sense and possibly, later, in a political sense.¹³⁴ A common currency would be the bridge between the inevitably different national economies which could eventually fuse them into an economic and political unit. America was often used as an example.¹³⁵ Despite these arguments, the French government agreed that the national currencies should be kept.¹³⁶

Agriculture was another very specific and very concrete area in the Common Market. Soon after the idea of a coal and steel pool and its successful implementation, suggestions for a ‘green pool’ had been raised.¹³⁷ By the time the Common Market became an issue, agriculture was the big issue for France not just economically, but also politically, because of its importance for the domestic economy – reflected in the Independent Peasants party, mainly with conservative credentials.¹³⁸ The sector’s structure made up of many small family farms, was seen as essentially embodying the French national identity. The French rural economy should therefore be preserved.¹³⁹ Most of these small family businesses were, however, unproductive and could not cope with competition in a Common market.¹⁴⁰ There-

¹³¹ The reference in this case is to the financial crisis of France, at the end of the 1950s. Under the EEC treaty it was obliged to settle this balance of payments deficit within two years of the EEC treaty coming into force. See Savary (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3135II

¹³² Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 73I, original: « L’unanimité, c’est le veto, c’est la paralysie. »

¹³³ Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 103I

¹³⁴ Bonnefous (UDSR), President of the Foreign Policy Commission, in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8915II

¹³⁵ Krieger (RPF), in JO, 2ème Lég., 7/12/51, p. 8912I, 8913I

¹³⁶ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 72I

¹³⁷ Pleven (UDSR), President of the Council, in JO, 1^{re} Lég., 24/10/50, p. 7118II

¹³⁸ Boisdé (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 18/10/56, p. 4221II, 32% of the country’s population worked in agriculture in 1957, see Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 102I

¹³⁹ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 72II-73I

¹⁴⁰ Laurens (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 104I

fore, decisions on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)¹⁴¹, which was introduced mainly due to French pressure¹⁴², would require unanimity during the first transition period, i.e. five years.¹⁴³

However, the French government recognised the opportunity for fundamental reform of the agricultural sector.¹⁴⁴ The economic rationale was that the productivity of the French agricultural sector would be increased through a gradual increase in competition within the Common Market, hopefully within the transition periods and with the French government in tight control of the whole process. CAP provided for a minimum price for agricultural products, which would provide a calculable basis of income for French farmers and in turn an effective guarantee to keep them in business.¹⁴⁵ For the first time it was not just the big industries which profited from international agreements, but this time the farmers would get a share of the cake, too.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, the Common Market would ultimately be beneficial to French agriculture.¹⁴⁷ De Gaulle appreciated the positive impact it could have for the individual farmers. It would therefore, strengthen the cultural fabric of the nation. Hence, he became the main advocate and pushed through the Common Agricultural Policy.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴¹ Many sceptics saw the definition of common agricultural policy, before the Treaty entered into force, as an essential safeguard for the French agricultural sector. See Temple (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 111I

¹⁴² This was a feature already in place under the Fourth Republic and therefore not a Gaullist invention as sometimes portrayed. See Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 200I, see also, JO, 3ème Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3300II

¹⁴³ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 215II

¹⁴⁴ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 211II, this position is also reflected among the Europhiles in Assemblée Nationale such as René Plevin, see Christian Bougeard, *René Plevin*, p. 282

¹⁴⁵ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 211II, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 173, 174, see also, Jacques Bariéty, 'Die Rolle der persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen Bundeskanzler Adenauer und General de Gaulle für die deutsch-französische Politik zwischen 1958 und 1963', p. 23

¹⁴⁶ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 71I

¹⁴⁷ Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3374I

¹⁴⁸ Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 38, 172, 232

The Free Trade Area (FTA)

Britain's initial plan was to set up a FTA including all OEEC members, mainly in order to avoid another split of Western Europe – this time in the economic field.¹⁴⁹ FTA basically meant the abolition of tariffs and quotas on all exports and imports.¹⁵⁰ In the free trade area Britain clearly wanted a wider, but shallower community.¹⁵¹ The benign interpretation was that the FTA was seen as a first step for Britain towards European integration. The hope for eventual integration of Britain into the EEC remained across the French political spectrum.¹⁵²

Beyond doubt, the British plan was a response to the initiative of the Six in establishing the Common Market.¹⁵³ And particularly the Euro-enthusiasts were sceptical as to whether British suggestions to link up the FTA and the EEC could be implemented without compromising the latter's essence, i.e. how could the preferential treatment of products from within the Common Market be maintained when in the next step one included the products from the free trade area, too? As a matter of fact the free trade area was a less developed economic cooperation than the Common Market and the advocates of the latter feared that if the link between the two was accepted that would actually mean a regression for the EEC.¹⁵⁴ More critically, there were some indications that the FTA was geared towards diminishing the importance of the EEC or delaying it.¹⁵⁵

On the practical level, agriculture was one sticking point and the main differences between the EEC and the FTA.¹⁵⁶ In the latter agriculture, would not be included, neither would there be a Common external tariff.¹⁵⁷ The FTA would also lack all the common structures for economic harmonisation.¹⁵⁸ Because of these reasons the FTA was considered dangerous for the French economy and in particular for the agricultural sector both of which still needed protection in the form of the

¹⁴⁹ Rolland (RRS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 209I, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 198, 202

¹⁵⁰ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3302I

¹⁵¹ Cot (RS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 197I

¹⁵² Lapie (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 106II, see also, Courant (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 118I

¹⁵³ Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 197II, see also, Couve de Murville (UNR), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3671I, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 526

¹⁵⁴ Pleven (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 102I, see also, Temple (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 110I

¹⁵⁵ Reference to speech by Macmillan, in: Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 197II, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 200

¹⁵⁶ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 76II

¹⁵⁷ Morice (RRS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 189II

¹⁵⁸ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 16/1/57, p. 76II

Common external tariff.¹⁵⁹ Precautionary measures on the part of the Six against British delaying tactics were mainly driven by France, one of which was that the negotiations proper on British membership of the EEC would start only after the Common Market had been established between the Six.¹⁶⁰ France's leadership in the EEC was often seen as paramount. British membership would not necessarily threaten it, but it would certainly disturb the relationship with Germany which had become a major factor in the French rationale.¹⁶¹

The biggest problem for British accession to the EEC was that Britain was not prepared to give up preferential food imports from the Commonwealth.¹⁶² However, this was exactly what threatened the preferential treatment of trade and production from within the Common Market.¹⁶³ This British refusal added substantially to the French conviction that Britain was not ready to play by the European rules. In particular, de Gaulle was convinced that Britain was a US satellite and had no role to play in his Europe.¹⁶⁴ Eventually, he displayed adamant opposition to the British initiative of the FTA, which became even stronger in the later rejections of British membership in the EEC. France, therefore, refused to take any further part in the FTA negotiations and brought the whole project to a breakdown.¹⁶⁵

In conclusion, the EEC can be seen as the concrete implementation of the Bonn-Paris axis. It was realised that Franco-German understanding about the ways and objectives of the EEC was essential to bring the Common Market about.¹⁶⁶ The EEC was also seen as another concrete proof of the union between the two people, proof of German reliability and of its inclusion in the West.¹⁶⁷ This European community was the concrete economic alternative to German economic dominance on the continent, and the EEC turned Germany from an economic threat into France's closest ally.¹⁶⁸

In addition, political integration was meant to result from economic cooperation under the EEC.¹⁶⁹ Europe was not just meant to be an economic community, but a

¹⁵⁹ Savary (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 2/7/57, p. 3139II, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3363I

¹⁶⁰ Reference to meeting between the Six on 6 December 1956, reference to speech by P-H. Spaak, in: Mendès-France (RRS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p.198I

¹⁶¹ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 192

¹⁶² Temple (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 110I, see also, Reynaud (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 202I

¹⁶³ Maurice Faure (RRS), Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 213I

¹⁶⁴ Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 420

¹⁶⁵ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 203

¹⁶⁶ Plevin (UDSR), in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 214II

¹⁶⁷ Pineau (PS), Foreign Minister, in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3374II

¹⁶⁸ Mollet (PS), President of the Council, in JO, 3ème Lég., 22/1/57, p. 216II

¹⁶⁹ Reference to the Messina a conference, see Engel (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 91I, see also, Giscard d'Estaing (IPay), in JO, 3ème Lég., 17/1/57, p. 95I

community in the original sense of bringing people together. In the end, the EEC should strengthen European unity – of course mainly advocated by Euro-enthusiasts.¹⁷⁰

Domestic problems in France held the possibility of threatening the whole EEC project just after it had been successfully set up. In the terminal phase of the Fourth Republic, huge debts had mounted, mainly as a result of the military campaigns. The Gaillard government considered invoking safeguard clauses of the Rome treaty or even of quitting the EEC altogether.¹⁷¹ Despite the staunch opposition of the Gaullists to European integration throughout the Fourth Republic, the first Gaullist government of the Fifth Republic supported the Common Market, firstly, for economic reasons and, secondly, for considerations relating to the unity of Western Europe.¹⁷² The EEC was worthwhile because it stimulated competition between the basic units of national economies. On both the economic and the political levels, it was a victory in the competition between the ideological systems in the Cold War.¹⁷³ The third reason was French antagonism towards the British economic conception of the FTA.¹⁷⁴ Hence, de Gaulle made a deal with Adenauer that he would fully implement the Treaty of Rome if Germany withheld support for the FTA.¹⁷⁵ The early economic results of the Common Market were so overwhelmingly positive that no safeguards were ever needed and that the first transitional period, which was meant to last for five years and which held most national safeguards, was shortened.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ Lapie (PS), in JO, 3ème Lég., 5/7/57, p. 3316II, see also, Teitgen (MRP), in JO, 3ème Lég., 6/7/57, p. 3362I

¹⁷¹ Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré*, p. 143

¹⁷² Couve de Murville (UNR), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3670II-3671I, see also, Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 110, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 203, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 167, 175

¹⁷³ Abdesselam (UR), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3695II

¹⁷⁴ Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 166-7

¹⁷⁵ Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 203, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 168, in contrast George asserts that the rejection of the British FTA proposals by West Germany happened as an exchange for de Gaulle's support for the federal German position in the second Berlin crisis 1959, see Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 28

¹⁷⁶ Couve de Murville (UNR), Foreign Minister, in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3670II, see also, Maurice Faure (Independent), in JO, 1^{re} Lég. V, 28/12/59, p. 3680I, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 504

2.5 Preliminary Conclusions for France

Verbatim records of debates in the *Assemblée Nationale* show that in the immediate post war years France sought first and foremost its own security. In particular, during the time of the occupation regime in Germany, the quest for security was manifested in very much the same way as in the inter war years, when its practical expression had been the effort to keep Germany isolated, down and out. However, the 1948-1950 period saw a remarkable change in France's foreign policy, mainly based on the perception that France's past attitudes towards Europe had failed insofar as they had not only not provided security but could even be seen as one of the causes of World War II. The change was implemented by France's long-time Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who made it absolutely clear that a return to the policies of 1920-39 was not a viable option for the post war period and that he would flatly oppose suggestions of this kind. At the same time he was in the forefront of the policy favouring a constructive reshaping of French foreign policy in the form of European integration. Integration became the security guarantee which France still needed in the post-war era; it became the healing of an old wound between the former arch-enemies France and Germany; and it became the hope of the future generations on which peace and understanding has been built.

Parliamentary debates clearly show all aspects of emotion and logic, from hatred and concern, on the one hand, to reason and goodwill towards Germany, on the other. They also show that in the reconciliation between France and Germany, the European integration process found a starting point as well as a purpose.

By the end of the 1950s, when Charles de Gaulle had returned to power, France had become used to relying on Germany as an ally, and it was indeed this concrete achievement of Franco-German reconciliation, which even the strongest opponents of the European integration process, the Gaullists, could not deny, which can arguably be seen as a major reason for them to continue the policy of European integration despite taking credit for the positive developments of relations with Germany themselves and despite their criticism of the supranational elements of the European Communities.

Against this background, it remains a fact that the European integration process was initiated under the Fourth, not the Fifth, Republic. The idealism of many of the – much-maligned – Fourth-Republic French deputies and their enthusiasm for this groundbreaking political initiative burns through in many of their speeches. So that the policy on integration should be more carefully weighed in the balance and the Fourth Republic should not be written off as an insignificant introduction to the admittedly remarkable achievements of the Gaullist period, and recognised as a

vital contribution, made in a period of immense difficulty, to the post war success of France.

To finish on an obvious point, the European integration movement has provided France with the security it sought in vain for so long, the whole of Europe with peace, and most of it with prosperity.

3. Germany

Just like in the chapter on France, I would like to introduce Germany with a short overview of the parties, the parliamentary system and the constituent groups of the individual German governments throughout the 1950s.

The first federal parliament of 1949 was to some extent a continuation of the last Reichstag of 1933, reflecting a much greater degree of fragmentation than was usual in later years.

One of such smaller parties, the Bavarian Party (BP) was represented with only a few MPs in the first federal parliament. It was set up to represent Bavarian interests on the federal level and was, therefore, fervently advocating federalism.¹ Its MPs would have preferred a stronger emphasis on federalism than the practice of the first years of the Federal Republic showed and also stronger than the Basic Law provided for. It is worth keeping in mind that Bavaria was the only Land which had voted against the Basic Law in the Constitutional Assembly, precisely because it saw the federalist elements not represented strong enough in the constitution.² The role of the BP as a representation of Bavarian interests was taken over by the CSU, the Bavarian branch of the CDU, which only competes in this land. Hence, the main points of political content were absorbed into the CDU/CSU and the BP was not re-elected into the 1953 Bundestag.

The name of the 'Pan-German Union and Association for the Exiles and those deprived of their rights' (GB/BHE) is a clear description of this party's mission. The integration of the refugees and expellees from the East into West German society was the greatest social problem of post war Germany and was a major issue throughout the 1950s.³ One problem for integration was that refugees and expellees tended to cluster together and formed a kind of subculture isolated from the rest of German society. The refugees' associations had a strong power base in those groups and influenced the politics of the Federal Republic to a considerable extent.⁴ The GB/BHE was the political representation of those refugees from the

¹ Seelos (BP), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2481B, 2484B

² Seelos (BP), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 53D

³ See Echhardt (GB/BHE), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 62A-B

⁴ See P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, OUP, Oxford, 2003, Ch. I, II

East and pressed claims for reunification of all German territories. Their ideological basis was the right for a home for everyone and the right of self-determination.⁵ However, in their Charter they foreswore all means of violence to arrive at those aims.

“I refer to the Charter of the war-displaced in which they say: ‘We renounce revenge and retaliation.’ and this decision, which at the same time rejects the re-conquest of our homelands by force, is final. (...) It is equally definite that we will not give up our right for a home; and we will not stop pursuing this right by peaceful means. (...) We have long agreed that the way for a peaceful recovery to our home is a European one.”⁶

That was the official side, but the rallies of the refugee associations remained a breeding ground for nationalistic ideas not excluding ideas of revenge and violence.⁷ Nevertheless, the official decision of the leadership to disassociate themselves from such methods was a considerable success.

Another problem Germany had, was the Nazi-legacy. This issue went right up into the first Adenauer government and was to a large extent embodied in the German Party (DP), which was one of the small parties of the first Adenauer coalition government. It had members like Hilmar Schacht, the former president of the Reichsbank, who was seen by some to have prepared the way for the Nazis to power. “We live in the present and believe in the future; and we look to the past only insofar as we want to preserve what is true and good in the German being.”⁸ This defence for the DP – in an apologetic style, close to neo-Nazi rhetoric – shows that the line between right-wing conservatives and former Nazi-sympathisers was certainly not clear cut. And authoritarian ideals of a strong leader were clearly still there: “We Germans, especially the non-political masses want someone to look up to; Germans want to admire and they want to be able to say: that’s a real represen-

⁵ Echhardt (GB/BHE), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 61D, see also P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, p. 39, 42-3

⁶ Kather (CDU) in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8150B, original: „Ich verweise auf die Charta der deutschen Vertriebenen, in der es heißt: „Wir verzichten auf Rache und Vergeltung“, und dieser Verzicht, der gleichzeitig die Wiedereroberung unserer Heimat mit Waffen ablehnt, ist endgültig. (Beifall bei der CDU/CSU.) Aber ebenso endgültig ist, dass wir unser Recht auf die Heimat nicht preisgeben wollen und nicht aufhören werden, dieses Recht mit friedlichen Mitteln zu suchen. (Beifall bei der CDU/CSU und bei der FDP.) Wir sehen uns seit langem darüber einig geworden, dass der Weg zur friedlichen Wiedergewinnung der Heimat über Europa führt.“, see also, Haasler (GB-BHE), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 96A, see also, P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, p. 44

⁷ P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, p. 41, 46-7, 106-7

⁸ Ewers (DP), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 51D, original: „Wir sind gegenwartsnahe und zukunftsgläubig und haben mit der Vergangenheit nichts anderes zu tun, als dass wir bewahren möchten, was echten und guten deutschen Wesens ist.“

tative. (MP Renner [KPD]: “That is why they fell for Hitler!”)⁹ The German Party was, however, the only one of the small parties which managed to reform itself and eradicate past extreme right-wing positions. Members such as von Merkatz are extremely important in that respect. He represented the classic conservatism, which coincided with a wholehearted European commitment.¹⁰ The success of this internal reform process can be seen in the fact that the DP was represented in the Bundestag until the 1963 election and it was, indeed, a member of the governmental coalition until November 1961.

Even smaller right-wing extremist parties such as the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) and the German Reich Party (DRP), both with Nazi affiliations, were represented with a few individual MPs in the 1949 Bundestag. However, just like the German Communist Party (KPD) on the far left¹¹, the extremists on both sides of the house were knocked out in the 1953 election. Adenauer saw this as a consolidation of German democracy.¹² The SPD was a bit more sceptical. Whether the democratic basis was a reliable foundation would only show in times of crisis.¹³

The 1950s are definitely one of the high points of ideological conflict. Reading German parliamentary speeches one gets the impression that this climate was very much present in internal affairs, too. German national issues, such as reunification and the lost territories in the East played just as important a role in the German national discourse as the big ideological questions.

In the eyes of the SPD the government wrote off the East. That was where the main strength of SPD constituencies lay. That was Berlin. That was middle Germany, the centre of what used to make up Germany. It must not be given up. This and the opposition’s accusation that the government had not tried hard enough for some form of recovery is exemplified in the debates about early German reunification. On the other hand, the government was seen as having been much too submissive to the West which could not be the basis for partnership. The almost stubbornly upheld claim for equality is an example for the SPD stance embodied in Kurt Schumacher as their leader. Before the historical background of the SPD, there could be no doubt about their commitment to Western values, such as liberty and democracy. They had fought and died for them, just like the Western Allied powers and the SPD could claim to be the only party to have stood by such principles in the Reichstag of 1933, although faced with terror and concentration camps.

⁹ Ewers (DP), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 52C, original: “Wir deutschen Menschen und gerade die unpolitische Masse will einen Aufblick haben, sie will verehren, sie will sagen: Hier wird repräsentiert. (Abg. Renner [KPD]: Deshalb ist sie Hitler verfallen!)“

¹⁰ See, Elbrächter (DP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12013B

¹¹ For the political positions of the KPD see National Security/Ideas and ideology/The Communists

¹² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 3, p. 11C-12A

¹³ Ollenbauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 36B

Precisely because of this they saw themselves as representatives of those values in their own right, not as a disciple of the West.

The accusation of the government against the SPD was that their policy was, on the one hand, too nationalistic and selfish and, on the other hand, too idealistic and unrealistic.¹⁴ The all-or-nothing approach was rejected by the Adenauer government.¹⁵ Adenauer, in contrast, recognised that to regain trust among the Western Allies, Germany would have to make up for the suspicion resulting from the last war. This would be difficult and long process of mutual understanding and not a precondition to this process- as the SPD saw it. Adenauer was poised to make this understanding happen and he remained, indeed, long enough in office to give it a solid foundation. His 1949 government was a coalition of the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the DP, giving it a secure majority. This coalition was renewed in 1953 adding the GB/BHE to it, which took the government further to the right of the political spectrum.¹⁶ Rather surprisingly, but very much to the pleasure of Adenauer, the 1957 election gave the CDU/CSU an absolute majority, which was the first and only absolute majority in the history of the Federal Republic. The dominant topic in the election campaign was Europe, the European re-launch and the treaties resulting from the Messina process. The DP which Adenauer took into government despite his absolute majority had also fought the election largely on this issue, and people like von Merkatz very much embodied this conservative European ideal. As will be seen in the sections dealing with the European treaties, this election was interpreted as a vote of confidence for the government and its European course.

The next section 'War Experience' will be devoted to show where this idealistic European commitment was rooted in German history.

¹⁴ Euler (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6523B

¹⁵ Euler (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6521CD, 6523A

¹⁶ P. Ahoenen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, p. 97

3.1 War Experience

3.1.1 War consequences

The destruction in Germany, in material, human and psychological terms had been immense.

“Tons of rubble are lying all over the streets of our cities and villages. This is bad enough. However, what is even worse is the density of the intellectual rubble which the ‘politicians’, ‘philosophers’ and ‘schoolmasters’ of the madman of Braunau [Hitler] have piled up before the heirs of Lessing, Herder, Goethe and Kant, Fichte and Pestalozzi. This rubble must be cleared away before we complete the rebuilding of our cities.”¹

And while there was a genuine regret for the deeds done in the name of the German people under the Nazi regime², there was also a real fear of the actual and physical destruction of the German people as such:

“The fear was of a coming to end; not only and not so much to one’s own end, but to the material end of our people and with that the historical end of the German nation. The hope, however, turned to the recreation of Europe, to a new psychological, social and economic form of living of the peoples, which were then bleeding each other to death.”³

Hence, Europe was a matter of life and death for the German people. It became a way of recognising past collective failure and a means of preventing such traumatic consequences as the last war from happening again.⁴

¹ See, Josef Felder [one of the SPD members who had refused to vote for the Enabling Act of 1933, which gave Hitler dictatorial powers], *Warum ich Nein sagte, Erinnerungen an ein langes Leben für die Politik*, Rowolth, Hamburg, 2002, p. 191, original: „Schutt in Millionen und abermals Millionen Kubikmetern lagert in den Straßen unserer Städte und Dörfer. Das ist schlimm. Weit schlimmer jedoch ist die Dichte der geistigen Schuttmasse, die die >>Politiker<<, >>Philosophen<<, und >>Pädagogen<< des Wahnsinnigen von Braunau vor den Nachkommen Lessings, Herders, Goethes und Kants, Fichtes und Pestalozzis aufgehäuft haben. Dieser Schutt muß abgetragen werden, ehe sich in unseren Städten die letzte bauliche Lücke schließt.“

² von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 113A

³ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 408D, original: „Die Furcht galt dem Ende; nicht nur und nicht so sehr dem ihnen persönlichen als dem physischen Ende unseres Volkes und damit dem geschichtlichen Ende der deutschen Nation. Die Hoffnung aber galt einer Neugestaltung Europas, einer neuen geistigen, sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Lebensformen der Völker, die im Begriff waren, aneinander zu verbluten.“

⁴ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 76A, D, see also, A. Grosser, „Die Rolle Konrad Adenauers in der jüngsten deutschen und europäischen Geschichte“ in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, p. 19

The German threat and the Allied powers

Almost everyone agreed that past German nationalism and militarism under the Nazis had led to the destruction of the old order i.e. the Reich. The message was driven home to the German people that only destruction could result from such practice, not least the destruction of their own country and livelihoods. “Once and for all we must get rid of past German militarism.”⁵ Even the far right in the newly elected parliament, which saw the Allies as at least partly responsible for the outbreak of World War II⁶, agreed that Germany was not in a position to pursue similar policies as in the past. However, the successor parties of the NSDAP such as the SRP, the DRP and the parliamentary exponents of the German military establishment had not turned pacifist overnight. And they could imagine a time for German military revival.⁷ The majority in the Bundestag could not, and the commitment to non-aggression became a centre-piece of the German position towards the Allies:

“We have [territorial] claims, but nobody, except Herr Richter [Independent, formerly DRP] and perhaps Herr Rische [KPD] (...), has said that Germany ever wanted to pursue these claims by means of aggression. (Hear, hear! In the middle of the house.) Nobody from the coalition or from the opposition has said that and I want to clarify that once again and for all: What we want and what we strive for is nothing more and nothing less than the maintenance of peace. (Loud applause from the government parties.)”⁸

Common European structures in addition to or even instead of national ones were seen as a possible solution: “The aim is called the United States of Europe, which would be a common framework for the European peoples’ efforts to meet their economic and political needs. This we see as the only satisfactory solution to the security problem which persists although we threaten no one.”⁹ The policy of

⁵ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3579C, original: „Mit der Vergangenheit des deutschen Militarismus muss ein für allemal Schluss gemacht werden.“, see also, Kiesinger (CDU) in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8144B

⁶ von Thadden (DRP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3587D

⁷ von Thadden (DRP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p.3589D

⁸ von Brentano(CDU), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8238D-8239°, original: „Wir haben Ansprüche anzumelden. Aber niemand - ich glaube, Herr Richter ausgenommen, vielleicht noch Herrn Rische (...) niemand hat erklärt, dass Deutschlands territoriale Ansprüche jemals im Wege der Aggression verfolgen will. (Sehr richtig! In der Mitte.) Das hat niemand aus der Koalition und niemand aus der Opposition erklärt, um ich stelle nochmals eindeutig und unmissverständlich fest: was wir hier wollen, was wir wünschen, ist nicht mehr und nicht weniger als die Erhaltung des Friedens, (stürmischer Beifall bei den Regierungsparteien.)“

⁹ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 410C, original: „ Das Ziel heißt: die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa als ein Rahmen, in dem sich die europäischen Völker gemeinsam um ihre wirtschaftlichen und politischen Bedürfnisse bemühen. Dies ist die einzige uns ausreichend erscheinende Lösung der trotz unserer völligen Ungefährlichkeit nach wie vor gestellten Sicherheitsfrage.“

peaceful development was taken as the lesson from World War II as the only one which could allow of the survival of the German people.¹⁰

In late 1950s, the SPD called on the Allies to overcome their fear of the German military threat and perceive the real threat to be in Soviet expansionism.¹¹ The SPD analysis of the security problem was in line with that of the government: “The approval of the Schuman Plan holds the logical conclusion for the Allies that the partner Germany – because we have become a partner of Western Europe! – must cease to be an object in East-West antagonism, but must be protected from Soviet attacks by incorporation into the Western security system.”¹² The early European steps transformed Allied responsibilities towards an occupied Germany into the beginning of partnership in a common European endeavour.

“Europe must be united and there are only two ways to that goal. Firstly the way of coercion. We saw the tragic and cruel consequences of such an option during the Hitler period. We know that a Bolshevik hegemony, too, would mean the unity of Europe in the darkness of dictatorship. (...) The way of coercion has been proven impossible. There is only one other way, namely the creation of a European unity on the basis of understanding, trust and mutual respect of all partners.”¹³

The above quotations show that the mood in Germany was clearly different than after the First World War. The will for cooperation with the West is clearly discernible in the early parliamentary debates, although there was of course not much chance of an alternative policy, because of the occupation of Germany, which will be dealt with in the following.

¹⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2282C, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3134C, see also, von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10651C, 10624D-10643A

¹¹ See Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 112, 4212AB, see also, von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8239B

¹² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, WP I, 184, p. 7818D, original: „Die Zustimmung zum Schumann birgt in sich die logische Folgerung der Alliierten, dass der Partner Deutschland – denn wir sind ein Partner Westeuropas geworden! – nicht mehr ein Objekt des west-östlichen Gegensatzes sein darf, sondern durch Einbau in das Sicherheitssystem des Westens gegen sowjetische Angriffe geschützt werden muss.“

¹³ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7797B-7798A, original: „Europa muss geeint werden, und es gibt nur zwei Wege zu diesem Ziel. Erstes den Weg der Gewalt. Wir haben die tragischen und grauenhaften Konsequenzen eines solchen Versuchs während der Hitler-Periode erlebt. Wir wissen, dass auch die bolschewistische Vorherrschaft über Europa eine Einheit Europas in der Finsternis der Diktatur sein würde. (...) Der Weg der Gewalt ist ungangbar. Es bleibt nur ein zweiter Weg, der Aufbau einer europäischen Einheit auf Einsicht, Vertrauen und gegenseitige Achtung aller Partner.“

The Occupation Statute

In the Occupation Statute the four Allies had undertaken to represent Germany's foreign interests jointly.¹⁴ After the breakdown of the Allied High Commission in March 1948¹⁵, the Occupation Statute was introduced at the London conference of June 1948. Some basic form of legal order and some domestic autonomy was conceded to the three western occupation zones. In addition, the Statute also provided for a German constitutional council.

The Communists were, naturally, critical of the Statute: "I would like to stress the point that the Occupation Statute is in the hands of the three Allied High Commissioners the actual basis of the West German state, that it prevents a peace treaty, and that it leaves the duration of the occupation undefined."¹⁶

The SPD under Schumacher took a nationalistic approach.¹⁷ "As a people we have to make German policy, which means a policy which is not determined by a foreign will, but which is the product of the will of our people"¹⁸ The SPD fought against the political restrictions, especially as regards foreign policy and the occupation regime with all political means at their disposal.¹⁹ Schumacher was the right man for this: "Here was a man of truly upright standing, a victim of Hitler who had suffered for his convictions, who – against all odds – kept the faith with his people and who was not prepared to see the German nation consigned to the dustbin of history."²⁰ 'Equality' became Schumacher's great demand and the *sine qua non* for a meaningful cooperation.²¹

¹⁴ Dehler (FDP), Minister of Justice, in VDB, WP I, 18, p. 482BC

¹⁵ For reference to the Allied High Commission and generally for the Occupation regime, see Wolfgang Benz, 'Einrichtung der Besatzungsherrschaft', in: *Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Deutschland 1945-1949 Besatzungszeit und Staatsgründung*, No. 259/2002, pp. 6-13

¹⁶ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 59BC, original: „Ich möchte ausdrücklich noch einmal darauf aufmerksam machen, dass das Besatzungsstatut in den Händen der drei Hohen Kommissare die eigentliche politische Grundlage des westdeutschen Staates darstellt, einen Friedensvertrag verhindert und die Besatzungsdauer ungeklärt lässt.“

¹⁷ For an according accusation see Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3154D

¹⁸ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 10, p. 182B, original: "Wir müssen als Volk eine deutsche Politik anlegen, das heißt eine Politik, die nicht Funktion fremden Willens ist, sondern Produkt des Willens dieses Volkes.“

¹⁹ Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 153-4, 163

²⁰ Peter Merseburger, 'Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999, p. 109, original: „Da war ein Mann von wahrhaft aufrechtem Gang, ein Opfern Hitlers, das für seine Überzeugungen gelitten hatte, sich dennoch zu seinem Volk bekennt und den Begriff der Nation nicht auf den Kehrichthaufen der Geschichte werfen will.“

²¹ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 401D-402A, see also, VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4764A, 4767C, see also, Key note speech of Schumacher at the party rally in Hamburg, 22. 5. 1950, Social Democracy fighting for Germany and Europe, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 777, see also, Peter Merseburger, 'Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, p. 112

The CDU, with Adenauer in government, was more moderate in tone and expectations. They recognised that Germany was not yet a sovereign state. “The Occupation Statute is by no means ideal. But it is a step forward from the lawless state which we had been living in until it came into effect. There is, still, no other way for the German people to regain freedom and equality.”²²

Central provisions of the Occupation Statute concerned reparations and dismantling of equipment. In the beginning, dismantling was a mix of two policies. On the one hand, dismantling was seen as a form of reparations, which were hard felt in post-war poverty and which were not regarded as a constructive policy in Germany.²³ On the other hand, the dismantling policy was meant to destroy all war important industries. Adenauer recognised the Western need of security against the well proven German war potential.²⁴ He realised the psychological impact of two devastating German attacks, particularly on France, and was prepared to co-operate fully with the Allies to re-build confidence and trust in the new Germany.²⁵

The opposition was less emollient. They were in favour of co-operating with the Allies in matters of internal security and disarmament. However, “(...) we tell the peoples of Europe: security does not come from the dismantling of machines and it does not come from the policy of simply keeping people down; security is delivered by living human beings, by their will for peace and their trust in the future.”²⁶ In addition, Schumacher had rightly pointed out that the dismantling policy did as much harm to the Allies as to Germany, considering the developing antagonism towards the East.²⁷ However, particularly due to French pressure, the basic guideline for the dismantling policy was retained: German arms production capacity had to be curbed, but restriction limited to that field alone.²⁸

²² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 29D, original: „Das Besatzungsstatut ist alles andere als ein Ideal. Es ist ein Fortschritt gegenüber dem rechtlosen Zustand, in dem wir bis zum Inkrafttreten des Besatzungsstatuts gelebt haben. Es gibt aber keinen anderen Weg für das deutsche Volk, wieder zur Freiheit und Gleichberechtigung zu kommen.“

²³ Seelos (BP) in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 426C

²⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 397D

²⁵ See letter to General Robertson (Allied High Commission) as quoted in: Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 398A-C

²⁶ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 402D, original: „(...) wir wünschen die Stärkung aller Kontrollmaßnahmen, wir wünschen eine starke Sicherheitsbehörde in Deutschland. Darüber hinaus sagen wir den Völkern Europas: Sicherheit kommt nicht aus der Zerstörung von Maschinen und nicht aus einer Politik der bloßen Niederhaltung; Sicherheit wird getragen von lebendigen Menschen, von ihrem Friedenswillen und ihrem Vertrauen in die Zukunft.“

²⁷ The argument went along the lines that the Western Allies might come to be in dire need for the German armament industry, if the tensions with the East developed into actual conflict. See Baade (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 18, p. 487C

²⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 18, p. 475B, see also Petersberg Accords Art. VIII.

The Ruhr Statute²⁹

The Ruhr Statute placed the economy of the Ruhr under Allied supervision. The legal basis was the Allied prerogative under occupation rule.³⁰ The main economic reason was seen in the steel-production-capacity of the Ruhr.³¹ Nevertheless, the Allies wanted German cooperation and scaled down the dismantling programme after the German government agreed to cooperate fully with them.³² The opposition was very worried. Schumacher saw the Ruhr agency as an alien institution which interfered with fundamental political and economic interests of Germany.³³ This was a highly sensitive issue for the SPD, notably because of the impact on the mineworkers.³⁴ When the administration was actually handed over to the Allies and the government agreed to cooperate in sending representatives to the Ruhr agency, Schumacher accused Adenauer of treason and called him ‘the Chancellor of the Allies’.³⁵

“The only way Germany could see the Ruhr Statute was as blatant discrimination through victors’ law, forced upon it through the London Accords, which Germany was bound to judge as the best way of preventing a European understanding. Only on the 9 May 1950 did the time seem ripe for an initiative which would overcome the past and could give a lead for the future. That was the day when Foreign Secretary Robert Schuman presented his programme in the name of the French government, (...)”³⁶

²⁹ Although the Ruhr Statute came into being before the Occupation Statute, it was subsumed under the bigger headline of the latter, not least, because it became a defining feature of the Occupation regime, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 274

³⁰ See Kurt Schumacher (SPD), ‘Essay on ‚Ruhr Statute and Peace Order, in: Die Gegenwart, 1st March 1949’, as quoted in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 628

³¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 408B

³² Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6516D

³³ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 405D, original: „ (...) wenn von der Möglichkeit gesprochen wird, dass die Ruhrbehörde einmal Leitung und Verwaltung von Kohle, Koks und Eisen in die Hand bekommen kann. Welche Garantien will sich die Bundesregierung von den Alliierten gegen diese für uns leicht gefährlichen Möglichkeiten auf dem Verhandlungswege erkämpfen?“

³⁴ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 405AB

³⁵ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 18, p. 525A

³⁶ Preusker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7583D, original: „Deutschland konnte das ihm einseitig durch das Londoner Abkommen auferlegte Ruhr Statut stets nur als eine schwerwiegende Diskriminierung kraft machstaatlichen Siegerrechts empfinden und musste in ihm den sichersten Weg zur Verhinderung einer europäischen Einigung erblicken. Erst am 9. Mai 1950 schien die Zeit für ein die Vergangenheit überwindende und in Zukunft weisende Initiative in Europa reif zu sein. An diesen Tagen nämlich hatten namens der französischen Regierung der französische Außenminister Robert Schuman sein Programm entwickelt, (...)“; see also, Report of the Committee for Economics on the ECSC, in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7629D, see also, Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6503C-6504B

And indeed it was the Schuman Plan which put Germany back on equal footing with the other five signatory countries and ended the Ruhr regime.³⁷

The Schuman Plan spelled not only the end for the Ruhr Statute, but also that of occupation rule in its entirety.³⁸ It was closely connected with the Petersberg Accords which restored major components of sovereignty to Germany. The SPD, however, was unenthusiastic about this 'European solution'. The ECSC and the EDC, it said, were selective schemes which harnessed Germany to the Western bloc, importantly, without giving Germany a full say in it.³⁹ In that sense, both were little more than the continuation of occupation under another name.⁴⁰ This suspicion persisted into the mid-1950s, when it was dispelled, largely because the EDC never came into being. The General Treaty was the last step terminating occupation rule.⁴¹

3.1.2 *Western commitment*

There was a general agreement between government and opposition about the western commitment of West Germany: "In our own mind there is no doubt that, due to our origins and our basic convictions, we belong to the Western European world."⁴² The first step on the road towards the West was clearly the reconciliation with France.⁴³

Reconciliation with France

Reconciliation with France was almost universally accepted as a driving ideal of post-war politics.⁴⁴ Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand had tried before in the

³⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7817A, see also, K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 436

³⁸ Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6507C

³⁹ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8189CD, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 48C

⁴⁰ Mommer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7218A, see also, Brandt (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11125D

⁴¹ See National Security/Fundamentals/Peace Treaty – Petersberg Accords – General Treaty

⁴² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p.29D, original: „ Es besteht für uns kein Zweifel, dass wir nach unserer Herkunft und unserer Gesinnung zur westeuropäischen Welt gehören.“, see also, William Paterson, 'The chancellor and foreign policy', in: Stephen Padgett (ed.), *The Development of the German Chancellorship Adenauer to Kohl*, Hurst & Company, London, 1994, p. 127

⁴³ Schröder (CDU) in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 415C, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1082D

⁴⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 30A, see also, VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2460BC, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126D, see also, Brandt (SPD), in General Report about the political implica-

1920s.⁴⁵ However, as this failed attempt shows, the difficulties were formidable, exactly because of long-standing historical grudges.⁴⁶ The political reflection of this was the French need for security:

“What divides us, still, is French suspiciousness, the fear of the future or the worry that its need for security could not be satisfied. We do not want to consider whether this need is justified or not (...). We simply accept this desire for security as a political fact. It will be satisfied through the Schuman Plan, because any danger of clandestine armament against France has been dispelled through the pooling of coal and iron. In addition, it will be prevented through the European Army, because a European Army under a joint high command manifestly precludes dissension between the partners.”⁴⁷

Adenauer made the German will for reconciliation and cooperation with France absolutely clear:

“I would like to address the following words to the French people. The Franco-German question is in all truth crucial to Europe’s destiny. (Hear, hear!) (...) I have been told that there is the honest will among the overwhelming majority in France to overcome the Germano-French opposition for good. (Bravo!) I pray the French people and the world community to believe me when I say that the overwhelming majority of the German people want this just as much.”⁴⁸

Importantly, the will within both governments to overcome the past was genuine and taken as such by the other side.⁴⁹ In the wake of the Schuman Plan, Adenauer

tions of the EDC treaty, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11180B, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 55A, see also, VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2253C

⁴⁵ Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 95D, see also, von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1573B

⁴⁶ See Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 412A, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3901A

⁴⁷ Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7214A, original: „Was heute zwischen uns noch steht, das ist das Misstrauen Frankreichs, die Furcht vor einer künftigen Entwicklungen oder die Sorge, dass sein Sicherheitsbedürfnis nicht befriedigt wäre. Wir wollen nicht darüber diskutieren, (...) ob dieses Bedürfnis berechtigt ist oder nicht. Wir nehmen einfach die Tatsache dieses Wunsches nach Sicherheit als eine politische Tatsache hin. Dieser politischen Tatsache wird durch den Schumanplan Rechnung getragen, weil durch die Gemeinsamkeit der Behandlung von Kohle und Eisen die Gefahr einer heimlichen Rüstung unsererseits gegen Frankreich ausgeschlossen ist, ferner durch die europäische Armee, weil eine europäische Armee unter gemeinsamen Oberbefehl selbstverständlich jeden Streit untereinander ausschließt.“

⁴⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 400B, original: „Ich möchte (...) folgende Worte an die Adresse des französischen Volkes richten. Die Frage Deutschland-Frankreich ist in Wahrheit eine der Angelfragen des europäischen Geschicks. (Sehr richtig!) (...) höre ich, dass auch in den weitesten französischen Kreisen der ehrliche Wille besteht, den deutsch-französischen Gegensatz ein für allemal aus der Welt zu schaffen. (Bravo!) Ich bitte das französische Volk und die Weltöffentlichkeit, davon überzeugt zu sein, dass bei der ganz überwiegenden Mehrheit des deutschen Volkes der gleiche Wille besteht.“

⁴⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5664CD

suggested even a full union between the two countries.⁵⁰ This commitment to France and Europe became the credo of the Adenauer government, which indeed set the precedent for all later governments.⁵¹ And it was realised that without Franco-German reconciliation meaningful European integration would not take place.⁵²

The distant partner Britain

Britain was not at the forefront of the German post-war mindset. The Commonwealth and Britain's commitment to its former colonies were seen as the main reason why Britain abstained from participation in the early European integration process, i.e. the Schuman Plan.⁵³ A certain insularity was also noted.⁵⁴ Among the moderate sections in the Bundestag, there was respect for Britain. "Precisely because of this feeling for freedom, because England has protected and upheld the spirit of freedom, it should be part of a future Europe."⁵⁵ The impact, British participation could have on European integration, was considered immense.⁵⁶ However, in Germany the reason for this respect seems to have been the distance between the two countries, rather than the respect between two close partners. On the far right of the first Bundestag this had the effect of indifference and ignorance with a hint of historical hostility:

"(...) we remind the western powers that they will not be able to build Europe (...) without central Europe and that is us. With regard to England: in our resolve to reorder Europe in

⁵⁰ Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 337, see also, Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, p. 358, Interview with Kingsbury Smith, head of European bureau of the International News Service, 7/5/50, for Adenauer's conviction on Franco-German union see p. 294

⁵¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5665A, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126D, for the importance of the Franco-German friendship see Helmut Schmidt, *Die Selbstbehauptung Europas: Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert*, Ullstein, Munich, 2002, p. 242, 248-249

⁵² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126D, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3901A, see also, Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, Vol. 1, p. 295, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 338

⁵³ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2469C, see also, Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2275A

⁵⁴ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2275BC

⁵⁵ Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2492C, original: „Gerade wegen dieses Bewusstseins der Freiheit, gerade deswegen, weil England den Geist der Freiheit damals geschützt und hochgehalten hat, soll es in einen künftigen Europa dabei sein.“

⁵⁶ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 74C, original: „Auch heute sind es, wenn wir vom deutschen Volke absehen, vornehmlich zwei Völker, bei denen noch die letzte, aber große Chance für Europa liegt, Frankreich und England, wenn sie sich ihrer großen geschichtlichen Aufgabe bewusst werden und sich im echten föderativen Gedanken für den Aufbau Europas einsetzen. Wir unterstützen deshalb die Absicht der Regierung, am europäischen Aufbau teilzunehmen.“

alliance with France we can leave them out. The era of balance of power (...) is over. And if those gentlemen wish to withdraw to their Commonwealth, well, let them do so.”⁵⁷

In the European integration process, it was considered more likely that one would have to do without Britain than with it. However, this fact should not prevent the continental European states to go forward with the integration process.⁵⁸

The European Ideal

In the first German parliament, European reconciliation and integration was widely accepted as an ideal.⁵⁹ However, in 1949 European integration was not much more than an ideal captured in the slogan: “Europe will unite or it will die.”⁶⁰ Such statements were often connected to ideas of Europe becoming a Third Force in the world. In Germany, there was no imperial mindset attached to ideas of a third force, but rather the fear of a permanent division of Europe and not least of Germany itself.

“A united Europe has to be created from the 17 remaining [OEEC] states; a Europe united in freedom and equality, between the Bolshevik colossus and the world power America. Otherwise, for the foreseeable future, Europe will be no more than a geographical term on the map of the world.”⁶¹

Most painfully for Germany, this immediate post-war conception was made redundant by Cold War realities and European idealism was replaced by the realist evaluation and commitment to the Europe of the Six.⁶²

When the unification of the whole of Europe became unrealistic, Western European integration acquired the aspect of becoming a bulwark against the East. “Whoever rejects Europe is the grave-digger of the German people, because he takes away the only possibility for each German to lead the life he values and treas-

⁵⁷ von Thadden (NR), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 436A, original: „ (...)wir die Westmächte darauf hinweisen, dass sie Europa (...) nicht bauen werden ohne Mitteleuropa; und das sind wir. Was die Engländer anlangt, so können wir sie unseren Willen, Europa mit Frankreich neu zuordnen, draußen lassen. Die Zeiten des balance of power (...) sind ein für allemal vorbei, und wenn die Herren sich jetzt auf ihr Commonwealth zurückziehen, - nun gut, dann sollen sie es tun.“

⁵⁸ Hasemann (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7771B

⁵⁹ See von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 18, p. 504C, Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, p. 2490A

⁶⁰ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2470A

⁶¹ Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8123C, original: „Aus dem in 17 Staaten aufgespaltenen Resteuropa zwischen dem bolschewistischen Koloss und der Weltmacht Amerika muss ein in Freiheit und Gleichberechtigung geeintes Europa entstehen, oder Europa wird in absehbarer Zeit nicht mehr sein als ein geografische Begriff auf Landkarte.“

⁶² Strauß (CDU/CSU), Defence Minister, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 378AB

ures, on the basis of Christian principles.”⁶³ Traditional western values were contrasted with those of the East. Matters such as the Christian faith turned into antagonistic focal points.⁶⁴ By the opposition this attitude was branded as preparing for a crusade against Communism.⁶⁵ Government policy on the European commitment was, however, usually supported by the opposition, at least in principle.⁶⁶ As von Brentano pointed out, the consensus for Europe usually entailed the recognition that Germany had become aggressive and eventually dangerous only in isolation.⁶⁷ It was time to come together, work together and live together in peace.⁶⁸ “In recognition that the revival of a German state can only grow from our commitment to Europe, we feel in tune with the best forces of the German people that every move which fosters the security and freedom of the freedom-loving peoples is justified. We believe in the European Community, in equal sacrifice and equal profit, in equal duties and equal rights.”⁶⁹ Thus, the European project became an avenue whereby Germany could regain its reputation, its place among the European nations and ultimately its equality.⁷⁰ Germany was on its way and European integration became one of the core policies for all post war German governments. European cooperation instead of national isolationism was one of the fundamental lessons taken from World War II, as Adenauer pointed out: “One positive result of the past war has been the conviction, which has broken through among all European peoples that the states of this continent must now come together in political and economic unity.”⁷¹ For the time being, Europe was the

⁶³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11140D, original: „Wer Europa verneint, ist der Totengräber des deutschen Volkes, weil er dem deutschen Volke die einzige Möglichkeit nimmt, sein Leben, so wie es ihm wertvoll und teuer ist, sein freies auf christlichen Grundsätzen aufgebautes Leben fortzuführen.“ see also, Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, p. 392

⁶⁴ See P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, p. 83

⁶⁵ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 398A-D, see also, Heinemann (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 403D-404A

⁶⁶ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 54D

⁶⁷ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 34B, see also, VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3883D

⁶⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6501C

⁶⁹ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3614A, original: „In der Erkenntnis, dass die Erneuerung eines deutschen Staates nur aus der Bereitschaft für Europa erwachsen kann, fühlen wir uns mit dem besten Kräften des deutschen Volkes darin einig, dass jeder Schritt gerechtfertigt ist, der dazu beitragen kann, Sicherheit und Freiheit aller freiheitsliebenden Völker zu fördern. Wir bekennen uns zu einer europäischen Gemeinschaft, zu gleichem Opfer und zu gleichen Nutzen, zu gleichen Pflichten und zu gleichen Rechten.“

⁷⁰ See, A. Grosser, „Die Rolle Konrad Adenauers in der jüngsten deutschen und europäischen Geschichte“ in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, p. 19, see also, Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, p. 354

⁷¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7071B, original: „Ein positives Ergebnis des letzten Krieges war die bei allen europäischen Völkern durchbrechende Überzeugung, daß die Staaten dieses Kontinents sich zu einer politischen und wirtschaftlichen Einheit zusammenschließen müßten.“

scope of Germany's political aspirations and the environment one wanted to work in, at least the government.

The United Nations (UN)⁷²

Peace and prosperity was the hope connected to the creation of the UN.⁷³ Especially when the SPD was still unenthusiastic about the institutional integration of West Germany into Europe and the Western alliance system, the UN seemed to be the alternative. It would keep the Western commitment while not infringing Soviet security concerns.⁷⁴ The UN had its weaknesses, but finally its collective security system was mankind's only hope for lasting peace.⁷⁵ The nagging question was whether the UN could actually provide for the security of the German people. The memory of the League of Nations, which had not been able to provide that security, played quite an important role in this evaluation. And things did not seem to have improved much, since International tension showed clearly in the UN, not least in the Security Council.⁷⁶ The government's answer was uncertain, but it was definitely not willing to take the risk, not least because western security integration provided a safer option.⁷⁷ This government position later changed to the realisation that the collective security system of the UN had failed to solve the East-West conflict and was therefore not suited to guarantee the security of the German people.⁷⁸ "(...) however, in itself the [UN] is certainly not a reliable means to secure peace. Not the UN - I repeat that - but NATO thwarted any further communist advance."⁷⁹ Therefore, the origin of the Western integrated defences must be seen exactly in the frustration about the UN.⁸⁰ The SPD agreed that even an international collective security system had to take the power structures in the world into

⁷² Germany did not become member of the UN until 18th September 1973.

⁷³ See quotation from a Truman speech to the UN, in: von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3616B

⁷⁴ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 49B-C, see also, VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1081A

⁷⁵ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10667CD, 10668A

⁷⁶ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 89B-90C

⁷⁷ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1088B, see also, Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2298A

⁷⁸ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2295AB, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3905A

⁷⁹ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10663C, original: „(...) aber sie [UNO] allein ist ganz gewiss kein verlässliches Mittel zur Sicherung des Friedens. Nicht sie - ich wiederhole -, sondern die NATO hat dem weiteren Vordringen des Kommunismus Einhalt geboten.“

⁸⁰ Brandt (SPD), in General Report about the political implications of the EDC treaty, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11176C

account, i.e. the superpowers.⁸¹ “The hope, born out of the ruins of the Second World War, was that the United Nations would be the means to secure peace – if the governments wanted it – (Truman), but the Cold War, nuclear deterrence and the right of veto [in the Security Council] has worn it down.”⁸² Later proposals to admit the Soviet Union into NATO did not have the least of a chance, before this background.⁸³ All that remained was the ideal on which the UN was built – preservation of peace.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 357B

⁸² Egon Bahr, *Der Nationalstaat: überlebt und unentbehrlich*, Steidl, Göttingen, 1998, p. 8, original : „Die aus den Trümmern des Zweiten Weltkrieges geborene Hoffnung, die Vereinten Nationen könnten das Instrument werden, das den Frieden sichert, >> wenn die Regierungen es wollen << (Truman), zerfaserte im Kalten Krieg an Vetorecht und Abschreckung

⁸³ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3154A

⁸⁴ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2298A

3.2 National Security

3.2.1 Fundamentals

The problems Germany had in the immediate post war period were pretty clear and the fundamental aims of German policy were widely accepted:

“Problem No. 1 is to prevent Germany from turning Russian (Hear, hear! From the SPD and the middle of the House) and problem No. 2 is to foster the creation of the United States of Europe (renewed loud agreement from the SPD and the middle of the house). Everything else is a subordinate function of these fundamental aims of our foreign policy.”¹

In parliamentary debates at least, Adenauer was the first to add German reunification to this list.²

From Sovereignty to Interdependence

In his first government statement, however, Adenauer recognised that Germany lacked what the majority of states took for granted: “Sadly, we always have to be aware that Germany and the German people are not yet free and that we do not yet stand as an equal beside the other peoples, and that – this is particularly painful – we are torn in two parts.”³ The recognition “(...) that for the time being we are only a torso, that we are only a region state; a rudiment; I would say we are an embryo of the future Germany (...)”⁴ This statement reflected the realities in Germany as they were in 1949. This form of minor status was based on the legal positions resulting from the unconditional capitulation of the German Reich on 8

¹ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 440D, original: „Das Problem Nr. 1 ist, zu verhindern, dass Deutschland russisch wird, (Sehr richtig! bei der SPD und in der Mitte) und das Problem Nr. 2 ist die Förderung der Bildung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa. (Erneute lebhafte Zustimmung bei der SPD und in der Mitte.) Alle anderen Dinge stehen letzten Endes im Verhältnis von Funktionen zu diesen wesentlichen Grundzielen unserer Außenpolitik.“

² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2233A, Those three priorities, i.e. Reunification, Peace and Freedom and Europe, were set in the first session of the Bundestag, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 548

³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 22A, original: „Zwar müssen wir uns immer bewusst sein, dass Deutschland und das deutsche Volk noch nicht frei sind, dass es noch nicht gleichberechtigt neben den anderen Völkern steht, dass es – und das ist besonders schmerzlich – in zwei Teile zerrissen ist.“

⁴ Ewers (DP), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 47D, original: „(...) daß wir vorläufig nur ein Torso sind, daß wir nur ein Teilstaat, ein Rudiment, ich möchte sagen ein Embryo eines zukünftigen Deutschlands sind, (...)“

May 1945 which remitted all state power to the Allies.⁵ Legally, sovereignty still rested with the German people, but its exercise was suspended until such time as the occupying powers handed it back. This state of affairs was accepted as a fact of life which could not be changed for the time being.⁶ “The only way to freedom is to work with the Allied High Commission and to try to increase our freedoms and responsibilities step by step.”⁷ The reestablishment of a normal state of affairs became the first and foremost duty of the Federal government.⁸ However, that did not mean a reversion to nationalistic patterns. The last remnants of nationalistic forces, which had played a minor role in the first German parliament, were eradicated in the second federal election in 1953. From then on even the most right-wing party in parliament, the representatives of the expellees (GB-BHE), recognised how much past nationalism had damaged the fortunes of the German people and Europe in general.⁹ “Now, perhaps more than all other peoples, we distrust the idea of the nation state as the ultimate wisdom.”¹⁰ Some suggested the replacement of the nation state through some European super structure. Mainstream Euro-enthusiast and federalists more realistically suggested in the Bundestag to replace national sovereignty gradually with European integration.¹¹ In addition to the developing European patriotism the Cold War era was the time of superpowers. Old-fashioned medium-sized nation states – of which Europe had so many – seemed outmoded.¹² In a world where only the superpowers could claim to enjoy real national sovereignty the concept of sovereignty was under siege.¹³ Equality in the international arena was often used as one definition of sovereignty.¹⁴ Interdependence modified this concept quite substantially. It seemed to be a much more up to date concept. Although it could not replace the constitutional doctrine of sovereignty, it reflected the economic and political questions of survival much

⁵ See Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9790A, WP I, 240, 11142B

⁶ Wahl (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11107B-D

⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 29D, original: „Der einzige Weg zur Freiheit ist der, dass wir im Einvernehmen mit der Hohen Alliierten Kommission unsere Freiheiten und unsere Zuständigkeiten Stück für Stück zu erweitern versuchen.“

⁸ Wahl (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11107D

⁹ Haasler (GB-BHE), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 96A

¹⁰ See 22. 5. 1950: Schumacher's keynote speech: “Socialdemocracy in its struggle for Germany and Europe“, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 750, original: „Wir Deutschen sind, vielleicht mehr als alle anderen Völker, jetzt geneigt, im Nationalstaats nicht der Weisheit letzter Schluss zu sehen.“

¹¹ See Seelos (BP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3582B, see also, Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2275CD

¹² von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3882CD

¹³ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 32C-D, see also, VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2245A

¹⁴ See, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2259B, see also, Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3821C

better.¹⁵ “No European nation, big or small, is, nowadays in a position to determine the course of its future on its own, nor can any guarantee security by itself.”¹⁶ The dependence on other states had become a fact of life and cast the rigid limits of national sovereignty into doubt.

A modest revival of national ideals came with the first disaster in the European integration process, the rejection of the EDC treaty. After that the Liberals advocated ideas similar to those of the Gaullists, i.e. a *Europe des patries* and the nation state as a reference point for its people as well as a constituent element for Europe.¹⁷ And indeed the way to Europe seemed to lead through a recovery of national sovereignty for Germany, which became obvious in the sequence of treaties to that end with the Allies.

Peace Treaty – Petersberg Accords – General Treaty

The issue of a peace treaty was particularly sensitive:

“The German people need a peace treaty which provides for its national unity and independence, and which ensures its democratic and peaceful development. The Occupation Statute stands in the way of such a peace treaty. It makes reunification impossible and it strengthens the same vicious forces which have already driven Germany into two world wars.”¹⁸

The calls for a peace treaty had a strong moral point: “More than 52 months have passed since guns fell silent. Nevertheless, legally we are still at war.”¹⁹ Especially among the Communists in parliament, these demands were used as a propaganda tool against the West: the main problem, however, was that no such treaty could be concluded without the consent of the Soviet Union.²⁰

The Petersberg Accords were the first step on an alternative route. Through it, partial sovereignty was restored. And for the first time since the war the German

¹⁵ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10644B

¹⁶ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10644B, original: „Keine europäische Nation, mag sie kleiner oder größer sein, ist heute noch in der Lage, ihre Zukunft allein und auf sich selbst gestellt zu bestimmen, ihre Sicherheit allein und aus eigener Kraft zu gewährleisten.“

¹⁷ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3159C, 3160A-C, see also, VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4620B

¹⁸ Renner (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 13, p. 324A, original: „Das deutsche Volk braucht einen Friedensvertrag der ihm seine nationale Einheit und Unabhängigkeit, der ihm eine demokratische und friedliche Entwicklung sichert. Durch das Besatzungsstatut aber wird der Friedensvertrag verhindert, wird die Einheit Deutschlands unmöglich gemacht, werden dieselben verhängnisvollen Kräfte gestärkt, die Deutschland bereits in zwei Weltkriege gestürzt haben.“

¹⁹ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 73A, original: „Mehr als 52 Monate sind seit der Einstellung der Kampfhandlungen vergangen, und de jure befinden wir uns noch immer im Kriegszustand.“

²⁰ Pfleiderer (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1095C

representatives were accepted as equal partners among the Allies.²¹ The most concrete achievement in this respect was the right to maintain consular economic missions abroad under the Petersberg agreement.²² Germany accepted quite severe restrictions of its economy, particularly in the field of coal and steel production.²³ The Petersberg Accords were also the beginning of a *de facto* peace treaty between the Western Allies and West Germany: as a consequence of the stalemate with the USSR, the conclusion was drawn that new ways of dealing with the situation had to be found: "There are no peace treaties, such as usually followed any war. Instead there are long lines of development which we are living through. It is our duty to work as hard as we can to achieve German equality during those times."²⁴ Probably the most important normative objective of the Petersberg Accords was the inclusion of West Germany as 'a peaceful member of the European community, which can be seen as deliberately coinciding with the partial return of national sovereignty.'²⁵

The General Treaty²⁶ between the Western Allies and the Federal Republic extended the line of the Petersberg Accords and added another component to the *de facto* peace treaty.²⁷ The Occupation Statute was replaced by the provisions of the General Treaty.

"The German Treaty ends the state of war as well as the occupation regime between the Federal Republic and the three Occupational Powers in the respective territories. It constitutes a preliminary substitute of a future peace treaty. Certain elements of sovereignty retained by the Allies must be seen only as necessitated by the circumstances."²⁸

²¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2465CD, see also, Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 283

²² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 399B-D see also Petersberg Accords, Preamble, Art. IV

²³ Erhard (CDU) Minister for Economics, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1137A, On the other hand the list of industrial plants up for dismantling was substantially reduced, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 284

²⁴ Stegner (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7700A, original: „Wir haben heute keine Friedensverträge unmittelbar nach dem Abschluss der Krieg mehr, wie es früher üblich war, sondern wir haben lange Entwicklungen, wie wir sie durchleben. Wir haben die Aufgabe, in diesen lange Entwicklungen so viel für die deutsche Gleichberechtigung zu tun, wie wir können.“, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8203CD

²⁵ See, Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 283

²⁶ Adenauer used to call it 'Deutschlandvertrag' i.e. German Treaty: see Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 222, p. 9909B

²⁷ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 541, for the criticism of the SPD on this was of proceeding see: Speech by Schumacher on wireless 'RIAS', on 15th July, 1952, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 965

²⁸ Pünder (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11105D, original: „Der Deutschland-Vertrag liquidiert in seinem Gebiet zwischen der Bundesrepublik und den drei Besatzungsmächten dem Krieg und das Besatzungsregime und sei völkerrechtlich einen vorläufigen Ersatz für den künftigen Friedensvertrag,

This was what Adenauer had worked for: full sovereignty over internal matters as well as foreign affairs.²⁹ All restrictions on trade were lifted.³⁰ And Germany was a partner again: “(...) it is the common aim of the signatory states to incorporate the Federal Republic into the European community on the basis of equality (...).”³¹ “And the most important thing is that the negotiations about the General Treaty have led the four participants [France, Great Britain, USA and West Germany] to lay down German reunification as their common aim.”³² So did the Council of Europe.³³ The final borders of Germany would be agreed in a future peace treaty to which the General Treaty was meant to lead.³⁴

Three areas of Allied prerogative remained: Firstly, the right to keep troops stationed in Germany and take action to ensure their security. They were no longer occupational forces, but remained, with German consent, as defensive forces within the Atlantic framework.³⁵

Secondly, Berlin remained under Allied control and, therefore, under a sort of occupational rule.³⁶ Thirdly, all matters connected to a final peace treaty, i.e. Germany as a whole and reunification would be reserved for final decision among the four Allies. These prerogatives were the result of the legal obligations of the Western Allies towards the Soviet Union, i.e. their responsibility towards the whole of Germany. For Germany they were also the embodiment of the remaining integral link between East- and West Germany and the safeguard of its claims for reunification.³⁷ The opposition saw this a bit more critically:

“Article 5 of the General Treaty – the so-called emergency clause – enables the Allies to take over the executive powers in Germany and to enter into international binding agreements

Nur aus der Zwangslage heraus seien gewisse Souveränitätsvorbehalte der Westmächte im Deutschland-Vertrag zu verstehen.“

²⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8099CD WP I, 221, p. 9790C

³⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9794C

³¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8099B, original: „(...) dass es das gemeinsame Ziel des Signaturstaaten ist, die Bundesrepublik auf der Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung in die europäische Gemeinschaft einzugliedern (...).“

³² Tillmanns (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7769A, original: „Und das Wichtigste ist: Die Verhandlungen über den Generalvertrag haben dazu geführt, dass die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands als gemeinsames Ziel der vier Partner vertraglich festgelegt wird.“

³³ Pfünder (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7074AB

³⁴ Pfeleiderer (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1095CD

³⁵ Wahl (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11109B

³⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9790CD, 9791AB

³⁷ Pfeleiderer (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1095B, see also, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3122B, see also, Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 541

for Germany, at any time, based on their own judgment and ultimately on occupation law. The highest authority still lies with the Occupation Powers.”³⁸

Adenauer’s reply was categorical: “The emergency clause did not give the three [Allied] powers the right to resume all powers.”³⁹

Adenauer’s major concern, before the conclusion of the Western Treaties, as they were also called, i.e. the EDC, the General Treaty etc., was that the post-war occupation rule might lead to an understanding between the four Allies to the detriment of Germany.⁴⁰ He was haunted by memories of the Morgenthau Plan, mercifully never implemented, but also the partition of Poland in World War II, implemented all too drastically. If any of that happened, Germany would have been kept as a subordinate, deprived completely of any influence on its own fate. Soviet expansionism came as a blessing in disguise in this context, because it changed the position of the Western Allies towards Germany.⁴¹ There was the chance of German development leading to freedom. Adenauer would not let this chance slip by. The Western treaties were, therefore, the consolidation and the embodiment of German partnership with the West.⁴² The full sovereignty of West Germany was achieved on 5 May 1955, granted in the revised General Treaty⁴³, and for everyone to see in the foundation of the Bundeswehr and its participation in NATO. The SPD rightly pointed out that it was not full sovereignty, because the Soviet Union as one of the Allies had not agreed to this status.⁴⁴ However, realities on the ground seemed to be stronger than theoretical legal arguments. This was as good as it would get, and it was indeed the foundation of the trust between West Germany and the Western Allies.⁴⁵ Questions such as whether the government of a reunited Germany could also commit the country to an alliance with the Soviet Union⁴⁶,

³⁸ Radio speech by Kurt Schumacher RIAS, on 15 July, 1952, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 969

³⁹ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 542, original: „Dieser Notstandsartikel gab den drei Mächten nicht das Recht, die volle Gewalt wieder an sich zu ziehen.“ The three Allied powers had the right, under Article 5 to declare a state of emergency under which they could take all actions necessary to provide for law and order and the security of their forces. Under Art. 5, Paragraph 6, the Federal government could ask them to lift the state of emergency and could refer the case for a final decision to the North Atlantic Council within 30 days

⁴⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11133D, see also, Brandt (SPD), in General Report about the political implications of the EDC treaty, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11177C

⁴¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, WP I, 190, p. 8096D

⁴² Brandt (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11112AB, see also, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11133AB

⁴³ See Art. 1 of the revised General Treaty as quoted in: Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3821C

⁴⁴ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3823D

⁴⁵ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3887A

⁴⁶ See Stegner (Independent), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2268AB

became less and less realistic, as the Western commitment became more and more secure.

3.2.2 *Internal Reform*

A new administration

At the beginning post-war Germany did not have working administrative structures which the new government could rely on. On the one hand, the truly democratic civil servants were few and far between. 'Denazification' took out a large number of able administrators, who had worked under the Nazi regime. The damage done by Denazification impaired the ability of the new authorities to discharge their duties.⁴⁷ The injustice of the Denazification system were criticised mostly on the far right.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the absence of a foreign ministry epitomised Germany's lack of sovereignty.⁴⁹ It was not yet able to live up to core duties of a state. Foreign policy was still a matter for the Allied High Commission minus the Soviet High Commissioner.⁵⁰ However when the Foreign Office was re-established in 1951⁵¹, the question of reliable personnel and with it the question of Denazification surfaced, again. Adenauer's position was that: "You can't simply set up such an important ministry [the Foreign Office] and do completely without experienced people from the past. (Hear, hear! in the middle of the House.) I remain resolved that now, in the year 1951 we should finally acknowledge the fact that there are people who were members of the NSDAP but have done nothing blameworthy. (Applause from the government parties. – Shouting from the SPD.) The Foreign

⁴⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 27B, see also, Seelos (BP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3584D

⁴⁸ Richter (NR), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 81B, 82A

⁴⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 23A

⁵⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 23A

⁵¹ For the special institutional situation of the Federal Republic, particularly in regard to the Foreign Office, which Adenauer kept for himself until 1956, see Roland Sturm, 'The Chancellor and the Executive', in: Stephen Padgett (ed.), *The Development of the German Chancellorship Adenauer to Kohl*, Hurst & Company, London, 1994, p. 80

Corps needs certain skills. You can't simply give the work to anybody."⁵² The SPD found this approach highly dubious.⁵³

Another problem was that the whole law code stemmed from the Nazi period. This included the civil service staff regulations, which had been changed to Nazi requirements in 1937, although based on even earlier legislation. The task of introducing new legislation in accordance with democratic principle was formidable. In addition the social realities had to change. Many Germans had become used to the war economy and the omnipotent state. The streamlining of the state, non-intervention and the liberalisation of the economy were urgent. State bureaucracy had to be cut back and the liberating force of individual responsibility and initiative had to be fostered in the economy and society. Without that the Federal Republic could thrive, neither in moral nor in financial terms.⁵⁴

West Germany becomes Germany

The democratic approach in the Federal Republic was in sharp contrast to the reality in East Germany.⁵⁵ This democratic handicap of the East marked the regime there and underpinned the claim of the West German democratic institutions to represent the whole of the German people.⁵⁶ This was also the borderline Adenauer refused to overstep: The Soviet advances toward reunification entailed direct negotiations between both German governments, in the early 1950s.⁵⁷ This would have meant that Adenauer accepted the Pieck-Grotewohl administration implicitly as equals.⁵⁸ That would have helped to perpetuate the division of Germany.⁵⁹ And it would have shattered the whole legitimacy argument which was the basis for seeing West Germany as the only rightful German representative and successor of

⁵² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 168, p. 6932B, original: „Man kann nicht einfach beim Aufbau eines so wichtigen Ministeriums auf erfahrene Leute der früheren Zeit rundweg verzichten. (Sehr richtig! In der Mitte.) Ich stehe weiter auf dem Standpunkt, dass wir jetzt im Jahre 1951 endlich einmal auch einen Strich darunter machen sollen, dass früher Leute der NSDAP angehört haben, ohne irgendwie da etwas pecciert zu haben. (Beifall bei der Regierungsparteien.- Zurufe von der SPD.) Der auswärtige Dienst verlangt doch auch gewisse Fähigkeiten. Man kann nicht jeden dazu brauchen.“

⁵³ Wienand (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3776AB

⁵⁴ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 76A, see also, Leuchtgens (NR), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 132C

⁵⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 13, 308C

⁵⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 13, 308D, see also, Schäfer (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 13, 319B, see also, see also, 22. 5. 1950: Schumacher's keynote speech: "The Socialdemocracy in its struggle for Germany and Europe", in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), Kurt Schumacher, p. 747, see also, Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1995, p. 390, 514

⁵⁷ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 169, p. 6985D-6986A

⁵⁸ See von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 302CD, 311BC

⁵⁹ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7106C

the German Reich.⁶⁰ This claim was accepted by the Western Allies in the General Treaty.⁶¹ West Germany got a huge boost of confidence and reputation through the strikes in the Soviet occupied zone in June 1953, which also discredited the Eastern regime and made the German peoples' will for reunification clear beyond doubt.⁶² Based on this popular support, as well as the legitimate democratic basis of West Germany, Adenauer argued all the more strongly that the Soviet Union should finally set free the 18 million Germans in their occupied zone and let them be reunited with their brothers in the West.⁶³ And again he did not talk to the East German regime, knowing full well that the final decision as to the fate of Germany would be taken in Moscow.⁶⁴ The recognition of the GDR as a political reality, if not as a state, occurred *de facto* only towards the end of the 1950s⁶⁵ and *de jure* only in the late 1960s with Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.⁶⁶

3.2.3 Territorial Integrity

German territorial integrity was the most pressing issue from the very inception of the Federal Republic. Under the declaration of the four Allies of 5 June 1945 Germany had not ceased to exist – within the borderlines of 31st December 1937 – as a state.⁶⁷ Especially on the far right, this fact was used as a propaganda weapon: “Any secession of German territories is a breach of international law as stated in Art. 43 of the Hague convention and the Atlantic Charter.”⁶⁸ Among responsible politicians, this position became more sophisticated and was elaborated in a European sense:

“It is an inescapable truth that we have lost the war. This realisation does, however, not free us from the duty to preserve Germany in its original borders, even within a policy of Euro-

⁶⁰ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7814A, see also, Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3205C

⁶¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2230A, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126A

⁶² Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1083D

⁶³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4606B

⁶⁴ Lenz (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10679AB, see also, Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10714C

⁶⁵ See Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 306D

⁶⁶ For early traces of recognising the GDR see Birkelbach (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2443C, see also, Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, Siedler, Frankfurt a.M., 1989p. 38

⁶⁷ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 431

⁶⁸ Richter (NR), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 82D, original: „Jede Abtrennung deutschen Gebietes steht also außerhalb aller völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen und widerspricht nicht nur dem Artikel 43 der Haager Landkriegsordnung, sondern darüber hinaus auch noch der Atlantik-Charta.“

pean integration. Europe can only be built from healthy components, if it is to last. It will never grow with mutilated limbs.”⁶⁹

The German aspiration for the peaceful restitution of the lost territories was accepted to be legitimate by the Western Allies.⁷⁰ They did not include Austria, which had been re-established as an independent state, although for some it was hard to accept, for example for the Bavarian Party (BP) which embodied the sentimental attachment and a feeling of kinship with Bavaria’s neighbours.

The Saar

The Saar was one of such territorial issues and it turned increasingly into a problem between France and West Germany. The negotiating position of Germany was as follows:

“France has economic interests in the Saar region. This must be accepted. Germany has economic and national interests there. (...) All those interests should be satisfactorily settled, which will be possible within the European Union, which we would like to join as soon as possible. (...) We will cooperate enthusiastically to achieve the great aim of this Union. (...) We are committed to doing all we can to take the route for the security of peace in Europe and the world, which has been laid out in this article.”⁷¹

Relations between France and Germany deteriorated, however, because France was suspected of wanting an independent Saar state or, if possible, further integration with France.⁷² The German government regretted that this process seemed to be a fall-back into nationalistic politics of the inter war brand.⁷³ They became very worried about France creating realities in the Saar which could not easily be undone

⁶⁹ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5686C, original: „Daß wir den Krieg verloren haben, ist eine Binsenwahrheit. Ihre Erkenntnis entbindet uns nicht von der Verpflichtung, den Bestand Deutschlands auch und gerade im Zuge einer europäischen Politik zu wahren. Europa kann ja nur aus heiligen Gliedern bestehen, wenn es dauern soll. Mit verstümmelten Gliedern wird es nie gedeihen.“

⁷⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2230BC

⁷¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 5, p. 30AB, original: „Am Saargebiet hat Frankreich – das ist ohne weiteres anzuerkennen – wirtschaftliche Interessen. Deutschland hat dort wirtschaftliche und nationale Interessen. (...) Alle diese Interessen sollen in eine Ordnung und Übereinstimmung gebracht werden, die sich im Rahmen der Europäischen Union, deren Mitglied wir möglichst bald zu werden wünschen, finden lassen wird. (...) Wir werden gerne und freudig an dem großen Ziel dieser Union mitarbeiten. (...) Wir sind entschlossen, alles zu tun, was in unserer Kraft steht, um den in diesem Artikel vorgezeichneten Weg zur Sicherung des Friedens in Europa und in der Welt zu gehen.“

⁷² von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3888D, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3922D

⁷³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 10, p. 186D

later,⁷⁴ particularly, because a peace treaty seemed so far off in the future.⁷⁵ An Accord between the Saar and France was signed in March 1950 with the following consequences⁷⁶: The French foreign minister represented Saar foreign interests.⁷⁷ Mines and railways were put under French control.⁷⁸ A monetary union was established which became the centrepiece of the economic union between the Saar and France;⁷⁹ a French police force was set up,⁸⁰ and some thought was given to the possibility that conscription should be introduced in the Saar for the French army.⁸¹ Furthermore, the regional Saar government under Minister-President Hoffmann was heavily supported by French occupation authorities.⁸² His government took on a more and more authoritarian form, which did not reflect western fundamental principles of liberal democracy.⁸³ Under international law, the authority of the Saar government to decide over the territorial status of the region was contested by all the German parties.⁸⁴ A referendum on cession, exclusively in the Saar was also unacceptable, because only the whole body of the German people could decide over its territory.⁸⁵ However, Germany did not really have any means to prevent any of this from happening⁸⁶, particularly because the French Saar policy was supported, in the early post-war years, by the other two Western Allies as a kind of recompense for war damage suffered by France.⁸⁷ For a while the Saar issue seemed to develop into a conflict reminiscent of Alsace-Lorraine, especially because of the possibility of a *de facto* cession of the Saar from Germany.⁸⁸ Emotions ran high:

“This is a fight for the right of self-determination of a part of the German people. This is a fight against chauvinism and against an artificially cultivated small-country nationalism.

⁷⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1557D, WP I, 190, p. 8102D

⁷⁵ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1563B

⁷⁶ See Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 307-8

⁷⁷ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 406C

⁷⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1560A

⁷⁹ Pfeleiderer (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1097C

⁸⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1557C

⁸¹ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3568C

⁸² Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5685C, see also Mayer (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5691C

⁸³ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1563CD

⁸⁴ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 55C, see also, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1071C

⁸⁵ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1106C, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3163C

⁸⁶ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3186B

⁸⁷ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3163C, Great Britain and the US agreed to the attachment of the Saar economy to France several times, the last time at the conference of the Foreign Ministers in December 1947, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 295

⁸⁸ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1572A-C, see also, Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5677D

Therefore, it is a fight about the fundamental principles for which the democracies have fought the last war. The Saar people want to be and should be true Germans, which means good Europeans, but they should not be and do not want to be half-French or bad Frenchmen.⁸⁹

Reconciliation between France and Germany seemed in grave danger,⁹⁰ and with it the whole European integration effort, too.⁹¹

“We are prepared to make economic sacrifices for the sake of Franco-German understanding, peace and European unification. We can – our colleague Schmid [SPD] has mentioned this – concede coal and iron and we can give economic advantages for the sake of peace! But we cannot, should not and will never hand over German people, neither their freedom or their human dignity.”⁹²

In addition, splitting the Saar from Germany might also be treated as a precedent for the later peace treaty with major implications for the other lost territories.⁹³ Adenauer sought a solution in the framework of European integration. Defending solely national positions would not lead to a solution of the Saar problem.⁹⁴ A preliminary solution came with the Schuman Plan.⁹⁵ The hotly disputed Saar mines would be placed under European control, importantly, without the Saar being an independent signatory of the ECSC Treaty.⁹⁶ A final solution for the Saar region would be reserved to a freely negotiated peace treaty.⁹⁷ This position was accepted by the Western Allies, including France, in an exchange of letters attached to the ECSC treaty, which gave it its legal status.⁹⁸

⁸⁹ Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5677C, original: „Es ist ein Kampf um das Selbstbestimmungsrecht eines deutschen Bevölkerungsteiles, es ist ein Kampf gegen den Chauvinismus und gegen einen gezüchteten Kleinnationalismus und es ist damit ein Kampf um die Grundsätze, um deren Willen von den Demokratien der letzte Krieg geführt worden ist. Die Saarländer wollen uns sollen ehrliche Deutsche und damit gute Europäer sein, aber nicht halbe oder schlechte Franzosen.“

⁹⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1559CD

⁹¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1560A

⁹² Mayer (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5691D-5692A, original: „Wir sind bereit, dem deutsch-französischen Verhältnis, dem Frieden und der Einigung Europas wirtschaftliche Opfer zu bringen. Wir können - Kollege Schmid sprach vorhin schon davon - Kohle und Eisen geben, und wir können wirtschaftliche Vorteile geben um des Friedens willen! Aber wir können dürfen und werden nie deutsche Menschen geben, nicht ihre Freiheit und nicht ihre Menschenwürde!“

⁹³ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 51A

⁹⁴ Quotation of Robert Schuman in: von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 33B

⁹⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2464C

⁹⁶ Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6508D

⁹⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1556C, 1557AB, 1559D, see also, VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5671A

⁹⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5665D, WP I, 182, p. 7598BC, for the German original of the letters of 18/4/51 see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 429-30

In August 1954, the rejection of the EDC also threw the arrangements about the Saar into disarray⁹⁹, because the van Naters plan, which provided for the Europeanisation of the Saar, was connected to the EPC and fell with it in the rejection of the EDC.¹⁰⁰ Finally, the issue was settled in a separate agreement between Adenauer and Mendès-France. The Saar Convention¹⁰¹ guaranteed civil and political liberties.¹⁰² And it allowed a referendum in the Saar.¹⁰³ The agreement was accepted by the government majority¹⁰⁴ and the referendum went in favour of reunification with Germany, which reattached the Saar fully to Germany.¹⁰⁵ The final settlement of the German borders would remain for peace treaty and the Saar agreement would be in force until such time.¹⁰⁶ The US and Britain became the guarantors for the agreements.¹⁰⁷

“(…) of course, the agreement does not fulfil all our wishes. But I hope from the bottom of my heart that it will fundamentally contribute to one of the preconditions for reunification and peace, namely to a true and lasting reconciliation between France and Germany.”¹⁰⁸

From the perspective of the German government, the Saar Convention was seen as proof that conflict could be overcome in a spirit of conciliation and understanding.¹⁰⁹ And, importantly, it also contributed to the re-launch of the European integration project, of which the Franco-German understanding was an essential component.¹¹⁰

⁹⁹ See Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2240B, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2253C

¹⁰⁰ Pfeleiderer (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1093AB

¹⁰¹ The Saar Convention was set within the framework of WEU. All its provisions were supervised by Commissioner from WEU, see Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3128A; the SPD voted against this agreement, see Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3142B, see also, H.-P. Schwarz, *Adenauer Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1991, p. 166-167

¹⁰² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3127CD, 3128A

¹⁰³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3127CD

¹⁰⁴ See voting list for the Saar Agreement, Paris 23/10/54, in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3939-3947

¹⁰⁵ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10640C

¹⁰⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3127CD, 3129A

¹⁰⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3130A

¹⁰⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3129A, original: „(…) bringt das Abkommen und selbstverständlich nicht die Erfüllung all unsrer Wünsche. Aber ich hoffe von ganzem Herzen, daß es wesentlich beiträgt zu der Erfüllung einer der Voraussetzungen für die Wiedervereinigung und den Frieden, nämlich zu einer echten und dauernden Aussöhnung zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland.“

¹⁰⁹ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10640D-10641A

¹¹⁰ Jacques Bariéty, ‚Die Rolle der persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen Bundeskanzler Adenauer und General de Gaulle für die deutsch-französische Politik zwischen 1958 und 1963‘, p. 15

The lost territories

The quarrel about the Saar bore no resemblance to what happened in the former Eastern German territories. The Oder-Neiße line became the embodiment of a much more lasting and contentious issue about the final German borders. Again, the legal position was that the German Reich had never ceased to exist within the borders of 1937 and that a final settlement could only take place in a freely negotiated peace treaty.¹¹¹ This position was maintained by the West German government until reunification in 1990. However, while the Western Allies accepted the latter claim, the idea of reunification within the 1937 borders was rejected by them in the negotiations for the General Treaty.¹¹²

The Oder-Neiße line was arguably the most contentious issue in that respect.

“We want to live in peace and friendship with all peoples and particularly with those in the East and the Southeast. (applause from the KPD. – shouting from the middle of the House: You have abandoned the homelands of 12 million people!) It is precisely the revision that not only disturbs our relationship with Poland, but must finally lead to war! (...) We cannot allow this! Our people must not be destroyed in a third world war. (...) The Oder-Neiße line is the borderline of peace. (continuing disorder: boo! boo! – noise – bell of the President – uproar: stand down! stand down!) - Reimann: “I will not stand down until I have said all there is to say!” (...) President Dr. Köhler: (...) Mr. Reimann, you have just said that the Oder-Neiße line is the border of peace. (continuing disorder.) All parties, which have spoken here since yesterday, have agreed, together, to reject the Oder-Neiße line as the German borderline.(...)” (applause in the middle of the house) “Such talk is a provocation of the overwhelming majority of the House.”¹¹³

Adenauer’s response was equally clear: “I would also like to make the following statement for the government: We regret that this house and this platform were desecrated by such a speech from deputy Reimann, which was wholly contrary to

¹¹¹ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4771B, see also, VDB, WP II, 5, p. 75C

¹¹² Wahl (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11108C, see also, Feller (GB-BHE), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10690B

¹¹³ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 66BC, original: „Wir wollen in Frieden und Freundschaft mit allen Völkern leben und besonders mit den Völkern des Ostens und Südostens. (Händeklatschen bei der KPD. – Zuruf aus der Mitte: Ihr habt die Heimat von 12 Millionen Menschen vergeben!) Gerade die Revision stört nicht nur unser Verhältnis gegenüber Polen, sondern bedeutet in der endgültigen Konsequenz den Krieg. (...) Das darf nicht sein! Unser Volk darf nicht in einem dritten Weltkrieg vernichtet werden. (...) Die Oder-Neiße-Grenze ist die Grenze des Friedens. (Andauernde erregte Rufe: Pfuil Pfuil – Lärm. – Glocke des Präsidenten. – Erregte Zurufe: Abtreten! Abtreten!) – Ich trete hier nicht ab, bis ich nicht alles gesagt habe! (...) Präsident Dr. Köhler: (...) – Herr Abgeordneter Reimann, Sie haben eben ausgesprochen, dass die Oder-Neiße-Linie die Friedenslinie ist. (Anhaltende große Unruhe) Seitdem gestern hier sämtliche Parteien gesprochen haben, haben sie übereinstimmend die Oder-Neiße-Linie als die deutsche Grenzlinie abgelehnt. (...) Es ist eine Provokation der überwältigenden Mehrheit dieses Hauses, wenn Sie derartige Ausführungen machen.“

any German interest (Loud agreement and applause).¹¹⁴ The Oder-Neiße line was unacceptable to an overwhelming majority in parliament.¹¹⁵ Schumacher put it in very drastic terms which show the strength of feeling on questions concerning German territories in the East: “We want to live in friendship with the Polish people, but not if it means German suicide.”¹¹⁶ In some expressions on the right wing, there was still a touch of the *‘Heim ins Reich’* policy which bore some resemblance to Nazi slogans about the reunification of all German people in one state:

“However, there is one thing in the government statement which I really appreciate, namely that the government has spoken such clear words in respect to the Oder-Neiße line none of us whatever our party loyalties, will ever agree to the Oder-Neiße line (Loud applause). But there is one thing which I have missed in the statement. Just as we are very concerned about Silesia and Pomerania, East Prussia and all the other German territories, so are we concerned for the fate of the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia (Hear, hear! on the right of the House).¹¹⁷

However, in 1950 the newly instated regime of the GDR accepted the Oder-Neiße line as Germany’s Eastern border in a treaty with Poland, the Görlitz Treaty.¹¹⁸ The West German government did not accept the legitimacy of this treaty,¹¹⁹ and was supported in this stance in a statement by all parliamentary groups except the Communists.¹²⁰

The West German government’s position remained that a settlement of the Eastern borderlines had to be sought in a peace treaty with a future all-German government.¹²¹ As of the present time, the Oder-Neiße line was unacceptable.¹²²

¹¹⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 67B, original: „Ich habe weiter im Namen der Bundesregierung folgende Erklärung abzugeben: Wir bedauern, dass dieser Saal und diese Rednerbühne durch eine solche Rede des Abgeordneten Reimann, die den deutschen Interessen absolut zuwiderläuft, entweiht worden sind. (Lebhafte Zustimmung und Händeklatschen).“

¹¹⁵ Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 62D, see also, von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 31B-C

¹¹⁶ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4766A, original: „Wir wollen die Freundschaft mit dem polnischen Volk - aber nicht um den Preis des deutschen Selbstmords.“

¹¹⁷ Loritz (WAV), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 68CD, original: „Aber eines freut mich in der Regierungserklärung: dass nämlich die Regierung so klare Worte hinsichtlich der Oder-Neiße-Linie gesprochen hat. Wir alle - ohne Rücksicht auf Partei - werden niemals die Oder-Neiße-Linie anerkennen. (Lebhafter Beifall.) Aber eins habe ich in der Regierungserklärung vermisst. Genau so wie uns Schlesien und Pommern, wie uns Ostpreußen und alle diese übrigen deutschen Gebiete am Herzen liegen, genau so liegt uns auch das Schicksal der Deutschen in den Gebieten in Böhmen und Mähren am Herzen. (Sehr richtig! Rechts).“

¹¹⁸ P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, p. 110

¹¹⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 13, 308D, see also WP I, 125, p. 4758C

¹²⁰ Löbe (SPD), Elder President of the Bundestag, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2457D

¹²¹ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10642D

¹²² von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10641D

Reunification and the Soviet Occupation Zone

For Adenauer, too, the aim of German reunification was non-negotiable.¹²³ In this he was at one with Schumacher and the opposition.¹²⁴ There was, however, much disagreement as to how this could be achieved: “German unity can be restored only by an all-embracing act of the German nation.”¹²⁵ The other possible way was an extension of the Basic Law, which was the option the Conservatives favoured. It is important to remember that even the founding fathers considered the Federal Republic of Germany and its constitution i.e. the Basic Law, as interim solutions pending a permanent settlement for ‘Germany in Europe’.¹²⁶ This mindset began to change only after the second federal election in 1953. The hopes for early reunification were not given up, but the Federal Republic was recognised as a state in its own right.¹²⁷ In this lay the danger that the division of Germany might become increasingly permanent.¹²⁸

Some doubted Adenauer’s sincerity in his effort to achieve reunification.¹²⁹ His commitment to making Germany an integral part of the West was well developed by then.¹³⁰ It was precisely this commitment which seemed to prevent the Soviets from agreeing to reunification or even closer links between the two parts of Germany.¹³¹ Out of this precarious situation Adenauer developed a political strategy which would dominate West German post-war politics: ‘Unity in Freedom’.¹³² The core idea of this concept is brilliantly reflected in a statement of one of his most fervent political adversaries, Herbert Wehner: “We know that the conditions and the content of [German] unity can only be the granting of full personal and civil

¹²³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8768C, see also, VDB, WP II, 3, p. 19C

¹²⁴ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2477AB, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 55B

¹²⁵ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2270D, original: „ die Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands kann doch nur durch einen Gesamtakt der ganzen deutschen Nation erfolgen (...)“

¹²⁶ See Preamble of the Basic Law and Art. 146, see also, Richter (NR), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 80B, see also, Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 413A, see also, Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7763A, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 136, 138, see also, 22. 5. 1950: Schumacher’s keynote speech: “The Socialdemocracy in its struggle for Germany and Europe”, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 750

¹²⁷ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 106B, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2238A

¹²⁸ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3143B, see also, VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4613C

¹²⁹ The most fervent accusations against Adenauer were made by two of his former fellow ministers, i.e. Dehler (FDP) and Heinemann (CDU, later SPD), see Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 384D-399C, see also, Heinemann (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 401A-406D

¹³⁰ Brandt (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11127B

¹³¹ Nuding (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2498D, see also, Renner (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7220D

¹³² ‘Einheit in Freiheit’, see, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8758A, 8760D, 8761B

rights for all, everywhere.”¹³³ Adenauer’s intriguingly realistic question was then: “How do we get to this reunification of Germany in freedom?”¹³⁴ Through our own strength? Through turning to the Soviets? No! It can only be done in cooperation with the Western Allies.¹³⁵ It was a concept of German unity which would not threaten the internal freedom and the integrity of the Federal Republic.¹³⁶

“Don’t we all know that if we lose freedom this time around we will have lost it for good, because those people who might possibly rebuild it will no longer be with us in Germany? And don’t we all know perfectly well, that there is no peace without freedom, that there is no democracy without freedom, that there is no justice which does not enjoy freedom, and that there is no human dignity which is not protected by freedom.”¹³⁷

Based on his experience with the totalitarian system of the Third Reich, one of Adenauer’s deepest and most sincere convictions turned into the policy aim of not letting Germany fall under another such system, i.e. Communism.¹³⁸ In a continuation of this line of argument Adenauer’s policy aimed at embedding Germany into Europe: “The highest aim of the policy of the government has been and will always be the restoration of German unity in a free and united Europe.”¹³⁹ There are two terms in Adenauer’s proposition: Freedom and Unity. Although the SPD finally agreed with the premise of this proposition¹⁴⁰, they would not reject solutions alternative to the Western commitment, if they offered better prospects

¹³³ Wehner, (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 13, p. 315C, original: „Wir wissen, dass die Bedingungen und der Inhalt dieser Einheit nur sein können die Gewährleistung der vollen persönlichen und staatsbürgerlichen Freiheiten für jeden einzelnen und überall.“

¹³⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8761B, original: „Wie kommen wir zu der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands in Freiheit?“

¹³⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8761B, 8768A, see also, VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2233A

¹³⁶ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2252B, see also, Thomas Sauer, Eugen Gerstenmaier (1906-1986), p. 35

¹³⁷ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3619D, original: „Wissen wir nicht alle, dass wenn wir die Freiheit dieses Mal verspielen, sie nicht wiedergewinnen werden, weil diejenigen, die sie vielleicht noch einmal schaffen könnten, diese Zeit bestimmt nicht mehr in Deutschland erleben werden? Und sind wir uns nicht alle klar darüber, dass es einen Frieden ohne Freiheit nicht gibt, dass eine Demokratie ohne Freiheit nicht gibt, dass eine Gerechtigkeit nicht gibt die nicht in der Freiheit lebt, und dass es keine Menschenwürde gibt, die nicht von der Freiheit geschützt ist?“

¹³⁸ See, H.Kohl, ‚Konrad Adenauer – Erbe und Auftrag‘ in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belser, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 78, see also, H. P. Schwarz, ‚Das Spiel ist aus und alle Fragen offen, oder: Vermutungen zu Adenauers Wiedervereinigungspolitik‘, in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belser, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 143

¹³⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 165, p. 6700A, original: „Das oberste Ziel der Politik der Bundesregierung ist und bleibt die Wiederherstellung der deutschen Einheit in einem freien und geeinten Europa.“

¹⁴⁰ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3139B

of reunification. “It must be worth the effort to rethink our ideas as to how our freedom can be safeguarded, if reunification could become reality.”¹⁴¹ Therefore, the leader of the opposition – then Erich Ollenhauer – replied to Adenauer’s reunification logic that union could be achieved only through an understanding between the four Allies.¹⁴² Schumacher, in particular, was not prepared to choose between East and West.¹⁴³ And the surviving links with their fellow countrymen in the Soviet zone had to be supported and maintained under all circumstances.¹⁴⁴ The SPD would never abandon hope of early reunification, and this led them to oppose many of the government’s pro-western and European initiatives. An example is captured in the following statement: “(...) what happens, if the accession of the Federal Republic to the European Defence Community has constitutional consequences on the other side of the Iron Curtain, if the first result of this step becomes the entrenchment and deepening of the division of Germany?”¹⁴⁵ In NATO and WEU membership, Adenauer’s policy became in fact what the SPD had always suspected. It gave Western integration priority over German reunification, and – they believed – actually prevented it.¹⁴⁶ This was nothing less than a betrayal of the German cause. “You can’t just accept that your own people, alone among the great peoples, remains divided (...).”¹⁴⁷ Instead the SPD demanded an active policy of reunification as the first priority of the Federal Republic.¹⁴⁸ The SPD accepted the Soviet Union as a foreign-policy reality, which could therefore be convinced of the merits of reunification.¹⁴⁹ As by the British Labour party, the Austrian solution was

¹⁴¹ Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8757D, original: „Es muss doch der Mühe wert sein, Konzeptionen für die Sicherung der Freiheit umzudenken, wenn ein vereintes Deutschland Tatsache werden könnte.“ see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 138

¹⁴² Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8764D, see also, VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1078B, 1082AB

¹⁴³ Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 140

¹⁴⁴ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8775CD, 8776A, see also, VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3826C

¹⁴⁵ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8113A, original: „ (...) was geschieht, wenn der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik zur europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft staatsrechtliche Konsequenzen auf der anderen Seite des eisernen Vorhangs auslöst, wenn die erste Folge dieses Schrittes die Verhärtung und Vertiefung der Spaltung Deutschlands ist?“

¹⁴⁶ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3137D, 3139D, see also, VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4611C, see also, VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10671CD, see also, Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 155, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 186

¹⁴⁷ See also, 22. 5. 1950: Schumacher’s keynote speech: “Socialdemocracy in its struggle for Germany and Europe“, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher*, p. 751, original: „Man findet sich nicht damit ab, dass sein eigenes Volk als Einziges unter den großen Völkern gespalten bleiben soll (...).“

¹⁴⁸ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2237C, 2238A, 2242A, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3140A,C, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3137D, see also, VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3897A, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 181, see also, Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, p. 524

¹⁴⁹ Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10721D

often cited as a positive example that there were reasons which could bring the Soviet Union to agree to reunification.¹⁵⁰

Adenauer, however, was convinced that the Soviet occupied zone was a fundamental issue for the Soviet Union itself. To surrender the zone would be to cast doubt on the whole system of satellite states.¹⁵¹ This meant that the division of Germany would continue, because it was a result of international tension.¹⁵²

“The Soviet Union will only agree to German unification in freedom, when she has to accept that her programme of further penetration of free Europe is no longer viable and when she has to accept that the Cold War policy has failed because of the will for freedom of the German people.”¹⁵³

The German problem was therefore only one symptom of the tensions in the world¹⁵⁴, although it contributed quite a lot to them. It would not be solved until those tensions abated.¹⁵⁵ And no one - not the government, nor the opposition, nor the world - really had a plan how to solve the problem.¹⁵⁶ Everything seemed to fall apart into two opposing camps, the world, Europe, Germany, and not least Berlin. In a sense, Germany had become the centre point of the world conflict. It was torn apart by it;¹⁵⁷ it was part of the reason for it; and it seemed that a good part of the solution lay on its grounds, while it could not be unified without the world settling its major conflicts of interest for good.¹⁵⁸

The link between the German problem and world peace was obvious. The great hope in Germany was that a resolution for the German problem would also resolve

¹⁵⁰ Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10727D

¹⁵¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4606C

¹⁵² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1075A

¹⁵³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1075CD, original: Die Sowjetunion wird der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands in Freiheit erst dann zustimmen, wenn sie einsehen muß, dass ihr Programm einer weiteren Durchdringung des freien Europa nicht mehr zu verwirklichen ist und dass die Politik des Kalten Krieges am Freiheitswillen des deutschen Volkes gescheitert ist.“

¹⁵⁴ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2252CD

¹⁵⁵ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3904C, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3918A, see also, Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 251

¹⁵⁶ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3153C, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3918A

¹⁵⁷ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3882C

¹⁵⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3132D, see also, Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3760A see also, quotation of Adenauer at the Hamburg party rally of 29/4/1953, in: Heinemann (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 402D-403A, see also, Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, p. 455

all the others.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, German reunification had to be part of every sensible security policy.¹⁶⁰ And again European integration was seen as the solution:

“The key for peace in Europe is to overcome the division of Germany. The door to peace will, however, be unlocked with this key only if a reunited Germany becomes a member of the united Europe, which in turn guarantees the security of Germany’s freedom and integrity in the future.”¹⁶¹

Berlin

There was the political will and a general consensus in parliament and in West Berlin itself that the city was part of West Germany and that it should become a full member, i.e. one of the federal *Länder*.¹⁶² Even before, it was heavily supported by the Federal Republic with subsidies. The moral case for this policy was almost universally accepted.¹⁶³ “Berlin is the embodiment of our people’s claim for German unification.”¹⁶⁴ And Berlin was also the test case whether Russian offers for reunification could be trusted. The main western precondition was free elections to be held first in Berlin and then in the whole of Germany to establish a constitutional assembly.¹⁶⁵ Despite several Soviet offers which came close¹⁶⁶ they never lived up to this one condition in the eyes of Adenauer, the parliamentary majority and the western powers.¹⁶⁷ Mostly they were seen as a cover for plans to ‘sovietise’ West Germany.¹⁶⁸

¹⁵⁹ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4610A, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7105D, see also, Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10718D, see also, Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 153

¹⁶⁰ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7079B

¹⁶¹ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 75BC, original: „Der Schlüssel des Friedens in Europa ist die Überwindung der Spaltung Deutschlands. Mit diesem Schlüssel wird aber das Tor des Friedens nur dann aufgeschlossen, wenn das in seiner Einheit wiederhergestellte Deutschland ein Glied des vereinigten Europas wird und damit seine Freiheit, seine Substanz auch für die Zukunft gesichert bleibt.“, see also, Key note speech of Schumacher at the party rally in Hamburg, 22. 5. 1950, Social Democracy fighting for Germany and Europe, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 757

¹⁶² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 13, p. 309AB

¹⁶³ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 55D

¹⁶⁴ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2478A, original: „, Berlin, dass es der Anspruch unseres Volkes auf die deutsche Einheit.“

¹⁶⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4758B-D, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3134B, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 184, see also, Speech by Schumacher on wireless ‘RIAS’, on 15th July, 1952, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher*, p. 967

¹⁶⁶ See Rische (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3593A, see also, Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3919B

¹⁶⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12305D, see also, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1075C

¹⁶⁸ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10657B

The General Treaty finally solved the status of Berlin. It remained the one part of Germany where the Allies retained rights. The Allies declared their commitment to guarantee the security of the city and to treating any attack on its territory as an attack upon themselves.¹⁶⁹ It remained a 'hot spot' and a test case for the Russians how far the Western Allies would maintain their position. Especially during the Berlin crisis of 1959, de Gaulle's staunch support became crucial for Adenauer. The Frenchman was the first leading western statesman to condemn Soviet action in and against Berlin, also supporting the refusal to compromise on the status of the city, which had always been a core line of policy of the Adenauer government.¹⁷⁰ De Gaulle's reaction was closely connected to the implementation of the EEC Treaty¹⁷¹, but it also reflected the solid foundation Franco-German cooperation had reached, by the end of the 1950s.

3.2.4 *Ideals and ideology*

The Communists

The Communist opposition in the Bundestag consistently referred to the Potsdam agreement as the bedrock for peace and for a peaceful *modus vivendi* with Soviet Russia in the future.¹⁷² They portrayed the West German government as a puppet regime.¹⁷³ In their rejection of all Western policies the growing antagonism between East and West became apparent, although one can add a genuine concern for the fate of Germany as a whole, at least in the immediate post-war years:

"I believe there is only one way to achieve German unification, namely the way of free self-determination of the whole German people. (...) It can neither be done under the regime of the Ruhr Statute or the Occupation-Statute, nor under the diktat of certain High Commissioners."¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁹ Statement of the Three Powers of May 27th, 1952, in: Wahl (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11108AB

¹⁷⁰ K. Larres, 'Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999, p. 22, see also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 230, 236, see also, H.-P. Schwarz, *Adenauer Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1991, p. 745

¹⁷¹ See Economic Security/European Integration/The EEC, see also, France/Economic Security/European Integration/The EEC

¹⁷² Niedergall (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1578A, 1579A

¹⁷³ Renner (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 13, p. 323D

¹⁷⁴ Fisch (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 124AB, original: „Ich glaube, es kann nur einen Weg zur Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands geben, nämlich den Weg der freien Selbstbestimmung des ganzen deutschen Volkes. (...) Sie kann sich nicht vollziehen unter dem Regime von Ruhr- und Besatzungsstatut und unter dem Diktat gewisser Hoher Kommissare.“

Negative references to the Americans became more and more overt:

“Chancellor, under your proposals you are prepared to subordinate the interests of the German nation to the interests of American imperialism. Your policy sustains the division of Germany for the sake of American imperialism.”¹⁷⁵

This reflects the nationalistic line which the Communists used as one part of their political strategy.

The West German state was, consequently, rejected.¹⁷⁶ Their utilisation of Europe to discredit the West German political system seems to follow the same pattern:

“The unification of Europe, the creation of a truly peaceful Europe can only be achieved by the peoples of Europe. A united and peaceful German people can and will also work positively toward the unity of Europe, meaning the whole of Europe. If we make our Germany into a country in which the forces of peace and the powers of true democracy become the decisive ones. (Shouting from the middle of the house: peoples’ democracy) (...)”¹⁷⁷

The accusation of imperialism, in particular against America, became the second mantra, which supported the nationalistic line. The tensions between Germany and France over the Saar were paraded as an example of French imperialism.¹⁷⁸ The EDC was invoked as another example of Western imperialism and militarism¹⁷⁹, even more so NATO¹⁸⁰, with the Schuman Plan as the economic basis.¹⁸¹ The common Communist strategy of using accusations of imperialism and nationalism

¹⁷⁵ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 429C, original: „Herr Bundeskanzler, sie sind nach ihren Vorschlägen bereit, die Interessen der deutschen Nation den Interessen des amerikanischen Imperialismus unterzuordnen. Ihre Politik ist die Aufrechterhaltung der Spaltung Deutschlands im Interesse des amerikanischen Imperialismus.“

¹⁷⁶ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 62D

¹⁷⁷ Renner (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7221A, original: „Die Einigung Europas, die Herstellung eines wirklich friedlichen Europas kann nur durch die Völker Europas erfolgen. Ein geeintes, friedliches deutsches Volk kann und wird auch positiv an der Wiederherstellung dieser Einheit Europas im Sinne des ganzen Europas mitarbeiten. Wenn wir aus unserm Deutschland ein Land machen, in dem die Kräfte des Friedens, die Kräfte der echten Demokratie die Gesetze des Geschehens bestimmen, (Zurufe von der Mitte: Volksdemokratie!) (...)“

¹⁷⁸ Niedergall (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 144, p. 5699D, original: „Im Gegensatz zur Sowjetunion stimmte im April 1947 die Regierungen der USA und Großbritanniens der de-facto Annexion des Saargebiets durch den französischen Imperialismus zu.“

¹⁷⁹ See Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7822A, see also, VDB, WP I, 222, p. 9866B, 9868B

¹⁸⁰ See Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 24, p. 737D, original „Dieser Atlantikpakt aber ist ein Kriegspakt, der geschaffen worden ist zum Zwecke des Angriffs gegen die Völker des Ostens und Südostens Europas.“

¹⁸¹ See Nuding (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2497B, 2498C, see also, Renner (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 103, p. 3759D

as political weapons was recognised early on. Remote-control from Moscow became obvious.¹⁸²

Their alternative to the Western system was the Communist model. This approach exploited the good reputation which the Communist system had enjoyed early after the war¹⁸³ to advocate enlightened popular democracy as a response to old-fashioned Western representative democracies. And Germany was meant to show the superiority of the Eastern model: "Peace can be secured and a peaceful economy built up only when, in a united German democratic republic, the German monopolists on the Rhine and in the Ruhr are stripped of their power."¹⁸⁴

The Communist tactics changed relatively early in the 1950s, when they realised that the West German regime showed no serious signs of crumbling and that their impact in the Bundestag could only be considered very minor.¹⁸⁵ Very much in an Eastern European style, they tried to build up an extra-parliamentary opposition, and tried to use the trade unions as a platform for subversion. Clubs, strikes, protests rallies and referenda were meant to serve this purpose.¹⁸⁶

The tendencies towards insurrection and the unconstitutional principles on which the KPD was set led to legal proceedings against it before the Constitutional Court and finally to the first banning of a political party.¹⁸⁷ By the time the Soviet Union invoked the imperialist tendencies in the EEC no one took such accusations seriously anymore, but rather as a sign that European integration was working. Soviet divisive tactics were no longer effective.¹⁸⁸

The imperialist, capitalist-dominance accusations of the Communists found some echo in the SPD, too.¹⁸⁹ However, when it became clear that the SPD would not toe the Communist line, but support the constitutional order of the Federal Republic, the Communists drew the conclusion that the SPD was in league with the conservative government.¹⁹⁰ Cooperation between the two working-class parties was therefore impossible.

¹⁸² Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4765CD

¹⁸³ See Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, p. 260

¹⁸⁴ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 427D, original: „ die Sicherung des Friedens und des Aufbaus einer Friedensindustrie ist nur möglich, wenn die deutschen Monopolherren an Rhein und Ruhr in einer einheitlichen deutschen demokratischen Republik entmachten sind.“, Notice that ‚German democratic republic‘ is not yet spelled with capital letters, but is ambiguously kept in the common meaning of the word.

¹⁸⁵ See for example, Renner (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 188, p. 7983A

¹⁸⁶ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8111A , see also, von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3886B

¹⁸⁷ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6552A

¹⁸⁸ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11349B-D

¹⁸⁹ See Eichler (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8750B

¹⁹⁰ Fisch (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 69, p. 2510B , see also, Renner (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 168, p. 6947C

The Socialist International

From the perspective of the SPD, Communism was the true enemy:

“The Communist system means denial of human rights and the enslavement of the working people; it perpetuates hunger, poverty and exploitation. The Communist leaders are the true warmongers against their own people. (strong applause from the SPD to the BP[right wing])”¹⁹¹

Democratic socialism and Communism had nothing in common in the post-war era and were in fact diametrically opposed to each other.¹⁹² All they shared was their origins. These went back to the time before the split between militant Communism and democratic socialism took place. And certain traditions clung to both orientations despite the chasm between them. Both claimed to represent and foster the cause of the working classes. One of the institutional consequences was the International, which brought workers of different nationalities together long before any of the conservative nationalists were even considering working together with their neighbours. Links were strong between the socialist parties of Europe. This was underpinned by the trade union links. However, these connections had not been strong enough to withstand the raging nationalisms of the early 20th century and they broke on the beginning of World War I. Nevertheless, most of the post-war politicians had seen this camaraderie and tried to revive what was left of the International after the war. The socialist objections to early European integration feature very similar arguments, all over Europe. At first sight, objections such as those to the ECSC might have seemed strange: “It is also surprising that it is the SPD which is so opposed to the handover of national sovereignty rights, because it used to be this party which advocated the international ideal and which sought to overcome the narrow national perspective.”¹⁹³ However, against the background of the Socialist International, it is not surprising that the SPD had some difficulty in accepting the European integration initiatives. They wanted to settle Germany in

¹⁹¹ Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 85, p. 3188B, original: „Das kommunistische System bedeutet Vernichtung der Menschenrechte, Versklavung der arbeitenden Menschen, Verewigung von Hunger, Elend und Ausbeutung. Die kommunistischen Machthaber sind die wahren Kriegshetzer gegen das eigene Volk. (Stürmischer Beifall von der SPD bis zur BP.)“

¹⁹² See Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 103A, see also, VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1078B, 1081A, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3145B, because of their uncompromising anti-Communist position the SPD was not readmitted into the Socialist international. This decision was only reversed at the end of 1947, see Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 130, see also, Schumacher’s statement on the forced unification of the SPD and the KPD in the Soviet occupation zone, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 331

¹⁹³ Seelos (BP), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6543, original: „Es ist auch verwunderlich, dass sich gerade die SPD so sehr gegen die Abgabe von nationalen Souveränitätsrechten sträubt, die in ihren Anfängen stets internationale Gedanken und die Überwindung einer engen nationalen Sicht betont hat.“

Europe.¹⁹⁴ More than that, they had practised European co-operation long before any of the present conservative Euro-enthusiasts had even dreamt of it.¹⁹⁵ They had seen national conservatives smash their dreams of a working-class Europe which embodied peace and prosperity for all. “(...) we do not accept as Europe everything which yesterday’s nationalists and new Europeanists declare as such and are trying to sell us.”¹⁹⁶ Recent conservative European integration policies, said the SPD, bore the hallmarks of the limited co-operation which was so characteristic of past capitalist interests. In addition, the European movement was too narrow and its protagonists were the wrong people: “(...) we do not place any trust in the heavy industries of Germany and France.”¹⁹⁷ A firm ‘No’ from the SPD to partial European integration was the logical consequence.¹⁹⁸

Political Europe

Triggered by the European movement, there was considerable momentum for a closer political integration. Churchill gave it a name: the ‘United States of Europe’. The 1948 Hague conference of national representatives from all over Europe and spontaneous demonstrations in favour of the idea seemed to unite leaders and peoples in a push for closer European solutions, even European unification. Germany was no exception.¹⁹⁹

The Council of Europe was built on this enthusiasm. However, in 1949, there was some serious doubt in the Bundestag as to whether Germany should become a member of the Council of Europe. The linkage between the Saar problem and Germany’s admission was the sticking point. France made accession conditional

¹⁹⁴ See the keynote paper of SPD positions, the ‘Dürkheimer programme’, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 149-50

¹⁹⁵ Birkelbach (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12007AB, see also, Newspaper article of Schumacher in: *Hamburger Echo*, 21st April, 1951, titled ‘Our rejection of the Schuman Plan’, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher*, p. 806

¹⁹⁶ Key note speech at the party rally in Hamburg, 22. 5. 1950, Social Democracy fighting for Germany and Europe, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 753, original: “(...) wir nicht alles als Europa anerkennen, was die Nationalisten von gestern und die Neuenropäer von heute uns als Europa deklarieren und verkaufen wollen.“

¹⁹⁷ Key note speech at the party rally in Hamburg, 22. 5. 1950, Social Democracy fighting for Germany and Europe, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 764, original: “(...) der Schwerindustrie in Deutschland und in Frankreich bringen wir kein Vertrauen entgegen!“

¹⁹⁸ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4764A, see also, SPD press release on the seven preconditions for SPD agreement to the ECSC (on 20 April, 1950), in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 805

¹⁹⁹ The German customs union of the middle of the 19th century was often used as a model for European integration and for how political unity could result from economic integration. see Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7082D, see also, Reif (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7101B

upon the Saar region becoming a member, too. In Germany, independent membership of the Saar was seen as giving the separatist tendencies and possibly the inclusion of the Saar into France another boost.²⁰⁰ German membership in the Council was not considered likely to happen, if the connection to the Saar problem remained as it was.²⁰¹ Therefore, Adenauer asked for a 'gesture' of good will towards Germany.²⁰² The French reply came on 9 May 1950 in the form of the Schuman Plan and made the French will for cooperation with Germany absolutely clear.²⁰³ The Council was regarded by the government as one important step on the way to bringing Germany back into the European family as an equal member.²⁰⁴ Because of the close causal connection to the Schuman Plan, a rejection of accession into the Council was inconceivable. European integration as a whole and not least the Schuman Plan would be rejected.²⁰⁵

A secondary, but very real hope was that German membership of the Council would reflect positively on the due revision of the Occupation Statute.²⁰⁶ The day-to-day experience of German representatives actually proved the hopes of the government right. They were accepted as equals in the Council.²⁰⁷ Full membership in the Council of Ministers was granted six months after accession.²⁰⁸ Although there were some voices in favour of the Council of Europe in the SPD²⁰⁹, the opposition as a whole was not in favour of membership in the Council of Europe: "Well, it is social-democratic policy to create a Europe which is strong both in political and psychological terms; to create a Europe in which every people sees its national as well as its European aim in overcoming the totalitarian and Communist danger. However, what is currently being concocted in Strasbourg is the creation of a Europe which is weaker than need be. It is so weak that it cannot fulfil its func-

²⁰⁰ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 411D, see also, Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1567D-1568A, see also, Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7082B, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 156-7

²⁰¹ In Germany the 1950 Saar Accords were seen – particularly because of the timing in March 1950 – as a wrecking effort by France, which was conceived as trying to prevent German membership in the Council. It seemed to say that France did not want German membership. see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 323

²⁰² Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 322, see also, exchange of letters between Adenauer and the Allied High Commissioners on 23rd March, 1950, in: Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 324-6

²⁰³ For the connection between the Saar issue, the Council of Europe and the Schuman Plan see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 327-331, see also, 'Der Schuman Plan', p. 324, 337

²⁰⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2460D, 2461A

²⁰⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2460C, see also, *Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 338

²⁰⁶ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 331

²⁰⁷ Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7212B

²⁰⁸ Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3759B

²⁰⁹ For example Herman Brill and Paul Löbe, see Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 160-1

tion of overcoming Communism reasonably well and might even fail to do so.²¹⁰ The Council of Europe was, therefore, regarded as futile and inadequate.²¹¹ Nevertheless, when German membership actually came the SPD participated in the work of the Council, because Schumacher believed that some positive changes could be made from inside.²¹²

Indeed, the opposition was not too far off the mark in its evaluation of the impotence of the Council of Europe. The Council of Ministers was regarded as a hindrance towards further European integration.²¹³ The Consultative Assembly was the progressive part, but it had no real powers of any kind.²¹⁴ None of the recommendations passed by the Council of Europe were binding on the member states.²¹⁵

Although the Council of Europe had been the birthplace of almost all European integration ideas, including the Messina conference in June 1955, its role had begun to diminish quickly and most obviously as the Common market worked out successfully.²¹⁶ Its greatest tangible achievement was the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR).²¹⁷ In Adenauer's *Realpolitik* approach, it became the stepping stone towards real integration in the Schuman Plan.

On a more theoretical level the debate raged between federalism and confederation and the supranational principle embodied in this Plan. The European avant-garde favoured supranationalism as a new solution for new problems.²¹⁸ Some even saw supranationalism as the evolution of the democratic system. In their eyes the flaw in international politics had always been the lack of democratic representation, i.e.

²¹⁰ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2472D, original: „Nun ist es sozialdemokratische Politik, ein politisch und psychologisch starkes Europa zu schaffen, ein Europa, in dem jedes Volk sowohl seine Europäische wies eine nationale Aufgabe in der Überwindung der totalitären und kommunistischen Gefahren sieht. Aber was jetzt in Straßburg zusammengezimmert wird, ist die Schaffung eines Europas, dass schwächer ist, als es zu sein braucht, so schwach, dass es seine Funktion der Überwindung des Kommunismus nicht so gut und möglicherweise kaum erfüllen kann.“

²¹¹ Bertram (Z), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6529D, see also, Hasemann (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7771A, see also, Decker (FU), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7812C, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), Kurt Schumacher, p. 157, 161, see also, Presentation of Schumacher at the party rally in Hamburg, 22. 5. 1950, Social Democracy fighting for Germany and Europe, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 757, 778

²¹² Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 162, following the SPD representatives in the Council: Eichler, Lützens, Nöiting, Ollenhauer, Ritzel, C. Schmid, Louise Schröder

²¹³ Mommer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7075D

²¹⁴ Mommer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7075D, 7076B

²¹⁵ Mommer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7076B

²¹⁶ See von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7106D

²¹⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7071C

²¹⁸ Schäfer (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3606D, see also, VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12330AB, 12331BC

parliaments. Only governments were interacting with each other.²¹⁹ Supranationalism promised to change that. Moreover, it would also increase the influence of the Union in world politics, not least for the benefit of each member state.²²⁰ Adenauer saw wider implications of historic dimensions:

“I believe that it is the first time in history, certainly in recent centuries, that countries are prepared to give up parts of their sovereignty without the use of force, (...) in favour of a supranational structure. (...) I am sure that once this first step has been made (...) other areas [of integration] will follow suit and that nationalism – the cancer of Europe – will receive a deadly blow.”²²¹

However, the new concept also held certain dangers, for example the separatist tendencies subsumed under the headline ‘Little Europe’. The SPD, in particular, was concerned as to another division in Western Europe through the union of the Six. “This divided Europe does not include the two countries on the Iberian Peninsula and, unfortunately Great Britain is rather less than half-committed, just like the Scandinavian countries which also keep their distance.”²²² By limiting integration to Western Europe, European integration actually helped perpetuate the division of Europe and, not least, the division of Germany.²²³ When it became clear that there was no prospect of a common Europe including the East, the whole idea of European unification seemed doomed, in the eyes of the SPD.²²⁴ The government coalition also saw the Europe of the Six not as an ideal, but as the first step on the road to broad European integration.²²⁵ In the second half of the 1950s, a variant of the old ‘Little Europe’ argument came up again during the EEC negotiations. Scandinavia, Great Britain, Switzerland and Austria were still not involved in European

²¹⁹ Schäfer (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12330BC, 12331C

²²⁰ Bertram (Z), , in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6530A, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7107A

²²¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6501CD, original: „ ich glaube, nun das wohl zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte, sicher der Geschichte der letzten Jahrhunderte, Länder freiwillig und ohne Zwang auf einen Teil ihrer Souveränität verzichten wollen, (...) um diese Souveränität einen supranationalen Gebilde zu übertragen. (...) Ich bin der festen Überzeugung, dass, wenn dieser Anfang einmal gemacht worden ist, (...) man dann auf anderen Gebieten diesem Vorgang folgen wird und dass damit wirklich der Nationalismus, der Krebschaden Europas, einen tödlichen Stoß bekommen wird.“

²²² Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 402B, original: „In diesem gespaltenen Europa haben wir noch die Absentierung der beiden Länder der Pyrenäenhalbinsel und die schmerzliche halbe oder noch weiter gehende Fernhaltung Großbritanniens und in gewissem Abstand auch Skandinaviens.“

²²³ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8171CD, 8172A, see also, Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8187B

²²⁴ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1080B, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 397C

²²⁵ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2297B, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7105C

integration, much less the Common market.²²⁶ The Economic Community, however, was explicitly left open for new member states to join.²²⁷

In addition, the lack of democratic control in the ECSC, the EDC project and the EEC was a serious obstacle to their acceptance as legitimate and for the claim that the European integration process had roots in the people.²²⁸ Demands for a European parliament, therefore, came up relatively early on, recurring at regular intervals.²²⁹ And indeed debates about the EEC and Euratom soon showed an interest in an economic parliament for both communities.²³⁰ Universal suffrage and full parliamentary control rights were the main objectives.²³¹ The creation of one European Assembly – with the coming into force of the Treaties on the European Communities – to which the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom would be answerable was considered great progress, not least in coordinating those three communities.²³² However, the powers of this assembly were generally considered to be too weak²³³, notably because it would only meet once a year and because it was initially not directly elected.²³⁴

Along the lines of creating institutional realities the demand for a draft European constitution was raised by the end of 1951.²³⁵ By the end of 1953 the Spaak committee was actively working on it.²³⁶ Those MPs who were also representatives in the Council of Europe were swept up in the idealistic wave which came through Europe in the early 1950s. A European army, the political authorities for it, a European Foreign Office, the remodelling of the High Authority into a European ministry for economic and social affairs, a common Finance Authority and finally a European Parliament and a European Court to control it all²³⁷; those were the institutional visions of the Euro-enthusiast which were captured in the European Political Community (EPC). Inspired by the EDC treaty, a set of rules was worked

²²⁶ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11339D, see also, Stegner (GB-BHE), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11366D

²²⁷ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12002D

²²⁸ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6512BC, 6513B,D

²²⁹ See Brandt (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11115B, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3185C

²³⁰ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10713A

²³¹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11333D

²³² Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 113447BC, see also, Euler (DP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12025B

²³³ Arndt (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11370C, 11371BC

²³⁴ Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11352D- 11353A

²³⁵ Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7211C, 7213B, see also, Pünder (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7215AB, for the proceedings of the ad hoc assembly leading to the first European constitution see Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution The European Political Community, 1952-1954*, see also, E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, 'Article 38 and the Ad Hoc Assembly', p. 212-7

²³⁶ See von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 34C-D

²³⁷ See Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7213A

out to guide all these European activities, i.e. a European constitution.²³⁸ The SPD was sceptical: “The SPD is committed to a great [European] Federation (...) This Federation, however, is currently not achievable.”²³⁹ With the rejection of the EDC in 1954, the European constitution died, too.

This shock was made up in the re-launch of the European integration idea. And de Gaulle’s unexpectedly became a major supporter of European integration, which took even Adenauer by surprise. For both men, the core of ‘*notre Europe*’ was undoubtedly the alliance between France and Germany, which was based on the similar interests of both states.²⁴⁰ With some doubts arising as to American foreign policy in the late 1950s, the drive for closer cooperation between France and Germany became one of Adenauer’s central policies.²⁴¹ In this relationship to France, Adenauer implicitly acknowledged French superiority and leadership in European affairs.²⁴²

Hence, by the end of the 1950s, the early European idealism had turned to a clear German commitment for the Europe of the Six, embodied in the close relationship to France and between Adenauer and de Gaulle.

²³⁸ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9826CD, see also, Schoettle (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9836A

²³⁹ Mommer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 176, p. 7217D, original: „Die SPD steht zu der großen Föderation (...) Diese Föderation steht aber nicht auf der Tagesordnung der möglichen Politik.“ In contrast to that the SPD supported Monnet’s and Spinelli’s Action committee for the United States of Europe’, see Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7081A, see also, Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10706D

²⁴⁰ H. P. Mensing, *Adenauer – Heuss, Unter vier Augen Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren 1949-1959*, Berlin, 1997, No. 69, 4/2/59, p. 291, see also, No. 70, 6/3/59, p. 294, see also, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 225

²⁴¹ H. P. Mensing, *Adenauer – Heuss, Unter vier Augen Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren 1949-1959*, No. 74, 7/8/59, p. 312, see also, Jacques Bariéty, ‚Die Rolle der persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen Bundeskanzler Adenauer und General de Gaulle für die deutsch-französische Politik zwischen 1958 und 1963‘, p. 18, see also, quotation of Rolf Lahr in: H.-P. Schwarz (ed.), *Adenauer und Frankreich Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1958 bis 1969*, Rhöndorfer Gespräche, 2nd ed., Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1990, p. 41

²⁴² Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 231, see also, Charles Williams, *The Last Great Frenchman*, p. 398, 414, see also, H. –P. Schwarz, *Adenauer Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, p. 747

3.3 Military Security

3.3.1 East-West Antagonism

Even in the early days of the Federal Republic, antagonism towards the East was deeply entrenched in the ruling coalition. The KPD expressed the same attitudes towards the West.¹ Although the SPD took their place somewhere in between these extremes, the development of the antagonistic blocs was reflected in the Bundestag. Apart from that, attitudes that had informed past German politics were still present in some minds, e.g. Locarno. “*Realpolitik* requires that we ask whether our choice is only between East and West.”² This was the last remainder of a vague memory that Germany once had the power to choose its allies and get the best out of all of them. However, there was not much left of the *Bismarckian* brand of alliance building policy. It became clear that such politics had been lost forever on the battlefields of the last 80 years and probably had their share in causing much conflict.³ Germany, it was now understood, was no longer a world power.⁴ There was also the idea that there had to be a way to bridge the differences between the East and the West, so sharp during the Cold War.⁵ “In our own interest we can only emphasise again and again how important an understanding between East and West is to us.”⁶ The former Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, Anton Brüning, had developed such an idea. However, it was precisely the Cold War reality which made such a conception impossible. The division was there and could not be bridged. Germany was no longer in a mediating position in Europe. Instead, West Germany had become a frontline state.⁷ Brüning’s idea was, therefore, never considered realistic.

¹ See Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 65D

² Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 74A, original: „Zur Realpolitik gehört es auch die Frage zu stellen, ob wir Deutschen nur die Wahl zwischen Ost und West haben.“

³ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 76A, see also, Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 310AB

⁴ Schneider (DP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 346B, see also, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 364CD

⁵ See Christian Hacke, Jakob Kaiser (1888-1961), p. 54

⁶ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 74B, original: „Wir können in unserem eigenen Interesse nur immer wieder betonen, wie sehr uns an einer Verständigung zwischen West und Ost gelegen ist.“

⁷ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2258AB

Neutrality

The Soviet Union often played on political currents and vanities within German society: firstly, on the nostalgia that Germany had once been a great power; secondly, on keeping open the options of the ultimate fate of the German Reich, insofar as the bait of the return of all lost territories was used; and lastly, the USSR also played to some extent on the old ideal of a unified Europe, in order to block West European integration. However, there was a catch in all these proposals:

“The objective of Soviet Russian policy towards the Federal Republic is to neutralise it. Soviet Russia does not want this country in a state of devastation. (MP Thiele [KPD]: *You* want to destroy it!) However, Soviet Russia is very keen on getting its hands on the war potential and human material of this country. Because it knows that it can then take the rest of Western Europe without much further ado and because it then feels strong enough to lead the war against the United States.”⁸

Led by Adenauer, the government parties were strongly opposed to any ideas of German neutrality, primarily on the grounds that Germany would become a Soviet satellite, with all the consequences of living under a totalitarian regime.⁹ Faced with the possibility of reunification this was a hard choice, but the position remained that Germany would not be able to resist Communist influence or even a take-over without Western protection.¹⁰ “A united Germany – along the lines of the demands in the Soviet Russian notes – as a neutralised Germany, a Germany on the basis of the Potsdam Accords is not acceptable to us.”¹¹ In addition, the government was agreed that neutralisation would mean that Germany would be permanently dependant on the four Allied powers, in the sense that they would have to guarantee German security.¹² An independent policy of neutrality had never been successful in German history, i.e. neutrality which Germany defended with its own

⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8098A, original: „Das Ziel der Sowjetrussischen Politik in Bezug auf die Bundesrepublik ist, die Bundesrepublik zu neutralisieren. Es liegt Sowjetrussland nichts daran, dieses Land in zerstörtem Zustand in Besitz zu bekommen. (Abg. Thiele (KPD): Sie [Adenauer] wollen es zerstören!) Aber es liegt Sowjetrussland sehr viel daran, dieses Land mit seinem Potenzial an Kriegsmaterial und an Menschenmaterial in seine Hand zu bekommen, weil es weiß, dass es dann ohne weiteres das übrige Westeuropa auch in seine Hand bekommt, und weil es sich dann stark genug fühlt, den Krieg gegen die vereinigten Staaten zu führen.“

⁹ Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 222, p. 9855D, see also, Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2277C.

¹⁰ Euler (FDP) in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 419A, WP I, 190, p. 8129C

¹¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9799C, original: „Ein Gesamtdeutschland, wie es bis jetzt Sowjetrussland in seinen Noten fordert, also ein neutralisiertes Deutschland, ein auf dem Boden des Potsdamer Abkommens errichtetes Gesamtdeutschland ist für uns nicht möglich.“

¹² von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2258C, see also, von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3883B

forces.¹³ The geographic position of Germany in the middle of Europe was often adduced as the reason for this.¹⁴

The SPD also opposed a neutral Federal Republic.¹⁵ However, neutralisation remained an option for a reunified Germany if that was what was necessary for reunification and if the four Allies were to guarantee the integrity of the reunified Germany.¹⁶ A solution which would keep Germany out of both big alliance systems was advocated.¹⁷ This became known as the concept of 'armed neutrality'.¹⁸ It meant that Germany would be free to defend its own neutrality, but could not become a threat to any of its neighbours. This concept was thought along the lines of the collective security system of the Locarno pact, which meant that any disputes within the system would be settled peacefully, and that all members would take action in case of the violation of this principle against the aggressor from within or without the system.¹⁹ The bottom line of the SPD was that one should at least try to avoid the development of antagonistic blocs.²⁰ Only if negotiations towards a collective security system failed, only then would one have to revert to the alliances system of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The diverging positions between government and opposition became very apparent in the reaction to the Stalin note of 1952. It suggested reunification on the basis of neutralisation of Germany like so many other Soviet diplomatic overtures.²¹ The difference was that it came from the Soviet Union and not one of its satellites like the German Democratic Republic and that it addressed the other three Allies, suggesting a lasting solution of the German question in the form of a peace treaty.²² Reunification seemed at hand, and the SPD had considerable problems in resisting the bait, as the government saw it.²³ Its answers were fixed by that time and they were not impressed by the Stalin Note. Apart from the fact that the decision for the western alliance system was probably already taken in Adenauer's mind, it was particularly the neutralisation precondition in the Stalin note which rang all possible alarm bells, because it would leave Germany vulnerable to any future Soviet subversion, or even aggression.²⁴ The other precondition, that Germany would not be able to

¹³ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2258D

¹⁴ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3882D- 3883A

¹⁵ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2317CD

¹⁶ Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 183

¹⁷ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2241CD, see also, Wienand (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3777B

¹⁸ Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4596D, see also, Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 362B

¹⁹ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2317AB

²⁰ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2317BC, see also, Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4598B

²¹ Fisch (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 18, p. 510A, see also, Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11120B

²² Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8785D

²³ Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8753B –D, 8757B

²⁴ See also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9825CD

determine the number and size of its own defence force, only served to heighten suspicion. The proposed peace treaty would set limits for the German forces. In Adenauer's eyes this would give a possible aggressor the means to limit resistance and more generally to bind Germany to minor status as in the Versailles treaty.²⁵ Adenauer's outright rejection had a decisive impact on the reaction of the other Western allies.²⁶ It was based on the conviction that Germany between the blocs would not be able to defend its own neutrality.²⁷ The idealist concepts of the SPD opposition were not entertained, much less given scope for development.²⁸ The government was not prepared to run the risk of the SPD third way.²⁹ In their view there was no realistic alternative to the Western commitment.³⁰ It regarded the conception of neutrality in whatever form as a threat to the integrity of Germany.³¹ Therefore, a number of initiatives along the lines of neutrality or disengagement were turned down one after the other.³² In the late 1950s, the government's critics saw this as a great opportunity missed.³³

The Soviet threat

In the early 1950s, however, Soviet expansionist policy was almost universal considered the main threat to security and stability in Europe.

"The three western allies scaled down their military forces to a minimum after the end of hostilities in 1945. Their wartime industrial arrangements were changed to peace economies. The allied demilitarisation provisions of 5 June 1945 have been fully implemented in the Federal Republic. There is not a single German military unit in the Federal Republic; there is

²⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8758B-D

²⁶ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 393CD, for the impact of the German negative stance towards the Stalin note on British policy see *Britain/War Experience/The hope for a peaceful future/The German Question*

²⁷ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2258C, see also, VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3918A

²⁸ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2317C, see also, Wienand (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3777B

²⁹ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4615C, see also, VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7084D

³⁰ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10651A, see also, VDB, WP III, 9, p. 311D

³¹ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4627C, see also, Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 307B

³² Such proposals were put forward by Eden, Gaitskell, Wilson, Healey, Gromyko, Rapacki, Gomulka, Kennan, Mansfield, Moch, Mendès-France, see, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 125, see Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 322B, 326BC, 328C, for the opposition see Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 360A, 362D, particularly for Kennan's proposals of disengagement see Paul A. Chilton, *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 1996, Part Two, 'Cold War', p. 123-245

³³ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 392D, 393B, 394A, see also, Heinemann (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 401D

also no German armaments industry. Not a single military weapon has been produced since 1945 in the Federal Republic.”³⁴

It was generally accepted that the Soviet Union had not brought its military forces down to reasonable peace-time level.³⁵ And it was trying to keep its advantage through steady expansion of its armed forces.³⁶ In Germany, too, the superiority of the East in terms of conventional forces was considered overwhelming. The numbers quoted vary from 30³⁷ to over a 100 divisions (each 10,000 to 12,000 men strong),³⁸ against 13 1/2 Western divisions in Western Europe.³⁹ In that context the opposition was pessimistic as to the value of a West German military contribution. 12 German divisions was the number which NATO wanted from Germany: in an epic battle between the superpowers they could not possibly be of decisive importance.⁴⁰ Moreover, they were expected to be neutralised by an equal number of divisions raised in the Soviet occupied zone.⁴¹ The rising number of paramilitary police, there, supported this argument.⁴²

The security situation became worse when the USSR acquired nuclear weapons. For Germany, the repercussions of nuclear weapons were on the one hand less immediate, because Germany was definitely not a nuclear power and had no plans to become one.⁴³ Undoubtedly the security of the Federal Republic depended in the last analysis on the American nuclear shield.⁴⁴ On the other hand, Germany was in the direct line of attack as a front-line state bordering the Soviet empire.⁴⁵ The advance in the development of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was

³⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4757D-4758A, original: „ Die drei West-Alliierten haben nach der Beendigung der Feindseligkeiten 1945 ihre bewaffneten Streitkräfte auf ein Mindestmaß reduziert und ihre Kriegsproduktion auf Friedensproduktion umgestellt. Die Entmilitarisierungsbestimmungen der Alliierten vom 5.6.1945 sind in der Bundesrepublik bis auf den letzten Buchstaben durchgeführt wurden. Es gibt keine deutsche militärische Verbände in der Bundesrepublik ; es gibt auch keine deutsche Rüstungsproduktion. Nicht eine einzige zu militärischen Zwecken geeignete Waffe ist seit 1945 in der Bundesrepublik hergestellt worden.“

³⁵ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3148B

³⁶ Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3751B

³⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3564AB, WP I, 125, p. 4758A

³⁸ See Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8159BC, WP I, 255, p. 12303B

³⁹ Euler (FDP) in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8131D

⁴⁰ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2237AB

⁴¹ Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3208C, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3896C

⁴² Roughly 100 fighter planes and 200.000 men in 7 divisions were estimated in 1954/5, see Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3224BC, In 1951 a West-German federal police force of 150.000 men was set up to counter the perceived threat of East-German paramilitary police, see S. Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955*, p. 22, 24-8, 34, 39

⁴³ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 299CD

⁴⁴ Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8120C, see also, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 367B

⁴⁵ Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 306D

therefore viewed with great anxiety.⁴⁶ The Sputnik shock, in October 1957 proved that the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles which could easily reach Western Europe with nuclear weapons⁴⁷, and also showed the vulnerability of the US to a Soviet nuclear strike.⁴⁸ Overall, Adenauer's analysis coincides very much with Churchill's insofar as he thought that the use of nuclear weapons would be devastating to the winner as well as the loser of any future war. That meant that war had ceased to be a means of politics and became rather less likely to happen at all.⁴⁹ The greatest volatility between East and West over Germany was in the early 1950s. In the years which followed the end of the Korean War the Soviet military threat was no longer considered imminent.⁵⁰ The Warsaw Pact was, nevertheless, seen as an instrument of terror against its own peoples⁵¹, and as a Soviet guided alliance system which had proven its aggressive intent against Western Europe.⁵² The Sovietisation of Eastern Europe, the 'loss' of China and the Korean War played a major role in forming this opinion.⁵³ The brutal reaction of Soviet military forces to popular uprisings in Eastern Europe, such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and earlier in the German Democratic Republic, further supported this conviction.⁵⁴ At the latest with these events the time of political and cultural relaxation, after Stalin's death, was over.⁵⁵ They showed that the Soviets might have changed their ways, but the ultimate aim of world revolution and world domination remained the same.⁵⁶ Adenauer had always seen Soviet policy of 'coexistence' as a political manoeuvre designed to upset Western plans for further integration, i.e. the EDC.⁵⁷ After the failure of the EDC, Khrushchev fell back into totalitarian tactics, no doubt also to prevent the Soviet empire from falling apart.⁵⁸ The relation with the West changed into trench warfare, in which both sides justified their military efforts by the existence of the opponent's military arsenal.⁵⁹

⁴⁶ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1077A

⁴⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 366D

⁴⁸ See Mark Speich, *Kai-Uwe von Hassel – Eine politische Biographie*, Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinischen-Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, Bonn, 2001, p. 335

⁴⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4605C, see also, Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 306B

⁵⁰ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3896A

⁵¹ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10645A

⁵² von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2261A

⁵³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3121A, see also, VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1068B

⁵⁴ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10641CD

⁵⁵ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10642AB

⁵⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3121B, 3134AB

⁵⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3133BC, see also, VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4604B

⁵⁸ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10641D, 10642B

⁵⁹ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2277A, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3162AB

In this context, the SPD became the champion of a policy of détente and disarmament.⁶⁰ War as a means of politics, the party argued, should be abandoned.⁶¹ “Instead, politically one has to ask: what kind of policy does one have to follow in order to end the Cold War (...)?”⁶² That was actually the main accusation of the SPD against the government, that it spent most of its energy on finding the best ways to prepare people for a conflict with Communism, instead of trying to find ways of preventing such conflict.⁶³ One had to accept the reality of Soviet security concerns.⁶⁴

“The Soviet Union had suffered under German military power (...) On the other hand, the Russians are convinced that it was the overwhelming superiority of the USA which won over the German war machine in the end (...) Is that not reason enough for the Soviet Union to fear a coalition of German soldiers under actual American command?”⁶⁵

However, in the late 1950s, the SPD realised that the call for general disarmament was not realistic.⁶⁶

In conclusion, the Cold War was regarded as a Soviet tactic to expand its influence all over Europe and the world. Germany was the prime target.⁶⁷ That meant that West Germany would be under constant threat not only militarily, but mainly through political pressure.⁶⁸ Several offers from the East for a demilitarised zone in Europe were regarded as following exactly this tactic, because ultimately it would do nothing to prevent an attack from the Soviet Union under the conditions of modern warfare.⁶⁹

⁶⁰ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2236C – 2237A, 2239D, see also, VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3896A

⁶¹ Strobel (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3766C

⁶² Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2271B, original: „Politisch gesehen muss man doch so fragen: Was für eine Politik muss getrieben werden, damit der Kalten Krieg zu Ende gehen kann (...)“

⁶³ See Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3115C-3116D, see also, Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 363B

⁶⁴ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 356D

⁶⁵ Hartmut Soell, ‘Fritz Erler (1913-1967)’, p. 113, original: “Die Sowjetunion hat die Schläge der deutschen Militärmacht erfahren ... Andererseits haben die Russen sich davon überzeugt, dass letzten Endes die überwältigende Überlegenheit der USA den Sieg über die deutsche Kriegsmaschine davongetragen hat ... Ist das nicht schon ein hinreichender Grund, der die Sowjetunion ... dazu veranlasst, eine bewaffnete Koalition zu fürchten, die deutsche Soldaten in eine Armee einreicht, die sich tatsächlich unter amerikanischem Befehl befindet.”

⁶⁶ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 357C

⁶⁷ Kaiser (CDU), Minister for German questions, in VDB, WP I, 85, p. 3185D

⁶⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1068A

⁶⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4604A

Rearmament

Constitutionally, Article 26 of the Basic Law prohibits ‘the preparation of a war of aggression.’ However, the right of defence was considered by the constitutional assembly as a natural right no state could be deprived of.⁷⁰ In addition, the use of force should only be allowed in a purely defensive alliance which would replace national military sovereignty by a common decision.⁷¹

The first hint of German rearmament came up in an interview given by Adenauer to the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*. Asked for his response to international pressure on Germany to set up a defence force:

“I replied that under no circumstances would it be acceptable that Germans became enrolled as mercenaries or the like in foreign armies. Even if the Allies demanded a German contribution toward European security, I would reject the raising of a German Wehrmacht. At most one could consider a German contingent within the forces of the European Federation.”⁷²

The rejection of any independent form of German remilitarisation was endorsed by the government coalition⁷³ and had almost universal consent in parliament at the time.⁷⁴ Initially it was very easy to refer any military commitment, even the defence of Germany’s own territory, to the Allies, who had taken over all military responsibility under the Occupation Statute.⁷⁵ Interestingly enough, it was not the Korean War which triggered the discussion about a German military contribution. It had already been brought up in late 1948 to early 1949.⁷⁶ However, the public debate as to whether Germany should make a military contribution towards the defence of the West started only at the end of 1950.⁷⁷ And the context, then, was the Korean

⁷⁰ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3612AB, WP I, 191, p. 8204B

⁷¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8105AB, see also, Art. 24 Basic Law

⁷² Interview given by Adenauer to the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, on 3 December 1949, as quoted in: Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p.341-3, original: „Ich entgegnete, daß unter keinen Umständen zugestimmt werden könne, daß Deutsche als Söldner oder Landesknechte in fremde Armeen einträten. Auch wenn die Alliierten das Verlangen nach einem deutschen Beitrag zur Sicherheit Europas vorbrächten, würde ich die Aufstellung einer deutschen Wehrmacht ablehnen. Im äußersten Falle sei ich alsdann die Frage eines deutschen Kontingents im Rahmen der Armee einer europäischen Föderation zu überlegen.“ see also, S. Dockrill, *Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955*, p. 32

⁷³ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 24, p. 735C, see also, VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3617B

⁷⁴ See Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 24, p. 738A, see also, Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 24, p. 740D, WP I, 68, p. 2489A, see also, Brandt (SPD), in General Report about the political implications of the EDC treaty, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11180A

⁷⁵ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 24, p. 735D, in deliberations of the constitutional assembly, 8.5.49, see also Security guarantee of the Western Allies for Germany, September 19th, 1950, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), Kurt Schumacher, *Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 168

⁷⁶ See Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 168

⁷⁷ For a comprehensive overview of political arguments in the rearmament debate see VDB, WP I, 98

War, which broke out in June 1950. "The German people must realise that they cannot expect the US, Canada and the Western countries to make sacrifices for the creation of such a united front of resistance while Germany stands aside."⁷⁸ Adenauer posed two preconditions for the German participation: Firstly, that the common front against Russia must be a wholehearted effort of the West such as would make any Soviet aggression impossible⁷⁹ and, secondly, that the partners in this Western coalition must have equal rights and equal duties, i.e. putting Germany on equal footing with the other Western powers.⁸⁰ Ultimately, Adenauer thought of German rearmament as a political resource: "Rearmament would, in my opinion have far-reaching consequences for the political standing of our people in the world. Full sovereignty could be achieved through it."⁸¹

It was a daunting prospect that German soldiers might once again stand in the front line against the Russians.⁸² "As hard and as disappointing as some of the victors' decisions may have been for our people, disarmament was supported in wide sections of the population."⁸³ Therefore, the issue of remilitarisation was a very sensitive one. The strongest confirmation, yet, that Germany would have to rearm one way or the other came when the then Interior Minister and later Federal President Gustav Heinemann resigned over the issue.⁸⁴ It was the first rebellion with some repercussions on the Bundestag. CDU dissidents and members of the smaller parties like the Centre (Z) and the Bavarian Party (BP) founded the 'Emergency Gathering for Peace in Europe' (NG).⁸⁵ Although this new party did not have any electoral success their following was undoubtedly built on the passionate principles of a peace movement.⁸⁶ The movement had a larger following than just

⁷⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3565D-3566A, original: „Die Deutschen müssen sich darüber klar sein, dass sie unmöglich erwarten können, dass die vereinigten Staaten, Kanada und die westeuropäischen Länder die Opfer, die mit der Schaffung einer solchen Abwehrfront verbunden sind, auf sich nehmen, während Deutschland selbst nichts dazu beiträgt.“

⁷⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, WP I, 190, p. 8108A, see also, Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8124B

⁸⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3566A, see also, WP I, 190, p. 8103C

⁸¹ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 345, original: „Die Wiederbewaffnung würde meines Erachtens weitgehende Folgen für die politische Stellung unseres Volkes in der Welt haben. Auf dem Weg über die Wiederbewaffnung konnte die volle Souveränität der Bundesrepublik erreicht werden.“

⁸² Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3580A

⁸³ Seelos (BP), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2481D, see also, Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3572B

⁸⁴ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3578B

⁸⁵ The voting behaviour in respect to the EDC and the General Treaty does not follow party lines or parliamentary groupings in all events. In particular, for the FU and the Independent MPs there is no general line whether they voted for or against the legislation. For the voting results see VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12363-6

⁸⁶ See, Etzel (BP), in VDB, WP I, 24, p. 737D, original „Ein dritter Weltkrieg würde Deutschland zum Kriegsschauplatz machen, er würde die Zerstörung unserer Heimat und die physische Ausrottung der Nation bedeuten.“

the few parliamentarians, which can be seen in some acts of civil disobedience against conscription, for example by the youth organisation of the German trade unions.⁸⁷ There was a whole generation of young men who did not want to become soldiers. The rejection of military service was seen as a direct counter-reaction of World War II and the militaristic culture which had led to it.⁸⁸ After its disbandment, most of the former peace movement leaders switched to the SPD, which had rejected the rearmament plans from the very outset. The SPD went as far as denying the right of the Bundestag to introduce legislation on German defence policy, on the grounds neither the MPs nor the voters had considered it necessary or even possible that a new Wehrmacht should be established.⁸⁹ The arguments ranged from the demand for general elections⁹⁰ to the claim that the Basic Law did not provide for any introduction of a German military structure⁹¹, i.e. the SPD votes would be needed for a 2/3 majority to change the constitution.⁹² However, the majority position in the SPD also rejected the pacifist alternative.⁹³ Nevertheless, it was the government which prepared public opinion for a future military engagement.⁹⁴ General conscription was probably the one issue which was the most controversial and reflected the whole political debate to the people outside. The representatives of the peace movement amplified those feelings of doubt among the electorate⁹⁵ and the psychological impact of having to send their sons on military service just a few years after the end of the war was considerable. The arguments in the public featured reasonable counter-arguments like: “(...) that general conscription causes the most severe disturbance in the economy during peace time. (...) It seems to me that the disturbance of the peace economy is one of the more recent objectives of world Communism. We shouldn't help that aim.”⁹⁶ Quoting the example of Britain abolishing it, the SPD also opposed general

⁸⁷ Ehlers (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2300B, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3145A,C, 3146A

⁸⁸ Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3222CD

⁸⁹ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8116AB

⁹⁰ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3575D

⁹¹ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3575A

⁹² Brandt (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11111B, see also, Brandt (SPD), in General Report about the political implications of the EDC treaty, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11178C, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 174

⁹³ See Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 169

⁹⁴ See Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3154B

⁹⁵ See Ribbeheger (FU), in VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12338C

⁹⁶ Bertram (FU), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8174B, original: „ (...) dass eine allgemeine Wehrpflicht in Friedenszeiten zu schwersten Störungen des Wirtschaftslebens führen muss (...). Die Störung des Wirtschaftslebens in Friedenszeiten scheint mir ein Nahziel des Weltkommunismus zu sein, zu dessen Erreichung wir nicht helfen sollen.“

conscription.⁹⁷ Technical counter-arguments such as that modern armies did not need large numbers, but rather highly trained personnel, featured prominently.⁹⁸ On the other hand the very emotional debate about German militarism was raging. On the part of the government, the pledge for democratic control of the army and democratic reliability of the soldiers⁹⁹ was underpinned by the plan to start the forces off on a voluntary basis.¹⁰⁰ There were inherent problems, such as that the volunteers would most likely be former soldiers of the undesirable kind. A personal selection was introduced to prevent such personnel from joining any future German army.¹⁰¹ The SPD believed that military service must be an expression of the democratic commitment of the soldier, later dubbed ‘citizen in uniform’.¹⁰² This position was not far off from the government’s case for general conscription as the legitimate child of democracy.¹⁰³ The army could only be a reflection of a democratic society if its citizens were actually serving in it.¹⁰⁴ An alternative service for conscientious objection was introduced.¹⁰⁵ Both measures normalised the relationship between people and the army in Germany. The days when the purpose of a young German’s life was to become a soldier were, however, gone for good.¹⁰⁶ On an institutional level, the army would never again be a threat to the democratic institutions or play a decisive role in policy formulation. ¹⁰⁷ “In Germany – we are all agreed on this, in this House – the army will be bound by the laws enacted by the Bundestag.”¹⁰⁸ The safeguard for this had originally been the rejection of a *national* German army and the commitment to an integrated army for Europe: “When we are considering that the German people should contribute to a international, supranational, a European and a more extensive defence community, we

⁹⁷ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10672BC, see also, Britain/Military Security/The national armies of Europe/British Rearmament

⁹⁸ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10672C

⁹⁹ Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 222, p. 9861AB, see also, Rasner (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3193C

¹⁰⁰ Kopf (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8746D

¹⁰¹ Kutschera (GB-BHE), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3778D

¹⁰² Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3145C, see also, Majonica (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3781A, see also, Letter of Schumacher to Adenauer about the position of the SPD on the German defence contribution, on 6th February 1951, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 891

¹⁰³ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2254C, see also, VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3901B

¹⁰⁴ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2254C, see also, Rasner (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3193D-3194A

¹⁰⁵ Majonica (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3780C

¹⁰⁶ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3145CD, see also, Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3155B

¹⁰⁷ Strauß (CSU) Defence Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10726A

¹⁰⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3134C, original: „In Deutschland - darüber sind wir uns alle in diesem hohen Hause einig - wird die Armee unter dem Gesetz stehen, das vom Bundestag erlassen werden wird.“

have to realise that this is something completely new which cannot be compared to any form of remilitarisation. (...) The age of the nation state is over. We have a new period. The new army is no longer a national one. (...) It is an army for the defence of peace.”¹⁰⁹ This was the ethos of integrated defence and of the later European Defence Community.¹¹⁰

3.3.2 *Integrated Defences*

The idea of integrated European and North Atlantic Defences represented real progress towards genuine security, in particular Western Europe.¹¹¹

“Neither the United States of America nor the countries of Europe want war. (...) America was in a position to seek victory in the last confrontation without putting its own continent at risk. For Europe the very first battle could be devastating, even if the Third World War was subsequently won. It is self-evident that after a Soviet assault and occupation there would be precious little left to liberate.”¹¹²

Older plans such as peripheral defence reflected just this scenario and were, therefore, gradually dropped. Isolationist tendencies in the UK¹¹³ and the US¹¹⁴ were also safely overcome. Growing institutional arrangements and solidarity between Western Europe and the US seemed to be the way forward.¹¹⁵ This was not altogether altruistic. The USA, as the key force behind the integration of defences clearly wanted a bulwark against Communism.¹¹⁶ This conception, however, suggests by itself the purely defensive nature of all Western defence organisations,

¹⁰⁹ Kiesinger (CDU) in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8141CD, original: „Wenn also heute daran gedacht ist, dass das deutsche Volk in dem Gesamtgefüge einer internationalen, einer übernationalen, einer europäischen und darüber hinausreichenden Verteidigungsgemeinschaft einen Wertbeitrag leistet, so ist es etwas ganz und gar Neues und hat mit „Rehmilitarisierung“ auch nicht das geringste zu tun. (...) Die Zeit des Nationalstaates ist zu Ende. Wir haben eine neue. Das neue Heer ist kein nationalstaatliches Heer mehr, (...) sondern eine Heer zur Verteidigung des Friedens.“

¹¹⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2284A

¹¹¹ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2239A

¹¹² Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 222, p. 9858A, original: „Weder die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika noch die Länder Europas wünschen einen Krieg. (...) Amerika könnte es sich leisten, ohne seinen Kontinent zu gefährden, den Sieg in der letzten Auseinandersetzung anzustreben. Für Europa könne schon die erste Schlacht eines wenn auch später gewonnenen dritten Weltkrieges vernichtet werden! Es bleibt nur als eine Selbstverständlichkeit anzufügen, daß nach einer sowjetischen Überrollung und Besatzung später auch eine Befreiung nicht mehr viel nützen würde.“

¹¹³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1069C

¹¹⁴ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2244A, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2251D

¹¹⁵ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2260C

¹¹⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12302C

such as the EDC, WEU and NATO against the perceived Soviet expansionism.¹¹⁷ “Finally, there is one thing I want to tell you [to the KPD] very clearly: neither the North Atlantic Pact nor the European Defence Community have any aggressive objective whatsoever.”¹¹⁸

European Defence Community (EDC)

The EDC would be Germany’s first concern: “For Europe, the system of military alliances of the old style is, I believe, over.”¹¹⁹ Building on the foundations of the Schuman Plan, one of the core aims of the Pleven Plan was to curb any future possibility of aggression between France and Germany by integrating their armed forces. “Therefore, let me say that again, I consider the creation of a European defence community in addition to the Schuman Plan as an essential element of permanent peace in Europe.”¹²⁰ In the discussions of the Plan, Adenauer said in the Foreign Policy Committee of the Bundestag that he regarded both treaties, i.e. the ECSC and the EDC, as the foundations for the ‘United States of Europe’, which would in turn bring the West European states together in every aspect of public life.¹²¹ In this particular case the dominant consideration was, however, defence: “European co-operation is no longer (...) just about cultural community, economic reason and political theses. Nowadays, the guiding principle is defence, more precisely the potential for defence.”¹²² The important difference as compared with past epochs was that defence was no longer just a national issue: “I believe the whole House has been united – at least so far – in agreeing that the reestablishment of a national army in Germany and the maintenance of national armies in the other European countries are not the right approach.”¹²³ The emphasis was, again, on

¹¹⁷ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10645A, see also, VDB, WP III, 9, p. 298BC

¹¹⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, WP I, 190, p. 8107D, original: „Eines möchte ich zum Schluss nochmals mit allem Nachdruck Ihnen [KPD] sagen: Weder der Atlantikpakt noch die europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft verfolgen irgendwelche aggressiven Ziele.“

¹¹⁹ Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 92B

¹²⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, WP I, 190, p. 8104A, original: darum betrachte ich - lassen Sie mich das nochmals sagen - die Schaffung einer europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft neben der Schaffung des Schumanplans als ein ganz wesentliches Element einer dauernden Befriedung Europas.“

¹²¹ See, Brandt (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11114AB

¹²² Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2488A, original: „Der Zusammenschluss Europas steht nicht mehr (...) einzig und allein im Zeichen kultureller Gemeinschaft, wirtschaftlicher Vernunft oder politische Thesen. Seine leitende Idee ist doch heute die Verteidigung, noch genauer gesagt, dass Verteidigungspotenzial geworden.“

¹²³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8760CD, original: „Ich glaube, das ganze Haus war sich – bisher wenigstens – darin einig, dass die Neueinrichtung einer nationalen Armee in Deutsch-

European co-operation. “(...) it has to be clear that the protection of Germany must be part and parcel of the protection of Europe.”¹²⁴ The enthusiastic response to the integrated partnership of the ECSC set a positive precedent:

“We consider the Pleven-Plan an essential contribution to European integration. The integration of Europe is still one of the main aims of German policy. We regard the creation of a European army – if possible with the participation of England – as a vital step on the way towards that final aim: European integration. We are, therefore, happy to participate in the consultations on the Pleven-Plan.”¹²⁵

In respect to Britain, its later association with the EDC would be an historic step.¹²⁶ The government considered the foundation of European defence a huge improvement. There had been several plans in the past for the strategic defence of Western Europe. There was general agreement that the most worrying ones were those which put the line of defence on the Rhine or even the Pyrenees, effectively giving up Germany or considering it the main battleground in a conflict with the East.¹²⁷ The argument that one could expect German soldiers to fight for Europe only if there was a reasonable chance that their own country would survive was convincing. It was agreed that a European defence system could work only if the Allies saw their fate equally linked to German survival.¹²⁸ These security guarantees were the working basis for German participation in the Western alliance system of which the Pleven Plan was the European embodiment.¹²⁹ On this basis Germany formally committed itself to the Western defence system in the General Treaty and at the same time regained another portion of status, prestige, equality and impor-

land und die Beibehaltung nationaler Armeen in den anderen europäischen Ländern nichts Gutes ist (...).“

¹²⁴ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3580A, original: „Es ist (...) eindeutig klarzustellen, dass der Schutz Deutschland in den Schutz Europas eingegliedert werden muss.“

¹²⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3565A, original: „Wir betrachten den Pleven-Plan als einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Integration Europas. Die Integration Europas ist nach wie vor eines der Hauptziel der deutschen Politik. Wir sind der Auffassung, dass die Schaffung einer europäischen Armee - möglichst unter Teilnahme Englands - einen sehr wesentlichen Fortschritt auf dem Weg zur Erreichung dieses Endziels: Integration Europa, bedeuten wird. Wir wollen deswegen gern bei der Beratung des Pleven-Plans mitarbeiten.“

¹²⁶ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1087AB

¹²⁷ See Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3569B, see also, Dorls (SRP), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3593C, see also, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9798B, see also, Brandt (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11115C

¹²⁸ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3571CD, 3574B, see also, Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3580D

¹²⁹ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8231B, see also, Strauß (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 222, p. 9858BC

tantly security.¹³⁰ “We achieve the greatest possible security through inclusion in the largest defence system in history and, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are no longer just an object of political and strategic considerations, but active participants as well.”¹³¹

In contrast with the government, the opposition was not so sure whether the EDC and finally NATO were the right way to guarantee German security. The question posed by the SPD was whether entrenchment of the East-West antagonism was really the only way to peace in Europe? And if the answer was not clear, should one commit West Germany to the Western military system?¹³²

“It is not true that there is only the alternative between being a satellite of the East or a vassal of the West. There is a third: (Shouting from the CDU: Ah, here it comes!) to bind yourself to the West in a way which the East does not have to find threatening (Laughter from the government parties) and to start a relationship of free exchanges with the East (...).”¹³³

The SPD was also not happy about the loose association of Great Britain with the EDC.¹³⁴ They stuck to their argument of equality insofar as they did not want to lead Germany into a western military alliance in which Germany would be subject to discrimination.¹³⁵ There were some indications of discrimination in the early drafts of the EDC, e.g. that only Germany was obliged to integrate all its military forces.¹³⁶ This was not a cooperation of equal partners.¹³⁷ More and more French demands, in the form of additional protocols, were seen as symptomatic.¹³⁸ The connection between the Saar issue and the ratification of the EDC treaty was an-

¹³⁰ Strauß (CSU), in Report about the military and political implications of the EDC treaty, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11264CD, see also, EDC Treaty, Art. 6

¹³¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9798A, original: „Durch den Einbau in das größte Verteidigungssystem der Geschichte erhalten wir die denkbar größte Sicherheit, und, meine Damen und Herren, wir sind nicht mehr Objekt politischer und strategischer Überlegungen, sondern wir werden Mithandelnde.“

¹³² Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 204, p. 8791C, see also, VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2237AB

¹³³ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 221, p. 9817C, original: „Es ist nicht wahr, dass es nur die eine Alternative gebe, Satellit des Ostens oder Vasall des Westens zu sein. Es gibt die dritte: (Zurufe von der CDU: Aha, jetzt kommt es!) sich dem Westen in Formen zu verbinden, die der Osten nicht bedrohlich zu finden braucht, (Lachen bei den Regierungsparteien) und mit dem Osten in ein Verhältnis freien Austausches zu treten (...)“see also, Speech by Schumacher on wireless ‘RIAS’, on 15th July, 1952, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher*, p. 968

¹³⁴ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1078D

¹³⁵ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3569CD, 3570A, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8114B

¹³⁶ Fröhlich (BHE-DG), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8220A

¹³⁷ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1080A

¹³⁸ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1079D

other example.¹³⁹ France was trying to safeguard its position there, i.e. in the economic union with the Saar, and to keep German interests at bay, i.e. to keep the Saar permanently detached from Germany.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, the SPD expressed doubts as to the reasons for European integration, in respect to America. Clearly, it was a matter of survival for them to retain access to the European continent, with all its industrial potential and natural resources.¹⁴¹ Perhaps most importantly the opposition was afraid that a German military build-up might provoke a Soviet attack, especially while the German defence capability was still low.¹⁴² In the eyes of the SPD, a dangerous illusion was being created. "You think a little security is better than none. Well, half of what is necessary for proper defence doesn't provide 50% security, but just the certainty of ten times the degree of destruction and ten times the area of scorched earth."¹⁴³ Schumacher developed his case for the establishment of a sufficient shield of allied forces behind which German troops could be made into battle worthy forces. Otherwise – he said- they would just be cannon fodder.¹⁴⁴ This was a very reasonable argument from a German point of view, but it became clear in several discussions with allied partners that it contradicted the fundamental idea of a common western defence. The American High Commissioner McCloy put it bluntly: if the West had all the troops necessary as a shield for German rearmament demanded by Schumacher, there would not be the necessity of a German military contribution. The fact of the matter was the West did not have these troops.¹⁴⁵ Despite these arguments, the SPD finally voted against the EDC.¹⁴⁶ They also abstained on the vote for the Churchill Resolution for a European Army in Strasbourg, in 1950.¹⁴⁷ There was clear evidence of a deep-rooted rejection of German military commitment and the SPD became and remained the leading and most articulate exponent of this current.

¹³⁹ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1083C, see also, Pfleiderer (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1093A

¹⁴⁰ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1079BC

¹⁴¹ Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2289B, see also, Letter of Schumacher to Adenauer on the position of the SPD on the German defence contribution, 6 February 1951, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 885

¹⁴² Fröhlich (BHE), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3601D, Bertram (FU), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8174CD

¹⁴³ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8196A, original: „Sie meinen, ein wenig Sicherheit sei mehr als gar nichts. Nun, die Hälfte des für die effektive Verteidigung Notwendigen gibt nicht halbe Sicherheit, sondern nur die Gewissheit zehnfacher Zerstörung, zehnfacher verbrannte Erde.“

¹⁴⁴ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3571C, 3574A, see also, Letter of Schumacher to Adenauer about the position of the SPD on the German defence contribution, on 6th February 1951, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 889, 891, see also, Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, p. 479

¹⁴⁵ Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, p. 484

¹⁴⁶ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 98, p. 3572C, see also, Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8193CD

¹⁴⁷ Lütgens (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 103, p. 3754C, Frommhold (DRP), in VDB, WP I, 103, p. 3759A

The EDC treaty was, nevertheless, signed by the governments of all the Six.¹⁴⁸ Early in 1953 came the first signs that the ratification process in the Assemblée Nationale was in trouble.¹⁴⁹ Hence, and as another concession towards France in the form of a protocol the supranational nature of the treaty was drastically scaled down.¹⁵⁰ Fundamental doubts were shared by the opposition and the government, whether a European army could be designed along the lines of national armies without the institutions to guide and control them i.e. a European government and a parliament¹⁵¹, and without an ideal such as that of the nation to it. The inclusion of Germany in the EDC settled any suspicion that Germany might be planning a war of re-conquest¹⁵², which should, it was hoped, satisfy the French need for security.¹⁵³ French attempts to control German rearmament through the EDC were noticed and as such were not welcome. However, against the background of the French need for security they were generally accepted.¹⁵⁴ All that remained was to wait and see whether the French would finally accept their own EDC creation in parliament. When the vote came on 30 August 1954, there was great disappointment and, of course, it was a setback like never before for the whole European integration process.¹⁵⁵ Some observers argued, with the benefit of hindsight that the EDC should have been the last element of the European integration process, instead of a hasty response to the Soviet threat, precipitating its failure.¹⁵⁶ “The EDC did not become reality; that is true. However, the current realities of London and Paris would be unthinkable without the preceding work on the EDC.”¹⁵⁷ The EDC was, hence, overhauled into the Western European Union.

¹⁴⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1068D

¹⁴⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12305A,

¹⁵⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2228A, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3124B

¹⁵¹ Lütken (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 103, p. 3754C

¹⁵² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 3, p. 21A-B, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 55A

¹⁵³ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3824D-3825A

¹⁵⁴ Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3911D

¹⁵⁵ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1087D, see also, VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2242C, 2244CD

¹⁵⁶ Reference to a statement by Robert Schuman, then French Foreign Minister, in: Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2282D-2283A, see also, Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 545, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 396, for the circumstances surrounding the vote in the Assemblée Nationale see France/Military Security/Integrated Defences/The European Defence Community

¹⁵⁷ Rasner (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3189C, original: „Die EVG ist keine Realität geworden ; das ist richtig. Aber die jetzigen Realitäten von London und Paris wären undenkbar ohne die vorangegangene Arbeit an der EVG.“

Western European Union (WEU)

The 1954 London conference was meant to clear up the mess after the rejection of the EDC.¹⁵⁸ There was a dominant feeling of crisis, which could have split up the West, and the British acted swiftly and with determination to unite the countries in NATO and in the newly drawn up WEU treaty.¹⁵⁹ Germany became a member of both organisations, a move seen in Bonn as completing the Western defence structure.¹⁶⁰

WEU was the product of the Eden Plan, which extended the old Brussels pact to Italy and Germany and made it into a Western European defence community.¹⁶¹ The Eden Plan had been drafted when the EDC was still under discussion but already raising hackles in the French parliament.¹⁶² The formerly explicit anti-German clause was deleted and Germany was made a full partner.¹⁶³ The clauses concerning automatic assistance in case of aggression included now the two new member states.¹⁶⁴ Essentially, most of the supranational elements of the EDC treaty¹⁶⁵ were replaced with an intergovernmental Council of Ministers as the core institution. For most decisions unanimity was required.¹⁶⁶ The idea of a European Parliament as a control institution was completely abandoned.¹⁶⁷ In contrast to earlier European efforts in the EDC, these measures were seen as a reverting to national thinking.¹⁶⁸ Perhaps in an attempt to make up for the loss of the supranational element, both alliances were presented as not only military, but also cultural, economic and political.¹⁶⁹ These components, however, were weak and insufficiently developed in the eyes of the SPD. And the latter's most stinging criticism was probably that: "The London agreement turns it [the Brussels Pact] from a military alliance against Germany into a military alliance against the Soviet Un-

¹⁵⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2231CD

¹⁵⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3121C, 3124D

¹⁶⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3133A

¹⁶¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2229D, 2231A, see also, VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4599D

¹⁶² See David Dutton, *Anthony Eden, A Life and Reputation*, p. 293, There was a first and a second Eden Plan, which differed insofar as the latter mentioned German reunification as an aim of all participating members

¹⁶³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2231A, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3124B, 3125A, CD

¹⁶⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2231A, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3125D

¹⁶⁵ Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3235AB

¹⁶⁶ Rasner (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3191A

¹⁶⁷ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3185C

¹⁶⁸ Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3750C

¹⁶⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2231B, see also, VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7071D

ion.”¹⁷⁰ In that spirit all WEU forces would be under NATO high command.¹⁷¹ Positively put, that would be the embodiment and the implementation of the common Western defence efforts.¹⁷²

The renewed British security guarantees for the European continent, which left British forces at the disposal of WEU, were universally welcomed.¹⁷³ The close incorporation of British forces into WEU was seen as an historic decision, which was essentially based on the realisation that – given the development of new long-range weaponry – no European state could defend itself alone.¹⁷⁴ Adenauer added his realistic consideration that, with Britain inextricably linked to the European fate, the US could never turn its back on Europe.¹⁷⁵

For Germany, the rejection of the EDC treaty – taking down with it the General Treaty as well – left a whole raft of open questions. All matters which had been settled were unclear again, such as German sovereignty, German defence commitments, the status of the occupation forces, and the relations with America and Britain and, not least, with the other defence community partners which had signed the treaty.¹⁷⁶ The WEU treaty settled these uncertainties. Germany was admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a full and sovereign member, importantly, without any discrimination.¹⁷⁷ Legally this meant similar arrangements as in the General Treaty.¹⁷⁸ The former occupation forces became Western allied forces stationed in Germany for its protection.¹⁷⁹ Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic agreed not to produce any ‘ABC’ and heavy weapons.¹⁸⁰ The

¹⁷⁰ Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2289A, original: „ Die Londoner Akte macht aus ihm [dem Brüsseler Pakt] statt einer Militärallianz gegen Deutschland eine Militärallianz gegen die Sowjetunion.“

¹⁷¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2231B

¹⁷² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2232AB, 2233B, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3124D, 3125B

¹⁷³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2231BC, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126B, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2238D, see also, Dehler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2251CD

¹⁷⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1069AB, see also, VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4605A

¹⁷⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2284C

¹⁷⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2228CD, 2229D

¹⁷⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2232A, see also, H.P. Mensing, *Adenauer – Heuss, Unter vier Augen Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren 1949-1959*, No. 33, 25/10/1954, p. 149

¹⁷⁸ The General Treaty was revised and adapted to the new situation, leaving essential provisions, such as on the handover of sovereignty unchanged. However, all emergency clauses and allied security rights could now be exercised only with the agreement of the German government. Berlin remained under Allied protection, see Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3121D, 3122D, 3123BC

¹⁷⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3123C, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3143C

¹⁸⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2232C, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126C, see also, VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2282D, similar suggestion denounce the production of ABC weapons and heavy arms on the part of Germany, came from Churchill even before WEU proposals came on the

armaments and numbers of troops were limited.¹⁸¹ The arms industry of all member states would be monitored by a control commission.¹⁸² Both measures were presented as a manifest sign of the German people's will for peaceful development.¹⁸³ Although the SPD considered the suspicions of the European neighbours unfounded, they did not object to the restrictions.¹⁸⁴ However, they saw their doubts as to Western integration – in particular military integration – fully vindicated¹⁸⁵, because the main message of NATO and WEU membership was German rearmament.¹⁸⁶

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Full German membership of NATO was initially vetoed by the French, ostensibly because of German territorial claims in the East which were at odds with the defensive nature of NATO.¹⁸⁷ Initially it was assumed that the EDC would become an integral part of NATO.¹⁸⁸ With its failure, the long-feared prospects of a German national army became reality, very much against the will of the overwhelming majority in Germany.¹⁸⁹ The problem at the outset was that Germany was not a member of NATO and would therefore not be able to influence decisions about its own troops which were only set up under the precondition that they were under NATO or EDC high command.¹⁹⁰ This at best indirect link was not good enough for the opposition and was recognised as a flaw by the government.¹⁹¹ In addition,

table, see H. P. Mensing, *Adenauer – Heuss, Unter vier Augen Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren 1949-1959*, No. 31, 9/9/54, p. 142

¹⁸¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126C, see also, VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7071D

¹⁸² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2232B, see also, VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3126A

¹⁸³ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2249A

¹⁸⁴ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3819D

¹⁸⁵ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2236AB, for the SPD objections to German rearmament and Western integration see Rearmament, for the role the ECSC played, in the conception of the SPD, as the economic basis for Western rearmament and a was of drawing Germany into this see Economic Security/European Integration/ The Schuman Plan

¹⁸⁶ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3136B

¹⁸⁷ von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8238D-8239°, original: „Herr Außenminister Schuman hat (...) erklärt, die Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in der NATO sei unmöglich, sagen wir es kurz: weil eine Gefahr der Aggression bestehe, weil ein Land wie Deutschland ja Ansprüche auf territoriale Änderungen anzumelden habe.“

¹⁸⁸ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8192CD, see also, Strauß (CSU), in Report about the military and political implications of the EDC treaty, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11265B

¹⁸⁹ Jaeger (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3212D, 3214B, see also, Mende (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3750B

¹⁹⁰ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8192D

¹⁹¹ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 191, p. 8237B-D, see also, Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2290D

under the EDC, NATO mutual defence clauses did not automatically apply to the Federal Republic.¹⁹²

German membership changed the whole strategic evaluation of the alliance. Germany was no longer a battleground, but a member state which had to be defended. That meant that the forward defences had to be improved in the sense that strategic defence plans had to be operative right up to the Iron Curtain.¹⁹³ Germany's only real hope was that they would never have to be used, because it was clear, if war came, that the fighting would take place in Germany.¹⁹⁴ The Hungarian crisis in 1956 took the possibility of armed conflict frighteningly near the German borderline. In that situation, the government had every reason to rejoice in the NATO protection that had been negotiated.¹⁹⁵

Given the SPD priority for reunification, the party could not support NATO membership. Firstly, NATO was part and parcel of the system of antagonistic camps which cemented and perpetuated the division of Germany.¹⁹⁶ Secondly, West German NATO membership also raised the daunting prospect of war between the two Germans.¹⁹⁷ That could not be security, let alone peace.¹⁹⁸ This became one of the main reasons for the SPD to oppose German rearmament and membership at the Western alliance system¹⁹⁹, as well as the main reason for opposition to military service by the German population.²⁰⁰

Adenauer's military assumptions were, again, fairly straightforward. As long as Soviet military superiority continued, the Russians would use it to its utmost to increase their sphere of influence.²⁰¹ The West would only get to the stage of serious discussions with the Soviets from a position of strength. Only then would the USSR treat the West as an equal.²⁰² Soviet expansionism had been halted only through Western unity.²⁰³ The Atlantic link remained the main reason for peace in

¹⁹² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12303CD, 12304C, that only changed when West-Germany became a full member of NATO in 1955, see Manteuffel (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3199A

¹⁹³ Manteuffel (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3199B, NATO MC14 puts the line of defence 'as far East as possible', see Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 28

¹⁹⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3230BC

¹⁹⁵ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10663B

¹⁹⁶ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3136CD, 3138A, 3139D

¹⁹⁷ Erler (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3208C, see also, Strobel (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3765A

¹⁹⁸ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10669AB

¹⁹⁹ See voting lists on the accession of the FRG into NATO and WEU, in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3859-3877, see also, VDB, WP II, 72, p. 3939-3947

²⁰⁰ Baade (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 71, p. 3755D

²⁰¹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 190, p. 8117C, WP I, 204, p. 8768C, WP I, 255, 12306A-C

²⁰² For the variant of this rationale which refers to West-Germany see, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2285AB, see also, Manteuffel-Szoegé (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2266B

²⁰³ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 84, p. 4614D-4615A, see also, VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10658B

Europe.²⁰⁴ In addition, the American guarantee had huge implications for the whole of the European integration process: “Europe could not even come into being, if it was not protected by the US.”²⁰⁵ In a political sense, this guarantee cemented the Atlantic link, which made clear that the security and well-being of Europe was in America’s interests, too.²⁰⁶ However, the commitment of American forces to the European continent was made dependent by Eisenhower and Dulles on whether the Europeans would ‘get their act together’ and found a European defence arrangement, either in the EDC or later in WEU.²⁰⁷ In that respect the German military contribution was primarily of political importance, insofar as it showed America that the European defence effort was going forward.²⁰⁸ The setback of the rejection of the EDC curbed European integration initiatives for defence. The consequences were, on the one hand, a reorientation towards national armies as constituent units and, on the other hand, the solution of the German military question within the bigger Western military framework, i.e. NATO. Although it was intended to capture a god bit of European idealism within WEU, its relevance in that respect as well as in the military field in general was rather limited.

²⁰⁴ Strauß (CDU/CSU), Defence Minister, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 378A

²⁰⁵ Euler (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 418A, original: „Dieses Europa könnte nicht einmal erstehen, wenn es heute nicht den Schutz der USA genösse.“; see also, Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, WP I, 190, p. 8107C

²⁰⁶ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10644D, 10646A,CD

²⁰⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 46, p. 2231CD

²⁰⁸ Euler (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3244CD

3.4 Economic Security

3.4.1 *The Nation*

The ideological differences between left and right, between Socialism and capitalism, were fully played out in economic doctrine, in the 1950s. This happened first and foremost at the national level.

Economic policies

The nationalisation issue was one of the classic conflicts between Capital and Labour. The CDU emphasised the traditional criticisms of undemocratic technocracy and the highly bureaucratic command economy.¹ The SPD countered with the following: “Further, the key industries and the primary sector must be nationalised. This is because where democracy is understood as the right of people to determine its own destiny, power in the economy cannot be allowed to lie with groupings which can, avoid proper democratic control, through their economic strength.”² Permanent control of economic power would make government intervention only in times of crisis unnecessary, because problems could be solved right from the start. Controlled economies would also prevent the fall-back into totalitarian regimes, which could undoubtedly deal much better with times of crisis than a liberal democracy. In addition, the complexity of the modern economy seemed to warrant central planning. All these were reasons to make the SPD argue for a command economy in West Germany. The ideal was to bring economic competition in line with the needs of the people.³ Only with the Godesberg programme of 1959, the SPD concept of command economy was changed.⁴

At macroeconomic level, the SPD was very much in favour of an active economic policy of the Keynesian type, using public investment as an economic stimulus. Economic stability was most important, not least because of the social and individual repercussions of unemployment.⁵

¹ Kiesinger (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 107A

² Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 10, p. 177C, original: „Es bedingt weiter, dass man die Schlüssel- und Grundstoffindustrien in Gemeineigentum überführt. Denn Demokratie als Bestimmung der Geschicke eines Volkes durch das Volk selbst gibt es nur dort, wo die Schalthebel der Wirtschaft nicht in Händen von Gruppen liegen, denen ihre wirtschaftliche Macht die Möglichkeit gibt, sich der demokratischen Kontrolle – jedenfalls einer wirksamen demokratischen Kontrolle – zu entziehen.“

³ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 40B-C

⁴ B. Bouvier, ‘Erich Ollenhauer (1901-1963)’, in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, p. 196

⁵ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11336D-11337A

The government, however, laid a heavier emphasis on the need for a stable currency. Both issues were linked through the interest rates set by the *Bundesbank*. That meant a very conservative currency policy and economic policy, to the detriment of full employment.⁶ However, in the time of the ‘economic miracle’ the repercussions of this were not as severe as in later years. Just like all public ownership projects, said Erhard, the Socialist concept of an active economic policy was bound to lead to dirigisme and eventually command economy.⁷ This was not seen as credible economic concept by the government.

Magnet Theory

These economic policies had repercussions on the position the Federal Republic could take up on the international stage. The “Magnet Theory” is the best example for the direct impact of economic strength on political objectives. Based on the objective of early reunification Schumacher developed his magnet theory.⁸ The idea was that West Germany should become as strong as possible so that it would eventually bring the East back into its orbit.⁹ The government thought that the overwhelming superiority of the Western economic system would yield a much higher standard of living and convince ordinary Germans living in the Eastern zone, but hopefully also its leadership, that they should work more closely together with the West.¹⁰ This would finally result in reunification. The opposition in parliament agreed with the final aim of this policy: “(...) there is only one way to victory in this battle: It is to achieve the greatest success here in the West, to realise true progress here and to liberate personal values here. The European idea will then conquer the East and bolshevism will not define Europe’s profile.”¹¹ However, the SPD put a more social gloss on it: “This means that we have to work for this part of our country to be seen as the core part of Germany. This, however, is only

⁶ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11337D

⁷ Erhard (CDU), Minister for Economics, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11344BC

⁸ Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 124

⁹ Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 129, 143, 147, 152, see also, 29.6.1947: keynote statement of Schumacher at the Nuremberg party rally of the SPD ‘Germany and Europe’ The Yes for the Marshall Plan, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 493, see also, Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, p. 386

¹⁰ Schäfer (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2479D

¹¹ Wessel (Z), in VDB, WP I, 7, p. 74B, original: „(...) es gibt nur eine Art des Sieges in diesem Kampf. Sie heißt: hier im Westen das Größte leisten, hier den echten Fortschritt zustande bringen, hier die Persönlichkeitswerte durchsetzen. Dann wird die europäische Idee den Osten erobern, nicht aber der Bolschewismus das Gesicht Europas bestimmen.“

possible if it is a socially progressive and a socially exemplary system.”¹² The magnet theory of the social-democratic brand embodied their core claim that only a socially just system would strengthen West Germany against Communist subversion. In time the simple facts of western improvement in all areas of society would call the bluff of the fake emancipation Communism promised to the people.¹³ This whole approach was, of course, outright rejected by the Communist opposition.¹⁴ However, unfortunately for them, the idea seemed to work. The Germans in the Eastern zone were voting with their feet and deserting their homes for the West. The number of refugees was steadily rising. Particularly in Berlin, where general economic tendencies combined in their effect with family relations, the movement became a flood.¹⁵ The magnet theory of the early days changed with the Federal Republic. If this theory was validated, eventually West Germany would have to be able to provide for the needs of all Germany. That was Adenauer’s policy, to make the Federal Republic strong enough to live up to its future and final responsibility.¹⁶ Eventually the magnet theory was also applied to the European picture. The Europe of the Six, and the Europe of WEU would become centres of gravity, which would attract future member states. This interpretation turned the accusation of ‘Little Europe’ on its head and gave the whole idea a positive impetus.¹⁷

3.4.2 Half-way Europe

For Germany the economic repercussions of the war had been particularly severe. The old Socialist argument that the capitalist lust for profit had actually turned into a reason for war became widely accepted, in Germany, too: “(...) the wars of recent times have essentially been wars of economic domination. This thought inevitably leads us to trying to bring to an end the competition between national economies.”¹⁸ Therefore, Germany welcomed the European economic integration

¹² Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 13, p. 319A, original: „Es handelt sich darum, dafür zu sorgen, dass dieser Teil unseres Landes wirklich als Kernland Deutschlands betrachtet werden kann. Das kann es aber nur sein, wenn es ein sozial fortschrittliches und sozial vorbildliches Gebilde ist.“

¹³ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 125, p. 4767B

¹⁴ Reimann (KPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 429C

¹⁵ Adenauer gives the figure of 78,000 from July to October 1952. See Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11137C, see also, Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, p. 56, 58, 59, 62

¹⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3132C

¹⁷ von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 62, p. 3185D

¹⁸ Wahl (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7724A, original: „ (...) dass die Kriege der Vergangenheit zu einem wesentlichen Teil Wirtschaftskriege gewesen sind. Dieser Gedanke führt zwangsläufig zu dem Versuch, Mittel und Wege zu finden, um den Konkurrenzkampf der Volkswirtschaften zu beseitigen.“ For the French of this argument see France/Economic Security/European Integration

effort as a way of breaking this vicious circle and finding a peaceful and prosperous position alongside its European neighbours.

The Marshall Plan and the OEEC have rather stronger economic implications. Therefore, these institutions were seen mainly as a first step, but not as the means which could finally counterbalance the economic motivations behind past wars.

Marshall Aid and the OEEC

The European Recovery Program (ERP) was America's structural plan to help the European economies help themselves.¹⁹ The implementing instruments were left to the individual nation states. However, in the Marshall Plan and since 1947, it became consistent US policy to encourage ideas of further European integration.²⁰ In this respect the Marshall Plan was seen as the financial incentive, but also as one way of making integration happen with the backing of the superpower:²¹ "(...) we regard the Marshall Plan as of major political importance for the integration of Germany into the European community. (...) also we believe that the aid from the United States is the start of general European economic co-operation. And we truly see the material basis of a European community in this economic co-operation."²² Hence, the first steps towards closer Economic co-operation with the US were endorsed enthusiastically by the overwhelming majority of the Bundestag.²³

The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) became the administering institution for the Marshall Plan, but it was also seen as having political potential, especially by the SPD. The European Economic Council under OEEC auspices was warmly welcomed and seen as an alternative to the integration of the Six as in the ECSC. It was not tainted by capitalist dominance and included

¹⁹ See, 29.6.1947: keynote statement of Schumacher at the Nuremberg party rally of the SPD 'Germany and Europe' The Yes for the Marshall-Plan, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 489

²⁰ See quote of speech of Secretary of State Marshall by von Brentano (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 46, p. 1572A

²¹ Reif (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7101D, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 128

²² Gerstenmaier (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 409B, original: „ (...) messen wir dem Marschallplan eine hohe politische Bedeutung für die Einbeziehung Deutschlands in die europäische Gemeinschaftlichkeit bei. (...) Wir glauben, dass diese Hilfe der Vereinigten Staaten darüber hinaus aber der Start für die wirtschaftliche Kooperation Europas überhaupt darstellt, und in dieser wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit erblicken wir allerdings die materielle Grundlagen einer europäischen Gemeinschaftlichkeit.“

²³ Köhler (CDU), President of the Bundestag, in VDB, WP I, 31, p. 958A

all 18 OEEC states.²⁴ The economic provisions under the OEEC were also not as rigid as the economic integration of the Schuman Plan brand.²⁵ Following this alternative current the British initiative to establish a free trade area alongside the European Economic Community was welcomed, although, again, more so on the opposition benches and with declining enthusiasm in the Adenauer government. The main problem with free trade plans for Europe had been that countries such as France pursued an active economic policy of state intervention for the sake of the social good, for example to combat unemployment. This objective was contradictory to free trade, because economies rigged in that way were essentially less competitive than economies run under free market economy principles.²⁶ Erhard, in particular, did not want to see European integration ending up in a 'fortress Europe'.²⁷ Erhard saw it rather as one step on the road to worldwide free trade.²⁸ Freely convertible currencies were a major objective and a precondition for that.²⁹ He favoured the OEEC model for European integration, particularly with its latest innovation, the European Payments Union (EPU).³⁰ For a while there was some doubt on the question whether the government had the support of its most eminent economists for the Common Market. To no small degree coerced by the chancellor, citing his constitutional right to determine the guidelines of federal policy³¹, Erhard finally came round to supporting the EEC.³² He still urged that the Common Market should lead to a wider free trade area³³, although he had realised that Britain's bid for a free trade area was motivated as a countermeasure to the fledgling European economic integration effort.³⁴ In public, the British initiative

²⁴ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 41D, 50A

²⁵ Drechsel (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7098A

²⁶ Hellwig (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11361B

²⁷ For the position of the Ministry of Economics on the dangers of protectionism in the EEC, see Sabine Lee, 'German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration: German 'Europolitik' during the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations', in: Anne Deighton (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe – National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63*, Macmillan, London, 1995, p. 43

²⁸ Erhard (CDU) Minister for Economics, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1138C

²⁹ Erhard (CDU), Minister for Economics, in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7093AB

³⁰ Erhard (CDU), Minister for Economics, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11342D, for parallels to the British position see, Sabine Lee, 'German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration: German 'Europolitik' during the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations', p. 44

³¹ See Art. 65 Basic Law, see also, letter of Adenauer to the cabinet of 19th January, 1956, in: K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 253-5, see also, H.-P. Schwarz, *Adenauer Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, p. 288, see also, Volker Hentschel, *Ludwig Erhard: Ein Politikerleben*, Ullstein, Berlin, 1998, p. 317, 476, 487

³² See Erhard (CDU), Minister for Economics, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11342D, Adenauer finally used his guideline competence (Art. 65 Basic Law) to bring his Minister for Economics Affairs into line., see also, Sabine Lee, 'German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration: German 'Europolitik' during the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations', p. 50

³³ Elbrächter (DP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11360C

³⁴ Volker Hentschel, *Ludwig Erhard*, p. 314, 381, 386, 390, 397

for a free trade area was welcomed as an opportunity to extend European integration beyond the Six.³⁵ However, it was noted that the Common Market came first and was essentially the basis the FTA would be build on.³⁶ It also showed that the European integration process could no longer be ignored in the British Isles.³⁷ The final aim was still to bring Britain into the Common Market and to find an accommodation for its Commonwealth connections.³⁸ The British initiative, however, also held the danger of further fragmentation of Western Europe into several smaller economic communities.³⁹

This danger was no doubt increased when the FTA negotiations finally failed and Britain set up EFTA, separate from the EEC. Some opposition to EFTA came from inside the Six.⁴⁰ The differences between the 17 OEEC states were seen as rather greater than between the Six, which must be taken into account, if integration was to be successful.⁴¹ In addition, the original FTA proposals were undoubtedly meant to give Britain the most favourable economic position in Europe.⁴² Pure national profit, however, was not the spirit of a community, such as the Six.⁴³ Still, most parliamentarians took a conciliatory line. Britain's free trade initiative in EFTA was seen as a possible way out of the Europe of the 'Little Six'.⁴⁴ It seemed to be the uniting bond which could bring Western Europe back together, instead leaving Western Europe at 'Sixes and Sevens'.⁴⁵ Therefore, EFTA should be implemented in addition to the EEC.⁴⁶

³⁵ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10647A, see also, VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12002D

³⁶ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12005B; see also, VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2437D-2438A,D This position was not supported by the FDP which rather saw the Free Trade Area and the Common Market on equal footing under GATT, see Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12015B

³⁷ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10712C

³⁸ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12005A, see also, Mark Speich, *Kai-Uwe von Hassel*, p. 247

³⁹ Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12016A

⁴⁰ Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2433C

⁴¹ Furler (CDU), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2438A

⁴² Furler (CDU), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2438B

⁴³ Furler (CDU), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2438B

⁴⁴ Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2430D, 2432A, see also, Furler (CDU), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2439A

⁴⁵ Reporting the position of Erhard (CDU), Minister for Economics, in a conversation with Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in March 1957, in: Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2432BC, see also, 2433BC, reporting the British position towards EEC in: Furler (CDU), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2431D-2438A

⁴⁶ Strauß (CDU/CSU), Defence Minister, in VDB, WP III, 9, p. 378B, reporting the government and majority position in parliament, in: Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2431D, see also, reporting the position of Erhard (CDU), Minister for Economics, in: Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2433A,C

3.4.3 European integration

The economic rationale of European integration was simple and straightforward. The European national units were too small to thrive between the two colossuses of the American market and the Soviet bloc.⁴⁷ As a result of the Second World War, the world had undergone fundamental economic change and Europe must keep up with this movement if it was to reap the benefits of mass production, large markets and economies of scale, as in the US or in the Communist sphere of influence.⁴⁸ European economic integration and the economic incentives resulting from this were considered essential.⁴⁹ Otherwise Europe would finally lose its independence, in the sense that it could no longer determine its own fate.⁵⁰ From this angle it mattered little to which side Europe would succumb. The European nation state would not survive either way.⁵¹ Only a united Europe could preserve the peoples from foreign rule: “We can achieve the survival of our nation only via Europe, nowadays. Only via an integrated Europe will the other peoples, the French, as well as the Italians, the Belgians and the Dutch and finally also the English achieve the survival of their nations.”⁵² European divisions were, therefore, not only the reason for the lamentable state the continent was in, but also the ultimate threat for their survival in the future. Consequently, the nations would have to change and the nation states might have to go.⁵³ Certainly, discrimination on the

⁴⁷ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 255, p. 12310D

⁴⁸ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7652D, 7654A

⁴⁹ Elbrächter (DP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11357D

⁵⁰ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11346A

⁵¹ Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 240, p. 11122A

⁵² Euler (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 418A, original: „Nur über Europa kommen wir heute zur Existenzsicherung unserer Nation, und über Europa nur kommen die andere Völker, die Franzosen ebenso wie die Italiener, die Holländer und Belgier und letzten Endes auch die Engländer zur Existenzsicherung ihrer Nation.“

⁵³ Undoubtedly Milward would not go as far as abolishing the nation state. His perspective is rather that European integration saved the nation state. The basic contention of his book is that on the basis of economic necessities the post-war nation states decided to give up limited areas of their traditional sovereign rights. The supranational European recipient organisations then delivered what the nation state was no longer able to achieve on its own. Peace and prosperity would be the core terms. In this sense the supranational level saved the nation state from the wrath of its own citizens. See A. S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, p. 3, Milward clearly emphasises economics. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the political rationale for European integration: “The argument of this book should not be misunderstood. In bringing together so much evidence relating to the economic and social foundations of the Treaties of Rome there is no intention to deny the political motivation which are conventionally and correctly ascribed to the Treaties. These are, that it was a further guarantee of the peace settlement a still closer Franco-German association; that in doing so it reasserted French political leadership in western Europe and that it represented a yearning that Europe should have a greater voice in world affairs. (...) The argument accepts all these political motivations, but asserts that, except in Ger-

grounds of nationality had to disappear.⁵⁴ This was definitely the spirit of the early European enthusiasm which was somewhat frustrated by slow progress. Neither the OEEC nor the Council of Europe had fulfilled the hope of bringing Europe closer together to the degree where these institutions could guarantee survival. Germany is probably the best example of the need for security within European structures, because of the proximity of the Soviet threat and the plight of the brothers in East Germany. The supranational European integration of the Schuman Plan type undoubtedly held the hope for a closer union, i.e. security.

The Schuman Plan (ECSC)

Carlo Schmid (SPD) had had some very concrete ideas about a coal and steel community as early as September 1949. They were very similar to the later Schuman proposals.

“There is no conflict about the Saar, unlike that over Alsace-Lorraine. There is one reality, namely coal from the Saar and ore from Lorraine, kept apart by a frontier. The problem is how to get them both together despite the frontier. (...) The best solution would be, if we could Europeanise the European mineral resources (...) if we could unite the potential of the Ruhr, the Saar and Lorraine, i.e. coal, ore, iron, steel, into an economic partnership. Even today there could be a treaty between Germany and France which could result in unreserved access of the ore to the coal and vice versa. I am thinking about something like the old German Customs Union [of 1844] (...)”⁵⁵

Not much later, in November of the same year, Adenauer called for “(...) an early participation of Germany in the closer economic association between France, Italy

many, the economic foundation of the treaties was more fundamental, because without it they could not have achieved their additional political objective. These were, in any case, not truly separable from the economic ones.” See A. S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, p. 208

⁵⁴ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7676B,D

⁵⁵ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 10, p. 185AB, original: „Es gibt keine Saarfrage, wie es einmal – mit Recht – eine elsäß-lothringische Frage gegeben hat. Es gibt eine Realität „Saarkohle“ und „lothringisches Erz“, die durch eine politische Grenze getrennt sind, und das Problem ist: wie bringt man diese Kohle und dieses Erz zusammen, obwohl eine politische Grenze dazwischen läuft? (...) Am besten wäre es natürlich, wir könnten heute schon die europäischen Bodenschätze europäisieren. (...) wenn man das Potential von Ruhr, Saar und Lothringen – Kohle, Erze, Eisen, Stahl – zu einem wirtschaftlichen Zweckverband vereinigen könnte. (...) Aber schon heute könnte man eine Vereinbarung zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich treffen, deren Ergebnis ein unbedingter Zugang des Erzes zur Kohle und der Kohle zum Erz sein könnte. Ich denke da an etwas wie den alten deutschen Zollverein (...)“, for reference to the German Customs Union see also, Stegner (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7700D, for the similarity of Schmid’s ideas with Monnet’s and Schuman’s see Helmut Schmidt, *Carlo Schmid 1896 -1979: Vortrag vor dem Gesprächskreis Geschichte der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 1996, p. 3

and the Benelux countries.”⁵⁶ And in the same month Gerhard Schröder, the future foreign minister, took up Carlo Schmid’s idea and expressed the wish of the CDU to progress towards coal and steel integration along those lines.⁵⁷

When the Schuman Plan came it was warmly welcomed by the government as a ‘sincere and ethical initiative’.⁵⁸ “It [the Schuman Plan] means the creation of a steel skeleton between European national economies, through a unified binding connection of the primary industries of coal and iron production.”⁵⁹ The immediate interest was to curb any future war-capability between France and Germany through this linkage of their primary and war-important industries.⁶⁰ Despite the economic implications it was an essentially political initiative, firstly in the connection to German membership in the Council of Europe and the Saar problem⁶¹, and secondly in the political integration objective which was made absolutely clear in Schuman’s letter to Adenauer on proposing the ECSC.⁶² It was hoped that political integration between the Six would result from practice and trust founded in economic integration of the ECSC.⁶³ Political unification implied in the Schuman Plan, mainly along federal lines, would bring equality between the partners and finally lasting peace.⁶⁴ It is very interesting, for a conservative government, that the accusations that the High Authority could turn into an instrument of command economy were quickly brushed aside.⁶⁵ On the contrary, the Schuman proposal was rejected by the opposition on grounds that it was too little and too limited, i.e. it was only in one sector of the economy, and it was built on the initiative and interests of a group of industrialists. Firstly, Europe could not be built on particular interests especially not on those of the heavy industries.⁶⁶ “Well, the High Author-

⁵⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 398C, original: „(...) möglichst frühzeitige Beteiligung Deutschlands an der engeren wirtschaftlichen Verbindung zwischen Frankreich, Italien und Benelux.“

⁵⁷ Schröder (CDU) in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 416C

⁵⁸ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2462D, see also, Becker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, p. 2490D

⁵⁹ Schäfer (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2480B, original: „Durch eine einheitliche Verknüpfung und Verbindung der Grundstoffindustrien der Kohle- und Eisenerzeugung bedeutet er [Schuman-Plan] die Bildung eines stählernen Skeletts zwischen den europäischen Volkswirtschaften.“

⁶⁰ See Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6501B, WP I, 182, p. 7600A, WP I, 184, p. 7817A

⁶¹ See Economic Security/Interim Europe /Council of Europe

⁶² See Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 328, see also, Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 384, even Milward agrees that the motivation for European integration was initially predominantly political in Germany, see Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, p. 223, see also, Ch. 6

⁶³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6500C, see also, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1074CD

⁶⁴ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2460B

⁶⁵ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6500D

⁶⁶ Schumacher (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 17, p. 402C, 404A, see also, VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2475CD, see also, 22. 5. 195: Schumacher’s keynote speech: “The Socialdemocracy in its struggle for Germany and

ity is nothing else – to speak in sociological terms – than a assembly of managers. It is exactly what took 150 years of democratic and parliamentary development to overcome at the national level.”⁶⁷ Secondly, the degree of economic planning involved was also too weak for the taste of the SPD.⁶⁸ And thirdly, the national idea was still predominant in the SPD. They saw the Schuman Plan as prejudicial to German coal and steel production, in favour of the French. “Really, this plan, this Schuman Plan, is the continuation of the Monnet Plan.”⁶⁹ They believed that the Schuman Plan and later the Pleven Plan were only meant to keep Germany in its place.⁷⁰ Hence, “We reject it [the Schuman-plan]. We reject it as an unsuitable means of achieving the aim which we are striving for, namely European cooperation.”⁷¹ This rejection served to isolate the SPD in Europe, because it was the only one of the Socialist parties of the six states which did not sign up to the project.⁷²

The recognition by the French and the German governments that the European Coal and Steel Community would be a political exercise made the abstention of Britain regrettable in the eyes of both governments.⁷³ The reason was seen in the overseas links of the Commonwealth which did not allow Britain to sign up to an admittedly limited European alliance.⁷⁴ The opposition saw it rather as a support for their doubts as to the whole project, not merely in respect to Britain, but be-

Europe“, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 767, see also, p. 164-6

⁶⁷ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6513B, original: „Nun, die Hohe Behörde ist nichts anderes – in der Sprache der Soziologie zu reden – als ein Konvent von Managern – also gerade das, [für]was auf der nationalen Stufe zu überwinden 150 Jahre demokratisch-parlamentarischer Entwicklung notwendig gewesen sind.“

⁶⁸ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1066A-C

⁶⁹ Schöne (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7619CD, original: „In Wahrheit ist dieser Plan - der Schumanplan – , die Fortsetzung des Monnet-Plans“⁶⁸. given as a quotation from a report about the Schmanplan from the Ministry of Economics, see also, Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1066A, see also, Newspaper article of Schumacher in: *Hamburger Echo*, 21st April, 1951, titled ‘Our rejection of the Schuman Plan’, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 806

⁷⁰ Lützens (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 103, p. 3755D, see also, Newspaper article of Schumacher in: *Hamburger Echo*, 21st April, 1951, titled ‘Our rejection of the Schman-plan’, in: Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 807

⁷¹ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7798, original: „Wir lehnen ihn ab [den Schuman Plan]. Wir lehnen ab als ein ungeeignetes Mittel zur Erreichung des erstrebten Zieles der europäischen Zusammenarbeit.“, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7803BC, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 165

⁷² See Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 166

⁷³ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2460B, WP I, 182, p. 7599A, with regard to the accusation that Britain was informed late and in an inappropriate way, Adenauer claims that Schuman had presented his plan to Britain before all the other countries, but was rejected, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 491

⁷⁴ Euler (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6524CD

cause Europe was unduly narrowed down to the Six.⁷⁵ A minority opinion also registered the possibility that it might be the economic unattractiveness of the continental European area itself which led England to stay aloof.⁷⁶ Adenauer was of the opinion that in 1945 Churchill could have taken Britain into Europe, but when he came back into office in 1951 the magic moment had passed and the British rejection had been settled on the grounds of principle which made any serious future engagement hard to conceive.⁷⁷

The government counterargument shows how much potential they saw for a close Western European alliance and also whom they saw as its uncompromising enemies:

“You [the Communists] oppose it [the Schuman Plan], because you know that, according to many historical examples, the creation of a large market generates scope for economic development which soon renders debate as to the advantage for one partner or the disadvantage for the other meaningless (...).”⁷⁸

The lifting of the ceiling of 11.2 million tonnes on annual German steel production – introduced under occupation rule – became a good example. It was very important for German national confidence.⁷⁹ And initially the other European nations were dubious as to the repercussions on their economies. To ease the competitive pressure for Italian and Belgian mines, compensation payments were introduced for a transitional period of five years. The argument that these funds were subsidies for the Belgian coal industry and may have saved it is historically correct;⁸⁰ Milward’s argument that Germany was used, that this was unjustly forced upon Germany is wrong.⁸¹ It was clear that the supranational European integration effort, which started with the Schuman Plan, could not be a narrow minded national project, but that it had to live from mutual give-and-take for wider European objectives such as peace and prosperity. In that respect it is interesting to see an argument along the lines of ‘spill-over’ applied against the ECSC: “Such an organisation has no built-in stability. It must necessarily lead either to expansion, or it must

⁷⁵ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6519D, 6520A, see also, Willy Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, p. 163-4

⁷⁶ Bertram (Z), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6530D

⁷⁷ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 490-1, „Großbritannien und die Entwicklung in Europa“

⁷⁸ Euler (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7811B, original: „Sie [die Kommunisten] möchten ihn [den Schuman Plan] verhindern, weil sie wissen, dass nach vielen geschichtlichen Beispielen die Bildung eines großen Marktes wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten gibt, die nach wenigen Jahren den Streit über den Vorteil des einen und den Nachteil des anderen als gegenstandslos erscheinen lassen (...).“

⁷⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 18, p. 476A, see also, Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 435-7

⁸⁰ Bertram (Z), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6526B, see also, A. S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, p. 116-8

⁸¹ See A. S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, p. 134, 142, 321

bring about its own downfall.”⁸² This is also where the main economic criticism of the SPD to the Schuman Plan meets the government’s European policy. Professor Nölting, the leading SPD economist in the early 1950s, advocated a fully developed European economic union, because partial integration was not viable. Complete economic units, like the nation state in the past, were ultimately the product of economic logic. Half-way solutions like the ECSC were not.⁸³ This was not far away from the final conclusion of the government coalition, with the reservation that the ECSC was considered essential to get the integration process going in the first place.⁸⁴ The economic rationale in Walter Hallstein’s thinking came from the interdependence of European economies. The national economies on their own were outdated and frontiers were only barriers which hindered further integration. The integration efforts were no more than the process of adaptation the national administrations to the economic realities of the time.

On the basis of this perception the rationale of interdependence became reality in the ECSC treaty:

“The guiding purposes of the European Coal and Steel Community are essentially the aims of every state: the increase in production and welfare. That is exactly what the states hold as their primary task in present times.”⁸⁵

Hence, the High Authority was required to promote free competition; the principle of non-intervention in economic affairs by the state; and the common application of national financial potential. The free movement of workers was introduced.⁸⁶ It was hoped to foster an equalising effect within the Six.⁸⁷ Internal tariffs and quotas were abolished.⁸⁸ Furthermore, in terms of real implications for Germany, the Plan recognised the German claim for reunification, and left open the question of the territorial attachment of the Saar.⁸⁹ It brought the Ruhr Statute and the remnants of occupation rule to an end.⁹⁰ Finally, the Plan was the beginning of European

⁸² Bertram (Z), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6528AB, original: „Solche Organisation hat keine innere Stabilität, sie führt notwendigerweise entweder zu einer Erweiterung, oder sie muß dazu führen, dass sie sich als solche nicht halten kann.“

⁸³ Nölting (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7670CD, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 4, p. 50B

⁸⁴ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7676A

⁸⁵ Wahl (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7724C, original: „ Die Zielsetzungen die die europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl zu verwirklichen hat, sind weitestgehend die Staatszwecke überhaupt: Steigerung der Wohlfahrt, Steigerung der Produktion, genau das, was die Staaten selbst in der Gegenwart für ihre erste Aufgabe halten.“

⁸⁶ Preusker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7590A

⁸⁷ Preusker (FDP) Minister for Housing, in VDB, WP II, 5, p. 81AB

⁸⁸ Preusker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7588D, see also, Henle (CDU), in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7601D

⁸⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7598A-C

⁹⁰ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP I, 182, p. 7595CD, 7596A,C

unification⁹¹ and the ECSC became a beacon for further European integration: “The principle of the common market, which has been implemented first in the European Coal and Steel Community, has proved its worth. Therefore, it should not remain restricted to coal and steel, but should gradually be extended to all economic goods.”⁹² The ECSC was seen as one important step on the road of European integration and the necessary precondition for the establishment of a comprehensive Common market.⁹³

The European Economic Community (EEC)

When the ECSC was set up, the founding fathers were aware of the need to expand the market for coal and steel into a larger common market for all goods sooner or later.⁹⁴ Again, due to a French initiative, the ECSC assembly had already suggested the creation of the common market at the end of 1954, already.⁹⁵ In the meantime many initiatives of various pools, such as a Postal Union, had been put forward.⁹⁶ All those proposals and independent lines of thinking were brought together in the 1955 Spaak report.⁹⁷ This set the agenda for the Messina conference in 1955 which led to the creation not only of the Common Market in the EEC, but also of Euratom.⁹⁸ The Venice conference in May 1956 further underpinned the huge advances made in Messina.⁹⁹ Adenauer’s visit to Paris in November 1956 – after Suez – was considered crucial for the political development of the Messina process.¹⁰⁰ The 1956/7 initiative of the Consultative Assembly of the ECSC into this direction gave some impetus to the renewed European momentum.¹⁰¹ Follow-

⁹¹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7653C, see also, Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 423

⁹² Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7072A, original: „ das in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl erstmalig verwirklichte Prinzip eines gemeinsamen Marktes hat sich bewährt. Es sollte daher nicht auf Kohle und Stahl beschränkt bleiben, sondern mit der Zeit auf alle Wirtschaftsgüter ausgedehnt werden.“

⁹³ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11345C

⁹⁴ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11327D

⁹⁵ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7093D

⁹⁶ Steinmetz, Secretary of State in the Ministry for Post and Communication, in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7109D- 7110A

⁹⁷ See von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12000D

⁹⁸ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7093D, see also, Blank (DA), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7100B

⁹⁹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11328A

¹⁰⁰ Furler (CDU), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2440C

¹⁰¹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11334B, see also, reference to: R.Mayne, ‘Schuman, De Gasperi, Spaak – The European Frontiersmen’, in: Bond, Smith

ing the failure of the defence community and the political community it was thought that further economic integration was the way forward.¹⁰² The objective of gradual political integration remained and was seen as implicit in the EEC treaty.¹⁰³ The most immediate concern were, however, mutual economic benefits most often subsumed in the catchphrase of raising the living standards.¹⁰⁴

“Does it have to be like that [...] that the current average living standard in the European countries which want to sign up to the Coal and Steel community is exactly 33% of the average American, of the average American worker? No! However, we can only catch up, if we abandon economic boundaries. We can catch up through the Common Market and through the courage which we will have to show in tackling the problems of the future [...]”¹⁰⁵

Economic stability was also a primary objective.¹⁰⁶ Because of its size the Common Market was far better suited to compensate for external economic shocks than the national economies.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, older doctrines of hegemony and continental dominance were regarded as out of date. The fundamental idea of the European Community was nothing like that. It meant overcoming the isolation and fragmentation of Western Europe and turning it into a viable economic and possibly political unit, while threatening no one.¹⁰⁸

Particularly in the beginning it was clear that all European integration could only work on the basis of mutual goodwill and trust.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the development of a sentiment of unity as well as a common political will in the European institutions was considered essential. The EEC treaty provided for an independent set of institutions on the basis of a supranational principle.¹¹⁰ The Council of Ministers would, however, be the most important institution. All decisions of major impor-

and Wallace (eds.), *Eminent Europeans*, p. 42, as quoted in: Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p.72

¹⁰² Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7097B

¹⁰³ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12004A

¹⁰⁴ Scheel (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2443D, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP II, 47, p. 2264B

¹⁰⁵ Preusker (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 161, p. 6546CD, original: „Muß es denn so bleiben, [...] daß nun der derzeitige Lebensstandard im Durchschnitt der europäischen Ländern, die sich zu der Montanunion zusammenschließen wollen, genau 33% des Lebensstandards des durchschnittlichen Amerikaners, des amerikanischen Arbeiters beträgt? Nein! Aber überwunden werden diese Zustände nur durch das Niederlegen der wirtschaftlichen Grenzen, durch den gemeinsamen Markt und durch den Mut, den man nun einmal im Denken an die Zukunft zu dieser Sache [...] haben muss.“

¹⁰⁶ Scheel (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2443D

¹⁰⁷ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12005A

¹⁰⁸ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7097B, see also, Elbrächter (DP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12014C

¹⁰⁹ Birkelbach (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12009CD

¹¹⁰ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11328C

tance would be taken there.¹¹¹ The problems with unanimity voting would not be severe in the beginning and were expected to decrease over time with the increasing convergence of interests between the nation states.¹¹² The Commission would be the guardian of the Treaty as well as the motor to further foster European integration.¹¹³ Its main powers would be that of legislative initiative as well as that of the best expertise and knowledge in European matters.¹¹⁴ In comparison with the ECSC, the supranational element was, therefore, reduced. The assembly initially had only a right of consultation and some minor control functions and ultimately the right to censure the Commission.¹¹⁵ It replaced the consultative assembly of the ECSC.¹¹⁶ The European Court of Justice (ECJ) would monitor compliance with the Treaty.¹¹⁷ In addition, an Economic and Social Committee would have an advisory function to the Council and the Commission.¹¹⁸ The institutions were given the creative freedom to flesh out the Treaty with more concrete legal provisions for making the fundamental ideas, laid down in the treaty, work in practice.¹¹⁹ In a way the new European economic institutions also took over the function, formerly exercised by the Council of Europe, i.e. of gradually aligning national legal codes.¹²⁰ Finally, the treaty would be binding on all members without the right to withdraw.¹²¹

The customs union was considered the precondition for the establishment of the common market.¹²² It would establish an area of freedom of movement of goods, services, labour and capital, in conditions of untrammelled competition.¹²³ This included free movement of workers.¹²⁴ This also meant dismantling all internal

¹¹¹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329B

¹¹² Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11347B

¹¹³ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329B

¹¹⁴ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11347AB

¹¹⁵ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329B

¹¹⁶ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329B

¹¹⁷ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329B, One important difference as compared with the ECSC was that some provisions under the EEC treaty were directly applicable, which meant that ensuing rights could be claimed before the European Court of Justice by every citizen of a member state. This is a root of the later competence-competence argument. Direct intervention by European institutions into internal affairs could possibly compromise the constitutional safeguard of fundamental rights protected by national institutions such as the constitutional court

¹¹⁸ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329B

¹¹⁹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11328CD

¹²⁰ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329A

¹²¹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329D

¹²² Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7096A, see also, VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10712AB

¹²³ Birkelbach (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12007D

¹²⁴ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP I, 183, p. 7676D

tariffs as well as quotas.¹²⁵ A common external tariff would be established, which would concern all imports into the EEC.¹²⁶ The main criticism of this arrangement was that the common market could be turned into a 'fortress Europe', especially if the common external tariff was high.¹²⁷ However, the abolition of national frontiers was considered strong enough evidence that there was no intention of isolationism or autarky.¹²⁸ And the Common Market held the prospect of offering a supranational basis for all productive forces in Europe.¹²⁹ One of the main early objectives was the development of a common economic policy as well as that of preventing undue national subsidies ('State aids'), which must inevitably distort competition and prevent the achievement of a 'level-playing field in this supranational economic entity. Government and opposition broadly agreed on this point of principle.¹³⁰ Both measures had to correlate. Subsidies had had the positive function of fostering weak economies, which had to be replaced through concerted action in converging economic policies.¹³¹ The fundamental principle of a market economy, i.e. competition, was accepted as the driving force behind European economic integration.¹³² Rationalisation and the large market would, it was believed, help to increase competitiveness.¹³³ But it was realised that this could result in hardship for some groups. The Socialists, therefore, regarded a common social policy as indispensable.¹³⁴ Social obligations arising from that were taken very seriously and a common investment fund was set up to offset detrimental effects on national economies, as well as on individuals, in so far as the fund provided for redeployment.¹³⁵ A Social Fund was also instituted providing money for individual training and the development of work skills. The overall objective of both funds was to increase the competitiveness of the economy and the living standard in more deprived areas of the Community.¹³⁶ Phased transitional periods were agreed to bolster the adaptation of national economies to the common market.¹³⁷ The pressure for such safeguards came mainly from France and this was reflected in the

¹²⁵ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11328D

¹²⁶ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7096C

¹²⁷ Erhard (CDU), Minister for Economics, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11344D

¹²⁸ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12005A

¹²⁹ Erhard (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7092CD

¹³⁰ Erhard (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7092D, see also, Kreysigg (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7103A-C

¹³¹ Birkelbach (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12009B, see also, VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2443B

¹³² Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11354C

¹³³ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12005C

¹³⁴ Kreysigg (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7103A-C

¹³⁵ Erhard (CDU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7093A, see also, Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7096C

¹³⁶ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329A

¹³⁷ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7096B, see also, VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12004C

Treaty.¹³⁸ Another of these safeguards was put in place for the national farm sectors. Very limited as it was, for dairy products only, it brought real financial advantage for German farmers.¹³⁹ The establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy happened largely due to French pressure.¹⁴⁰ De Gaulle himself made it a *sine qua non* when he returned to power.¹⁴¹ The French agricultural sector was, however, not the only one which was not state of the art in terms of competitiveness.¹⁴² The results were also beneficial for German farmers.¹⁴³ The fundamental principle was that initially the agricultural market should be protected from full competition in the Common Market in order to bring this economy up to speed¹⁴⁴ and, on the other hand, to preserve small farming culture, considered a defining factor of the nations.

Beyond agriculture almost all member states had their national peculiarities which needed compromise on some of the principles in the EEC treaty.¹⁴⁵ By 1954, France had become Germany's most important export partner.¹⁴⁶ At least a quarter of all exports from the Federal Republic would go to the Six.¹⁴⁷ Three-quarters of imports, however, came from outside the European Economic Community.¹⁴⁸ This was one very concrete reason why protectionism – in the form of the Common External Tariff – was no option for Germany.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, there was of course the issue of reunification. The SPD made their priority for reunification very clear: “The European Economic Community is no substitute for German reunification.”¹⁵⁰ Beyond this point of principle the most likely consequence was that the European treaties would have to be adapted, should reunification occur.¹⁵¹

¹³⁸ See, Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11329CD: As provided, the move from one stage to the next would require unanimity. France could keep its preferential import and export treatment for its overseas territories (DOM-TOM), until it settled its budget deficit in this area. The fear of competitive disadvantage because of higher social security costs was the background to many demands. The harmonisation of the national social security systems was a major issue in this context. Equal pay for men and women was often quoted as an example

¹³⁹ Horlacher (CSU), in VDB, WP I, 146, p. 5831AB

¹⁴⁰ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7096D, see also, VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11346D

¹⁴¹ Maurice Vaïsse, *La Grandeur*, p. 38, 172, 232

¹⁴² Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12016C

¹⁴³ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11346D

¹⁴⁴ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12003C

¹⁴⁵ See Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11337B

¹⁴⁶ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 61, p. 3127A

¹⁴⁷ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11330B

¹⁴⁸ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11339D, see also, Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11354AB

¹⁴⁹ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12002BC

¹⁵⁰ Arndt (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 113725C, original: „Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ist kein Ersatz für die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands.“

¹⁵¹ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12006A

The chances that they would be abrogated or that a reunited Germany would take position against European integration were considered very low.¹⁵² The other member states agreed fully with this position.¹⁵³ EEC membership would, therefore, not pose any threat to German reunification.¹⁵⁴ On the other side of the Iron Curtain East Germany had long been integrated into the Soviet economic system.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, retention of the few remaining trade links was a sensitive issue for Germany. Berlin is another important example, particularly for the SPD.¹⁵⁶ The government agreed that an accommodation would have to be found in the EEC treaty.¹⁵⁷ The solution is a very good example of the trust built up between the Six. No formal provisions were put into the Treaty, but every member state would ensure that its trade links with Eastern Germany would not compromise the spirit of the Treaty or harm any of the economies of another member state unduly.¹⁵⁸

With regard to French decolonisation, it is interesting to see that Adenauer also regarded the war in Indochina as an attempt to curb Communist expansion.¹⁵⁹ The Algerian question was watched with great concern in Germany¹⁶⁰, but essentially it was considered a French domestic affair.¹⁶¹ Supportive of the French position, the diversion of European aid efforts towards former French colonies, in particular in northern Africa, was considered.¹⁶² Because of the long-standing association of the overseas territories with their mother-countries in Europe the association of those territories with the Common Market could not possibly be denied.¹⁶³ A special form of attaching overseas territories to the Common Market would have to be found.¹⁶⁴ The EEC treaty provided for exactly that, mainly in the form of associa-

¹⁵² Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11332AB

¹⁵³ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11332B

¹⁵⁴ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12006A

¹⁵⁵ Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11352B

¹⁵⁶ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11340BC

¹⁵⁷ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11332C

¹⁵⁸ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11332D, see also, paragraph 2 of the additional protocol on trade between the [German] zones of occupation, as quoted in Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11340CD, see also, Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12006A

¹⁵⁹ Adenauer (CDU), Chancellor, in VDB, WP II, 26, p. 1068B, see also, Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur*, p. 230

¹⁶⁰ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11348B

¹⁶¹ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11348C-11349A

¹⁶² Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11331B

¹⁶³ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11331AB

¹⁶⁴ von Brentano (CDU), Foreign Minister, in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10647A

tion agreements.¹⁶⁵ Undoubtedly, there was a genuine will to help these underdeveloped countries.¹⁶⁶ On the other hand, there was also the possibility of great profit through the exploitation of natural resources. Although any idea of supporting exploitation, oppression and corruption of power was said to be out of the question¹⁶⁷, a degree of paternalist benevolence is still discernible in the view that the relations between the former colonies and Europe would be mutually beneficial.¹⁶⁸

What was important from the German perspective was that these European funds would be additional money, clearly earmarked as European development aid.¹⁶⁹ All had to go through the Commission and the Council, which would avoid any undue national influence.¹⁷⁰ The French initiatives to establish democratic institution in these territories were welcomed.¹⁷¹ To have the genuine expression of the will of these peoples concerned was considered most important for the legitimacy of these foreign aid projects.¹⁷²

Although the SPD recognised the importance of future co-operation between North Africa and Europe¹⁷³, they wanted nothing to do with colonialism.¹⁷⁴ “The decisive question is whether the underdeveloped states, which are dependent on help and support, will go with the free people of the West or side with the Communist governments. The outcome will mainly depend on whether the larger states with colonial holdings can find a way to foster the development of these peoples towards freedom in friendship - and not be the oppressors of developing peoples (...)”¹⁷⁵ The Common Market harboured at least the indirect danger of supporting colonialism, if European economic activities in those areas were not probably

¹⁶⁵ See Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11330D- 11331C: Tariffs and quotas would be reducing in exactly the same way as with the other member states. Morocco and Tunisia would be invited for an association agreement

¹⁶⁶ Elbrächter (DP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11360A, see also, Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12006C

¹⁶⁷ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11348A

¹⁶⁸ See Scheel (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2446D, 2447A

¹⁶⁹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11331BC

¹⁷⁰ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11331C

¹⁷¹ Hallstein (CDU), State Secretary in the Foreign Office, in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11331C

¹⁷² Elbrächter (DP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12014A

¹⁷³ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11340D

¹⁷⁴ Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 107007B, see also, Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11341BC

¹⁷⁵ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11341B, original: „ Die entscheidende Frage ist doch wohl, ob die unterentwickelten Staaten, die auf Hilfe und Unterstützung angewiesen sind, diesen Weg an der Seite der freien Völker des Westens oder an der Seite kommunistische Regierung gehen. Der Ausgang dieses Prozesses ist entscheidend davon abhängig, ob die Großstaaten mit Kolonialbesitz einen Weg finden, um die Entwicklung dieser Völker zur Freiheit in Freundschaft zu fördern - und nicht als Unterdrücker aufstrebender Völker in Erscheinung zu treten (...)“

guided and controlled.¹⁷⁶ However, the provisions regarding overseas territories under the EEC treaty could also be seen as a safeguard that at least there would be no undue exercise of power in the future.¹⁷⁷

1956 saw the turning point in the attitude of the SPD towards European integration. Earlier suspicions gave way to full support.¹⁷⁸ The change was consistent with the older SPD argument that partial integration, such as in ECSC, could not work.¹⁷⁹ Along that line, the SPD considered the ECSC a failure. It had not fulfilled its main objectives of increasing employment and the standard of living.¹⁸⁰ Another SPD criticism of the ECSC was that it was a fool of Cold War power politics.¹⁸¹ It would be important to separate the European Economic Community from this kind of Cold War power politics.¹⁸² If all these past mistakes were avoided, it was hoped that the EEC would finally fulfil the main objective of its predecessor of a stable and prosperous economy.¹⁸³ The human perspective and, therefore, the repercussions on the individual worker also remained most important for the SPD. In that respect the SPD accused the government of cutting out important social elements from the draft treaty.¹⁸⁴

The Treaties of Rome were ratified in late 1957 by a very strange combination of the CDU/CSU government parties and the SPD opposition, against the votes of the FDP, which was in the coalition government. The government broke up over this issue, and this led to the 1958 elections. British membership in the EEC in respect to the FTA proposal and the demand for preparatory steps towards European monetary union (EMU)¹⁸⁵ were the main issues. On the other hand, the consent of the SPD opposition to the Common Market was considered great progress.¹⁸⁶ In sum, the economic argument was overwhelmingly positive. There was every reason to believe that given some time, political potential would develop. Given the experience with the EDC it was agreed, however, that France should

¹⁷⁶ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11341CD; German economic engagement in Northern Africa was considered inappropriate, at least until France had solved its colonial conflict there

¹⁷⁷ Elbrächter (DP), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11359D

¹⁷⁸ Schmid (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 137, p. 7082AB, see also, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10673B

¹⁷⁹ Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10673BC, see also, Wehner (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 188, p. 10707A

¹⁸⁰ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11335BC

¹⁸¹ See Birkelbach (SPD), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2441CD, The idea was that the ECSC and the EDC had been part of a bigger plan to consolidate the Western camp in the Cold War. The government did not see any reason in this argument, see Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11345D

¹⁸² Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11336AB, 11339B

¹⁸³ Deist (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11336CD

¹⁸⁴ Birkelbach (SPD), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12010B, 12011C

¹⁸⁵ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12005C, see also, Scheel (FDP), in VDB, WP III, 42, p. 2445D

¹⁸⁶ Furler (CDU/CSU), in VDB, WP II, 200, p. 11345D

ratify the EEC Treaty first.¹⁸⁷ It was a great relief to Adenauer that on his first meeting with de Gaulle in Colombey, the French leader said he would not oppose the implementation of the EEC treaty. Particularly with de Gaulle's notorious anti-integrationist views, there had been some doubt about the future of the Treaty and European integration in general. These doubts were fully dispelled in the meeting between the two leaders.¹⁸⁸ And in European economic integration the Franco-German partnership found another reflection.

¹⁸⁷ Margulies (FDP), in VDB, WP II, 208, p. 12015C

¹⁸⁸ Hans Peter Mensing, *Adenauer – Heuss Unter vier Augen Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren 1949-1959*, No. 66, 16/9/58, p. 279

3.5 Preliminary Conclusions for Germany

Emerging from the destruction, the physical and psychological devastation of the war and the moral degradation of Nazi crimes, Germany, in 1945, then suffered foreign occupation and for the immediate post-war years was deprived of a government of its own. Though lacking a central authority, however, it was by no means a political wasteland. Building on their underground and exile organisations, the democratic forces began at once to re-establish themselves. And from 1946 onwards, the Christian Democrats on the right and the Social Democrats on the left formed regional governments in the newly restored *Länder*, with the encouragement of the Western Allies. In these early years, the SPD held a very strong position, and seemed destined to form the first post war government of the Federal Republic; it was the only party which could reasonably claim – by voting against him in 1933 – to have used all democratic means at its disposal to resist Hitler. Its members had fought in the resistance and languished or perished in the concentration camps. Their leader, Kurt Schumacher, headed these brave men. Unlike most of the German political elite, tainted by ideological commitment, “accommodationism”, or supine acquiescence, here was a German who had suffered cruelly at Nazi hands and who, again, in contrast with the widespread defeatism, was not prepared to give up on his people and see the idea of a single, viable Germany consigned to the dustbin of history. A powerful orator, he had enough moral standing to feel free to criticise the failings of the occupation policy of the Allies, and robustly defended democratic Germany’s claim to equality with the other European nations. Although he did not become the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic as widely expected in Western circles, the policy of equality became one of the guiding themes of early post war German politics. Taken up by the first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, this very natural aspiration formed one of the main motivations for Adenauer’s policies of Western commitment, reconciliation with France and European integration. His conciliatory approach of cooperation with the Western Allies was better suited to a gradual recovery of Germany’s lost reputation and forfeited rights than Schumacher’s uncompromising and sometimes rather strident approach. Equality eventually found its embodiment in the policy of European integration initiated by France in the European Coal and Steel Community with the enthusiastic support of the German government. The early European integration effort sought to bring about a Franco-German reconciliation on the basis of which festering and potentially dangerous problems such as the Saar issue could be solved so that mutual trust could grow and that the old hostility between the two countries could slowly but surely be overcome. West Germany backed this policy wholeheartedly, not least

because this was the environment in which promotion towards an equal status with the other European nations was possible. However, European integration also enabled the governments to go beyond the boundaries of national politics, which, when driven to extremes, had brought so much harm to the countries and the continent, and ultimately wrought disaster. Although it was by no means foreseeable that European integration would one day serve to realise the age-old dream of a united European continent, a goal which has now been brought much closer with the enlargement to the East, Adenauer fully appreciated that far beyond the old and urgent claim to parity for Germany, European integration had the potential to provide peace and prosperity for Western Europe on the basis of a strong political and economic union which would also, eventually, have the potential to facilitate German reunification. Debates in the Bundestag show the commitment to European integration itself and for the very concrete policy objectives connected with it. By the time of the Treaties of Rome (1957), the idea of European integration had attracted a broad political consensus in Germany and even before that a commitment to cooperation at European level had widespread support in the Bundestag and indeed among the German people, as the 1957 elections – fought by the CDU mainly on European issues – clearly demonstrated.

4. Britain

In the 1950s, Britain remained a country of sharp class divisions, inevitably reflected in the party affiliations in the House of Commons. Labour – despite a generous sprinkling of public-school-Oxbridge graduates, especially on the front bench – was unquestionably a working-class party, with nearly half its MPs classified as ‘workers’, while most of the Tory MPs hailed from the landed aristocracy or the comfortably-off professional and middle classes.¹ The Liberals came in only a distant and relatively uninfluential third, with a sharply reduced and dwindling number of seats.²

World War II brought with it a whole set of new bearings in British domestic politics. Winston Churchill had been Prime Minister in a wartime coalition with Labour and the Liberals since 1940. However, the parliament had been elected in 1935, a full ten years before the end of the war. In the 1945 elections Labour achieved a landslide victory, but in those of February 1950 its massive majority of 146 plummeted to only six.³ The last remaining Communist MPs lost their two seats. In absolute numbers of voters the government did not have a majority at all and only the British electoral system of first-past-the-post saved the Labour majority.⁴ The small margin in the House contributed to the instability of government. Severe health problems of leading figures such as Clement Attlee, Stafford Cripps and Ernest Bevin (who died in April 1951) added to the feeling that there was not much life left in the government.⁵ However, perhaps the greatest strain was generated by the government’s own policy on rearmament. Raymond Blackburn (Birmingham, Northfield) resigned the Whip over the issue, bringing the majority down to five.⁶ Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman left as government ministers for the same reason, severely weakening the front bench. The Op-

¹ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden - A Life and Reputation*, p. 252, 276.

² 1935, 20 seats; 1945, 12 seats; 1950, 9 seats, 1951, 6 seats, 1955, 6 seats, 1959, 6 seats.

³ This was to some extent due to changes to the electoral register by the previous Labour government. Attlee hoped to redress inequities in the system by abandoning some small London seats, which had been Labour strongholds. See Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 50

⁴ This argument was extensively used against the Labour government by the Conservatives. See Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1720.

⁵ See J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 141.

⁶ See, Blackburn (Independent), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1159, see also, Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, Macmillan, London, 1998, p. 19.

position sought to capitalise on the government's plight with relentless attacks on Socialist legislation such as the Iron and Steel Bill. Its vigorous exploitation of parliamentary procedures in an effort to exercise a *de facto* veto over such projects cruelly exposed the fragility of the government's majority.⁷

Most opposition MPs wanted another general election sooner rather than later.⁸ When it came, in October 1951, it delivered a small but workable Conservative majority of 17, which took Churchill back into 10 Downing Street. Anthony Eden became Foreign Secretary again, and Churchill's successor as Prime Minister in April 1955. He then won a comfortable majority of 58 in a general election only seven weeks later.⁹

Eden resigned, a victim of the Suez crisis, in January 1957, but the Conservative parliamentary majority was never in danger. In a choice within the Conservative party between 'Rab' Butler and Harold Macmillan, the latter 'emerged' as Eden's successor. No general election was called. However, in 1959 Macmillan, having survived not only his (initially) wholehearted involvement in Suez but also the Free Trade Area (FTA) disaster, actually succeeded in increasing the Conservative majority to 100 seats.¹⁰

⁷ Morrison (Lab.) Lord President of the Council, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1742

⁸ See, Heald (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1788-9, Robson-Brown (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1812

⁹ Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, p. 22.

¹⁰ For the election results of 1951, 1955 and 1959 see Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, p. 26

4.1 War Experience

The first part of this chapter will deal with the relationship between Britain as an Allied power and Germany as an occupied country, because it was the starting point of the post-war relationship between the two countries. The second part will deal with the 'Status Quo', i.e. the position in which Britain saw itself after the war, as a leading world power and victor in the war. The last part will focus on the hopes British politicians had in the immediate post war years and consider some of the concrete measures born out of their idealism.

4.1.1 War Consequences

Allied Responsibility and the German Threat

Britain suffered a great deal of devastation during World War II. In the early 1950s, this was still all too obvious in many parts of the country. Coventry and all the other blitzed cities were only the sharpest reminders of the nights of terror.¹ Despite all the destruction, there appeared to be little hate against the Germans: "It is not in the nature of the ordinary man in the street to go on hating people. That would be entirely contrary to the whole of our history."² And there was a good deal of sympathy and understanding: "(...) I did not judge the German army of that time, whatever may have been their political label, by that label. I think the majority were ordinary people compelled into military service and fighting desperately in defence of their native land."³ Nevertheless, there were some hard feelings, even among the most astute leaders:

"Mr. Bevin: The Hitler revolution did not change the German character very much. It expressed it.

Mr. Churchill: No.

Mr. Bevin: That is what it did. It was latent there right from Bismarckian days."⁴

¹ See Horace King (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 99-102, see also, in Hansard 1953-54, 520

² Prior-Palmer (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 491, c. 520

³ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 174

⁴ Bevin (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 323, see also, Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 315

The grief and the grudges of old would not easily be settled.⁵ Germany's militaristic past left serious doubts as to its trustworthiness. The danger that Germany might revert to its old militaristic ways was by no means discounted.⁶

As we have seen in France, there was an East German variant of this concern in the shape of the paramilitary units set up in the Soviet Occupation Zone.⁷ This issue combined two psychological currents: firstly, the fear of German military prowess, and secondly, the fear of Communism and more precisely of expansionist Communism.⁸ Britain had some experience of the former phenomenon from the inter-war years in that paramilitary units such as Hitler's SA were widely as enabling fast German military build-up. Hence there was an argument of curbing similar paramilitary organisations in the post war era from the outset.⁹ However, British efforts to call on the Russians to prevent East German rearmament came to nothing and the spectre of the German soldier under Soviet high command became reality.¹⁰ This argument was inverted in the criticism on the Western integrated defence system. It was thought – especially by Labour in opposition – that Western integrated defences were the one thing Russia really feared, because it combined the German army, which had stood within sight of Moscow only a few years previously, with the American industrial power and high command, which had subdued even the Germans.¹¹ In response to the East German paramilitary build-up a West German federal police force was set up with the remit of guaranteeing the internal security of the Federal Republic.¹²

Although most concerns about the German threat and its revival focused on the East Germany, there were, particularly in the Labour party, doubts about the reliability of the government under Adenauer. These doubts were particularly strong in connection with the rearmament issue. This became very clear when the SPD was questioning the German government's lawful right to commit the country to a course of rearmament within the Western defence system, in the early 1950s. The

⁵ Mott-Radclyffe (Con.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 429

⁶ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1460-1

⁷ Roughly 50,000 men were assumed to be serving in the *Bereitschaften*, in: Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 484, p. 45, see also, France/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/The Soviet Threat

⁸ Amery (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 222, see also, Attlee (Lab.) Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 66

⁹ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1477

¹⁰ Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 240-1, see also, Irvine (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1551

¹¹ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1475, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 425

¹² Eden (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1382

Labour National Executive demanded – just like the SPD – a new mandate for the West German government in the form of general elections.¹³

In addition, the threat from the right wing military establishment to Germany's democratic order was considered serious by Labour. "I have seen little evidence to indicate that the officer class of Germany are willing to dedicate themselves to the service of Western democracy. If a German military force is strong it will be politically dangerous."¹⁴ The policy of caution and constructive cooperation, adopted by the second Attlee government, was the result:

"German democracy must make sure that the armed forces will be its servants and not its masters. I agree that there is always that danger of an emergence again of the same kind of forces that made Germany a menace, but you do not get rid of that by leaving a vacuum. The answer is that there should be democratic forces democratically controlled in Germany."¹⁵

A major objective of the British administration in Germany, therefore, was to foster the general development of democratic foundations.¹⁶ During the occupation period, the re-education programme was important in this respect, the term being first used in a purely military context: "The 're-education' of Germans was carried out in prisoner-of-war camps in the United Kingdom and the Middle East until repatriation was effected between 1947 and about 1948."¹⁷ The re-education of German youth, in particular, played an important role, because only on the basis of a stable democracy, founded on the consent of the coming generation, could peaceful development be guaranteed.¹⁸ Only on such a basis would permanent cooperation with West Germany be desirable.¹⁹ By 1953/4, the success of West-German democracy was recognised, however:

"It cannot be said that since the last war democracy has not been a reality in Western Germany. It has succeeded up to now, and it is profoundly important that it should continue to succeed; but I doubt whether it would continue to succeed if we continued to hold Germany rigidly under control. Sooner or later there would be trouble, and we should find emerging

¹³ Bevan (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1515, 1522, see also reply from Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 367, 1456-7, see also Germany/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/Rearmament

¹⁴ Jones (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 267, see also, Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1477

¹⁵ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 67

¹⁶ See Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 378

¹⁷ Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 371

¹⁸ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 315, see also, Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 371

¹⁹ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1968, see also, Woodburn (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 89

those national and antidemocratic elements which we were wishing to keep under control and underneath.”²⁰

This was a reason to end occupational rule sooner rather than later.

Occupational Rule in Germany

However, the first duty of the Allies as occupation powers was the protection, maintenance and safeguarding of Germany’s rights. In military terms that meant the protection of West Germany by the Western alliance system, especially after the establishment of the FRG. “Today, the security of the Federal Republic against external aggression remains the responsibility of the Occupying Powers, and any armed attack on the occupying forces of those Powers will bring the Atlantic Treaty into play.”²¹ The Berlin airlift was a prime example where the Allied obligation towards the German people resulted in concrete action in that the airlift was legally justified by the obligation of the Allies to feed and protect the German people.

After such immediate responsibilities were settled, British occupational concerns were to a large extent administrative, which is reflected in the relatively low key debates – in terms of length, content and emotional charge – in parliament about the occupation of Germany.²² Under the Potsdam Agreement the four Allies had agreed to demilitarise Germany. No German troops or weapons whatsoever were allowed under these provisions.²³ However, the Potsdam Agreement had become devoid of content with the breakdown of Allied consensual rule in Germany. Nevertheless, the objective of disarmament remained in the West, i.e. removal of the German military menace. The dismantling policy followed the same rationale in that the policy was kept for armament production facilities. Civil production facilities were spared, while the Allies stuck to the dismantling of arms plants.²⁴ This step was officially taken in the 1949 Petersberg Agreement, which also marked the end of the occupation regime and the beginning of cooperation between the West

²⁰ Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 426, compare the change of opinion in Bevin, footnote 4

²¹ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 963, Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 66

²² In a comparison between British and French debates on occupation in Germany, my general impression was that such sessions in the *Assemblée Nationale* were usually more charged, more dragged out and dealt with particular issues in much more detail

²³ Blackburn (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 1173

²⁴ Jones (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 265-6

German state and the Western Allies.²⁵ The British government saw and supported this development:

“I do not think that it is possible to take the line that Germany should remain a vacuum. Nor is it possible to take the line that we wish to see Germany back in the comity of nations and yet suggest that, somehow or other, she should be occupied and protected by other Powers. In due course occupation will end and the German people become entirely responsible for their own country.”²⁶

4.1.2 *The Status Quo*

At the end of the war Britain was broke, but at least morally at the height of its power. The Empire was still just intact; it was one of the leading world powers; and some shortage in material reserves was easily offset by the moral superiority of the last remaining European world power which had first defied and ultimately defeated Hitler.²⁷ In particular, the immediate post war governments tried hard to preserve this state of affairs and as a consequence there was a general tendency to immobility and conservative attitudes in the traditional sense of the word to preserve the status quo.

Imperial Defence

Imperial defence is one such remnant of an old policy, reminiscent of past glory. Particularly with the dominions, there was the experience of cooperation during wartime. As a result, ideas of Imperial defence were still strong after the war, as can be seen in the 1950/1 British rearmament programme which explicitly stressed the reinvigoration of a common defence strategy throughout the Commonwealth.²⁸ Such cooperation comprised all stages of defence, from military production, shared military structures, strategic dispersal of important sites, to the exchange of military personnel.²⁹

²⁵ With the Petersberg Agreement reparations were also effectively left to run out. For a more detailed account of the Petersberg Agreement see, *The hope for a peaceful future/ The German Question*, see also, *Germany/National Security/Fundamentals/ Peace Treaty - Petersberg Accords - General Treaty*

²⁶ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 70

²⁷ See Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 332

²⁸ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1912, see also, Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 961, see also, King's Speech on the prorogation of Parliament 1950, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 2943

²⁹ Shinwell (Lab.) Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1265, 1277-8

However, the Empire was generally in decline and the Labour minister of defence was very well aware of the burden Imperial defence actually meant to Britain:

“(…) the U.K. has world-wide responsibilities which must be sustained. Indeed at the present time it is these responsibilities that press most heavily upon us and which present difficulties in making a radical approach to the problem of adjusting the shape and size of the Armed Forces in the next few years.”³⁰

However, in the early 1950s, few were prepared to admit that the Empire, which had been the strength of Britain, was becoming a liability. Imperial defence tied up a lot of soldiers in far away positions and in relatively small units, so that the battle value of these troops was minimal in a major confrontation. It was also a constant drain on the manpower resources at home which effectively weakened the British defences in Europe against the Soviet threat.³¹ Although the Commonwealth was suggested as holding the solution to the British forces’ manpower problem in that the overseas territories were seen as a reservoir for recruitment³², decolonisation issues had become a serious point in political debates, most obvious in the independence of India in 1947. Changing attitudes towards Imperial defence can best be shown in a criticism on the colonial regime – mainly from the Labour benches:

“If there are colonial armies, they must be armies of people defending their own liberties and their own countries, and they must be persuaded that any common strategy with us is a strategy which defends them at least as much as it defends us. (...) colonial armies formed only to fight for us will collapse every time they come up against Communism.”³³

Issues of legitimacy of the colonial system are raised for the first time as a messenger for the dawning period of decolonisation.³⁴ Moreover, the world-wide commitments became a serious financial burden which eclipsed one of the remaining advantages of the Empire, i.e. its sheer size. Strategically important facilities, such as production plants or airfields, could be widely dispersed out of harms way.³⁵ Reading through the debates one gets the impression that mostly on the basis of glorious memories of the Empire the prevailing opinion remained: “(…) that a Commonwealth defence policy is vital and that as soon as we can get the Com-

³⁰ Shinwell (Lab.) Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1269

³¹ See Strachey (Lab.) Secretary of State for War, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 544

³² Strachey (Lab.) Secretary of State for War, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 545

³³ Crossman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950-51, 485, c. 737-8

³⁴ For a fuller discussion of decolonisation see National Security/Territorial Integrity/Decolonisation

³⁵ Blackburn (Independent), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 225, see also, Follick (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 289

monwealth as a whole to agree to a defence policy (...) we should do so.”³⁶ It never came to be.

In sum, Imperial defence was rather a dream and sentimental attachment to the glorious past of the Empire, than a concrete defence strategy. Nevertheless, as such, Imperial defence is a prime example for the adaptation process Britain had to go through in the post war period in terms of its power structures and how it exercised its power all over the world. British self-perception was still that of an imperial world power with a wider perspective than just Europe, i.e. the world.

The last remaining European World Power

A similar heritage and problems came with Britain’s world power status. Britain was the only real winner of World War II on the European continent, after its stance of defiance at a crucial moment. Churchill, as the Prime Minister at the time, expressed this again in his second tenure. “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”³⁷ The Few had prevailed against the onslaught of barbarism. And it was generally seen as Britain’s ‘finest hour’. It left a deep mark on the British psyche and entrenched a conviction of the unbreakable inner strength of the British people.³⁸

This can be seen as the foundation of the ‘Third Force’ policy. It had been developed mainly on Bevin’s initiative after the war.³⁹ The purpose of these plans was still controversial. On the hand, they could be seen as a supplement to the Anglo-American alliance.⁴⁰ On the other hand, they are often referred to as a British plan to build a bridge between Western Europe and the Empire.⁴¹ Undoubtedly, some of the British justification for ‘Third Force’ ideas came from its role as a world power.

“There used to be a lot of talk about the so-called ‘Third Force’ as if there were only two big Powers in the world. I have not the slightest doubt that the British Commonwealth and

³⁶ Blackburn (Independent), in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 434

³⁷ Churchill (Con., Prime Minister, in Hansard 1940, 364, c. 1167

³⁸ Pilkington (Con.) in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 258

³⁹ Reference to Bullock, *Ernest Bevin*, pp. 41-2; Frankel, *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 186-7; see also LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, p. 52 and Northedge, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 58, in: O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 126, see also, p. 130, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans – Britain and European Integration, 1945-1998*, Longman, London, 2000, p. 28

⁴⁰ Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 79-81, 84-85

⁴¹ Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 80

Empire remains a Power as great in the world as either the Soviet Union or the United States of America.”⁴²

In addition, there are features of a balance of power policy in British Third Force ideas:

“We have a very great Empire. We have immense responsibilities in Europe, and we also have our association to the United States. It would be a disaster if one of these links became too strong and if the others were allowed to be weakened. I think that, for the present, the Anglo-American alliance is strong enough, and I would like to see Britain pour more of her energies into the Commonwealth and European arrangement.”⁴³

This was no statement by the government, but Hinchingsbrooke represented the mood and the mindset of the time reasonably well. One key purpose of British Third Force dreams was, therefore, to retain British independence in order to be able to act freely in the foreign policy field. That entailed putting a healthy distance between America and Britain.⁴⁴ However, alternative alliance scenarios such as combining the British with the French colonial empire – courted briefly in the late 1940s – were quickly discarded. The development of the Cold War made any idea of disengagement from America unrealistic.⁴⁵

The Conservatives – although agreeing with the principle of British freedom of action – had the advantage of coming to power only when the Third Force scenario was already obsolete in 1951. They also agreed that Europe could be nothing else but a junior partner to Britain, not least because of its role as a world power.⁴⁶ Having said that, there were however two conflicting tendencies in Britain’s policy towards Europe, which were nevertheless mutually dependent: firstly, the British form of isolationism. Continental Europe did not hold much of interest for Britain. It was a war-stricken continent which was more likely to remain a liability than a source of power for Britain. Particularly in the early post war year, the fact that Britain was relatively well off in comparison to the continent, despite its financially precarious situation serve the conviction that even in an area where Britain was weak, the continent was even weaker. Nevertheless, Britain’s position as a world

⁴² Blackburn (Independent), in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 436, for Bevin’s brand of this concept see L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 82

⁴³ Hinchingsbrooke (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1207, see also, David Weigall, *British perceptions of the European Defence Community*, p. 92

⁴⁴ Hynd (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1982, see also, reference to Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947*, pp. 443, in: O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 127

⁴⁵ Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 87

⁴⁶ Probably the last instance where this attitude shines through is Eden’s attitude towards the Messina power, refusing to see them as equals mainly on the grounds of British world power status. see Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 105, see also, Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, p. 23

power necessitated an interest in Europe affairs, as Eden pointed out still in opposition:

“I say deliberately that in all its dreams of wedge-driving Russia could hope for nothing better than the reduction of Britain to the status of observer in Franco-German relations. That would run entirely counter to our Commonwealth interests and to our responsibilities as a world Power, which we share with the United States, and that no doubt is why the Kremlin wants it so very, very much (...)”⁴⁷

Secondly, if all this was true and Britain had to deal with European issues such as European integration and with Europe in general, nothing less but the leading role was acceptable.⁴⁸ The conviction in Britain was that Europe needed British leadership.⁴⁹ In the early 1950s, this was indeed not far from the truth. Continental Euro-enthusiasts were pleading for British leadership.⁵⁰ The disillusionment on the continent that British leadership was not forthcoming, fed suspicions about British motivation towards the European integration process.⁵¹ Despite such frustration on the continent, in the early 1950s, the general conviction in Britain was that Europe was going nowhere without Britain.⁵²

The policy deduced from the two contradictory tendencies in Britain’s attitude towards Europe was to stay involved, but aloof: Britain had the power to hover between its three different centres of gravitation, i.e. the US, the Commonwealth and Europe, so strikingly summed up in Churchill’s three circles:

“We feel that we have an historic rôle to play as a pivot of understanding between Europe, the Commonwealth, the Atlantic Community and the rest of the world, and that if we were to rush into a close federation in Europe without thinking about it – as hon. Members opposite would have us do – that would destroy the future greatness of this country.”⁵³

Another trait of the Third Force idea – *en vogue* in the later 1950s – could be seen in trying to establish Europe as an independent power bloc between the US and USSR, dreaming of the potential of a united continent with the might of several former world powers put together.⁵⁴ “A truly united Europe would represent a balancing force of immense power and influence—a concentration of economic

⁴⁷ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1913, see also, c. 1922

⁴⁸ Legge-Bourke (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1994

⁴⁹ Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 321-2, see also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 128

⁵⁰ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 103-5

⁵¹ See quotation of Henry Spaak by Butler (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 166

⁵² Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 316, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 852

⁵³ Adams (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2028, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 852

⁵⁴ Biggs-Davison (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 733

and scientific resources second to none in the world.”⁵⁵ Clearly, nothing came off it, but some features along these lines were revived in the field of economics, i.e. under the EEC:

“There is a desire in Western Europe to assert itself as a specific area of the world. If this does not stem from a desire to create a third force in the world comparable in its power with the American area and the Soviet bloc, at any rate there is a strong desire in Western Europe to create a third market in the world.”⁵⁶

Such statements came much later than the original Third Force debate of Bevin’s coinage sketched out at the beginning of this subheading. And this time, against the background of the Messina process, the Labour opposition praised the potential of the European integration process which it had failed to appreciate when integration started and when Labour was in power. Nevertheless, the change of mind between the early and the late 1950s is clear. Britain still considered itself a world power, but the marked contrast to continental Europe – down and out in the immediate post-war years – had clearly faded.

4.1.3 The hope for a peaceful future

I shall deal with the major part of the German question in this section for two reasons. Firstly, Britain saw itself as an Allied power along with the US. This entailed some psychological distance to the German question, which France, for example, did not have being concerned in the most fundamental sense of survival. Secondly, there was no immediate territorial concern for Britain in relation to Germany. There were no border disputes and territorial claims such as the Saar for France, for example.

Franco-German reconciliation

In Britain, Franco-German enmity was singled out as the most important reason for the decay of Europe.⁵⁷ The key objective resulting from this recognition was to end the conflict between them: “France is not alone in this desire. Britain has every reason to be just as passionately convinced of its desirability, because twice in one

⁵⁵ Braine (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 779, see also, reference to Bevin, in, Kent, *Bevin’s Imperialism*, p. 70, in: O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 129

⁵⁶ Harold Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 56

⁵⁷ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1461

generation we in this country have poured out blood and treasure in order to come to the aid of France and civilisation.”⁵⁸ Very idealistically Eden told the House that to overcome the old enmity between France and Germany had been one of the main policy aims of Britain for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries - explicitly not in reference to the British balance of power policy.⁵⁹ Even more idealistically Churchill had stated earlier that without the full support of Britain this leap of reconciling France and Germany could not succeed.⁶⁰

The European integration effort was seen as the way to achieve Franco-German reconciliation, not least by Churchill:

“Here are two men [Adenauer and de Gaulle] who have fought and struggled on opposite sides through the utmost stresses of our times and both see clearly the guidance they should give. Do not let all this be cast away for small thoughts and wasteful recrimination and memories which, if they are not to be buried, may ruin the lives of our children and children’s children. It may be that this year 1950 (...) can be made the occasion for launching Europe on its voyage to peace and honour. Let us make sure that we play our part in turning thought into action and action into fame.”⁶¹

Spoken in March 1950 by Churchill, these words sound almost prophetic for the Schuman Plan which was announced only two months later. The French effort towards mutual understanding with Germany was appreciated in Britain.⁶² In the Franco-German reconciliation the European idea seemed to have found its concrete cause.

“Many wars have been fought, much blood has been shed over the years because of the enmity of France and Germany, but the extent to which the French and the Germans today are cooperating in so many ways and the entirely new spirit which has arisen between them, is really remarkable.”⁶³

In particular, in Churchill’s statement in the House one gets the impression that Franco-German reconciliation was a question for the whole of Europe, fully appreciated by Britain and in which this country was not a distant third party, but attached to the cause with its heart.

⁵⁸ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1965, see also, Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1461-2, see also, R.A. Butler (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 225

⁵⁹ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 890

⁶⁰ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 192, see also, Maclay (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1950

⁶¹ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 195

⁶² Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 316

⁶³ Hay (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 767, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1405-6, 1408

The Saar

The Saar question was regarded as the acid test of the Franco-German reconciliation.⁶⁴ Britain realised that the Saar had the potential of becoming another Alsace-Lorraine, but largely took the role of an observer in the Saar issue.⁶⁵ The Saar did not have any direct impact on British policies, apart from the general Allied obligations, which were anyway discharged by France in this area.⁶⁶

However, French policy towards the Saar put the British government in a difficult position. The status of the Saar remained provisional up and until a settlement with Germany in a peace treaty.⁶⁷ That was the accepted legal position and the 1950 Saar Convention was considered to have at least the potential of compromising this position by creating facts on the ground which could not easily be reversed.⁶⁸ The government was also worried about undue French influence in the Saar elections and undemocratic practice in the region.⁶⁹ Rather conveniently, such concerns over the Saar were satisfactorily resolved by the positive development of Franco-German understanding, which found its reflection in the later Saar Convention of 1954 which ultimately re-attached the Saar to the Federal Republic.

The German Question

Despite some resentment born of past conflicts, Britain was not afraid to take a very pragmatic view of the German question. "If we and our former Allies are ready to play our part, Germany must play hers. It takes two to make a partnership, but it is partnership that we want and not hard bargaining over points which inevitably lose their value with the mere passage of time."⁷⁰

The first step on this road was the Petersberg Agreement of 22 November 1949, the purpose of which is sketched out in the following:

⁶⁴ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 300

⁶⁵ Davies (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1550, for the respective correspondence with France and Germany see Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1551-2

⁶⁶ Therefore, the issue did not feature too high on the agenda and therefore it is dealt with under War Experience/War Consequences and not under National Security as for France and Germany.

⁶⁷ Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 457

⁶⁸ Hynd (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1550, see also, Stuart Croft, British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51, p. 81, for the contents of the Saar Convention see France/National Security/Territorial Integrity/The Saar, see also, Germany/ National Security/Territorial Integrity/The Saar

⁶⁹ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 300, see also, Noel-Baker (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 312

⁷⁰ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 48

“The primary objective is the incorporation of the Federal Republic as a peaceful member of the European community, and to this end German association with the countries of Western Europe in all fields should be diligently pursued by means of her entry into the appropriate international bodies and the exchange of commercial and consular representation with other countries.”⁷¹

This was the first step to an institutional framework which would bind West Germany formally into the Western alliance, one of the core aims of Western Allied policy towards Germany.⁷² There were two main reasons for this policy. Firstly, the historical lesson had been learned that Germany had only turned into an aggressive power when isolated. This necessitated a change of attitude on the British part, which placed a stronger emphasis on cooperation and equality instead of punishment. The sacrifices entailed in this course – in particular in terms of economic competition with Germany – were by no means underestimated:

“Her [Germany’s] political allegiance is bound to turn towards the group that feeds her. (...) Her competition will hit this country at that critical moment at which we ourselves are hoping to be balancing our own trade with the West. If, at that critical juncture, we deny Germany the right to compete in the West, she will turn eastwards; and while it is right and proper that the large proportions of her trading should take place in Eastern Europe, we cannot risk allowing her to increase her trade with the East to such an extent that it would be possible to blackmail her by a threat to her food supplies. Therefore, the hard fact is that the price of German membership in the Western society is German competition with ourselves in the West and in the dollar market.”⁷³

Secondly, the cooperation of West Germany was considered crucial in the dawning Cold War: “(...) I consider that Germany’s industrial power and strategic position are of such importance that, unless we succeed in winning her unconditional support of our cause, we shall lose the political struggle in the West.”⁷⁴

The West German government and the Western Allies were in complete agreement that neither wanted to fall prey to Soviet expansionism.⁷⁵ The cooperation expressed in the Petersberg Agreement therefore was to a mutual benefit. For Germany the Petersberg Agreement meant the transfer of sovereign rights from the Allies to Bonn. However, just four years after the end of the war it was expected that there would be some trouble ahead in a divided country which was still searching for its place in Europe and which had not yet found its right balance: The

⁷¹ Policy Statement for the Petersberg Agreement, see, Younger (Lab.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 215

⁷² Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 246, see also, Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 316

⁷³ Winterbottom (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 254

⁷⁴ Winterbottom (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 257, see also, Woodburn (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 89

⁷⁵ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1171

problem of Eastern expellees was only one such issue which was considered a very serious problem for the stability of the Federal Republic, in particular by Labour.⁷⁶ This was one reason why full sovereignty, for example over foreign affairs⁷⁷, was withheld until 1955. The Treaty of Bonn⁷⁸ was signed on the 26 May 1952. It was another step towards restoring West German sovereignty.

One of the major issues still open was the peace treaty. Despite the legally precarious situation, there were several calls to get to grips with this issue.⁷⁹ A first step was the formal termination of the state of war on 9 July 1951.⁸⁰ A peace treaty, it was accepted, would have to wait until such time when Germany was united again, which needed the consent of the Soviet Union.⁸¹

However, for the time being British policy was rather concerned with a realistic evaluation how to keep West Germany in the Western camp:

“The problem we now face is how to ensure that a Germany, which is certain to become powerful, works with the Western side by its own free choice and not with the Soviet Union. As I say, it is only the German people themselves who can make that choice. (...) National unity will soon become the over-riding aim of the Western German people, and Germany will go to the side which offers her the best chance of getting national unity on acceptable conditions, and she will leave any side which denies her the chance of unity under conditions which she considers acceptable.”⁸²

However, Russia seemed to have all advantages to draw Germany to its side.⁸³ The Stalin Note of 1952 was the most prominent initiative into this direction. It offered German reunification. As a result, it was highly divisive in the House of Commons. Labour advocated considering the Soviet proposals: “(...) the main issue at stake in the international situation is a satisfactory settlement in Europe.”⁸⁴ Therefore, nothing should be done which could prevent such a settlement. This is the ration-

⁷⁶ Winterbottom (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 251, see also, P. Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, p. 1-2

⁷⁷ Morrison (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 490, c. 41

⁷⁸ Also called General Treaty or ‚Deutschlandvertrag‘ by Adenauer

⁷⁹ Boothby (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 109, see also, Silverman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1449

⁸⁰ Morrison (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 490, c. 39, This step was decided between the Allies at the NATO Conference of 12-26 September 1950, see S. Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955*, p. 33-7

⁸¹ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1459, see also, Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 373-4

⁸² Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1499, see also, Maclean (Con.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1506

⁸³ Boothby (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1431, see also, Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1499

⁸⁴ Ellis Smith (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1464, 1552, see also, Irvine (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1551

ale behind the hesitation of Socialists all over Europe towards further Western military integration, i.e. German rearmament and its integration into the Western defence system: “(...) we on this side would like the Western Powers to show more overt and demonstrative readiness to modify E.D.C. in return for Russian concessions on all-German elections.”⁸⁵ More fundamentally, Labour MPs – in particular from the far left – thought that the EDC should not be allowed to stand in the way of a final settlement between East and West.⁸⁶ The reason behind this Labour policy was neither pacifism, nor sympathy with the USSR, nor opposition to the British rearmament programme, but realism; realism in the sense that the strategy behind rearmament had actually worked. From a Labour point of view, rearmament was meant to give the West a strong negotiating position: “We say that now is the time to explore the Russian offer. It may well be that the Russian offer is the fruit of the policy of re-armament by the West, but we say that we must explore it.”⁸⁷

The Conservative government stuck to their policy regarding Stalin’s note as a manoeuvre to prevent further Western European integration, i.e. the EDC.⁸⁸ Beyond that, the note was deficient in key provision, e.g. in respect to political freedoms and liberties, as well as with regard to the re-establishment of German armed forces and an armament industry.⁸⁹ It never came to a thorough discussion between the four Allies, not least because of the West German government’s negative response to the Stalin note.⁹⁰

Confirming the scepticism, based on the failure of the Four Power rule in Germany, as to whether a Four Power conference could solve the German problem, the 1953 Churchill initiative for four-power came to nothing.⁹¹ The failure of this initiative was another example that four-power talks were a delicate undertaking and were not very likely to succeed in the Cold War atmosphere.⁹²

Despite these difficulties German reunification was stated as a British and Allied policy.⁹³ On this basis reunification was widely recognised as a legitimate German

⁸⁵ Irvine (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1552, see also, Hynd (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 502, c. 38

⁸⁶ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 590, see also, Paton (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 632

⁸⁷ Irvine (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1555, see also, Noel-Baker (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1568-9

⁸⁸ Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1580, see also, Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 502, c. 38-9

⁸⁹ Wade (Lib.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1540-1

⁹⁰ See Germany/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/Neutrality

⁹¹ For Labour sceptics of the idea of a four power solution to the German question see Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 71, see also, Bellenger (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1489

⁹² Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 424

⁹³ See Sandys (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 84

claim. "If I were a German, I would say, 'I want to unify my country.'"⁹⁴ German unity was, therefore, seen as an essential element for a permanent and peaceful settlement in Europe.⁹⁵ However, the democratic basis for reunification had to be free, equal and secret elections. This became the acid test for all Soviet proposals for reunification.⁹⁶ The Western Allies as well as the West German government wanted to be sure that these plans were not just a pretext for subversion leading inexorably to a united, but sovietised Germany.⁹⁷ The Labour opposition was, however, much more willing to accommodate Soviet claims in a peaceful European settlement:

"That would mean that N.A.T.O. troops and Russian troops stayed in Germany as they do at present, but that we have a united German Government elected by free elections, free to integrate itself politically and economically with the West. That is exactly the present situation of Austria. It is not a very nice situation but it is better than the present situation of a divided Germany with all its future potentialities for war."⁹⁸

From the perspective of the government, the Austrian solution, as it came to be called, was wholly unrealistic and dangerous in itself, as was the talk of distrust of West Germany. Nevertheless, even Conservatives agreed that "(...) the solution to the problem of German unity, unhappily like the solution to so many other problems, depends on our being able by some means or another to restore something like relations of normality between ourselves and the Soviet Union."⁹⁹

Again mainly among Labour MPs, there was the great fear and lurking suspicion that German reunification would be done by force of arms, if the Germans had their way, possibly followed by the re-conquest of former German territories in Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁰ The questions resulting from these territorial disputes were considered to have a huge impact on any possible future settlement in Europe and indeed the world.¹⁰¹ The Oder-Neiße line came to epitomise that struggle and would remain a contentious issue between West Germany and the Western Al-

⁹⁴ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 281-2, see also, Winterbottom (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 252

⁹⁵ Queen's Speech 4/11/52, in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 5, see also, Queen's Speech 3/11/53, in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 4, see also, Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 585

⁹⁶ See, Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 42, 347, see also, Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 693

⁹⁷ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 402

⁹⁸ Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 320, see also, Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 282

⁹⁹ Sandys (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 86

¹⁰⁰ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 281-2, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 848

¹⁰¹ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 848, see also, Silverman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1466

lies.¹⁰² For the time being it remained an academic argument, because of the Red Army occupying all those territories and because a final settlement would only be reached in a peace treaty.¹⁰³

The European Ideal

From the suffering in the last war and notorious historical problems, such as the German one, sprang ideals, which are reflected in the early enthusiasm for European cooperation:

“Such was the terrific destruction of the war and the suffering which the people were enduring, that it really shocked one that people would not gather to discuss economic matters, even if they could not agree politically, to try to save their people from any more suffering by turning our available resources to the best account.”¹⁰⁴

The rationale for European cooperation was clearly emphasised by Churchill while in opposition, too:

“France and Britain, both sorely distressed, can combine together and, thus joined, have the superior power to raise Germany, even more shattered, to an equal rank and to lasting association with them. Then these three countries, helping each other, conscious of their future united greatness, forgetting ancient feuds and the horrible deeds and tragedies of the past, can make the core or the nucleus upon which all the other civilised democracies of Europe, bond or free, can one day rally and combine.”¹⁰⁵

Churchill recognised that it was easy to stir up sentiments of hatred nourished by past losses all over Europe. He called for Britain to lead the way and to “(...) rise above those pettinesses. It may well be that our safety depends on our proving ourselves capable of doing so.”¹⁰⁶ Moreover, from the sacrifices Britain had suffered, a certain obligation arose not to let it happen again.

“We cannot, even if we wanted to, turn our back on Europe at this stage. If we did, we should not only expose ourselves to mortal peril; we should break faith with the cream of two British generations who are now lying over there in the fields of France, Flanders and

¹⁰² A. Edward Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 261

¹⁰³ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 889

¹⁰⁴ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1498

¹⁰⁵ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 193

¹⁰⁶ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 194

Italy, because they were prepared to give their lives not only for this country but in order that Europe might live in freedom and peace.”¹⁰⁷

There was a place for Britain in Europe and it was well recognised that Britain would have to do its share to make it happen. Faced with the accusation that the new Conservative government, too, was half-hearted about Europe, the British concept of Europe and its place in it became clearer:

“No, we did not run away from it. We always made it clear that there could be no question of Britain coming into a European federation. What we did want was a United Europe, developing on what we might call Commonwealth lines in which this country would join as a full member. In it we would hold the balance between the French and the Germans, we would be a safeguard to both and, in the tradition of the old Locarno Treaty, could work for their reconciliation.”¹⁰⁸

Such a Commonwealth structure, i.e. a much looser association than that which the continental Six were envisaging, appeared more attractive. Finally, in the late 1950s, it was recognised across the board that the European enthusiasm was not as strongly reflected in Britain as in France or especially in Germany.¹⁰⁹

The United Nations (UN)

The early idealism for the UN was rather stronger in Britain.¹¹⁰ The UN as a necessary institutionalised world-wide co-operation had full support. Based on the ideals of the League of Nations and trying to avoid its flaws, the UN fitted the mindset of British statesmen who had lived through the war. One idea which connected the imperial past with the future of the UN was that if the time of the Empires was coming to an end – perhaps because they were too small to solve the world’s problems – then these problems had to be solved on a world level, i.e. in the UN.¹¹¹ The disaster of another world war had to be prevented under all circumstances. That became the brief for the UN.¹¹² The idealist commitment to the UN was therefore widespread in the immediate post-war years: “My Government will con-

¹⁰⁷ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 853, see also, Royle (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1454

¹⁰⁸ Amery (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1525, see also, Wade (Lib.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1544

¹⁰⁹ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1405

¹¹⁰ Attlee was one of the most prominent supporters of the UN during his time as PM, see Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 78

¹¹¹ Bing (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2009

¹¹² David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 282, 284, 319

tinue to give full support to the United Nations, for it is only through an effective system of security that world peace can be assured.”¹¹³ For a short time, this idealism carried the UN through the troubles of the rising tensions between the Communist bloc and the West.

However, the UN could not conceal the developing rifts for long and realism was soon reasserted:

“The House is familiar with the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and San Francisco in 1945 from which the United Nations emerged. If our expectations had been realised, the Government would not now be making provisions in Estimates for defence expenditure totalling £780 million.”¹¹⁴

The idealistic expectations of the early days were scaled down to keeping the UN as a possible forum for discussion, to open the channels when occasion would arise:

“Our policy will, therefore, continue to be based, so far as possible, on seeking peace and security through the international machinery of the United Nations (...). Unfortunately, we must face the unpleasant fact that progress in this field has not kept pace with our desires and that, failing agreement on collective security, there is no alternative but to pursue our object by other means.”¹¹⁵

The UN was considered to have failed in its main target to foster understanding and ultimately to prevent war: “N.A.T.O. was called into existence because U.N.O. belied its name. It was not a United Nations’ organisation; collective security as applied to U.N.O. was not, in fact, collective, and did not bring security.”¹¹⁶ Both parties in the House agreed in this analysis and NATO became ultimately responsible for the security and defence of the West, because it was where the real power of the free world resided.¹¹⁷

Another example for the inadequacy of the UN came in the Suez crisis. From the government’s perspective its inability to solve conflicts was the most flagrant shortcoming: The argument that any resolution against Nasser was bound to be vetoed by the USSR was most forcefully put forward by the government.¹¹⁸ The verdict was damning: “I do not believe that any responsible Government can be

¹¹³ King’s Speech at the opening of Parliament 1950, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 38

¹¹⁴ Shinwell (Lab.) Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1265

¹¹⁵ Shinwell (Lab.) Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1265

¹¹⁶ Younger (Lab.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 208

¹¹⁷ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 846, see also, Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 582

¹¹⁸ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 306

bound by United Nations inaction to do nothing to protect its own security.¹¹⁹ In addition, the anti-colonial stance often taken in the UN was also a source of embarrassment for Britain.¹²⁰ The problem with such criticisms was that they came during the Suez crisis, when Britain was under heavy attack in the UN. The call for reforming the UN sounded rather like fitting British requirements, which cast the sincerity of the British commitment to equal partnership in the international arena of the UN severely into doubt.

Regardless of that, the UN was not the solution that could provide security. This was left mainly to the regional defence systems which will be dealt with in the Military Security section.

¹¹⁹ Beamish (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 66

¹²⁰ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 81

4.2 National Security

4.2.1 *Fundamentals*

Sovereignty

In the immediate post war period the concept of sovereignty came under serious scrutiny, particularly in continental Europe where national governments made an effort to provide properly for the needs of their peoples, by moving closer together.¹ “Nationalism and national government have brought neither security, prosperity nor peace to the peoples of continental Europe.”² Integration and what came to be called ‘supranationalism’ was what was really new about early continental co-operation, entailing a reappraisal of old concept of sovereignty.

One of the consequences of greater mutual dependency was the continental brand of interdependence theory. The British form of interdependence had multiple roots, particular to the British setting. On the one hand, Britain had a huge network of world-wide relations which provided for its primary needs, i.e. food and other primary commodities, which made integration less urgent. On the other hand, it was precisely those world-wide relations – maintained by Britain for centuries – which made interdependence a day-to-day business. The Commonwealth was the concrete embodiment of trade and mutual dependency – although with a colonial touch. Growing on that experience, the boundaries between national sovereignty and co-operation had been settled by past practice and concrete experience. Continental ideas of interdependence, integration and supranationalism were seen as impinging on these long settled boundaries between British national sovereignty and the degree of international, e.g. Commonwealth, dependence Britain was prepared to admit. These limits and the remaining national sovereignty would not be given up easily, either by the last Labour government, or by Churchill later on.³ British reservedness against European integration, on the one hand, and the continental tendency to abdicate sovereignty was called ‘insular nationalism and isolationism’ by critics, in the House of Commons.⁴ Geographical landmarks such

¹ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1910

² Boothby (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1433, see also, Wade (Lib.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1544

³ Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2107, see also, quotation of Churchill from his first speech in the Council of Europe, in Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2106

⁴ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2118, 2120, for Churchill’s position see Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 816

as the Channel and the insular position often served as a reference point vis-à-vis Europe.⁵ In the early 1950s, some Conservative MPs saw national sovereignty degenerating into a narrow-minded nationalism which contradicted the fundamental interests of Britain.

“It is inconceivable to me (...) that we can continue much longer in Europe as an anarchy of separate sovereign nation-States. Some form of integration, both economic and political, is bound to come. If it does not come by voluntary union, it will come by way of empire. It nearly came by way of Hitler’s empire. It may still come by way of Stalin’s empire. We now have to break down national sovereignty.”⁶

National sovereignty was, therefore, no longer sacrosanct.⁷

4.2.2 *Internal Reform*

In contrast to those of France and Germany, Britain’s political system had survived the Second World War. More than that, it was reinvigorated in its democratic tradition, as if the prevalence over tyranny had proven the old structures right and legitimate, which before the war many saw crumbling.⁸ The class struggle had not unsettled the social structure of Britain, and the internal Communist threat, which had professed to be the ideology to this end, was safely neutralised.⁹

Class struggle

Nevertheless, the class divide played a major role in British politics. In the 1950s, Conservatives, on the one hand, and Labour, on the other, were still very much the embodiment of this divide. The European integration issue was only one point in this political struggle between the two and it had actually a direct reference to class struggle.

The Conservatives made the most of the categorical rejection of early European integration efforts by the Labour government.¹⁰ It was suspected that the reason

⁵ Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 24, see also, L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Britain Faces Europe*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1969, p. 2, see also, Ferdinand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, Penguin, London, 1994, translated by Richard Mayne, see also, Stuart Clark, ‘The Annales historians’, in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, CUP, Cambridge, 1985

⁶ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2120

⁷ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2159

⁸ See Eden (Con.) Minister for Dominion and Colonial Affairs, in Hansard 1939-40, 355, c. 755-62

⁹ See Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, p. 3

¹⁰ Maclay (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1953-4

for abstaining was a Socialist conspiracy, which would account for the refusal to work with Conservative governments on the continent, such as the French MRP or the German CDU/CSU.¹¹ Although this argument seems to be somewhat far-fetched, the same cautious line had been taken by the SPD opposition in Germany towards the Schuman proposals. The rejection of early European integration because of its restricted scope (heavy industry) as well as the capitalist nature and the danger of re-establishing pre-war cartels was common to both Socialist parties.¹² There were also party political even ideological reasons why Labour was reluctant to join the early European integration movement. On the one hand, Labour suspected a Conservative conspiracy in European integration which was founded, to a large extent from the experience of the European Movement dominated by conservative politicians and used as a political platform by the Tories when in opposition. From the Labour point of view, the Conservatives were so much in favour of the European integration process only because the economic advantages resulting from it would mainly favour their clientele.¹³

“What is it that enables the right hon. Gentleman [Churchill] to embrace with joyous abandon this supra-national authority outlined in the Schuman declaration and yet to reject the nationalisation of industries at home? The answer is that the common factor which runs through all the actions and speeches of the right hon. Gentleman in his long career is the ruthless determination to defend at all costs the privileges of the class to which he belongs. (...) The truth is that the right hon. Gentleman is now prepared to yield power and responsibility if only ownership remains intact. He is prepared to go outside this country to seek a muzzle for Socialism at home.”¹⁴

And indeed the Conservative opposition sought to capitalise on the weakness of the second Attlee government by opposing unwelcome legislation such as the Iron and Steel bill, again, a contentious political issue in terms of diverging interests of the working classes and the capitalist class, and with an important reference to the European integration of the coal and steel industry under the Schuman Plan.¹⁵ The class issue, therefore, interfered with Britain’s position towards early European

¹¹ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1914-5, 1919-22, see also, Heath (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1961

¹² See Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1943

¹³ Irvine (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2012, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 37, for the main criticism, see the pamphlet of Labour’s national executive ‘Feet on the ground’, as quoted in: David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 38, see also, J.T. Grantham, ‘British Labour and the Hague “Congress of Europe”’, *Historical Journal* (1981)

¹⁴ Adams (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2025, for the Conservative conspiracy in regard to Churchill’s ‘European Army’, the Council of Europe as a platform for Conservative policies and Bevin’s accusation in that direction see S. Dockrill, *Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955*, p. 24

¹⁵ See Morrison (Lab.) Lord President of the Council, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1742

integration and the class issue defined, to some degree, Britain's position against European integration by attaching an ideological stigma to it.

4.2.3 Territorial Integrity

Unlike France and Germany, Britain had no border disputes on the continent. Its interests and territorial conflicts were connected with the Empire, the Commonwealth and later, the decolonisation process.

Empire and Commonwealth¹⁶

In the beginning the Empire, and with the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 the Commonwealth¹⁷, were the material proof of Britain's world influence.¹⁸ Through it Britain had grown used to exercising world-wide power. Despite indications of strain, in the retreat from Greece for example, the Empire was still reasonably effective in the immediate post-war years. The preferential treatment of colonial affairs must be set in the context of a strong sentimental commitment to the Empire under which those relations would always be important to Britain. "We have our Commonwealth family, still the most remarkable example of true international co-operation in the world."¹⁹ On the basis of such conviction, suggestions for further integration and cooperation with the Commonwealth countries were put forward:

"(...) permanent machinery should be set up, as soon as possible, for the purpose of establishing, first a Commonwealth defence policy, secondly, a Commonwealth foreign policy, and thirdly, a Commonwealth economic policy. I feel that it is far more important to get Commonwealth foreign defence, and economic policies than it is for us to take the lead in any other sphere of foreign affairs. (...) we must be prepared to take risks if the British

¹⁶ The subheading 'Imperial Defence' under the War Experience indicator, which mentions the Empire for the first time, stressed Britain's sentimental attachment to a military strategy which was no longer a viable policy option by the 1950s. It was thus dropped relatively quickly as a blueprint for Britain's overall military strategy. The subheading 'Empire and Commonwealth', in contrast, will emphasise Britain's attachment to the political construct of the links with its dominions and colonies. Despite the realisation of the demise of the Empire, this policy of tentative links and political connections was kept throughout the 1950s. The determination to hold on to it can not least be seen in the introduction of the Commonwealth

¹⁷ For further details see David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, ch. 6, The Commonwealth Dimension, pp. 83-95

¹⁸ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 53, see also, Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 67-8

¹⁹ See Queen's Speech 4/11/52, in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 4, see also, Eden (Con), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 309

Commonwealth and Empire are to become an even greater force in future than in the past."²⁰

Despite the passionate attachment to the Commonwealth shown in such ideas, they never reached the level of detailed plans and sophisticated institutional structuring the European integration effort experienced.²¹ Instead, the Commonwealth developed into a sentimental barrier for Britain to join the European integration process. Britain ran the danger of becoming entrapped in this nostalgic perception of past imperial greatness which had less and less to do with contemporary reality. This danger was twofold. Firstly, old-fashioned lead- and subject country roles reminiscent of colonial times had the potential of alienating Britain's former subjects even within the more modern construction of the Commonwealth. The danger of damaging these relationships beyond repair was not to be underestimated. This would of course also destroy the possibility of reshaping these old links into an effective cooperation for the future.²² Secondly, the Empire was used as a reason to stay aloof, both from closer relationship with America and the European integration process.²³ Britain's priorities appeared very clear at the time: "First there is the Empire and the Commonwealth; secondly, the fraternal association of the English-speaking world; and thirdly, not in rank or status but in order, the revival of united Europe as a vast factor in the preserving of what is left of the civilisation and the culture of the free world."²⁴ The development of the European Community was regarded as something of an irrelevance in the context of Britain's global role.²⁵ In the final analysis, America and the Commonwealth took priority over Britain's relations to Europe.²⁶ And it was hard indeed for statesmen whose entire lives had been shaped by the fact of British greatness to realise that the imperial façade no longer represented power, but weakness and bankruptcy.²⁷

²⁰ Blackburn (Independent), in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 432-3, see also, Hansard 1950, 477, c. 436

²¹ Leather (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 407, see also, Craddock (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 75

²² Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 420-1

²³ Leather (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1221

²⁴ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2155, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 59

²⁵ Bevan and Gaitskell are given as examples holding that position in: Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, p. 405, Eden as another in: David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 282-283, 292, see also, Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 13

²⁶ J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 127, reference to CAB. 128/16, C.M.(49)62; CAB. 129/37, C.P.(49)203, F.O. 371/78134/11438

²⁷ Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 479, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 94

Sometimes, European integration was seen as a threat to the well-established links with the Commonwealth.²⁸

“In our view, participation in a political federation, limited to Western Europe, is not compatible either with our Commonwealth ties, our obligations as a member of the wider Atlantic community, or as a world Power, and I gather from what the right hon. Gentleman [Eden] (...) said that the opposition would agree with that proposition.”²⁹

This thesis was mainly advocated by the Labour Party in the early 1950s, but was revived at the end of the decade in the face of the failure of the FTA, as a counter-argument against EEC membership, by the Conservative party, too.³⁰ “I, for one, would be no party to any arrangements which drew us away from the Commonwealth, and I think that that would be the general view here.”³¹

In the early 1950s, the Conservatives were much less dogmatic and more positive about combining the Commonwealth and Europe: “(...) there is no incompatibility or inconsistency between Britain’s part in a United Europe and her position as the centre and pivot of the British Empire.”³² This stance was supported by the Dominions. They urged the British government “(...) to get on with their programme for a united Europe, and not to hold back.”³³ It was gradually accepted that the Commonwealth and an integrated Europe could go together.³⁴ This position was held by both parties. The positive political target taken from it calls for British leadership for Europe:

“It must be our task to associate our partners overseas in the work we are doing in Europe. It is the surest foundation of peace. I am convinced that the whole of Europe is waiting today for a lead from this country, as indeed they have been waiting for five years. We must not let this opportunity slip through our hands. I think it needs only imagination and courage for Britain, already the leader of a united Commonwealth, to become the leader of a united Europe and perhaps one day of a united world.”³⁵

²⁸ Roberts (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 206, see also, Hynd (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1985

²⁹ Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1948, see also, Gordon-Walker (Lab.), Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 439, Eden did agree with that position, see David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, pp. 287, 291, 296, 299, 301

³⁰ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1384-5

³¹ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 49

³² Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 197, see also, quotation from P-H Spaak by Butler (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 166

³³ Leather (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2029, see also, Mackay (Lib.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2126

³⁴ Hogg (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2051, see also, Robert Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 741

³⁵ Hopkinson (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 238, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 288, 292

Hence, at the beginning of the 1950s, the conviction that Britain was the leading European nation and could, therefore, afford to keep its distance to the rest of the continent was almost a universal consensus among the political establishment. This had undoubtedly changed at the end of the decade, which coincides with the decline of British imperial power and in turn with the loss of a viable political and economic alternative to European integration.

Decolonisation

Britain's initial response to the breaking away of the Empire was a form of progressive conservatism which still very much reflected the colonial mindset and which L.J. Butler summed up in the following quotation: "There was, at least in theory, a growing reluctance to retain colonies by the use of force, but, equally, there was no desire to impose independence on communities which were not considered 'ready' for it, as this might leave a 'dangerous vacuum' liable to be filled by less pliant strains of nationalism."³⁶ Communism and Arab nationalism were seen as dangers to world peace, the Commonwealth and ultimately to the former colonies themselves.

Not least because of such dangers, a kind of tutoring process was suggested to guide the colonies towards independence:

"Unless each Colony is economically sound, it is not ready for self-government. I suggest to my right hon. Friend that Colonial policy might be summed up in a new motto. Instead of saying, 'Self-government as soon as possible,' they should adopt the motto, 'Self-government as and when self-supporting' and then say, 'We will do everything we can towards both those objectives, but we shall not pursue one without the other.'"³⁷

The development of a sound economic basis was sought in developing primary industries, i.e. agriculture and mineral resources.³⁸ References to the civilising achievements of colonial institutions such as the Anglo-Iranian oil company were made.³⁹ The problem was that in reality less than 1% of Britain's GNP went into colonial development⁴⁰, which might be an indication why the civilising efforts did not receive much credit abroad. In contrast to that, Britain purchased large amounts of commodities from the other Commonwealth countries, normally at

³⁶ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 80, see also, Noel-Baker (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 903

³⁷ Geoffrey Cooper (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 852

³⁸ Geoffrey Cooper (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 852

³⁹ See Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 49-50

⁴⁰ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 84, a figure of £40.5 million is given for the period between 1946 and 1951, while at the same time £250 million of funds from overseas territories were held in London as "sterling balances", which were in fact British debts towards the colonies

fixed prices favourable to Britain, which was a major advantage for the British national economy.⁴¹

The oil resources of the Middle East were an example of the economic importance of former colonies. However, the 1951 Iranian oil crisis was a sign of approaching trouble in this region and of the much loathed Arab nationalism. The Iranian oil crisis is one of the first examples where the financial interests of the colonial power Britain touched upon national revenue of an Middle Eastern state – although none of Britain’s colonies: “Underlying the dispute is a widespread feeling among the Persian people that the Persian oil industry should be so conducted that their economic and political independence is not prejudiced and that an unfair proportion of the profits of the industry should not go abroad.”⁴² The nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company by the Iranian government followed.⁴³ Britain was the majority stakeholder and the Iranian oil was of strategic importance to British industry.⁴⁴ Some suggested a tough line and the use of force. Attlee, however, overruled his Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, and no army was sent to defend British financial interests.⁴⁵ A war was avoided, but relations between the Iranian government and Britain deteriorated drastically, culminating in a complete breakdown of diplomatic relations.⁴⁶

Malaya became another prominent case of decolonisation, which exemplified the Communist threat.⁴⁷ While the imperial mindset was still very present, there was another reality:

“What is the use of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War talking as though all that is happening in Malaya is a Communist conspiracy? The fact is that a great deal of what is happening in Malaya at present is happening because for generations the British Imperial Government refused justice to the population.”⁴⁸

Aneurin Bevan presented a left-wing position, here, i.e. a criticism on the imperial system, not shared by many at the time. Despite the frankness and clarity, so characteristic of Bevan, the ultimate victory of the British forces over the Communists enabled the British to turn their Malayan colony into a democratic and friendly

⁴¹ Turton (Con.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1412-3, see also, L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 82

⁴² Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c.48

⁴³ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 79

⁴⁴ Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 64-5, see also, L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 110, see also, Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1995, p. 482

⁴⁵ See Attlee (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 253, see also, Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 65

⁴⁶ Queen’s Speech 3/11/53, in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 4

⁴⁷ There were strong indications of Communist subversive tactics at work, see Gammans (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 1428, see also, Cornelli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 484

⁴⁸ Bevan (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1513

government.⁴⁹ It also remained a front-line state against communist expansion in the Far East.⁵⁰ “In exchange for Malaya’s continued membership of the Sterling Area, Britain provided Malaya’s new rulers with the military aid they needed to counteract the country’s internal guerrilla threat. These arrangements were highly acceptable to each side.”⁵¹ Malaya came to be the best example for a successful military intervention, for a successful decolonisation process with independence at the end and for a viable colonial economy.⁵²

However, the British imperial model showed more and more cracks and its injustice – as brandished by Bevan – was becoming all too obvious as the recognition dawned that the subjects in the colonies should actually have the same rights, privileges and standing as their British masters. The mindset was changing to the realisation that there was no military reply to this ideological challenge.⁵³

4.2.4 Ideas and ideology

Communism

Britain itself seemed to be immunised against Communism. Domestically the Communist problem had been solved by Labour taking over their allegiances and their votes.⁵⁴ However, the general suspicion was that having failed to undermine the political institutions, Communists were trying to subvert other mass movements.⁵⁵ “The Soviet Government also believed that by working through the trade unions they might succeed in converting them to Communism. I cannot see any great sign of that in this country at the present time (...).”⁵⁶

The external Communist threat was also considered serious, by the Prime Minister and the leader of the Labour opposition:

“I said that the difficulties and disturbances in the world are the result of a deliberate Communist campaign carried on by various means. Communism is a militant and imperialist

⁴⁹ Cornelli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 484, see also, L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 118-9

⁵⁰ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 87

⁵¹ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 140

⁵² Mainly through its tin and rubber resources, the country was a net dollar earner within the sterling area. see L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 82, 85, 87

⁵³ Bevan (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1513

⁵⁴ Albu (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 252, see also, Lipton (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1040-1, The few communist MPs lost their seats in the 1945 election. See Introduction/Britain

⁵⁵ Glyn (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1157-8, see also, Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 589

⁵⁶ Headlam (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 233, see also, Glyn (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1158

creed held with fanaticism by its adherents. It is based on certain ideas. You cannot confute ideas by armed forces. You cannot confute them by better ideas and by better action and by showing in practice the superiority of the democratic way of life. Military defences against Communism are essential, but they are not a complete policy.⁵⁷

The suspicion was that the high level of armament in the Eastern bloc was geared towards putting a constant strain on Western economies and in turn on the political system there, so that they would finally implode.⁵⁸

The antidote to Communism was, therefore, not to be found in increased armament. This was a war of ideologies and in order for the West to win it, a return to its fundamental values of liberty, democracy and not least self-determination was necessary.⁵⁹ “The Communists can only offer the peoples of the world the position of slavish satellites, but we can offer the nations of the world freedom and nationhood if they remain inside the democratic group.”⁶⁰

From the British point of view and with regard to my last section, the Commonwealth was of great importance in countering the world-wide Communist threat.⁶¹ A sensible colonial policy would prevent communism from spreading, physically and ideologically and hence it was hoped to deliver peace. Therefore, Britain thought itself to have in the Commonwealth a powerful political tool in its hands which might have the potential to end the Communist threat and the Cold War, a tool the other European nations could only dream of.

The Socialist International

Labour took some pride in being part of the socialist international in the 1950s.⁶² The traditional accusation had always been that, because of this international link, Labour’s patriotism was diminished.⁶³

When it came to the early steps of European integration, however, the picture was reversed. The opposition had a more Europhile outlook and the Labour government took the nationalistic line, too nationalistic for some Labour MPs and in

⁵⁷ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 953

⁵⁸ Wade (Lib.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1543

⁵⁹ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 52

⁶⁰ Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 247

⁶¹ For a reference to the Commonwealth potential to halt Communist expansion, see Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 53

⁶² Greenwood (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1955-6

⁶³ See Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2148, for the counter-position see Lee (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1012

particular for the Conservative Euro-enthusiasts, such as Edward Heath.⁶⁴ The reason for this nationalism may be found exactly in the earlier fundamental criticism levelled against Socialists of not being patriotic enough. During the last decades, and particularly during the war, the national perspective had become the dominant one. Although the Socialist movement tried to re-establish old international links, the ideal of international brotherhood had become weaker after the war.⁶⁵

“What seems to me the first aim, the first objective, the first goal, of our new organisation is peace. This is not a new problem. The working classes and the trade unions have always desired peace, but if we ask ourselves honestly: ‘Have we succeeded in getting peace?’ we must have the courage to say that we did not succeed. It was because we did not act at the moment when we should have acted; because we did not speak at the moment when we should have spoken; because we have been influenced by the rising nationalism of every one of our countries; and because we have chosen the national answer instead of obeying to the mandate of the international. Therefore, we have failed.”⁶⁶

As Léon Jouhaux said, the general trend of the weakening of the internationalist discourse left its mark in the Socialist mindset, which might explain to some extent the hesitancy of the Labour government towards a wide-ranging and groundbreaking initiative such as the Schuman Plan. Another example was relations with the SPD. Not least because of the nationalistic position the SPD presented, the party was not regarded as a reliable partner. The Socialist international links were, therefore, no guide in regard to solving the overall European or indeed the German problem.⁶⁷

Both the SPD and the Labour Party said that they wanted Europe – no definition for the meaning of ‘Europe’ was supplied – but the approach, for example in the Schuman Plan, was not the right one.

“We believe there is only one fundamental and effective solution to the problem of the development of European economic unity and that is the Socialist one. The ideal chance of solving the great problem which exists in developing European unity would come by co-operation of like-minded Socialist Governments. (...) The Government face the realities of the situation, and realise that Governments are not like minded to that extent. They have adapted their policy accordingly. (...) The fact that the variance exists, although it is fundamental, is not a reason for not co-operating to the maximum possible extent with other

⁶⁴ Greenwood (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1955, see also, Heath (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1960

⁶⁵ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1967-8, see also, Hynd (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1981

⁶⁶ Quotation from Léon Jouhaux at the first Congress of the International Federation of Trade Unions in London 1950, in: Eccles (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1976, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2119

⁶⁷ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 681

Governments, but it is a reason why that co-operation should not take the form of a step towards federalism.⁶⁸

This is a very dogmatic view of the Schuman Plan, and it might not have been shared by the leading figures in the Labour government, but effectively they took a negative stance towards the first European integration efforts.⁶⁹

Political Europe

In Britain, in particular, a wide variety of theories have been elaborated to explain and map out the ensuing European integration process. Federalism was one of them. There was a long tradition of federalist thinking in Britain.⁷⁰ And the federalist trait in the Council of Europe reflected some of it, at least on the Conservative side of the House. After the war, the Council was well suited to give Europe the impression of some degree of normality and control. The initial hope was that through economic co-operation political stability and possibly closer relations could be fostered.⁷¹

“(…) the original concept of the Council of Europe was that this body should afford, in the first place, a forum of European opinion and that it should be a forcing house for ideas which could be taken into account by Governments through the Committee of Foreign Ministers (…). It was generally hoped that this exchange of ideas would create a European opinion and would contribute to the development of a sense of European unity (…).”⁷²

Answering the criticism that it lacked of real power, Bevin said that what had been done was the most that was achievable.⁷³

This might have been the case at the time when the Council was founded in 1948. However, by 1950, it was suggested that the Assembly should become a proper parliament for Europe while the Council of Ministers was proposed as a second chamber representing the member states. The exponents of such ideas were some British MPs who had “gone native” in Europe and who thought that the Council should be moulded into an effective political institution for Europe with appropriate powers.⁷⁴ Those hopes were comprehensively dashed by the British govern-

⁶⁸ Irvine (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2013, continued on 2015

⁶⁹ See J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 150-1

⁷⁰ See M. Burgess, *The British tradition of Federalism*, Leicester University Press, London, 1995

⁷¹ Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 242, see also, Boothby (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1431

⁷² Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1392

⁷³ Bevin (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 322

⁷⁴ Mackay (Lib.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2127, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 851-3

ment: "As to the Consultative Assembly, it was never considered that it should be a parliament, that it should have in any sense legislative powers."⁷⁵ Unanimity was kept in the Council of Ministers, although it could in any case only make recommendations to the national governments.⁷⁶ The British government wanted to keep the Council of Europe just as it was, i.e. a consultative gathering on European affairs.⁷⁷ Although it was suggested later that the WEU assembly be merged with the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, again, nothing came of the idea to develop it into an organisation with real powers.⁷⁸

There were, however, two real achievements of the Council of Europe: firstly, the admission of West Germany into the Council of Europe was a positive step forward towards the unification of Europe.⁷⁹ The link between the admission of both West Germany and the Saar to the Council of Europe was made and accepted by the government as a way to bring France to accept West Germany back into international circles.⁸⁰ Both Germany and the Saar were accepted only as associate members.⁸¹ And there was some caution by the British government about German intentions: "It is essential that the German Federal Republic should state that it is willing to abide by the provisions of the Statute of the Council and to give clear proof of its desire to do so."⁸² The British government was very much in favour of German membership under these conditions.⁸³

Secondly, the main moral achievement of the Council was the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.⁸⁴ The important difference as compared with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was that the ECHR was binding in all its elements on the member states of the Council of Europe. The rights were individually enforceable by the European Court of Human Rights in The Hague.⁸⁵

As soon as the honeymoon period of the European movement – which led to the creation of the Council of Europe – was over, the insufficiency of this idealistic endeavour became apparent. In terms of actual power, it was no more than the lowest common denominator. The political impotence of the Council showed that

⁷⁵ Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1392

⁷⁶ Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1406

⁷⁷ Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1394, 1406

⁷⁸ de Freitas (Lab.), in Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 206-7

⁷⁹ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 196, see also, Tweedsmuir (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1446

⁸⁰ Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 241-2

⁸¹ Younger (Lab.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 217

⁸² Statement of the Standing Committee of the Council of Europe, in, Younger (Lab.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 217

⁸³ Bevin (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 323

⁸⁴ Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1406

⁸⁵ Sandys (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1412

it was little more than a talking shop.⁸⁶ A confusing jungle of diverging and opposing ideas was discussed: 'Big Europe', including Britain and Scandinavia, was set against 'little Europe' of the Six; federal, supranational, inter-governmental and functional theories which all had their champions. In particular for the Euro-enthusiast it was hard to see that the Council was losing its sense of direction and purpose.⁸⁷ It remained that the Council was the expression of early European idealism which was still searching for a proper shape.

However, the federalist tradition of the European movement – dominated by Churchill in the early 1950s – and reflected in the Council did not have a good reputation in Britain: "The amount of enthusiasm for federal union in any country is a measure of its defeatism and of its feeling of inability to measure up to its own problems."⁸⁸ Britain was not defeated and had more than lived up to its responsibilities in the last war. Therefore, Britain could not be party to such a European union.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the ideological basis for 'federation' was seen in a fundamental consensus, a feeling of belonging together, of unity. Most British politicians could not see anything like that in Europe in the immediate post-war years.⁹⁰ And they could definitely not see Britain being part of it.

"(...) we must understand that there is no general public support in this country for the idea of political federation with Europe. (...) We must not advocate courses or make suggestions that we are [not]⁹¹ prepared to follow through to their ultimate consequences. If we do that we shall be rightly earning the title of perfide Albion."⁹²

Intergovernmentalism came to be the preferred way of doing business with Europe and indeed the only one acceptable for years to come.⁹³ One fundamental reason for the preference of intergovernmentalism was the national veto embodied in it and the required consensus which was seen as the reflection of freedom in the

⁸⁶ Williams (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1463, see also, Hollis (Con.) in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 91

⁸⁷ Eccles (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1970, see also, Blyton (Lab.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1452

⁸⁸ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2039, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1406

⁸⁹ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 301

⁹⁰ Legge-Bourke (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1990, see also, Irvine (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2015

⁹¹ apparently a clerical error in Hansard

⁹² Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1380, see also, quotation from New York Times 12.1.1952, in: D. Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 297, see also, p. 313, see also, J.W. Young, (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-1955*, Leicester UP, Leicester, 1988, p. 85

⁹³ Eccles (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1975

West based on the nation state as opposed to corporatism and dictatorship in the East.⁹⁴

Supranationalism, on the other hand, was new and it reflected the enthusiasm for Europe in the early 1950s. For the first time there was a theory for common practice which got rid of all the inherent problems in the older intergovernmental approach.

“It is difficult to take decisions for the common good through inter-governmental agencies of which the members were allies or friendly neutrals in the war, how much more difficult will it be to take such action if our ex-enemy Germany is invited to be a member of such an agency? That is the origin of the Schuman conception, with its emphasis on going beyond the O.E.E.C. model and creating an authority whose decisions, subject to appeal and proper safeguards, will be binding to the members. (...) We must arrange matters so that they speak not as Frenchmen and Germans, but as Europeans.”⁹⁵

Therefore, some MPs saw in supranationalism enough positive potential to solve longstanding European problems such as the Franco-German enmity.⁹⁶

For Britain, however, it was a different story: “As freedom of movement clashes with xenophobia, so the problem of supranationalism touches the deeper suspicions against the outside world.”⁹⁷ In addition, the arguments against supranational institutions included the lack of democratic influence i.e. technocracy in Strasbourg or Brussels.⁹⁸

The constitution which was drafted under the European Political Community did not meet Britain’s approval either.⁹⁹ These are only two of the most striking examples of an overwhelmingly negative British attitude towards far-reaching European integration efforts, in the early 1950s. In opposition the Conservatives were very critical of this cautious policy of the Labour government. “It is widely thought on the Continent and in America that the British Government are lacking in zeal for the whole plan – ‘dragging their feet’ – is, I believe, the American expression. (...) This is what is widely believed and it tends to weaken our general influence in Europe.”¹⁰⁰ However, it was not just hesitation that Churchill saw. It was also obstruction of the European unification effort in the form of the European Movement and in the chamber of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.¹⁰¹ At-

⁹⁴ Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 244

⁹⁵ Eccles (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1971

⁹⁶ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2039

⁹⁷ Quotation of Uwe Kitzinger, a Gaitskellite in the Labour Party, in: Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, p. 407, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 286, 289

⁹⁸ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2164, see also, Hansard 1950, 477, c. 1167-8

⁹⁹ Bevin (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 322

¹⁰⁰ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 196, see also, Boothby (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 262

¹⁰¹ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2142, see also, Sandys (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1409

tree's reply – then from the opposition benches - to this accusation against his government was equally biting:

"I am glad to see that the Government have very largely come down to taking the same line as that which the Labour Government took. There was a time when it looked as though the Prime Minister was going to be, so to speak, the stroke of the European boat, but he is now only offering a few helpful suggestions from the towpath. In this matter we used to be accused of dragging our feet, but the proposal which has been put forward by the Foreign Secretary [Eden] is very much in line with the view which we have always taken on the question of European unity; that is, that we are willing to give it all the assistance we can, but we cannot be solely a European power."¹⁰²

Churchill's change of mind came as a surprise not only to the European partners. "Macmillan later ascribed this to Churchill's unwillingness to press the issue against hostility of the Foreign Office and the indifference of the Treasury."¹⁰³

But that was not the whole story; further into continental European integration, Britain still thought that something special had to be drawn up for her. The idea was of "(...) something much more than an old-fashioned alliance and yet something much less than an old-fashioned federation, which will be large enough and strong enough to survive the major problems of world politics in the years which lie ahead."¹⁰⁴ As the rejection of the FTA will show, the continental European partners and in particular France were no longer prepared to play the British game and give it a position of *primus inter pares*, by the late 1950s.¹⁰⁵

In the debates in the House of Commons at the time of the Messina process and even more so at the time preceding the British EEC application, one gets the impression that continental Europe had moved on while Britain was still bound up in a more and more artificial discussion about old and outmoded concepts for the political future of Europe. It was realised that continental Europe seemed to have reconciled itself to the fact that Britain would not lead the European integration effort. The debates about special arrangements for Britain, if and when it would join the integration process show the persistence of a different mindset emphasising Britain's world power status and imperial greatness, discussed earlier. This

¹⁰² Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 15, see also, Hynd (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 933

¹⁰³ See quotation of Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, London, 1971, p. 65, in: Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 22, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 104, Roy Jenkins supports the view that Eden was 'very cool' towards Europe, see Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 857

¹⁰⁴ Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 420, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1409

¹⁰⁵ See Economic Security/Britain in Europe/The Free Trade Area (FTA), see also, Economic Security/Britain in Europe/The European Free Trade Area (EFTA), see also, France/Economic Security/European Integration/The European Economic Community (EEC)

approach was not shared by continental Europe which seems to have run out of patience to support such peculiarities, by the late 1950s.

The special Relationship to the US

The special role Britain saw itself in was also reflected in its relations to the US. Britain wanted to be treated as an equal.¹⁰⁶ From the perspective of London, there were several reasons for this claim: firstly, the Commonwealth was a major element in Britain's claim to world power status. Secondly, before the war, the Empire, the fleet and sophisticated trade links had indeed provided power and riches for Britain.¹⁰⁷ After the war the picture had changed. The US was undoubtedly the dominant partner in the Anglo-American relationship.¹⁰⁸

However, one thing had not changed. When it came to choosing allies it would be the US for Britain, any time.¹⁰⁹

"Some people here constantly suggest that Britain is a subservient follower of the United States. There are people in America who suggest that the United States is misled by the clever diplomacy of Britain. They are both wrong. The United Kingdom and the United States are found acting in concert, because they are both nurtured in freedom and democracy."¹¹⁰

Britain was therefore proud to be America's strongest ally in the world and to be the only one with real influence on American decisions.¹¹¹ Even more real were, however, the fundamental worries about Britain's own security. In that respect the special relationship with America and its nuclear shield was paramount for all British governments.¹¹² Any policy weakening the special relationship was unlikely to succeed, including America's own pressure on Britain to participate in the European integration process.¹¹³ Therefore, the special relationship acted as a psycho-

¹⁰⁶ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 482, c. 1369

¹⁰⁷ See Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1291

¹⁰⁸ See Alan Clark, *The Tories, Conservatives and the Nation State*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998, p. 301

¹⁰⁹ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 200, see also, Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, p. 431

¹¹⁰ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 482, c. 1361-2

¹¹¹ Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 322

¹¹² David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 78

¹¹³ Reference to an article by Edward Dickinson, Junior Minister in the US State Department, in: Boothby (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1436, see also, Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p.15, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 152. In contrast to this position, I have not found any indication in the parliamentary debates that Britain was staying out of European integration in order to keep the Americans committed to Europe. One reason for this lack of evidence is certainly that this argument stemmed from a foreign policy mindset of Bevin in the late

logical barrier to British openness towards European integration.¹¹⁴ America itself was much more positive:

“There was a time when men thought that the conception of a United States of Europe would be resented by the United States of America, but now we have the American people, with their own heavy burden to bear, sacrificing themselves and using all their power and authority to bring about this very system. In this lies the hope of the Western world and its power to promote beneficial solutions, perhaps, of what happens in Asia.”¹¹⁵

This was clearly a Europhile argument by Churchill from the opposition benches, which was meant to prompt the Labour government to adopt a more positive stance towards European integration, supported, not least, by the pro-European position of the American administration.¹¹⁶ When the first serious integration steps were taken in the form of the Schuman proposals, the US was very disappointed about Britain staying outside.¹¹⁷

“The United States are not, thank God, an aggressive or Imperialist Power, but if we fail to discharge our responsibilities in this matter [participation in the Schuman proposals], it will not be surprising if little by little they look upon us less as partners and more and more as air-strip number one.”¹¹⁸

The prompting by the Americans of a more pro-European position on the British part was carried through right to the last major European initiative, i.e. the EEC.¹¹⁹ In particular towards the end of the 1950s, when British power was obviously dwindling, Britain saw the Europe of the Six rather as a competitor than as a partner in respect to the ‘special relationship’. This became especially obvious in the competition between the British EFTA scheme and the EEC for American support. In the reply to the Foreign Office Lloyd describes his frustration over American support for the EEC, but also his fear that continental Europe could replace Britain in the special relationship, or could, at least, weaken the link between Britain and the US.

1940s. However, it does not have any standing later on, which seems to be supported by the lack of evidence in primary sources in the 1950s. For the argument, see David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 70, 75

¹¹⁴ Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 15

¹¹⁵ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 193, see also, Hopkinson (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 238

¹¹⁶ David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 45

¹¹⁷ Clement Davies (Lib.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1931-2

¹¹⁸ Amery (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2022-3

¹¹⁹ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 135

“Our Special Relationship with the USA: It does exist. It means preferential treatment for us in discussion and in certain types of knowledge (nuclear, intelligence, etc.). It gives us considerable influence on United States policy. We ceased to be on an equal basis with the United States and USSR when we gave up the Indian Empire. We have been in retreat since ... I do not believe size or physical military power will decide the future. But even if it is so we must prevent the Six supplanting us as the principal influence on United States policy. (...) To achieve this, we need to play in the game both as pro-Europeans and pro-Atlantic community.”¹²⁰

Leaning more towards Europe, some Europhile MPs saw European integration as an alternative to the special relationship with the US:

“I am fed up with the inferiority complex which all too many people in all parts of the Committee take regarding the United States, and with the low view they take of the possibilities of Europe. If the metropolitan and colonial territories of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany and Italy are united, is there anything the United States have got, either in manpower or raw materials, which we have not got? (...) we can achieve in United Europe that same high standard of living and that same strength in armaments which has made the United States the hope of the freedom-loving nations of the world today (...).”¹²¹

This, however, was and remained a minority position. In the ‘special relationship’, Britain saw itself again hovering between the Americans and the other Europeans; a power in its own right and not prepared to decent to the status of a mere European power. The ‘National Security’ indicator for Britain has brought out this idea in several different aspects and it has underlined this trait in the British way of thinking.

¹²⁰ Selwyn Lloyd’s (Con), Foreign Secretary, reply to the FO on 13/12/59, in: Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 133

¹²¹ Astor (Con.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1538

4.3 Military Security

4.3.1 East-West Antagonism

Russia had been the other great winner of World War II and the one major continental European ally against Nazi Germany. It had taken the brunt of the German onslaught and survived with its ideology victorious. Even when the signs of oppression and expansionism became obvious, experienced leaders such as Anthony Eden were still wary about an open rift with Soviet Russia.¹ Even when the two antagonistic camps became reality, the hope remained of reviving the old wartime alliance, if only for the sake of preventing a conflict of the kind the two countries had just been through.

Churchill's analysis was different:

“(…) I think it probable that the Soviet Government fear the friendship of the West even more than they do our hostility. The Soviet regime and the lives of its rulers might be imperilled by allowing free, easy and friendly inter-mingling with the outer world. An endless series of quarrels, a vehement and violent antagonism, the consciousness of an outside enemy in the minds of the masses, may be regarded by the Soviet as a necessary precautionary element in maintaining the existence of the Communist power. There indeed is a gloomy thought. There indeed is a reason for fear. But fear must never be allowed to cast out hope.”²

In 1950, this was the first comprehensive explanation for Soviet behaviour, which was confirmed when the Soviet Union gradually cut all communication channels with the West and putting on a show of force. Spheres of interest, demarcation lines and all the rest turned up again, and became a fact of Cold War life. The reality of the East-West split had been realised in the foundation of the Federal Republic and NATO in the West and the German Democratic Republic and the Warsaw Pact in the East, only a little later. The military mind of Field-Marshal Montgomery saw the strategic implications clearly:

“The strategic centre of the battle for world peace today is Western Europe. We must be able to hold the position there. The task before the nations of the West is primarily political. Economic fusion and military strength will not be obtained until the political association between the group of nations concerned has first been defined.”³

¹ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1448-51, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 283, 284, 318-20, see also, Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 78

² Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 198-9, see also, quotation from a conversation between Adenauer and Churchill 4/12/51, in: Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, p. 508

³ Quotation from Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery in: Boothby (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1432

The main purpose of Western defences was therefore not to fall for Soviet promises or intimidation, and not to lay idle against the threats, but to unite the western world in an effective defence.⁴

The Soviet Military Threat

West Germany would be part of the Western defence system, but first the realisation had to settle in that Germany was the threat no more:

“We are near all of us now agreed in seeking the unity and restoration of Europe as a great hope for the future. We cannot do this without the aid of the Germans. The strong German race, which, during the last 40 years, we and our Allies twice fought and defeated, have now the opportunity of rendering an immense service to mankind. Having submitted to internal tyranny and brought measureless suffering upon us all, and especially themselves, they now have a chance of redeeming the German name by helping to repair what has happened in the past and by playing their part – and it might be a great one – in lifting the civilisation of Europe to a level where its old glories may revive and where the various forms of tolerant freedom and resulting happiness and culture may be restored.”⁵

The Germans actually signed up to this task and with the Korean War in June 1950, the Soviet Union became the real threat.⁶ It underpinned the assessment of the West that the Soviet Union had become an expansionist power which could well turn against the remainder of Western Europe soon.⁷ Attlee’s warning against the Soviet threat was very clear:

“Our way of life is in danger, our happiness, and the happiness and future of our children, are in danger; and it is both our privilege and our duty to defend them if they are attacked. War would bring our standards crashing down; defeat would destroy and obliterate them for ever. Make no mistake about that. (...) One power in the great alliance that overthrew Hitler (...) did not turn back to the path of peace; it went down the road of conquest and of imperialism.”⁸

The material superiority of the Red Army was overwhelming in the early 1950s.⁹ Unlike the Western Allies, the USSR had never disarmed. Estimates of Soviet military strength differed widely. Figures of 120–215 divisions were mentioned as

⁴ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 172, 174

⁵ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 192 see also, Noel-Baker (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1566

⁶ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 953-4, see also, Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1449-50

⁷ Astor (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 257, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 257

⁸ Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, p. 470, Attlee speaking in Lewisham on 28.1.1951, see also p. 502

⁹ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1333

regular troops;¹⁰ up to 500 divisions after mobilisation;¹¹ this included the armies of the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe.

One official complaint which Britain brought against these states and the USSR was that none of them had reduced their armed forces to the limits in the individual peace treaties which they had signed with the four Allies.¹² This happened within the Soviet bloc and, undoubtedly, with the USSR in the know, which only underlined Western caution against the Soviet threat.

Relatively unsubstantiated as the guesses of Soviet military strength were¹³, they supported the psychological build-up which was meant to prepare Britain for a possible conflict.¹⁴ The continuation of National Service in the Armed Forces – unprecedented during peace time – indicated how serious the Soviet threat was taken.¹⁵

There were, however, some who sincerely doubted the doctrine of Soviet expansionism. The alternative explanation was that Russia was still so afraid of Germany – based on past experience – that it kept the high level of armament for its own security.¹⁶ This reason may have been understandable from a British perspective, but the ways and means used by the Soviet Union to achieve its security were not.¹⁷ After Stalin's death in March 1953 the climate changed. The relaxation and the reduction of tensions on the international stage were seen in the West as providing a window of opportunity for a rapprochement with Russia.¹⁸ Churchill put it in a very realistic way:

“The only really sure guide to the actions of mighty nations and powerful Governments is a correct estimate of what they consider to be their own interests. Applying this test, I feel a sense of reassurance. Studying our own strength and that of Europe under the massive

¹⁰ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1946, 427, c. 1689-90, see also, Macmillan (Con.), Defence Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 593

¹¹ Emrys Hughes (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1109

¹² Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 45, see also, Beamish (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 939, under Peace Treaties, Eastern Europe (Violations), see also, Beamish (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 510, c. 1821-2, under Eastern Europe (Armed Forces), see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 29

¹³ Regarding the uncertainty and the guesswork in hard military facts, i.e. troop numbers, see Rhys Davies (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1621, see also, Donnelly (Lab.), in Hansard 1950-51, 491, c. 526

¹⁴ Churchill using the entrenched fear of the German U-boat, followed a similar line, when he described the same weapon in the hands of the Soviet Union. See Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1291-2, 1294

¹⁵ See, Shinwell (Lab.) Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1273

¹⁶ Hinchingbrooke (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1206, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 425

¹⁷ Mott-Radclyffe (Con.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 430

¹⁸ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 228, 230, 231, 233, see also, Alport (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 324, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 10

American shield, I do not find it unreasonable or dangerous to conclude that internal prosperity rather than external conquest is not only the deep desire of the Russian peoples, but also the long-term interest of their rulers."¹⁹

'Co-existence' was the Russian invention for living in peace, at least for the time being.²⁰ Others, however, were not so sure whether the final objective of world revolution and world domination had been abandoned indefinitely.²¹

In addition, the strikes in East Germany were seen as indicative of the Soviet system coming under pressure from within.²² Such internal tension may have put the Soviet system under pressure, but the reaction was swift and brutal in Soviet tanks on the streets and the tightening up of the internal system of repression. The period of relaxation was ended soon and the familiar regime of internal control and terror was again clearly discernable.

In respect to the German problem it was thought unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept a reunited and rearmed Germany in the Western alliance system. Alternatively a collective security system along the lines of the old Locarno treaty²³ was suggested – mainly by the Labour opposition.²⁴ In the end such a policy was not seen as realistic, as was also conceded by some Labour MPs:

"Any attempt to translate a vague Locarno idea into detailed proposals must be of such a sort that either Russia or Germany would certainly refuse it. It is not, therefore, a realistic policy (...)."²⁵

So the period of relative *détente*, in the mid-1950s, soon ended and the Cold War was resumed.

¹⁹ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 29, see also, Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 175

²⁰ Hynd (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 930

²¹ Wyatt (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 961, see also, Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 294

²² R.A. Butler (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 218

²³ The essence of the Locarno treaty was that all member states would resist aggression against another member regardless of whether the attack came from another treaty member or from outside.

²⁴ Ernest Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 443, see also, Arthur Henderson (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 432-3, see also, Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 590

²⁵ Gordon Walker (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 338

The Nuclear Age

The destructive power of nuclear weapons as well as the long-term effects of their use set them apart from all other weapon systems.²⁶ They completely changed strategic doctrine and became the ultimate deterrent.²⁷

Attlee and Churchill in particular, shared the concern about the atomic bomb. "Churchill believed that an H-bomb exchange meant effectively the end of the human race."²⁸ The greatest danger came from Soviet intransigence which prevented any sensible arrangements in the nuclear field.²⁹ The only logical way open to the West was deterrence. Accordingly, 'Massive Retaliation' became the dominant NATO strategy against the Soviet threat until the beginning of 1957.³⁰ The consequences were clear. It could turn into nothing short of a nuclear apocalypse which could physically destroy Britain.³¹

Nevertheless, it was this very nuclear shield which protected Europe and ultimately Britain from Soviet attack.

"Do not, I beg the House, nurse foolish delusions that we have any other effective overall shield at the present time from mortal danger than the atomic bomb in the possession, thank God, of the United States. But for that there would be no hope that Europe could preserve its freedom, or that our island could escape an ordeal incomparably more severe than those we have already endured."³²

Britain played a vital role in establishing and maintaining this nuclear deterrent. While the US B29 bombers stationed in Britain were the backbone of Western nuclear defence in the early 1950s³³, by the end of 1952 Britain had developed its

²⁶ Because of this, the McMahon Act in the US transferred the final decision as to the use of nuclear weapons from the commander in the field to the President. see Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1439

²⁷ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 201, see also, Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 176

²⁸ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 849, see also, p. 846, 873-874

²⁹ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 70, 746

³⁰ See strategy paper NATO Military Committee MC 48, replaced by 'Flexible Response' on 23 May 1957 in MC 48/2, MC14/2 and MC70, which saw the use of the full nuclear arsenal only if it was judged that all-out war was imminent. see Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, pp. 33-41, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 284 for original see 1958 defence white paper

³¹ S.O. Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1209, see also, H. Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 420

³² Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1297, see also, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1334, 482, c. 1368

³³ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 482, c. 1369, Under the Spaatz-Tedder agreement of 1946, US military aircraft could use British air bases in peace time. US bombers that could reach the USSR were first deployed in Britain itself in 1948 during the Berlin crisis. The first US atomic bombs were moved to Britain in 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, when it was feared a similar aggression might

own nuclear strike force. However, Churchill did not think it likely that a new world war was imminent. The reason he gave was simple. It was the devastating destructive potential which both sides would have to suffer from the very initial stages of such a war:

“Moralists may find it a melancholy thought that peace can find no nobler foundation than mutual terror. But for my part, I shall be content if these foundations are solid, because they will give us the extra time and the new breathing space for the supreme effort which has to be made for a world settlement.”³⁴

This was one factor for his decision to manufacture the British H-bomb. “The actual decision to develop atomic weapons was only taken on 8 January 1947 by a small sub-committee of the British Cabinet.”³⁵ The later integration of such weapons into NATO nuclear deterrence embodied Britain’s close links with the US, which was the only way to make deterrence and potential retaliation credible and which, therefore, was pivotal for Britain’s own security from a Soviet nuclear attack.³⁶

More generally, nuclear deterrence was the answer of the West to Soviet conventional superiority.³⁷ On the basis of nuclear deterrence – countering Soviet conventional superiority – it was indeed the West which rejected Soviet proposals for complete nuclear disarmament as early as 1951³⁸, although the US had suggested the internationalisation of nuclear weapons earlier, even before the USSR had them.³⁹

In addition, one catch with nuclear deterrence was that it was exactly the nuclear rationale which could be seen as a reason to drive the Soviet Union to expansionism: “(...) their weakness in nuclear weapons would make it all the more important, as I have said, for them to secure large areas of territory in Western Europe.”⁴⁰ Size mattered in the sense that the strategic dispersal of vital facilities

occur in Europe. See Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 63-4, see also, Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 484

³⁴ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 198, see also, Hansard 1950, 478, c. 989

³⁵ Birch (Con.), Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 435, see also, Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 875, 893, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 282, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 66

³⁶ Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 69-70

³⁷ reference to General Gruenter (SACEUR) and Field-Marshal Montgomery in: Bellenger (Lab.), in Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 438, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 2

³⁸ Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 38

³⁹ Pannell (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 647

⁴⁰ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 177

drastically reduced the effectiveness of a pre-emptive nuclear strike, which could prevent it from taking place at all.⁴¹

Although it was not given much credibility in the West, according to the above logic, expansionism could be justified as a defensive tactic forced upon the Soviet Union by the West through the ultimate threat of nuclear apocalypse.

4.3.2 *The national armies of Europe*

German Rearmament ⁴²

In 1950, the pressing issue of European defence led Churchill to mention ‘a German contribution’ towards the Western defences.

“I find it necessary to say, however, speaking personally, giving my own opinion, that this long front [of the Atlantic Pact] cannot be successfully defended without the active aid of Western Germany. (...) Germany is at present disarmed and forbidden to keep any military force. Just beyond her Eastern frontiers lies the enormous military array of the Soviet Union and its satellite States, far exceeding in troops, in armour and in air power all that the other Allies have got. (...) We have no guarantee to give except to engage in a general war which, after wrecking what is left of European civilisation, would no doubt end ultimately in the defeat of the Soviets, but which might begin by the Communist enslavement of Western Germany, and not only of Western Germany.”⁴³

Churchill’s breaking of ranks sparked a long and often hot-tempered debate about German rearmament. Labour was utterly opposed, which is reflected in the following position:

“Its long-term European policy is to achieve unification of Germany and its neutralisation in a peace treaty with the Russians. It may take ten years or fifteen years, but it is the only sound policy. Unify Germany, disarm Germany, neutralise her and guarantee her against aggression from both sides and then all of Eastern Europe and Western Europe are very likely to be happy and united. Arm her, and we make the unity of Europe impossible (...)”⁴⁴

⁴¹ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p.103-4; For the same rationale applied to the French and British Empires see National Security/Territorial Integrity/Empire and Commonwealth and France/National Security/Territorial Integrity/ The *Communauté Française/Decolonisation*

⁴² This section will not deal with military details of German Rearmament, because they have been extensively dealt within previous chapters, see France/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/German Rearmament, see also, Germany/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/Rearmament, for a reference to the British position and the military details see S. Dockrill, *Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament 1950-1955*, for the early German rearmament policy, as mentioned in the above section see particularly Chs. 1 and 2

⁴³ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1288-9, see also, Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 248

⁴⁴ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 280, see also, Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, p. 498

In 1950, it was inconceivable to many Labour MPs to have German officers in commanding positions, even in the high command.⁴⁵ German mercenaries for Europe, which could have solved the military problem, were considered highly unlikely by Labour, because of German honour and national pride.⁴⁶ At the beginning of the 1950s, a non-national army was not considered a serious alternative.⁴⁷ Particularly in the military field the national discourse was clearly predominant. In this mindset, realistic Labour MPs realised that full equality of Germany, including the right of self-defence, was ultimately inevitable.⁴⁸

Although Churchill's lead had won acceptance among the Tories in that there was the general conviction that German forces would be needed for the defence of Western Europe, some fundamental doubts remained. It would have to be done slowly and with sufficient safeguards in place to prevent this new German army from becoming a dominant political factor domestically. The mercenary option was the first which came to mind if German soldiers were needed, but not a German army. Right-wing Conservatives stressed that mercenaries were already being used, for example, in the French Foreign Legion.⁴⁹ However, it was not only firmly rejected by Adenauer, but the principles of equality and, importantly, honour were accepted as the basis for German military contribution by the vast majority of the Tory party.⁵⁰ The political consensus between both parties was that the defence of Europe against Russia was paramount.⁵¹ Hence, a German defence contribution was considered essential by the NATO powers as early as autumn 1950.⁵² And the Labour government gave up its opposition and agreed that "(...) if Western Germany is to be defended, it seems to us only fair and reasonable that the people of Western Germany should help in their own defence."⁵³ The Conservatives fully agreed and implemented this policy when they came into office⁵⁴, initially, in admit-

⁴⁵ Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 240, see also, Crossman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 278

⁴⁶ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 278

⁴⁷ Bellenger (Lab.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 464

⁴⁸ Noel-Baker (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1573

⁴⁹ Hinchingbrooke (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1201, see also, France/Military Security/East-West Antagonism/German Rearmament

⁵⁰ Padget (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 85, see also, Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 191

⁵¹ See Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 17, see also, Bevan (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1514

⁵² Amery (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 220

⁵³ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1172

⁵⁴ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 370, 1457-8, see also, Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 512, c. 576

ting a financial German contribution towards Western Defence in 1952⁵⁵, and, later, in an actual military contribution in 1955, i.e. the Bundeswehr. Five years had passed since the start of the debate in which a German military contribution had become acceptable and had come to be considered indispensable for Western defence.⁵⁶

The main question was how to make German rearmament safe. Picking up on his idea of a European army, Churchill suggested: "(...) an Atlantic army with (...) a European army inside of it and a German contingent, on honourable terms, inside that."⁵⁷ In addition, Germany would only have integrated forces, no national ones and it would not have a general staff. ⁵⁸ "The final safeguard, however, is that Germany should feel herself a partner in the Western comity of nations and should form the habit of acting within that framework."⁵⁹ To round the British priorities off, Attlee – still as Prime Minister – set out a sequential list for rearmament

"Obviously, the re-armament of the countries of the Atlantic Treaty must precede that of Germany. Second, I think the building up of Forces in the democratic States should precede the creation of German forces. Third, the arrangements must be such that German units are integrated in a way which would preclude the emergence again of a German military menace."⁶⁰

As Attlee's list shows, British priorities did not put Germany on a fully equal footing with the other West European states, let alone the Atlantic partners. However, with the creation of the Bundeswehr Germany undoubtedly made an important step towards equality with its Western partners.

The French

France was Britain's main continental European ally⁶¹, but particularly in the context of German military potential, British confidence in France was not strong,

⁵⁵ Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 496, c. 1460, a monthly payment of 850 million D-mark (~£70 million) was agreed, plus about a billion a year for defence arrangements in Berlin = 11.25 billion D-mark p.a.

⁵⁶ Macmillan (Con.), Defence Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 593

⁵⁷ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1333, see also, Noel-Baker (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1573

⁵⁸ Sandys (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1418, see also, Macmillan (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1309-10

⁵⁹ Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1353

⁶⁰ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 67

⁶¹ See Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 79, 80

mainly because of the instability of the Fourth Republic.⁶² This kind of weakness showed in the French need for reassurance from Britain:

“Certainly we have, since the end of the war, guaranteed five times under the various N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. agreements, under the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, to help to the utmost of our strength defend France against aggressive attack. Quite a lot—five times; and not as a result of any party decisions, but with the general assent of the British nation.”⁶³

France had been overrun by German military forces several times in the past and there was no indication that the respective strength of both people had significantly changed in the post-war era. Left unchecked, MPs recognised French fears that Germany would have the potential to dominate France and, indeed, the whole of the European continent.⁶⁴ The only thing which had forced the Germans back behind their frontiers was the intervention of Britain on behalf of France, naturally with some help from the US and Russia. This had several repercussions: firstly, the Franco-British alliance was considered essential to keep Germany in check.⁶⁵ Secondly, Britain saw itself as the dominant partner in the alliance with France.⁶⁶ Thirdly, in the early 1950s, there is a general confidence that Britain could stand alone against Germany, if the nightmare scenario of post-war German dominance of the continent was realised.

“Perhaps the lesson is that we cannot tame the Germans by a constitution⁶⁷ and that it is better to have the British in, on terms appropriate to the British, to maintain the power relationship, which is the only thing which can tame Germany. One thing about which we ought to warn our French friends is the belief that a constitution can cure chronic evils. A constitution such as this will make no difference to the essential danger from Germany.”⁶⁸

⁶² Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1997, see also, Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 581, for a reference to the position in Whitehall see David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 41, particularly in terms of sharing of military secrets there is an additional argument, namely that because of the strong Communist element in the political establishment, France was not a reliable partner. This argument was particularly strong during the Communists' time in government until 5 May 1947, see Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 84, see also, France/National Security/Internal Reform/The Fourth Republic

⁶³ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 892

⁶⁴ Paton (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 630, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1405

⁶⁵ Fitzroy Maclean (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2035

⁶⁶ See J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 120, 123

⁶⁷ The reference to 'constitution' is the Schuman Plan

⁶⁸ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2038, see also, Biggs-Davison (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 734

Fourthly, France's leaders were well aware of the country's weakness. According to the British logic it was therefore highly unlikely that France would not sign up to an isolated alliance with Germany – the historical reference in 1950 is the Schuman Plan. Open British rejection would suffice to kill any French idea of still signing up to the Schuman Plan.⁶⁹ In this sense, Britain saw itself as the leading power in Europe, capable to prevent old evils, especially German militarism, from happening, again.

British Rearmament

Britain itself had taken decisive action to meet the Soviet threat, well before any other European initiatives were seriously considered. A sharp increase in the defence budget⁷⁰ and the extension of the National service from 18 to 24 months were implemented under the Labour government.⁷¹ At the beginning of 1951, before the rearmament programme took effect, the Army had an overall size of just under 400,000 men.⁷² Numbers rose, as planned, to 900,000 by the middle of 1952⁷³, which would make up 10 Regular⁷⁴ and 12 Territorial divisions⁷⁵ after mobilisation.⁷⁶ New weapon systems – Centurion tanks, Venom fighters, Canberra bombers – were developed and new ship designs introduced.⁷⁷ The defence budget estimates continued to rise to an all-time high of £3,600 million, which would be £4,700 million by the end, over three years (1951-4), and which was the best the country could do short of planning the economy on a war footing.⁷⁸ The general impression was that war might be just around the corner.⁷⁹

⁶⁹ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2038, see also c. 2045

⁷⁰ From 8% to 14% of GNP, see L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 66

⁷¹ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 957-8, see also, King's Speech on the prorogation of Parliament 1950, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 2943

⁷² 10 Divisions à 20,000 men plus auxiliaries, see Shinwell (Lab.), Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 411-5

⁷³ Shinwell (Lab.), Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 413

⁷⁴ Three divisions were set for garrison duty in Germany, later increased to four. Just over four divisions were earmarked for overseas duty and another one augmented for home defence. See Shinwell (Lab.), Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 413, see also, Strachey (Lab.) Secretary of State for War, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 544

⁷⁵ Territorial divisions ~ 600,000 men whose main task would be the defence of Britain, see Head (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 535

⁷⁶ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 960

⁷⁷ Shinwell, Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 419-20

⁷⁸ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 959, see also, Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 512, c. 577-8

⁷⁹ Shinwell, Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 414-6

Although the Labour government committed Britain to the rearmament effort, it was clearly uneasy about it:

“We do not like re-armament for its own sake: nor do we believe that to be the disposition of the nation. (...) Yet, when exposed to danger (...) we must, with resolution, accept the responsibility of providing adequate safeguards against aggression, and, if we must choose between submission to tyranny and enslavement, on the one hand, and the safeguarding of our liberties and pattern of life, on the other (...) there is no other course open to us than to defend—at whatever cost—our security.”⁸⁰

Gaitskell, in his main speech on spending for the rearmament programme, presented it as the preparatory step which would prevent a ‘major attack’ and ‘total mobilisation’. However, the grim perspective that it might still happen was implicit.⁸¹ For many Labour MPs the armament programme was going too far.⁸² Its impact on the economy and the cuts required in social services took the Party and, indeed, the government to breaking point.⁸³ The resignation of Aneurin Bevan was only the most obvious sign of strain in Labour.⁸⁴

However, once in opposition the diverging positions could be spelled out more freely:

“If the re-armament programme is so great that it makes inroads upon the Welfare State inevitable, as hon. Members opposite seem to consider, judging by the action they are taking, then it is necessary to ask ourselves whether the effectiveness of the re-armament programme in achieving defence against Communism might not be offset by the spreading inside certain countries of that against which we are fighting.”⁸⁵

This statement of the former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was geared against the newly elected Conservative government. The complaint, however, could easily be levelled against his own Labour government. The crux of the question was whether such a substantial rearmament effort was warranted by the military threat. Few Labour MPs saw war in the foreseeable future, much less as

⁸⁰ Shinwell, Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 427-8, Bellenger (Lab.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 462

⁸¹ Gaitskell (Lab.), Minister of State for Economic, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1149

⁸² Emrys Hughes (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1109, see also, Bevan (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1514

⁸³ See Gaitskell (Lab.), Minister of State for Economic, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1131-7, 1139, 1147, three ministers resigned over the issue of rearmament, i.e. Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman, see David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 78

⁸⁴ Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, p. 478, 479, see also, Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, p. 21, There is no record in Hansard of Bevan’s support for the nuclear research programme during his time in cabinet. See East-West Antagonism/The Nuclear Age

⁸⁵ Ernest Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 877

imminent.⁸⁶ For them, the rearmament programme was deemed simply too much for Britain to shoulder.⁸⁷

In addition, Labour's old preference for disarmament again resurfaced.⁸⁸ National Service was a particular concern.⁸⁹ The need for large numbers of troops decreased after the Korean War and because of reduced imperial responsibilities in the later 1950s. However, the Conservative government stuck to the 24-month National Service.⁹⁰ By 1955, the pressure was on to reduce or abandon National Service.⁹¹ And Labour doubted the need for National Service in general.⁹² The decision to abandon it was finally taken in 1957⁹³, which coincided with a shift towards nuclear defence and ballistic missile systems, as the main pillar of British defences.⁹⁴

In sum, the armament policy of the British government was, firstly, seen as exercising the right of self-defence.⁹⁵ Secondly, the policy of strength was essential if Britain was to shoulder properly its world-wide responsibilities.⁹⁶ Thirdly, this kind of policy was also necessary to give diplomacy and ultimately peace a chance.⁹⁷ Endurance and stamina were essential to win the ideological competition and sustain the Western liberal democratic system.⁹⁸ Therefore, the British rearmament programme was presented as a contribution to Western defences in the form of NATO.⁹⁹

⁸⁶ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 288, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 424

⁸⁷ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 285, see also, Bevan (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 409-11

⁸⁸ Noel-Baker (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 317, see also, Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 230, see also Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, p. 528, 529, 534, particularly for Bevan's position on disarmament.

⁸⁹ See, Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 512, c. 581, 584, 586, 588

⁹⁰ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 512, c. 572-4, see also, Head (Con.), Secretary of State for War, in Hansard 1952-53, 512, c. 602, see also, Eden (Con.) Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 545, c. 31

⁹¹ See National Service Call-up (White Paper), in Hansard 1955-56, 545, c. 30-3

⁹² Strachey (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 391, see also, Swingler (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 545, c. 30-1

⁹³ It was implemented in 1960. The total strength was limited to 185,000 men, see Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 487, 489

⁹⁴ Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 72, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 282

⁹⁵ Shinwell (Lab.), Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 411, see also, Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 696

⁹⁶ Head (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 540

⁹⁷ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 678, see also, Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 175

⁹⁸ Strachey (Lab.), Secretary of State for War, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 542, see also, Lead article in the *Times* 14/2/50

⁹⁹ King's Speech on the prorogation of parliament 1950, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 2942

4.3.3 Integrated Defences

In all Western military organisations, the sole purpose of defence was eloquently presented in the following quotation: “We hope that the Russians are beginning to realise the analogy of the lamp-post and the motor car which is that no lamp-post has ever yet hit a motor car except in self-defence. The tragedy is that the international roadways are not at the moment very adequately lit.”¹⁰⁰ The West was alert to prove the accusation of aggression wrong, not least in order to prevent an arms race.¹⁰¹

The Brussels Treaty

The Dunkirk Treaty – the first of such common Western defence arrangements – between France and Britain was signed in 1947 with the primary purpose of preventing any military resurrection of Germany. Its successor, the Brussels Treaty, was signed in 1948, adding the Benelux countries to the alliance and cultural and social elements to its content. Such initiatives beyond concrete military arrangements reflected the rise of enthusiasm for European integration in the late 1940s.¹⁰² On the one hand, the Treaty represented the recognition that the British insular perspective of defence was outmoded. Modern times rather required a common and integrated European defence effort.¹⁰³ The crux of that proposition had always been whether Britain would be willing to station troops on the continent on a permanent basis and under an integrated command structure.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, the Treaty also had an Atlantic perspective for Britain. The term ‘Western Union’ was often used synonymously for the Brussels Treaty Organisation and sought to project the prospect of a formal alliance with the US.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, it was the stepping stone towards NATO.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ Prior-Palmer (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 491, c. 522

¹⁰¹ Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 39, Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1461

¹⁰² Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 69

¹⁰³ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1307-8

¹⁰⁴ See, Wyatt (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1530-1

¹⁰⁵ Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1945, see also, Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 482-3, for reference to the term and the content of Western Union, see Bevin’s ‘Western European Union’ speech in the Commons on 22 January 1948, as quoted in: Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 84

¹⁰⁶ Shinwell (Lab.) Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1265, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 143

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

The Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin became one of the key figures in the forging of the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁰⁷ The idea of neutrality had been discarded as a false friend, although built on the genuine longing for peace.¹⁰⁸ Undoubtedly, there were pacifist MPs in the Parliamentary Labour Party who put forwards such positions, but the Foreign Secretary Bevin was not one of them and he made it clear that the crucial question about neutrality in the European context was not whether one wanted to stay out of the Cold War, but whether one could find the strength to defend that neutrality. Neither Europe nor Britain could do that on its own.¹⁰⁹

The issue of neutralisation still had particular relevance for West Germany.¹¹⁰ There was a wide consensus in the House of Commons that it would not be possible to allow for a neutral Germany with all its population and industrial potential in the centre of Europe.¹¹¹ If neutral, the belief was that it would fall under Soviet control.¹¹² In the worst case, it would create a vacuum and bring the Cold War to a head, with the consequence of another world war.¹¹³

Neutrality was, therefore, neither an option for Britain, nor Europe, nor, indeed, Germany. Any lingering thoughts about British neutrality were dispelled by the commitment to NATO.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the revolution in American foreign policy was based on the Truman doctrine which allowed of a permanent military commitment to Europe.¹¹⁴ The stated purpose of NATO was the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area from outside aggression and general cooperation between the partners within this area.¹¹⁵ It was the development of common practice and common answers to defence questions which really set it apart from a traditional alliance.¹¹⁶ Importantly, this also meant a limitation of national sovereignty, which was another

¹⁰⁷ Bevin (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 319-20, see also, Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1503-4

¹⁰⁸ For adherents to the pacifist current and representative comments in that direction see Rhys Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1620, see also, Emrys Roberts (Lib.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 203

¹⁰⁹ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 583

¹¹⁰ For reference to neutralisation tendencies within Germany, in the peace movement and the trade unions, see Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 441

¹¹¹ Corbet (Lab.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 106-7, see also, Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1500

¹¹² Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1581

¹¹³ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 70

¹¹⁴ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 70, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 25

¹¹⁵ Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 496, c. 1465

¹¹⁶ Morrison (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 491, c. 471

step towards military interdependence.¹¹⁷ In less abstract terms it meant sharing intelligence, common training programmes and the nucleus of common political institutions, e.g. the Atlantic Council.¹¹⁸

Against the background of Soviet material superiority there was some doubt whether continental Europe could be defended. The peripheral defence strategy was built on this scepticism. It proposed to leave continental mainland to Soviet influence. Peripheral points such as Britain, Spain and some islands in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean should be held as bomber bases and as bridgeheads for later re-conquest. However, by 1950 at the latest this strategy was untenable: "I am very glad that this view has been decisively rejected by the United States, by ourselves and by all the Powers concerned in the Brussels Treaty and the Atlantic Pact."¹¹⁹

One major reason for dropping the peripheral defence concept was that it was no longer credible in respect to possible German membership in NATO, because the peripheral defence strategy would have left continental Europe open to conquest by Russia. However, the Labour opposition picked up the inconsistency in government policy between German integration into NATO and a policy of German reunification.¹²⁰ German NATO membership would finally close the option of coming to a settlement of the German problem via negotiations with the Soviets.¹²¹ Consequentially, the only possibility left was war, an alternative Labour was not ready to accept.¹²² In this realisation Labour had exactly the same position as the German SPD and both criticised their governments for it.¹²³

The second major obstacle to German NATO membership was that the organisation was not suited to control any German military revival, because as it stood it could not oversee its individual constituent units, i.e. the national armies.¹²⁴

Nevertheless, as the old strategy of peripheral defence was replaced by deterrence¹²⁵, the German contribution to what was considered sufficient to halt a Soviet attack, of some 60 to 70 divisions, became important in psychological and in

¹¹⁷ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1911

¹¹⁸ Shinwell, Minister of Defence, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 426

¹¹⁹ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1288, see also, Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1043-4

¹²⁰ See also War Experience/ The hope for a peaceful future /The German Question

¹²¹ Paton (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 629, see also, Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 478-80, 483

¹²² Paton (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 628

¹²³ See Foot (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 151-3, 347, see also, Castle (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 364-5

¹²⁴ Sandys (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1419, see also, Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1476

¹²⁵ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 176, for nuclear deterrence see The Nuclear Age

material terms.¹²⁶ It was more than clear that Europe was in no state to defend itself against the Red Army. "I am sure that while there is talk of integration in Western Europe, Western Europe will not be strong enough in itself: it is the integration of the Western world that will give the strength and the power necessary to defend ourselves."¹²⁷ Bevin's evaluation proved accurate in that the way was paved for British, but more importantly American weaponry flowing to the continent, facilitating its rearmament.¹²⁸ The conclusion was that on the basis of the Atlantic link and under British leadership in Europe the continent might be saved.¹²⁹

"The Americans did not commit themselves in Europe for the sake of the French or for our sake, but because they thought it was the major interest of the United States. Indeed, if I did not think that was the reason, I would not put much faith in it."¹³⁰ This view formed the solid and mutual foundation of the Atlantic link with Labour and Conservatives sharing the war-time consensus that everything must be done to stabilise, maintain and extend the alliance with the US.¹³¹

Apart from the material need for American support¹³² the psychological effect of American presence in Europe was most important. On the one hand, it showed its Western allies that America would stand by them.¹³³ On the other hand, it signalled to the other leading world power, Russia, that it would not have Europe without a war with America.¹³⁴ The essential step was the American commitment to station US troops in Europe on a permanent basis, i.e. also during peacetime.¹³⁵

This shows that psychological deterrence was the most important component of the Western defences. Within the Western bloc, NATO was therefore meant to build a united front which could measure up to the Soviet threat and which in turn could be presented to the Soviet Union as the basis of the policy of strength.¹³⁶ There was a consensus in the political establishment that NATO alone had guaranteed the security of the West and had made the Soviet bloc move away from

¹²⁶ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 986, For the strategic and military importance of German membership in NATO, see *The national armies of Europe/German Rearmament*

¹²⁷ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 320

¹²⁸ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 69

¹²⁹ Head (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 540, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 847

¹³⁰ Younger (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 682-3

¹³¹ Morrison (Lab.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 491, c. 473

¹³² See Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 583

¹³³ Kerr (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 296

¹³⁴ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 279

¹³⁵ Sandys (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1420, see also, Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1331

¹³⁶ See Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 679, see also, Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1954-55, 535, c. 175

threats of force to the policy of 'co-existence'.¹³⁷ "I believe myself that Russia will one day disengage, and that is why I believe in the policy of peace through strength. I think this is an achievable end and that the achievement of a settlement with Russia can be envisaged, even though I do not think it will happen in the near future."¹³⁸

NATO remained the most important defence arrangement of the West throughout the 1950s. Built on this recognition, NATO had one of its strongest supporters in Britain.

The Pacific Pact Proposals

After the first successful co-operation in the Atlantic Pact, the focus shifted to the Far East. In particular, because of the Korean War, it was thought that the same example of a regional alliance and security system could be applied to the Pacific region, too. The Labour government was, however, cautious and did not go along with such enthusiastic plans mainly from the Conservative opposition.¹³⁹ Anthony Nutting, later Minister of State in the Foreign Office, however, put forward a more realistic evaluation, in accordance with the Labour government.

"In the past, several of my hon. Friends have suggested that we should have a Pacific Pact on the basis of the Atlantic Pact. Well, I do not see the practicability of this suggestion at this juncture, largely for the reason that the necessary basis of common political purpose does not yet exist amongst the nations who would obviously be involved and be members of such a Pacific Pact (...)."¹⁴⁰

The Pacific Pact, therefore, remained limited to the South-East Asian region without British participation.¹⁴¹ Under the Conservative government this position changed and in 1954 the Manila treaty was signed with the US, Thailand, the Philippines, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France and Pakistan forming the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). SEATO is another example of British world-wide interests and activities, not confined to the European theatre as for Germany, for example.

¹³⁷ Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 404, see also, Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 421, see also, Wade (Lib.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 654

¹³⁸ Gordon Walker (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 494

¹³⁹ See Oral Answers, 'Pacific Pact Proposal', in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 2256

¹⁴⁰ Nutting (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1396

¹⁴¹ See 'Pacific Defence Pact', in Hansard 1950-51, 491, c. 444-6

The Baghdad Pact

The Baghdad Pact is another example of Britain's world-wide interests and its efforts to translate the connected security questions into regional defensive systems. The 1955 Baghdad Pact was one such construct, for the Middle East.¹⁴² Like the Atlantic Pact it was meant to contain the expansion of Communism. In strategic terms the Middle East was crucial for the West and for Britain in that respect.¹⁴³ Therefore, the Pact had the important purpose of stabilising the region as a whole.¹⁴⁴ It was also a constructive step of transition from colonial rule towards independence while keeping British influence in the region alive.¹⁴⁵

A by-product of the Baghdad Pact came from its membership. Britain, France and the US were meant to be guarantor powers. The other members were Middle Eastern nations, i.e. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.¹⁴⁶ Although it was hoped to develop into a collective security system for the whole of the Middle East¹⁴⁷, the consequence of an alliance between four Muslim states was the implicit opposition against Israel, a repercussion of the Baghdad Pact only the opposition stressed in parliament.¹⁴⁸ However, before the Suez crisis Britain took a cautious foreign policy line towards Israel, which became a dividing line with the US, which never signed the Baghdad Pact.¹⁴⁹ The division between the US and Britain over a coherent Middle Eastern policy had serious repercussions, not least for Britain itself.¹⁵⁰

The European Defence Community (EDC)

Inspired by Churchill's proposal for a European army¹⁵¹, the EDC was seen as serving several purposes: Firstly, it was seen as a means to bridge the distrust be-

¹⁴² Nutting (Con.), Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1954-55, 539, c. 834

¹⁴³ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 1311-2

¹⁴⁴ Nutting (Con.), Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1954-55, 539, c. 835, 836

¹⁴⁵ Nutting (Con.), Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1954-55, 539, c. 834

¹⁴⁶ Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 62, see also, L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 112

¹⁴⁷ Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1954-55, 539, c. 843, 850

¹⁴⁸ Shinwell (Lab.), in Hansard 1954-55, 539, c. 836, see also, Gordon Walker (Lab.), in Hansard 1954-55, 539, c. 856

¹⁴⁹ See Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1954-55, 539, c. 847 for the different security concepts of the US and Britain in the Middle East see Crisis/Suez Crisis

¹⁵⁰ See Crisis/The Suez crisis

¹⁵¹ For Churchill's proposal of a 'European Army' in the Council of Europe, see E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community*, p. 74-7, In a conversation with A. Nutting Churchill also said in qualification: "I meant it [the European Army] for them [continental Europe], not for us." Ibid, see also, David Weigall, *British perceptions of the European Defence Community*, p. 94, see also, Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: political ideas, influences and strategies in the EC 1972-1987*, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 67

tween France and Germany in the military field – after the success of the ECSC.¹⁵² The fact that Germany did not want a national army rendered it far easier for the French to accept them back in European circles.¹⁵³ Secondly, “(...) the proposal for a European Army was designed to meet not only the immediate threat from Soviet Russia but equally the less immediate, but none the less real, danger of revival of German militarism.”¹⁵⁴ The controls over the German armament industry were considered very important in that respect.¹⁵⁵ Thirdly, it would also foster the integration of Germany into the West.¹⁵⁶ And fourthly, it would support the Western defence effort.¹⁵⁷ Somewhat to the surprise of Britain, the French enthusiastically picked up Churchill’s idea, in the Pleven Plan.¹⁵⁸ France was, however, in a dilemma. They would never concede a German national army, which was basically the reason for the existence of the EDC.

“The agreement last September to treat the European Defence Community as the right framework for a German contribution would never have been accepted by N.A.T.O. had not our French ally said that they would not accept a German defence contribution in any other framework.”¹⁵⁹

However, the French seemed to lose faith in their EDC as a means of controlling German rearmament. These doubts were based on the imbalance between German and French forces in Europe, mainly a matter of French overseas commitments. The British conclusion was that German rearmament could not be properly checked between France and Germany alone.¹⁶⁰ Hence France tried to get Britain to join the EDC.

“But Britain cannot join E.D.C. (...) because it has become a cardinal principle of British policy since the war not to accept additional commitments in Europe which might be treated by America as an excuse for reducing American commitments. That principle can be differently expressed as ‘We should try to avoid accepting new commitments in Europe which we cannot get the Americans to share.’ (...) There is only one way by which the French can get

¹⁵² Pilkington (Con.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 331

¹⁵³ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 985, see also, Sandys (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1418

¹⁵⁴ Sandys (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1416, see also, Butler (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 491, c. 497

¹⁵⁵ Noel-Baker (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1574 Noel-Baker (Lab.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 15

¹⁵⁶ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 679

¹⁵⁷ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1469

¹⁵⁸ Astor (Con.) in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1536, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 128, 142

¹⁵⁹ Gordon Walker (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 341

¹⁶⁰ Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1503, see also, Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 285

what they want, and that is by having Germany re-armed within the only framework in whose integrity Britain and America have a direct and vital interest, and that framework is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.”¹⁶¹

Thus, Britain’s refusal to become a signatory power was based on a cross-party consensus.¹⁶² There were several reasons such as the supranational principle¹⁶³ and British overseas commitments which necessitate control over national troops.¹⁶⁴ However, Britain made genuine efforts to support the EDC as an associate member.¹⁶⁵ For example, in the event of war the Atlantic Treaty provided for each partner to decide about the extent of its participation in military action.¹⁶⁶ Under the EDC – associated members such as Britain included – they would use all means at their disposal to defend each other.¹⁶⁷ Although this might only be seen as a detail, it was received as a sign of the close ties between Britain and the continent.¹⁶⁸ Some frustration over nagging continental demands on Britain shone through in Churchill’s statement: “What more is there, then, that we could give, apart from completely merging ourselves with the European military organisation? We do our best for them.”¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, before it actually happened, a failure of the EDC was considered to be disastrous.¹⁷⁰ The long dragged out period of non-ratification by the French parliament was not welcomed in Britain.¹⁷¹ Considerable pressure was brought to bear on France, too much from the American side to remain constructive and dignified.¹⁷² However, the possibility of failure of EDC was mentioned too often to be inconceivable.¹⁷³ Its actual rejection caused a great deal of disappointment and even despair in Western Europe. “What really matters is that,

¹⁶¹ Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1504, see also, Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 316

¹⁶² Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1173-4

¹⁶³ Attlee (Lab.) Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 64

¹⁶⁴ Wyatt (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 500, c. 1531, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 296

¹⁶⁵ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 892, see also, Queen’s Speech 3/11/53, in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 4, see also, Pilkington (Con.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 333, see also reference to the Communiqué issued at the tripartite Bermuda conference in 1953, in: Paton (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 627, see also, Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 696, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 293, 294

¹⁶⁶ See Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 2

¹⁶⁷ Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 499, c. 23, see also, Hansard 1951-52, 502, c. 34

¹⁶⁸ See Eden (Con.) Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1951-52, 502, c. 34

¹⁶⁹ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 893

¹⁷⁰ Nutting (Con.), Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 961, see also, Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 580

¹⁷¹ Reference to the speech by Churchill in Margate 1953, in: McNeil (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 323, see also, Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 425, 651

¹⁷² Healey (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 315, see also, Paton (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 627

¹⁷³ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 890, see also, Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 14

with the rejection of E.D.C., there was a grave risk of the free Western European nations disintegrating (...)¹⁷⁴ At the time, Britain considered the eventuality of extremist parties assuming power in France. In Germany, the position of the Adenauer government was seriously undermined by the failure of EDC, because the whole of government policy depended on Western integration, of which the EDC was the epitome in Germany, because full NATO membership had not yet been considered as an option.¹⁷⁵

Western European Union (WEU)¹⁷⁶

Prompt action was needed and was provided in the form of the revised Eden Plan.¹⁷⁷ “What we had to try to do was to meet the vacuum created by the defeat of E.D.C.”¹⁷⁸ The experience of Britain rushing to Europe’s aid in the past two wars was pivotal in the decision for WEU. This time, it was thought, one should take action before military intervention became necessary.¹⁷⁹ And there was indeed a sense of relief in Britain and Europe that a grave crisis had been overcome.¹⁸⁰ It also curbed isolationist tendencies in the US which was received with relief by both parties.¹⁸¹

Long before WEU actually got off the ground, its spiritual father, i.e. Eden, was hoping for a participation of Britain in a ‘European Army’.¹⁸² He pleaded for a genuine British commitment to European defences, albeit from the outside.¹⁸³ That was what the Eden Plan proposed. When the EDC failed ‘a lot of thought’ had already been put into this alternative.¹⁸⁴ Eden strongly denied any attempt to sabotage the EDC, though.

¹⁷⁴ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 685-6

¹⁷⁵ Maclay (Con.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 621, see also, Wade (Lib.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 655

¹⁷⁶ Also referred to as ‘Treaty of London’ or ‘Nine-Power Treaty’

¹⁷⁷ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 686

¹⁷⁸ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 403

¹⁷⁹ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 398, see also, Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 678

¹⁸⁰ Pannell (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 651

¹⁸¹ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 685-6

¹⁸² See Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 49, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 65

¹⁸³ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 299, 300, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 102, see also, G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community*, 1956-63, p. 30, 40

¹⁸⁴ The first Eden plan, was drawn up in the spirit of British involvement in European defences, already in 1952. see Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 304, see also, Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 25, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 293, see also, David Weigall, *British perceptions of the European Defence Community*, p. 95

“As a matter of fact, we could not have produced our plan earlier, for the very simple reason that we had not got a plan. Nor could we have possibly had one before the failure of E.D.C. (...) First, we were quite convinced that it was no use trying to make yet another attempt to put E.D.C. into effect after the vote in the French Chamber. Secondly, that being so, the right course to pursue was to bring Germany into N.A.T.O. (...) Finally, we thought that that, by itself, would not be enough, and we must try to recreate in another form something of the spirit of unity in Europe which underlay the E.D.C. scheme.”¹⁸⁵

However, all this enthusiasm begged the question why the government had not fully committed British forces to the EDC.¹⁸⁶ And the answer was again British opposition to federalism or supranationalism. WEU was purely intergovernmental, which was why Britain could fully participate in it.¹⁸⁷ Britain committed troops to continental Europe on a permanent basis.¹⁸⁸ “It is to say that within this century they shall stay there as long as our Western European Union so determines. (...) This action has been saluted as historic, not as a provocation that makes for war, but as a deterrent which can build the peace.”¹⁸⁹ SACEUR would also have all WEU forces under his command.¹⁹⁰ “It is thus established that no country will be able to use its force operationally, in the area of SACEUR’s command, in a manner inconsistent with the strategy laid down by N.A.T.O.”¹⁹¹ In addition, any change or increase to national military force would have to be unanimously agreed by the WEU partners as well as the NATO Council.¹⁹² Hence, WEU was firmly settled within NATO and all its military and control structures.¹⁹³ This was particularly important in regard to Germany. The strict control system of the EDC type was kept under WEU.¹⁹⁴ It would control the voluntary abstention of the Federal Republic from ABC weapons production.¹⁹⁵ Importantly, it was pointed out, the control regime was not directed against Germany. However, it certainly prevented

¹⁸⁵ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 687-8, see also, David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 290, 291

¹⁸⁶ Wyatt (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 399

¹⁸⁷ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 400

¹⁸⁸ Three armoured and one tactical air force division were put under WEU, see Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 398-9, see also, Macmillan (Con.), Defence Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 594

¹⁸⁹ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 399

¹⁹⁰ Macmillan (Con.), Defence Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 595

¹⁹¹ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 404

¹⁹² Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 406

¹⁹³ Macmillan (Con.), Defence Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 594-5

¹⁹⁴ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 403, 405, 406, 413

¹⁹⁵ See reference to protocols II-IV of the WEU treaty, in: Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c.406-7, 689, see also, Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 418, 427

Germany from developing an independent military policy.¹⁹⁶ On the other hand, German equality was fully recognised and implemented in WEU¹⁹⁷, which could be seen in the gradual reduction of the financial contribution towards the maintenance of the Allied forces in Germany, while the actual military contribution in the form of the Bundeswehr rose.¹⁹⁸

In sum, WEU was indeed the concept Churchill had suggested for a European army, in 1950.¹⁹⁹ The EDC crisis also showed that at least in military affairs France wanted Britain at its side.²⁰⁰ This was an essential precondition in order to foster and maintain Franco-German reconciliation.²⁰¹ In Britain, the government was set for WEU. Labour also supported the Treaty.²⁰² The EDC crisis had been contained and Britain had saved the day by its decisive action. Unfortunately, in the long run WEU did not fulfil the hopes for further European unity, a sentiment and an objective it was explicitly set up to reflect. In reality, WEU came to be so closely connected to NATO that its relevance outside the bigger Atlantic alliance was minimal.

4.3.4 Crisis

The following sub-section 'Crisis' – which is particular to the British chapter – is meant to underline two things: firstly, it shows the closeness of Britain to the course of the Cold War, to world events and to colonial issues, as a result of its world-wide responsibilities and its world power status. Secondly, especially in contrast to Germany, it will show the wider perspective of British foreign policy, beyond European matters and on the concrete example of the Suez crisis.

¹⁹⁶ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 407, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 124

¹⁹⁷ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 415

¹⁹⁸ Macmillan (Con.), Defence Minister, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 599-600

¹⁹⁹ see Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 481, c. 1333

²⁰⁰ Wyatt (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 972,

²⁰¹ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 398

²⁰² Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 421, 426, There was a minority in the Labour party – mainly made up of Bevanites – who opposed the agreement, but in the end they abstained or toed the party line. See Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 475-7, 480, The Treaty was accepted with 264 in favour out of 268. See voting list in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 693-6

The Korean War

Korea was the first post war case where the special relationship between Britain and the US became once again important. The junior position of Britain in this alliance became soon evident.²⁰³ Troops were sent to Korea under the banner of the United Nations against North Korean aggression.²⁰⁴ New NATO thinking, assuming that the global confrontation with the Communist bloc would be initiated by a series of conventional and localised conflicts, seemed to support the idea that the Korean War was the beginning of a major confrontation.²⁰⁵ The shock of the Korean War must be seen in the realisation of the West that the Cold War, which many had got used to, had turned into actual armed conflict, which might well be the first step towards the professed Soviet world revolution.

Strategically, the Korean War, therefore, triggered the fear that all troops used in South-East Asia would have to be drawn off from the European theatre, where the Soviet threat seemed to be just as great.²⁰⁶ The conflict also showed clearly the weakness of Western defences. No coherent plan against Soviet expansionism was available, yet. And the various national forces were down to peacetime levels.²⁰⁷ The West was not prepared for a major engagement with the Communist bloc; the Korean War came as a wake-up call to that reality.²⁰⁸ Europe was the prime theatre where future action could be expected. Korea was initially regarded as a sideline scenario, in which the Communists tested Western resolve through Communist subversion and a low intensity conflict stopping short of all-out war. Western intervention in Korea can therefore be interpreted as drawing a line against Communism. The British rearmament programme was geared exactly towards this purpose. It was meant to put British forces into a position where they could deal with another such 'second-hand' war – meaning one which would not pose an immediate threat to Britain. That was hoped to be sufficient to deter it from happening for example in Germany, which was considered to be a possible next target after Korea.²⁰⁹

²⁰³ Mott-Radclyffe (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 960, for example the number of American casualties was 130,000, more than any other nation had troops in the theatre

²⁰⁴ See King's Speech on the prorogation of Parliament 1950, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 2941

²⁰⁵ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 66, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 30

²⁰⁶ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1910, 481, c. 1335, see also, Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, p. 462

²⁰⁷ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1330

²⁰⁸ Attlee (Lab.) Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 484, c. 59

²⁰⁹ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 953

In addition, Communist China made its influence felt on the world stage for the first time. The nationalist Chiang Kai-shek regime had been overthrown.²¹⁰ The impact of Mao on international politics was difficult to predict. Britain had recognised his government²¹¹, but the first indications were rather negative. For a start, most of the weaponry used in Korea came from China. Active intervention by Chinese troops in the War – in contempt of the UN²¹² – was a concrete sign of hostility towards the West.²¹³ Furthermore, the invasion of Tibet was the next indication of Chinese Communist expansionism.²¹⁴ And threatening behaviour towards Formosa – where Chiang Kai-shek had fled – supported this picture²¹⁵ This triggered serious questions: “Is this move into Korea part of a grand strategy for a bigger purpose? Is there a Russian-Chinese conspiracy on a world-wide scale?”²¹⁶ Certainly, one conclusion drawn was that Soviet Russia could not afford to neglect China and would probably try to incorporate it into the Communist bloc. Overall, the Communist weight would undoubtedly be increased.²¹⁷ The United Nation Forces under General MacArthur were eventually successful in halting the Communist attack.²¹⁸ The withdrawal of UN troops behind the 38th Parallel could be seen as a solid victory for the West.²¹⁹ Events in the Korean campaign were widely discussed in the House of Commons. Very concrete issues such as demarcation lines, prisoners of war and the armistice were usually presented by the government.²²⁰ On the other hand, criticism of the war and its consequences came mostly from pacifist Labour backbenchers such as Emrys Hughes.²²¹ Undoubtedly, the relief was great that the war had been contained in Korea and that the earlier fears of a larger conflict looming had not been realised.²²² The Korean War was much more important and concrete for Britain than it was for France or Germany. Britain had troops on the ground. Its involvement into the

²¹⁰ See Noel-Baker (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 905

²¹¹ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1167, The reason for British recognition of China was the lesson drawn from the non-recognition of the Soviet Union, see Noel-Baker (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 901-2

²¹² Noel-Baker (Lab.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 314, see also, Hollis (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 361-2

²¹³ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1439

²¹⁴ Nutting (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1391-2

²¹⁵ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 482, c. 1354

²¹⁶ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1166

²¹⁷ Butler (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 168, see also, Tomney (Soc.), in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1374

²¹⁸ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1164-5

²¹⁹ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 19

²²⁰ See Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950-51, 482, c. 1353

²²¹ See Emrys Hughes (Lab.) in Hansard 1950-51, 487, c. 1194

²²² Eden (Con), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 309-10

war alongside American troops was more immediate than for France, let alone Germany and Britain saw itself as living up to its world-wide responsibilities and leadership in the Western world.

The Suez Crisis

The Suez crisis was closely connected, on the one hand, to Britain's role as a colonial power and, on the other, to the problems resulting from decolonisation. Egypt was a volatile state in the 1950s. The monarchy and King Farouk was toppled in a coup in July 1952 by General Nguib, who in turn was deposed by Colonel Nasser.²²³

This did not make the relationship with Britain easier. One critical point which overshadowed everything was the British garrison of 80,000 men which derived from the time when there was a danger of Nazi invasion by Rommel.²²⁴ The most contentious issue, however, was the quarrel between Egypt and Britain over the operation of the Suez Canal. Egypt had always contested the 1936 agreement which provided for the operation of the Canal.²²⁵ The connection between the Suez Canal and the Empire was that it was the access route to British colonial holdings in the Far East and most importantly to India.²²⁶ The most fundamental principle remained that of free passage through the Canal by anyone at any time, under the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.²²⁷

Free passage was a matter of great economic importance, as most of the oil supplies from the region had to be shipped through the Canal, which was thus the lifeline of the British economy.²²⁸ Through oil there was a direct link to the living standards and to jobs in Britain and Europe.²²⁹ Most importantly, the possibility of putting Egypt into position to be able to blackmail the West, because of its de-

²²³ Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, p. 248-9, see also, L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 112

²²⁴ Mott-Radclyffe (Con.), in Hansard 1952-53, 515, c. 957-8, All British troops were withdrawn under the 1954 agreement with the Nasser government. See Mott-Radclyffe (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c.199, see also, Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 481

²²⁵ Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 692

²²⁶ See Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 12, see also, Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), The Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1952-53, 510, c. 1827-8 under Egypt, British Troops, Canal Zone, Suez Canal (Shipping Restrictions)

²²⁷ Referring to a conversation between Dulles and the acting Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, in: R.A. Butler (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1952-53, 518, c. 214

²²⁸ Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 3

²²⁹ Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 3, 15, see also, Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 161, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 109

pendence on oil, was unacceptable.²³⁰ The emblematic as well as the real significance of the Canal was considerable: "(...) Britain had fought in one world war to secure the Middle East and in a second to retain it. Such a prize would not be lightly thrown away."²³¹

The 'nationalisation' of the Suez Canal Company by the Nasser regime was considered a hostile act.²³² Nasser's pan-Arabian aspirations were seen as a grave warning and a threat to the British position and indeed Western defence in the Middle East.²³³ In the period before the Suez intervention arguments of advancing imperialism, colonialism and oppression were used to their utmost by Nasser.²³⁴ They found fertile ground in the Arab world. The consensus was that Britain was trying to bully Egypt into submission.²³⁵ On the international stage, the Soviet Union supported Egypt's accusations of colonialism against Britain, in an attempt to seize the moral high ground.²³⁶ It also handed out economic aid at roughly ten times the amount received by the whole of the Middle East.²³⁷ The danger of an Egyptian cross-over to the Soviet bloc was considered very serious.²³⁸ That would not necessarily happen voluntarily, but rather by the course of events and by Soviet intrigue sucking Egypt into its orbit.²³⁹ The Soviets would be only too keen to fill the vacuum left in the Middle East, if Britain moved out or was forced out.²⁴⁰

Against the background of a clear communist threat in the Middle East, the American position towards Egypt was considered badly informed and even ignorant of both the Soviet danger²⁴¹ and the sensitivities of its British ally.²⁴²

"Sometimes they have blown hot and cold, like a woman's hair dryer. (...) I believe that it would not be at all harmful to our relations with them for us to say in this Parliament, in the

²³⁰ Attlee (Lab.), in Hansard 1953-54, 522, c. 588, see also, Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 15, see also, Mott-Radclyffe (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 200

²³¹ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 356, 357

²³² Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 5

²³³ Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 14, 300

²³⁴ See Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 21, see also, Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 300, Nasser's speech of 26 July 1956 is a prime example of nationalistic, pan-Arabic and anti-Western arguments, see quotation in: Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, p. 251

²³⁵ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 85, see also, Younger (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 132, 134

²³⁶ Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 7

²³⁷ Macmillan (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 435

²³⁸ Beamish (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 70, A weapons deal with Czechoslovakia further alerted the West of the danger of Egypt turning communist, see Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, p. 250

²³⁹ Selwyn Lloyd (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 165

²⁴⁰ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 368, 372, 381, 385, 390

²⁴¹ Macmillan (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 436-7

²⁴² Beamish (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 71

friendliest possible way of criticism, that we expect America to support us as we supported America.”²⁴³

However, America did not want to ‘shoot its way through the Suez Canal’, as Eisenhower put it.²⁴⁴ He and Dulles were of the opinion that Britain was clinging on to its colonial holdings in the Middle East. In their mind, the Suez crisis was just an example of a policy the US was not willing to support.²⁴⁵ Only a few weeks before the actual intervention in the Canal zone, Crossman, highly critical of the government’s handling of the Suez crisis, had a hunch that what Eden was up to was doomed to end in disaster:

“I realised that some people were mad enough to think that they could try to overthrow Nasser without the ignominy of General Eisenhower ordering them out. Because that is what will happen if they try. Within 48 hours the Security Council, under American leadership, will tell them to stop.”²⁴⁶

Therefore, the government designed a covert plan to justify military action: “The political purpose of the Anglo-French expedition to Suez was to topple President Nasser of Egypt off his perch, it being believed that he threatened the whole British and French position in North Africa and the Middle East. The ostensible purpose was to separate the Egyptians and the Israelis, already at war.”²⁴⁷ Initially, government and opposition agreed that “(...) circumstances might arise which would necessitate the use of force.”²⁴⁸ Military preparations were made in the Mediterranean, long beforehand.²⁴⁹ After the initial seizure of the Canal by Nasser passed without military intervention, the Labour opposition was in favour of bringing the British case before the UN Security Council, rejecting any independent military action.²⁵⁰ “If hon. Members are really content to ‘go it alone’ with France,”

²⁴³ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 211-2

²⁴⁴ See Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 296, see also, quotation of Eisenhower in: Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, p. 267

²⁴⁵ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 373, 382, 389, 405, 412

²⁴⁶ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 88, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 211

²⁴⁷ Dodds-Parker (Con.), Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 7, see also, Edward Heath, *The course of my life*, p. 170, see also, Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 485

²⁴⁸ Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 3, see also, Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 16, 292, see also, lead articles of *The Times*, *The Daily Telegraph* and *The News Chronicle* on 3 August 1956 as quoted in Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 19

²⁴⁹ Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 14

²⁵⁰ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 557, c. 1624-5, see also, Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 18-20, 22, 23, 25, 26-8, 31, 290, 291, 296-7, 300, see also, Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 415-6, 421

the rest of the world being against us, then they are simply making for disaster.”²⁵¹ If Britain did not want to keep permanent garrisons in the area, Labour saw no perspective in the military option.²⁵² Military intervention over the Suez Canal would leave behind a legacy of distrust and bitterness towards the West in the whole of the Middle East.²⁵³

However, when war actually came the harsh American reaction came as a surprise to almost all senior members of the Eden government.²⁵⁴ “According to Macmillan [then Chancellor of the Exchequer] the Americans were selling sterling viciously and there was a deadly danger of a panic devaluation of the pound, British reserves not being adequate to prop the pound up against such heavy American selling.”²⁵⁵ The whole campaign was over in a few days. All British (13,000) and French nationals were expelled from Egypt.²⁵⁶ And until May 1957 British shipping was prohibited using the Canal with considerable economic repercussions for British industry.²⁵⁷

“What the consequences were is clear to all and cannot be denied – the blocking of the Canal, the cutting of the pipelines, the strain on the pound, the introduction of petrol rationing here, the check to industrial expansion, a tremendous blow to our reputation in the world and particularly in the Middle East and in Asia and, at the very least, a very serious breach between ourselves and America and grave misunderstanding in and a threat to the unity of the Commonwealth.”²⁵⁸

Undoubtedly, the Suez crisis split Britain from the Arabian member states of the Baghdad Pact, which had been one of the main pillars of British policy in the Middle East.²⁵⁹ The secret alliance with Israel – under the Sèvres agreement – shows, on the one hand, that the government was not confident in working in concert with Israel. On the other hand, this shift towards Israel did nothing to reconcile the British position in the Middle East with American policy. After the Suez disaster, the leading role in the Middle East was taken over by the Americans, embodied in the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957.²⁶⁰ For Britain, the Suez crisis turned the

²⁵¹ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 21, 294-5, see also, Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 411, 423-4

²⁵² Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 95

²⁵³ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 23, 300, see also, Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 97, see also, reply to this argument in: Eden (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 301

²⁵⁴ David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 391, 432

²⁵⁵ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 19

²⁵⁶ see Egypt (Expulsion of British Subjects), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 30-3

²⁵⁷ Macmillan (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 429

²⁵⁸ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 422

²⁵⁹ Younger (Lab.), in Hansard 1955-56, 558, c. 133, see also, Baghdad Treaty, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 25

²⁶⁰ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 141

'Special Relationship' with the US into a charade and could have pushed Britain the European way, as some comments from Eden's last days in office suggested.²⁶¹ Taking up Eden's turn towards Europe, Heath – Chief Whip at the time – saw Suez as a wake-up call:

"(...) the greatest legacy of Suez was that it forced many of the British establishment to accept that the sun was setting on the British Empire and that America was the new superpower. This in turn forced many who had hitherto been sceptical about European unity to realise that our future lay in our own continent and not in distant lands which our forefathers had coloured pink on the map."²⁶²

Heath might have been a little optimistic in his hope that Suez turned Britain in the European direction. It did not, and, more critically, the fact remained that the Suez crisis had absorbed the better part of the work and attention of all major ministries including the Prime Minister at a time when Europe was staging its re-launch, the Messina process leading to the EEC.²⁶³ During this highly creative and innovative time on the continent, Britain was focussed on the Middle East. Suez must, therefore, be seen as partly responsible for Britain's failure to help shape the proposals following Messina and to ensure that they corresponded more closely to British desiderata. In contrast to France, Suez did not turn Britain towards Europe.²⁶⁴ Despite some hard feelings in Britain over the 'American betrayal'²⁶⁵, the only way forward was seen in mending the relationship.²⁶⁶ That became Macmillan's first and foremost policy as Prime Minister.²⁶⁷

²⁶¹ Note by Eden Jan. 1957, PREM 11/1138, as quoted in David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 310, see also, Eden to K. Adenauer, 17.11.1956, AP 20/25/163, as quoted in: David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 446, see also, Edward Heath, *The course of my life*, p. 178, see also, Eden's plan to bring the Commonwealth and Europe closer together as a consequence of the Suez crisis, in: G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 33, For Eden's advice to Macmillan to apply for EEC membership in 1959, see G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 41

²⁶² Edward Heath, *The course of my life*, p. 178

²⁶³ See G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 79-80, 238-40, see also, J. Ellison, *Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955-58*, Macmillan, London, 2000, Ch. 2, esp. pp. 37f, 80f. The absorption of ministerial attention could be seen as reminiscent of the impact of the Iranian oil crisis on the British administration at the time when the Schuman Plan was discussed in 1950, with the same result in that Britain took a negative, over-cautious or unimaginative position towards European integration. See National Security/Territorial Integrity/Decolonisation

²⁶⁴ See Ellison, 'Perfidious Albion?', p. 21, as quoted in: O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 178, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 109, for a reference on definite French turn towards European integration after the Suez disaster see France/National Security/Territorial Integrity/ The *Communauté Française*/Decolonisation

²⁶⁵ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 422-3

²⁶⁶ Gaitskell (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 570, c. 424, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 42-3

²⁶⁷ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 25-6

Therefore, the Suez crisis became another example where Britain's extra-European policy had direct repercussions on its policy towards European integration, leaving it trailing behind the Six. Preparation for war and the defence against the world-wide Soviet threat also attracted government attention to the extent that European Economic integration efforts must have seemed of minor importance. Undoubtedly, Eden's preference for world- and foreign affairs and his reported 'coolness' towards Europe add the personal layer and the individual influence of the Prime Minister, supporting the scenario of overstretch in connection with neglect towards European integration, outlined above.

4.4 Economic Security

4.4.1 *The Nation*

Again, World War II had shown that the British imperial economy could provide for the needs of the nation. The alternatives, such as the European Economic integration, had not yet proved equally viable.¹ Therefore, the primary focus was on the national economic policy, including a Commonwealth component.

Primary Defence: Economic Stability

The main domestic policy emphasis was clearly on economic stability: “We are making ready to defend ourselves if we are attacked, but at the same time it is our duty to increase the economic strength on which our future must depend.”² The Conservatives basically agreed with this fundamental objective, but gave it an additional twist with regard to foreign policy:

“(…) the purpose of all this endeavour ought to be to strengthen the economic fabric and free way of life of all nations determined not to fall under the Communist rule. Once this has been achieved, it should be possible to negotiate with Moscow on a basis of strength (…)”³

The Cold War on the other hand seemed to have the purpose of causing economic overstretch of the Western economies, which in combination with Soviet subversive tactics was geared towards the collapse of the Western liberal democracies.⁴ Hence, economic stability was a key objective of British policy and it remained the first line of defence, at least in Cold War rhetoric.

The Magnet Theory

The corollary of economic stability as the main defence against Communism was the ‘magnet theory’. It focussed on economic stability and Western affluence as the main weapons against the Soviet system.

¹ See Britain and the European Organisations

² Gaitskell (Lab.), Minister of State for Economic Affairs, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1146

³ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 317

⁴ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1262-3, see also, 1269-70, see also, Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG*, p. 33

“In the long run, one of these cultures [Eastern and Western] must attract the other to it; and our purpose must be to secure that our culture is the stronger and that it attracts the Eastern zone to us. This it will only do if we in the West produce a society which gives its citizens a greater degree of prosperity, security and social justice; and furthermore, if we ensure that the knowledge of the existence of this better society is sufficiently widespread to overcome all propaganda to the contrary. (...) If we in the West succeed in creating a just and prosperous economic system, we can turn the Eastern zone and the Russian sector of Berlin into a political ulcer that will infect the satellite.”⁵

It can be seen from this quotation that the Conservatives and Labour clearly realised the competition between the Eastern and the Western economic systems. Both parties agreed that the Western system and with it Britain must be on the winning side. The magnet theory – also very prominent in West Germany⁶ – was the theoretical expression of this conviction.

Nationalisation

The main question arising from that was how to organise the Western economies most effectively. The driving ideological logic was the liberal market economy on the Conservative side⁷ and economic planning on the Labour side.⁸ Materialistic interests were seen as the driving force in both conceptions. For Labour, the question of public ownership was therefore the key issue.⁹ The most contentious issue arising from that was that of profit. Private profit was seen almost to have something immoral about it and even the Tories were wary of admitting to greed as the driving force and incentive for economic activity.¹⁰ It seemed to have the potential to compromise the best outcome for the nation in the sense that the profit rationale could outweigh reasons to acting according to national interests. Nationalised industries were meant to reduce this disadvantage; their primary concern was not profit, but the satisfaction of the nation’s needs. The Conservatives saw Labour’s aim as the nationalisation of all British industry.¹¹ Labour deliberately chose the steel industry as the first step towards this aim.¹² The steel industry showed a

⁵ Winterbottom (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 252-3

⁶ See Germany/Economic Security/The Nation/Magnet Theory

⁷ More specifically it was the ‘property-owning society’. The idea was to spread ownership as widely as possible among citizens and give them an interest in the success of the company they worked in. See David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 249

⁸ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 67, see also, Stauss (Lab.), Minister of Supply, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1833-4, see also, Kenneth Harris, Attlee, p. 429-430, 436, 445, 468

⁹ Mulley (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1772, see also, Blyton (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1790

¹⁰ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1817-8

¹¹ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 60-2

¹² Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 22

promising development.¹³ But the Conservative opposition feared dire consequences for the steel industry from nationalisation:

“We believe that the Iron and Steel Act now to be brought into immediate force will seriously damage the efficiency of production through the centralisation of responsibility (...) We believe that added risks and burdens will be thrown on to the taxpayer. We believe that the position of consumers (...) will be further weakened by vesting control in a public ownership Corporation (...).”¹⁴

Ideologically, they attacked the Socialist paradigm of economic “planability”: “(...) that Act puts too much power in the hands of too few men who have too little knowledge. Even if they have the responsibility for the control of the whole industry, they have neither the knowledge nor the experience.”¹⁵

The real sticking point for both the government and the opposition was, however, the rearmament programme. For the Conservatives the repercussions of the Iron and Steel Act (administrative chaos, bureaucracy, loss of efficiency and corruption) would lead to failure in this national effort.¹⁶ For the Labour government the danger came from another quarter: “Indeed, it is imperative that this great [steel] industry, which is vital to the whole of the Government’s rearmament programme, should be fully geared to the national needs (...)”¹⁷ Profit considerations should not be allowed to stand in the way of this most serious need of the nation, i.e. defence.¹⁸ Following their criticism, the nationalisation of the British steel industry was reversed under the next Conservative government.¹⁹

The maintenance of the arms industry

There is an economic argument in the support rendered by government to the arms industry, resulting from the 1950 rearmament programme. The idea of common defence was all very well, but the national benefit should not be forgotten. “In short, the sale of arms to other countries has three most valuable compensations. It increases our own war potential; it increases our export earnings; and seven-eighths of it, which goes to the Commonwealth and Europe, adds to the military strength

¹³ See Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1721

¹⁴ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1729, see also, Maclay (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1776

¹⁵ Robson-Brown (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1812

¹⁶ Churchill (Con.) in Hansard 1950-51, 482, c. 1370-1

¹⁷ Morrison (Lab.) Lord President of the Council, in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1742

¹⁸ See Military Security/The national Armies of Europe/British Rearmament

¹⁹ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 507, c. 21-2

of the free world as a whole.”²⁰ The British aircraft industry is the best example where all three purposes were served.²¹

In the build-up of the Western defences, it was recognised early on that the standardisation of armament and supplies was desirable.²² In reality the fact was that every national army had its own equipment. The nations, Britain in particular, were not willing to go ahead with standardisation. A closer look at the supply routes of weaponry shows why. In all countries, except West Germany, there was a national arms industry. Any change in this field had implications for national employment as well as for national pride. Both arguments could not be lightly ignored by any government. In addition, because of the complex techniques and production used in this industry any change along the lines of standardisation was not necessarily in the hands of ministers, but rather engineers, who did not usually work together across national borders, especially in such a secretive industry as arms production. The consequence was that in order for standardisation to work there needed to be coordination of national arms industries below the governmental level. A satisfactory degree of collaboration was never really achieved. Fears of economic espionage – even among allies – added another argument to the list against standardisation. The Soviet threat in the early 1950s further heightened the urgency for rearmament to the detriment of complex coordination between national industries and in favour of getting on with the job on a national basis.²³ From that national perspective the main question was who was setting the standard for future European standardisation. Britain thought itself in a good position to do that for the rest of Europe with its well-established and experienced arms industry. In that sense, standardisation was considered a great idea, if it was British standards which were followed. To put it more positively, Britain wanted its due share of the rearmament programmes under way in all West European states, in particular in West Germany.²⁴

²⁰ Churchill (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1952-53, 512, c. 578-9

²¹ Eden (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1375

²² See Eden (Con), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 520, c. 313-4

²³ Jeffreys (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1035, Ward (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 478, c. 1064-5, see also, Armed Forces Equipment Standardisation, in Hansard 1950-51, 487, c. 1007

²⁴ J.R.H. Hutchinson (Con.), in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 394-5

4.4.2 Imperial Preference

The Sterling Area

Soon after the war the dollar took over as the main global reserve currency. However, the sterling area was still a very important economic unit. Half of the world trade was invoiced in sterling, even after the war.²⁵ Britain had used the currency as a unifying bond with the dominions and its colonies in the previous war and still regarded the Sterling Area as one of the most powerful tools of influence all over the world.²⁶ It was an economic lever Britain could pull and it was used as an active economic means of resistance against Soviet expansionism all over the Commonwealth. The trade opportunities, particularly for the less advanced part of the former Empire, and sometimes the aid received from the mother country, were incentives to stay within this community and indeed the Western bloc.²⁷ And the Sterling Area was an institutional embodiment of the Commonwealth and one of the concrete links between its member countries. The increasing financial problems of post war Britain saw the country find a new purpose for the Commonwealth connections in the dollar accumulation capabilities of the Sterling Area. “(...) the sterling Area became a mechanism through which the dollar sources of the empire and Commonwealth could be ‘pooled’ and rationed.”²⁸ The Sterling Area remained a reasonably effective economic instrument at the disposal of Britain throughout the 1950s – although clearly with declining importance. “All in all, the Empire-Commonwealth was considered to hold far greater attraction than Europe in helping to improve Britain’s external trade and payments position.”²⁹ Hence, in the early 1950s, the British preference for Empire and Commonwealth was still intact and acted as an economic cushion on which Britain comfortably rested letting the European Economic integration initiatives pass by.³⁰

²⁵ Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 474, c. 48, By 1958/9 the figure was still 40% of international trade carried in sterling, see John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1393

²⁶ See, Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 68, see also, Hansard 1950, 478, c. 954

²⁷ Price (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 1419, see also, Gammans (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 1424, 1427

²⁸ L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 65, see also, p. 82

²⁹ David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 33, for further repercussions of the Commonwealth connection on Britain’s position towards Europe see National Security/ Territorial Integrity/ Empire and Commonwealth

³⁰ See National Security/Territorial Integrity/Empire and Commonwealth

4.4.3 Britain and the European organisations

Long before any of the supranational institutions were founded there was a growing fear that the European integration project could impair the economic well-being of Britain. Particularly Germany was seen to be a threat to the British economy. A whole range of mainly psychological arguments was utilised reaching from 'what have we fought the war for' to the suggestion that Britain was actually fostering German economic progress through aid to the detriment of its own economy.³¹ These arguments faded away. The psychological animus against Germany, however, seems to have been transferred to the European economic integration effort.³² In the early 1950s, such anti-European integration views were particularly wide spread among Labour MPs.³³ The Socialist angle is at least as important as the British angle, here and indeed they support each other in the strong impression that Britain had something to lose and not much to gain, apart perhaps from greater political unity with Western Europe. But that was not of immediate benefit to Britain, which implicitly meant that one had to be careful that the losses did not outweigh the gains.

Marshall Aid and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)

The European Recovery Program (ERP), which became known as Marshall Aid was "(...) at the time, an unprecedented step, and it set us on the road towards measures of political as well as economic inter-dependence with Europe."³⁴ The basic intention was to prevent economic collapse; the results for Western Europe were remarkable.³⁵ Eastern European countries did not apply for Marshall Aid – undoubtedly under Soviet pressure – which was one of the first signs of deteriorating East-West relations. The Cold War turned ERP from being the economic consolidation programme for Western Europe into a means of resisting Communism. In Britain, Marshall Aid resulted in relative economic affluence and stability, at least until 1952, when the programme ended. Then it was recognised, Britain would have to stand on its own feet.³⁶ The economic situation was, however, much worse on the continent. And it was generally recognised that Marshall Aid was a great

³¹ Edelman (Lab.) in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 243, see also, Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 277

³² See O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe*, since 1945, p. 41

³³ Irvine (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2016

³⁴ See quotation from the Preamble of the Marshall Plan, in: Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2119

³⁵ Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1945

³⁶ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 67, see also, Kenneth Harris, Attlee, p. 433

positive stimulus which started and underpinned the economic recovery, particularly of France and Germany.³⁷

The OEEC was built upon the foundations of the European Recovery Program. It was, firstly, set up to manage the distribution of Marshall Aid. Secondly, its main purpose after this was to work for liberalisation of trade in Western Europe.³⁸ The European Payment Union (EPU) was one of the main means to achieve this and Britain supported it wholeheartedly.³⁹ The EPU was set up to achieve “complete transferability of European currencies (...).”⁴⁰ Britain had a particular interest in this because sterling was, alongside the dollar, a major reserve currency.⁴¹ Foreign capital bound up in sterling, therefore, brought not only funds and interests to London, but also increased the economic weight of Britain and ultimately its political influence. The second political objective of the EPU was to liberalise trade relations.⁴² The incentive was that the abolition of trade barriers would actually facilitate the great western ideal of freedom.⁴³ It would not only deliver economic growth through trade opportunities, but it would be, in an ideological sense, a brilliant counter-example against restrictions on trade and production in the East. The principle of free movement, which would become so important in the European integration process, can be found as an ideal in the EPU, already.

This already shows British priorities and the ethos by which future European economic co-operation would be conducted. It was a combination of the free trade model and Intergovernmentalism, in opposition to an inevitably restricted Common market in Europe, founded on the principle of supranationalism. The OEEC embodied the former principles and the British commitment to the OEEC framework must be seen in this context.⁴⁴ The transfer of key OEEC characteristics to the FTA and EFTA further demonstrates this policy line. This British policy became known as ‘Intergovernmentalism’.⁴⁵

³⁷ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1406

³⁸ Gaitskell (Lab.), Minister of State for Economic Affairs, in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 2382

³⁹ King's Speech at the opening of Parliament 1950, in Hansard 1950, 472, c. 37

⁴⁰ Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 1141, see also, Heathcoat Amory (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1958-59, 582, c. 1079-80

⁴¹ See Heathcoat Amory (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1958-59, 582, c. 1081-3

⁴² Younger (Lab.), Minister of State in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 213-4

⁴³ Eccles (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 477, c. 2379, see also, Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1951-52, 495, c. 850

⁴⁴ See, Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1498-9, see also, Macmillan (Con.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 572, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, p. 198, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 121, 141

⁴⁵ See National Security/Ideas and Ideology/Political Europe

The Schuman Plan (ECSC)

The Schuman Plan was of a different type than OEEC. It was the first step on the road of supranational integration, but more importantly in 1950 it was a gesture by France “(...) for an effective reconciliation with Germany on the basis of such a measure of pooling heavy industries which would, if developed, make impossible a renewal of war between these two nations.”⁴⁶ Churchill personally welcomed the move unreservedly. The Labour government – Bevin was still at the Foreign Office – was, however, caught somewhat off guard. Britain was not consulted prior to the official proposals in detail.⁴⁷ “Bevin’s initial reaction to the Schuman Plan was one of shock and betrayal.”⁴⁸ In addition, Bevin was too ill to conduct diplomacy or attend the House when the Schuman proposal was debated.⁴⁹ The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps, who went for preliminary discussions to France, were confronted with what seemed to them unorthodox procedures for international negotiations in that the practical implications of the pooling of coal and steel were as yet unclear.⁵⁰ Instead, principles which amounted to preconditions for taking part in the negotiations were set, i.e. the acceptance of the High Authority. In addition, the pooling of resources under the High Authority whose decisions would be binding on governments was stipulated from the outset. The French government secured the agreement of the German government, again surprisingly quickly.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2154, see also, Germany/Economic Security/European integration/The Schuman Plan

⁴⁷ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1965, see also, René Lejeune, Robert Schuman Père de l’Europe, p. 14, see also, Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l’Europe*, p. 111, see also, Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 20, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 149; There had been a general agreement between the American, the British and the French Foreign ministers that France should make a constructive proposal to re-integrate Germany into Western Europe, see France/Economic Security/European Integration/The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); In addition there was a suspicion that the belated notification of the British government over the Schuman Plan was at least in part the revenge for poor consultation with the French government over the devaluation of sterling from \$4.03 to \$2.80 in September 1949, see Stuart Croft, *British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51*, p. 88

⁴⁸ J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 150

⁴⁹ See Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1907, see also, Churchill (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2142, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 156

⁵⁰ Atlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 41-2, 44, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1967, see also, J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 152, 154

⁵¹ Not only did Adenauer reply to an emissary from Schuman within the hour, but when Monnet visited Adenauer with more detailed plans in the second half of May, he reached general agreement. See J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 153

“This fact naturally determined the course of the subsequent exchanges of view between the two Governments and made difficult the achievement of His Majesty’s Government’s desire to play an active part in the discussion of the French proposal but without commitment to the acceptance of its principles in advance.”⁵²

The rudimentary nature of the Plan might have supported the opinion in the British government that it was only a gesture towards Germany with not much importance beyond that:

“It is the declared policy of the Western Powers to promote the entry of Germany as a free member into the comity of the European nations. The French [Schuman] proposals are designed to facilitate that process and must consequently be regarded as a notable contribution towards the solution of a major European problem.”⁵³

If it was only this gesture which Adenauer had asked the High Commissioners for, then no serious European integration effort was to be expected to come from the Plan and it certainly would not have any repercussions which called for British participation. This could be seen as another reason for the British government’s non-committal line.⁵⁴ It would also explain the fear that the Franco-German concordance could be broken up again if Britain joined the discussions without signing up to the fundamental principles.⁵⁵

However, there was dynamism to the Plan which was perhaps unintended by the French and unexpected by the British, which gathered pace in the fleshing out of the supranational principle.⁵⁶ From the British position such a principle could not be a precondition for negotiations, but at most the outcome.⁵⁷

Once that fundamental position was reached, national precautions came to the forefront:

“When discussing the Schuman Plan, the House will, I am sure, bear in mind the immense importance of the steel and coal industries to our own economy. (...) any weakening of our coal and steel industries would be bound to have the most profound effects upon the whole

⁵² Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 36

⁵³ Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 475, c. 587

⁵⁴ See Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 552

⁵⁵ Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1937

⁵⁶ On another line of argument Stephen George asserts that Bevin was favourably disposed towards a customs union. However, the board of trade and the Treasury remained sceptical and convinced the Foreign Office not to take an outright positive stance on the ECSC. George also says that Monnet expected this British position, for which I could not find any primary evidence. See Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 17-20

⁵⁷ See Communiqué on the Schuman Plan, 3rd June 1950, in: Attlee (Lab.), Prime Minister, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 36, 2166-72, see also, Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1935-6

of our external and internal trade. Our special trading relationships with the Commonwealth and Empire must likewise be greatly affected by the conduct of these two basic industries.”⁵⁸

In addition, the Commonwealth connection and the nationalisation of the coal and steel industries were British counter-arguments against the Plan.⁵⁹ Any policy which compromised any of those long-standing policy lines would have to face intense scrutiny if not the entrenched opposition of the political establishment.⁶⁰ Moreover, there also seems to be an issue of thwarted national pride. The way the Plan had been introduced by France challenged British leadership in Europe, for the first time since the war. The initial response was withdrawal and reserve. The second was reference to the larger Western framework in which Britain was still the unrivalled European power. Leadership and national pride could and should still be exerted on the international stage and more particularly in NATO.⁶¹

Resulting from this role as a world power Britain had a more international outlook than any continental European power. It was fine for them to sign up to a European endeavour in order to recover some of their economic strength. It was a completely different affair if Britain, one of the leading world powers, agreed to a venture which must ultimately be seen as geared against the Soviet Union. There were still some hopes left that the rift between East and West could be settled on an amicable basis. It was the responsibility of the government to keep this option open.⁶²

The Conservative opposition doubted the genuine will of the government to support the European effort. ⁶³“(…) surely we would be better placed to make a constructive contribution and to model the agreement in a form which we could accept if we were ourselves taking part in the negotiations.”⁶⁴ Precautions and safeguards should be applied⁶⁵, but“(…) it is an essential British interest that the Schu-

⁵⁸ Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1933-4, 1939, 1941-2, for the positions taken up by the British steel industry see Ruggero Ranieri, ‘Attempting an unlikely union: the British steel industry and the European Coal and Steel Community: 1950-54’, in: Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe – European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991

⁵⁹ See L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 71, see also, Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 9, 20, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, pp. 102, 156

⁶⁰ See Cripps (Lab.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1934, 1948

⁶¹ Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1969

⁶² Davies (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1997-8, see also, Bing (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2006

⁶³ Heath (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1964

⁶⁴ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1917, see also, Heath (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1960-1, see also, Eccles (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1969

⁶⁵ Eden suggested a similar arrangement as the one with The Netherlands, under which, although the Dutch government accepted the two principles as a negotiating basis, it reserved the right to abandon the whole project if“(…) it should show in the future that the application of these principles raises

man proposals should succeed, and to enable them to do so Britain should take her part in them.”⁶⁶ They saw a historical decision before them:

“The Government must feel, as we do, that, whatever the mistakes or differences of the immediate past, here is an opportunity to play our part not only in uniting this nation, but in uniting the free countries of Western Europe. Our appeal to the government is to seize the opportunity.”⁶⁷

There would be bargaining and wrangling, but all the more reason for Britain to be present. It was still in a position to play a role of mediating power:

“There are seeds of conflict in these negotiations between France and Germany, and I submit that that is a very strong reason why we should take part in these discussions, in order that we may balance out the difficulties between France and Germany which are bound to arise on the economic side.”⁶⁸

With regard to Germany, it was thought that there was a genuine will to come to a settlement with France: “The first thing they want is to achieve agreement with France, and secondly they want to achieve the unity of Western Europe in order to stand against the threat from the East.”⁶⁹ The Plan had re-animated the European integration effort and had the potential to solve the old German problem.⁷⁰

However, the Labour government rejected the Schuman plan. The reaction abroad to Britain’s “No” was disappointment.⁷¹

“I think that, after their experience of the last two or three years, we cannot blame the French Government for regarding this [the Schuman proposals] as the test for our sincerity, and I say that we have failed miserably to meet that test. There is nothing in these documents to prevent us from welcoming this initiative.”⁷²

objections in practice.”, in: Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1918, see also, Hogg (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2056

⁶⁶ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1909, see also, Amendment to the governments response to the Schuman Plan, in: Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2104, see also, Clement Davies (Lib.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1927

⁶⁷ Eden (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1924, see also, Heath (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1959, 1964

⁶⁸ Heath (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1964

⁶⁹ Heath (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1962

⁷⁰ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2117, see also, Hogg (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2055

⁷¹ Maclay (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1951-4, see also, Eccles (Con.) in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 1970, 1974

⁷² Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2117, see also, Garner-Evans (Lib.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2130

The fact remained, however, that both big parties rejected the supranational nature of the ECSC on grounds of principle.⁷³

“There was no compelling imperative to enter into negotiations on French terms. The merits of intergovernmental cooperation, the weakness of idealistic schemes for European federation, the desirable balance between European and extra-European interests, and Britain's restricted economic interest in Western Europe all told against any other response and demonstrated the meaning of the concept of limited liability.”⁷⁴

In addition the tailor-made nature of the Plan for settling the enmity between France and Germany and particularly in tackling the German question in continental Europe posed a problem for British membership: “Some constitutional institutions designed to keep the Germans tied might have the disadvantage of keeping the British tied. That is the dilemma of the Schuman Plan.”⁷⁵ Although Britain did not become a full member, it eventually sent a mission of permanent representatives to the High Authority.⁷⁶ In return, an ECSC mission was established in London.⁷⁷

In 1954, the UK made another small step towards the ECSC in an agreement which was mainly an initiative to re-assess the situation.⁷⁸ The achievements of the ECSC were acknowledged in that it had made the continental coal and steel industries competitive while giving security to the workers and avoiding the predicted mass unemployment.⁷⁹ Edward Heath saw the 1954 agreement ‘as the first step towards British participation in a united Europe’.⁸⁰ And indeed it contributed to a more positive British attitude towards Europe in general:

“(…) had we then participated in the Coal and Steel Community we should have followed it up by being members of Euratom; we should have been in the European Parliament and in

⁷³ See Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1404, see also, Sandys (Con.), Minister of Housing and Local Government, in Hansard 1954-55, 537, c. 881

⁷⁴ David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 53

⁷⁵ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2038. In contrast to Crossman's statement the following commonly used argument does nothing to explain the genuinely British perspective of scepticism, caution and “wait and see” attitude towards early European integration efforts in general and the Schuman Plan in particular: “The truth is that the French were more interested in the West German rather than the British response.” For an example see David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 43

⁷⁶ See Nutting (Con.), Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1952-53, 510, c. 1831-2

⁷⁷ Hope (Con.), Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in Hansard 1955-56, 543, c. 434-5

⁷⁸ Sandys (Con.), Minister of Housing and Local Government, in Hansard 1954-55, 537, c. 883

⁷⁹ The number of unemployed as a result of ECSC restructuring was put at about 20,000 in the period up to 1958. See Robert Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 740

⁸⁰ Edward Heath, *The course of my life*, p. 147

the European Economic Community, and the present impasse [about FTA] would never have arisen. (...) We should have been greater Europeans from the outset.”⁸¹

This reflects already a shift in mood towards European integration in Britain by the end of the 1950s.

4.4.4 *Britain in Europe*

The tendency for a more positive reception of European integration had set in by the mid-1950s already. From 1956 on there was a loose pro-European network slowly pulling Britain towards membership: “Leading figures in Whitehall’s ‘turn to Europe’, Lee, Shuckburgh and Roll being prominent examples, fit this category (...) a number of ministers asserted the pragmatic grounds for their ‘conversion’ – Sandys and Soames, for instance, and even Macmillan (...).”⁸² The EEC, the FTA and later EFTA showed the change in Britain’s willingness to engage with Europe and vice-versa.⁸³ Because of this change in the British attitude FTA and the EEC are dealt with in the following under a separate heading ‘Britain in Europe’, which will show the remaining difficulties, but also the converging British and continental European positions towards the European integration project.

The European Economic Community (EEC)

The failure of the EDC seemed to support the British line that the European supranational endeavour was doomed. Because of this the European re-launch at the Messina conference was not taken too seriously.⁸⁴ British experts took part in the conference and subsequent meetings, but remained restricted to a non-political and technical role.⁸⁵ At Messina it was decided that Britain should be invited to partici-

⁸¹ Royle (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1455-6

⁸² G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 460

⁸³ This argument is further supported by a steady increase in public opinion in favour of European integration up to an all-time high of 75% in the mid-1950s. This must have had some impact on the policy decision to draw closer to Europe. For statistical evidence see R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977, p. 346

⁸⁴ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1394, see also, Rippon (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1670, see also, Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner*, p. 23, 26, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 99, see also, Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, p. 23

⁸⁵ Boyle (Con.), Economic Secretary to the Treasury, in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1676, Richard Lamb says that “Eden refused even to send an observer to Messina, and Macmillan as Foreign Secretary, despite his earlier enthusiasm for an integrated Europe concurred.” See Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan*

pate in the deliberations on the establishment of a Common market.⁸⁶ This was confirmed in May 1956 in Venice. However, the report of the Spaak committee, which was accepted as the basis for negotiations on the Common Market at the Venice conference, was drawn up without significant British participation.⁸⁷ Britain slipped again into the role of mere observer.⁸⁸ Particularly the few Europhile MPs in the House of Commons felt history was repeating itself.⁸⁹ “Our friends in Western Europe are a little tired of having our blessing and encouragement and very little else.”⁹⁰

However, the economic arguments for a Common market were fully accepted in Britain. Firstly, the advantages of economies of scale were fully recognised.⁹¹ Only a common European market of 250 million people could hope to stand up to the economic pressures emanating from the superpowers.⁹² Secondly, “Not a single European country, including this country, is a viable political or economic unit in the modern world. The net of isolating nationalism, with its welter of frontiers, barriers, tariffs, quotas, currencies, passport restrictions and bureaucracies must be broken.”⁹³ Isolation was no longer a credible solution, not even in the sense of the large British Commonwealth.⁹⁴ The free-trade argument figures prominently in this debate, contending that ‘tariffs have always been irrelevant for the economic well-being of a country’ and that only the abolition of these could deliver a higher standard of living across Europe and indeed the world.⁹⁵ “This is not a unilateral lowering of barriers in a small area whatever anybody else may do. It is a mutual freedom in a large common European market.”⁹⁶ Evidence from the ECSC suggested that

Years, p. 104, This contradicts my findings in the parliamentary debates, although it is correct that there were no political representatives for Britain at Messina, i.e. only civil servants

⁸⁶ Rippon (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1667, see also, Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 36

⁸⁷ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 36, Britain withdrew its representatives from the Messina process in November 1955, see, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 27

⁸⁸ See, Boyle (Con.), Economic Secretary to the Treasury, in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1676

⁸⁹ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1673, 1676, see also, Mulley (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 76-7, see also, Bonham-Carter (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1428

⁹⁰ Mulley (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 77, see also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 206

⁹¹ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 43

⁹² Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 101, see also, Cronin (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 144

⁹³ Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 262, see also Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2121

⁹⁴ Maurice Macmillan (Con.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 72, see also, Mulley (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 78

⁹⁵ Holt (Lib.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 119-21, see also, Deedes (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 725

⁹⁶ Thomeycroft (Con.), President of the Board of Trade, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 162

the abolition of tariffs had the effect of increasing trade between its members.⁹⁷ That was what created profits and was, therefore, beneficial to all. Thirdly, British industry would finally have to face up to competition. Only steadily increasing productivity, efficiency and self-improvement could help provide for the wealth and well-being of the nation.⁹⁸

Apart from these predominantly economic arguments, there were political implications connected to the EEC, a realisation which had to be underlined by certain MPs⁹⁹, because Britain had always tried to avoid or limit political repercussions from European integration. The most pressing such issue was Germany. Firstly,

“The real issue which is in the minds of all hon. Members is, can we leave this market free to German industry to overrun? (...) We must ask ourselves what would be the position if we had to pay tariffs in this area and German industry entered the market duty free.”¹⁰⁰

Germany’s economic strength was growing so fast that its exports overtook the British exports by early 1958.¹⁰¹ Hence, in order to prevent German economic dominance over Europe, one should try and find a way of association to the Common Market.¹⁰² Secondly, there were some similarities with the French inferiority complex towards Germany, although clearly less developed: “To support this scheme, one must believe in the strength of British industry. (...) I think it is those who have doubts about it who will plead special cases today.”¹⁰³ Relying on Britain’s strengths and self-confidence, European integration held no fears.¹⁰⁴ Thirdly, the argument of binding Germany to the West came up, again. Therefore, Britain should support this West European integration project.¹⁰⁵ Finally, the conclusion was reached that economic competition with Germany was already a reality. German competitiveness did not come from unfair practice such as dumping or low social standards.¹⁰⁶ In order to keep it that way it was more sensible to be within the Common Market and avoid the external tariff which would have a discriminative effect against all outsiders.¹⁰⁷

⁹⁷ Maddan (Con.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 125, see also, Cronin (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 143

⁹⁸ Thorneycroft (Con.), President of the Board of Trade, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 156-7, 162

⁹⁹ See Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 100-1, 108, see also, Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 730

¹⁰⁰ Harold Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 59, see also, c. 68

¹⁰¹ Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 730

¹⁰² Harold Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 59

¹⁰³ Mulley (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 83, see also, Boyd (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 749

¹⁰⁴ Maudling (Con.) Paymaster-General, in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 796

¹⁰⁵ Cronin (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 144

¹⁰⁶ Robert Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 739-40

¹⁰⁷ Harold Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 69

Moreover, relations with the Commonwealth were clearly a political issue of the greatest magnitude, not least in their economic implications. Just one third of British trade was done in and with Europe, two-thirds with the rest of the world, and half of the overall trade within the Commonwealth.¹⁰⁸ This statistical fact was often used as a counterargument against joining the 'Customs Union type of Common Market'.¹⁰⁹ Undoubtedly, the Commonwealth was still Britain's biggest market. However, it was not an expanding market, as Europe.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, this argument was not fully watertight: "It is also true that in the years 1950 to 1956 the trade of the metropolitan O.E.E.C. countries rose in value by nearly 96 per cent, while the world increase was 66 per cent. But what was the starting line? It was ruin and rubble, defeat and occupation. The remarkable recovery of a ravaged Western Europe sustained by lavish American aid is a misleading indication of future prospects."¹¹¹ Nevertheless, the whole Commonwealth market was static.¹¹² "If the question is asked: has Britain a bright future in Empire trade, the answer is that it most certainly has not."¹¹³

Although some MPs saw in Europe the obvious alternative to Empire and Commonwealth¹¹⁴, this was still a minority and there were difficulties particular to Britain: Common Market principles, for example, were seen as incompatible with the British policy of Imperial Preference, because the Common Market arrangements would threaten the whole of the Commonwealth fabric, which was largely made up of trade exchanges.¹¹⁵ "I feel sure that the Governments of the countries who are negotiating their customs union in Brussels understand and appreciate our position in this matter. So that is out."¹¹⁶ The continental European powers did not have the longstanding sentimental attachment Britain had to the Commonwealth.¹¹⁷ Moreover, British responsibilities towards these relations could be impaired if Britain was outvoted in the Council of Ministers, for example. It was the classical criticism of qualified majority voting (QMV).¹¹⁸

¹⁰⁸ Boyle (Con.), Economic Secretary to the Treasury, in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1677

¹⁰⁹ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 37

¹¹⁰ Rippon (Con.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 137, see also, John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1401

¹¹¹ Biggs-Davison (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 735

¹¹² Maurice Macmillan (Con.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 71, see also, Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 745

¹¹³ Holt (Lib.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 117, see also, Bonham-Carter (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1434

¹¹⁴ Maurice Macmillan (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 745

¹¹⁵ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 37-8

¹¹⁶ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 38

¹¹⁷ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 39

¹¹⁸ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1381, see also, c. 1489, 1491

However, with the changing situation, particularly in respect to the weakening links to the Commonwealth, the view that some political cooperation with Europe should be sought found more supporters:

“Our interests lie in getting inside, and it is worth getting inside if we are wanted inside by the other nations. I do not think that there is any country in the little Six on the Continent which does not want Britain to join. (...) Here is a remarkable opportunity for Britain to join where we are wanted, in contrast to other parts of the world where we have been accustomed to be leaders.”¹¹⁹

Particularly given the British step-by-step approach of ‘practical’ economic cooperation in Europe, rather than sudden, spectacular advances which were seen as characteristic of continental development, the change from a Commonwealth mindset to a commitment to Europe was not easy.¹²⁰

“It might seem that it is a difficult jump psychologically for us, because we have all committed ourselves in the past by saying that it was not practicable for us to join the Common Market. That is because we have looked at it literally. We have followed the British way of thinking: we cannot accept a grandiose concept but rather like to nibble away at something in little bits. (...) There is no doubt that General de Gaulle and his supporters like the idea of doing things in big dramatic jumps. They do not nibble at something.”¹²¹

This plea to think bigger and try to understand the continental approach was more generally supported by the argument from all parties that it would be better to engage actively and have ‘some say’ in the development of Europe.¹²² However, to try for full membership remained a minority opinion.

Britain raised instead a note of caution against the Messina powers not to divide Europe even further than it already was by the Cold War.¹²³ An additional danger in the Common Market was that it would result in isolation and protectionism, most strikingly captured in the phrase ‘fortress Europe’.¹²⁴ This obviously posed a threat to the British economy, too.¹²⁵ This is essentially the ‘Little Europe’ argument.¹²⁶ The clause in every European Community treaty to keep them open to

¹¹⁹ Boyd (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 751-2, see also, Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1466

¹²⁰ See J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 121, 123

¹²¹ Boyd (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1465

¹²² Rippon (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1668, see also, Holt (Lib.), in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1672

¹²³ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 38

¹²⁴ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1370

¹²⁵ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 53-4

¹²⁶ See Boothby (Con.), in Hansard 1955-56, 555, c. 1674

new members alleviated that fear.¹²⁷ At a later stage the Labour opposition saw the same danger of splitting Europe apart in the British FTA proposals as set against the EEC.¹²⁸ In 1958/9 the Macmillan government found itself accused of having pursued a policy of obstruction and wrecking against the EEC. This was of course refuted: "We have never sought to undermine the Treaty of Rome. We have recognised that it opens new possibilities of expanding prosperity and expanding progress."¹²⁹ Nevertheless, in autumn 1955 the Eden government had decided to seek to block the development of the European Common Market.¹³⁰ Therefore, unofficially the government policy had been close to what the Labour opposition accused it of:

"(...) he [Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General] said that Her Majesty's Government had always positively wanted and encouraged' the Common Market. That is not true. Everyone knows what happened after the publication of the Spaak Report. Everyone knows that, whatever we may have said in public, in private we were going around Europe casting doubts on the project."¹³¹

Although this policy was no longer justifiable by the end of the Eden government, the damage was done.¹³² Before this background and the fact that the FTA project coincided chronologically so much with the Common Market initiative, it was generally conceived by the Six as a wrecking manoeuvre.¹³³ The will to arrive at a reasonable settlement with the EEC, voiced by all parties in the House¹³⁴, simply lacked credibility abroad.

¹²⁷ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 38, see also, reference to: Hallstein, President of the European Commission, in: Maudling (Con.) Paymaster-General, in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 790

¹²⁸ Jay (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 783, 787, see also, G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 253

¹²⁹ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1370, 1489

¹³⁰ CAB 134/1026, MA.C.(55) 45th meeting, 27 October 1955, see also, Edward Heath, *The course of my life*, p. 178, see also, reference to Kaiser, *Using Europe*, pp. 48-54; Ellison, 'Perfidious Albion?', p. 3; Schaad, 'Plan G', pp. 44-7, as quoted in: O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 177, see also, David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 101, 103

¹³¹ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1395, see also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945*, p. 162, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 106-7, 111, see also, Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, *British Politics since the War*, p. 23

¹³² Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 54, see also, Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 100, see also, John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1389

¹³³ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1395

¹³⁴ Harold Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 70, see also, Mulley (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 76-7

The Free Trade Area (FTA)

The position that an association with the EEC could only be imagined on a free trade basis did not make it any easier to believe that FTA was not just a wrecking move.¹³⁵ The idea put forward was a free trade area around the core of the Six, which would include as many OEEC countries as possible.¹³⁶ The preservation of the unity of Western Europe became the moral objective of the FTA.¹³⁷

“What matters to us at present are the foundations that have been laid for inter-European trade since the war. That is why I regard as so important the present fabric of inter-European trade which rests on the foundations built up since the war in O.E.E.C. by a multilateral trade and payments system, the very essence of which is non-discrimination. This fabric can and should be strengthened, as the six countries have taken the lead in doing, but we must try now to strengthen the fabric overall if it is really to hold Europe together.”¹³⁸

In the FTA Britain also tried to combine its Commonwealth connections with the evolving European integration process.¹³⁹ The FTA was meant to prevent Britain from having to choose between the two. “(...) we must make it clear that we cannot make a choice between the Commonwealth and Europe.”¹⁴⁰ If Britain was forced to choose, anyway, it would have to choose the Commonwealth.¹⁴¹

One reason was Commonwealth food imports. A sufficient level of food supply for Britain from its own soil had always been a problem. The Commonwealth food

¹³⁵ For an corresponding position in the German Foreign Office see, Sabine Lee, ‘German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration: German ‘Europolitik’ during the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations’, p. 48-9, These suspicions were built on earlier experiences, in the early 1950s. Britain had effectively used the OEEC to see off plans for further economic integration, such as the European investment bank plan. See David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 100

¹³⁶ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 39, see also, reference to Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, p. 44, in: O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 159. This has become known as Plan G which was developed under the Macmillan government. See David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 106-7, I have not found any reference to the term ‘Plan G’ in the parliamentary debates

¹³⁷ Maudling (Con.) Paymaster-General, in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 798, see also, Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1373, 1387, 1493-4, see also, Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, London, 1971p. 441, see also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 159, see also, reference to Home, *Macmillan: Volume 2*, p. 30. For further details see Home, *Macmillan: Volume 1*, pp. 385-7, in O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 159

¹³⁸ Ridsdale (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 718, see also, Jay (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 784

¹³⁹ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 35-6, 37

¹⁴⁰ Ridsdale (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 714, see also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 160

¹⁴¹ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1380

imports were devised to alleviate that problem and played a vital role in fulfilling the needs of Britain.¹⁴²

“(…) any project we could envisage of a free trade area cannot be extended to foodstuffs¹⁴³ (…) We must remain free to continue to grant to this great volume of imports the preferential arrangements we have built up over the last twenty-five years. This is an essential counterpart to the preferences which we enjoy in Commonwealth markets.”¹⁴⁴

Moreover, Britain’s responsibilities towards its colonies also supported this argument, because the positive development of many of them depended on their revenues from agricultural exports to Britain.¹⁴⁵

The position to exclude foodstuffs from any arrangement with Europe was supported by the domestic agricultural arrangements:

“In Great Britain and throughout the Commonwealth we have built up an agricultural policy based on guaranteed prices, and on marketing boards which are prepared to pay stabilised prices by paying more for commodities in a bad year than the market will face (…). If once we start abolishing frontiers we leave the way open for the pushing across of the produce of all the other people who have not contributed to the marketing board in the good years, and who will thereby wreck the scheme in the bad years by swamping the market. That sort of thing makes it impossible to do away with the frontiers between planned and unplanned economies.”¹⁴⁶

Although the Conservatives would definitely not subscribe to the last sentence they kept the general line of the Labour policy, when they came to office. And the objection of their Labour colleague above might well be one of the most appropriate descriptions of what remained a major stumbling bloc on Britain’s way into Europe, i.e. the refusal to abolish national farmer subsidies. “But whichever side we are on, none of us would like to see our farmers subject to completely free competition as we would have to do in a federal union [with Europe].”¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, by 1958, the exclusion of agriculture was considered a mistake.¹⁴⁸ The advantages of the Common Market for continental agricultural industries became obvious in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) still under considera-

¹⁴² See David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 91

¹⁴³ This included industrial as well as individual food and drink and tobacco, see Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c.42

¹⁴⁴ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 41, 42, 49

¹⁴⁵ Thornycroft (Con.), President of the Board of Trade, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 155

¹⁴⁶ Bing (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2008

¹⁴⁷ Crossman (Lab.), in Hansard 1950, 476, c. 2042, see also, Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 107

¹⁴⁸ Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 728, see also, Maudling (Con.) Paymaster-General, in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 792

tion. Various investment and support schemes rendered great help especially to backward agricultures such as the French.¹⁴⁹ The outright British refusal to include agriculture had further complicated the negotiations and their relations to the Six.¹⁵⁰ This was recognised as a mistake and on the basis of the realisation that the Common Market was never meant as a free competition between national agricultures, the government finally agreed in 1957-58 to include agriculture in the FTA negotiation as provided for in OEEC Council Resolution 221.¹⁵¹

The second fundamental difference vis-à-vis the EEC scheme was that no common external tariff was envisaged under FTA, as it would run counter to the very spirit of a free trade area, i.e. non-discrimination.¹⁵²

“The negative advantage if we move towards this area is that we shall avoid being discriminated against in Europe. If we were to remain aloof while other countries went in our goods would be able to enter the markets of the rest of Europe only over tariff walls, which would place us at an overwhelming disadvantage relative to our European competitors.”¹⁵³

Under the FTA the long-term objective was to abolish tariffs and quotas completely over a period of ten to fifteen years.¹⁵⁴ Contrary to that, the purpose of the common external tariff which the Six suggested was to protect their economies from dumping. Cheap products from the Commonwealth were the prime example.¹⁵⁵ Britain saw the same problem of dumping for its own economy.¹⁵⁶ Particularly wage dumping by the Six was a danger that was often mentioned¹⁵⁷, comprehensively and convincingly refuted by economists on both sides of the House.¹⁵⁸ In terms of social security there was the usual argument of high standard countries, such as Britain, in favour of levelling up instead of cutting back.¹⁵⁹

¹⁴⁹ Cronin (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 759

¹⁵⁰ Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 728, see also, Hay (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 770

¹⁵¹ Hay (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 771

¹⁵² Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 40

¹⁵³ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 43

¹⁵⁴ Ridsdale (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 713-4

¹⁵⁵ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1373, Britain suggested a ‘system of certificates of origin and a code of general good conduct’ which would fulfil the same protective function for the Six while not imposing a universal tariff which must produce harmful effects for Britain. Although Britain had some experience with such a system in the Commonwealth, there were serious problems to make it work on such a large scale as the European market. see Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1371-2, see also, Belenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1408

¹⁵⁶ Macmillan (Con.), Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 47

¹⁵⁷ Nabarro (Con.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 109, 111, 112-3

¹⁵⁸ Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 102-4, 111, see also, Thorneycroft (Con.), President of the Board of Trade, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 160

¹⁵⁹ Thorneycroft (Con.), President of the Board of Trade, in Hansard 1956-57, 561, c. 158

However, the main problem was in the end not in such details, but in the French reservations of the FTA scheme in general.¹⁶⁰ Initially there had been a clear commitment of the Six to set up the FTA. The Ockrent Report of October 1958 was the last in a series of such commitments.¹⁶¹ Shortly after that, France stalled. The situation became almost surreal in the House of Commons, when Roy Jenkins [Lab.] took the side of the government, defending it against continental European governments which were supposedly hoping for a change of government in Britain. There would not be a change of policy, even if there were a change of government.¹⁶² Feeling under attack from the Six the tone against them became harsher¹⁶³, which of course did not help the FTA scheme: Ultimately Reginald Maudling, the minister in charge of the FTA negotiations had to announce defeat: "Unfortunately, just after our November meeting the French Government announced that it could no longer support the idea of the Free Trade Area (...)"¹⁶⁴ As a result of the FTA breakdown, relations with France deteriorated.¹⁶⁵ This was not because the final rejection of FTA took place under the new de Gaulle government.¹⁶⁶ In fact, the last Fourth Republic governments were also suspected of trying to mask their weakness by driving a hard bargain over the FTA, even before de Gaulle.¹⁶⁷ However, de Gaulle did not seem to be minded to let the British into his continental European 'club'.¹⁶⁸ The frustration about French intransigence was very palatable: "The fact is that the negotiations failed not because of any particular argument or any particular point. They failed because the will to agree failed and because the determination to succeed faltered. The basic premise upon which we started, that all of us wished to establish a Free Trade Area, no longer remained true."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁰ Maudling (Con.) Paymaster-General, in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 802

¹⁶¹ Maudling (Con.) Paymaster-General, in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 792, see also, Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1374

¹⁶² Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 731-2

¹⁶³ For examples see Ridsdale (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 719

¹⁶⁴ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1375, see also, reference to Nutting, *Europe Will Not Wait*, p. 98. See also Leith Sainsbury, 'Harold Macmillan', in Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (eds.), *British Foreign Secretaries*, pp. 113, in: O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 159

¹⁶⁵ Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 730, see also, Cronin (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 760

¹⁶⁶ de Ferranti (Con.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1401-2

¹⁶⁷ de Ferranti (Con.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1402, see also, Chetwynd (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1416

¹⁶⁸ See, James Hutchison (Con.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1453, see also, Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1478, 1480, see also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 171

¹⁶⁹ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1373

Nevertheless, there was a certain amount of self-criticism: “We were taking a step forward in the commercial field unprecedented but, nevertheless, essentially economic in character. For my part, I do not believe that the Rome Treaty would ever have been drafted, let alone ratified, on economic grounds alone. Nor do I believe that the unity of the Six would have been maintained through these difficult negotiations if purely commercial considerations had prevailed. I think that we have never properly understood this.”¹⁷⁰ However, for Britain the fact was that: “Discrimination has begun. The Treaty of Rome is in effect, and there is no Free Trade Area.”¹⁷¹

The European Free Trade Area (EFTA)

After the FTA disaster¹⁷² the British strategy was twofold. Firstly, immediately after the 1959 elections, Macmillan began industriously in steering Britain towards full EEC membership, which resulted in the 1961 application.¹⁷³ This effort was, of course, frustrated by de Gaulle’s veto in January 1963. Secondly, the government tried to pick up the pieces of the FTA in the EFTA.¹⁷⁴ The EFTA scheme was envisaged as a collection of bilateral treaties along free trade lines and up to the limit every single country could accept. Finally these agreements should be moulded into a multilateral agreement which would reflect the core consensual points between the partners.¹⁷⁵ In November 1959, Britain, along with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland signed the EFTA agreement in Stockholm, which entered into force in July 1960.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1394, see also, Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1395, see also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 96, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 110, 117

¹⁷¹ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1377

¹⁷² Mainly the opposition took this position, but it was pretty self-evident that things had gone terribly wrong. see John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1388

¹⁷³ G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 54, 58, see also, O. Bange, ‘Grand Designs and the Diplomatic Breakdown’, in: G.R. Wilkes, (ed.), *Britain’s Failure to enter the European Community in 1963: Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, Frank Cass, London, 1997, pp. 191-94, see also, A. Deavin, ‘Harold Macmillan and the Origins of the 1961 British Application’, in: G.R. Wilkes, (ed.), *Britain’s Failure to enter the European Community in 1963*, see also, ‘Future Policy Study, 1960-70’, PRO, CAB 129/100, FP (60) 1, 24 February 1960

¹⁷⁴ On the obstructive lines taken up in FTA, Richard Lamb says that EFTA was another wrecking effort in retaliation for the FTA disaster. See Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 120, 128, reference to F.O. 371/134510

¹⁷⁵ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1377-8

¹⁷⁶ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1386, see also, L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 165, see also, Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 111

The club which was to make up the EFTA was not chosen by accident. The Scandinavian countries, in particular, were regarded in Britain as having similar economic structures and welfare system and they would, therefore, figure as prime candidates for closer economic co-operation.¹⁷⁷ Concern as to the impact of the Common External Tariff also bound the remaining OEEC states outside the Six together.¹⁷⁸ Undoubtedly, EFTA also kept them away from the Six.¹⁷⁹ The fear of economic dominance by the Six was only another facet of this argument.¹⁸⁰ The strengthening of OEEC principles was the non-partisan objective of EFTA.¹⁸¹ However, that could also mean building up an alternative trade bloc to the EEC, which can be seen as the consequence of a profound shock to the trust between Britain and the Six.

By the end of the 1950s, the Labour Party had become far more open to 'pro-European' politics than the Conservatives.¹⁸² Witness remarks made by John Edwards – Labour's spokesman on European issues – suggesting a new approach to Europe: "A good unifying principle is to go to Europe, not saying 'Let us get rid of restraints on trade', but saying, 'Let us see how we can work together to make of this area one that is really dynamic in economic and social terms'."¹⁸³ Economic expansion, full employment and social progress should be promoted.¹⁸⁴ On the part of Labour it was hoped that common practice would bring the EFTA and EEC members together.¹⁸⁵ The harmonisation of tariffs was suggested as a first concrete step.¹⁸⁶ As harsh as the phrase 'Discrimination has begun' sounded, in regard to the Common External Tariff, it was nothing like the economic catastrophe previously predicted. For the time being EFTA and the EEC would operate independently of each other without much harm being caused on either side.

¹⁷⁷ Roy Jenkins (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 731-2, see also, Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1481-2

¹⁷⁸ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1377

¹⁷⁹ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years*, p. 128

¹⁸⁰ Boyd (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 751, see also, Bellenger (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1407

¹⁸¹ Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1379

¹⁸² G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, p. 467

¹⁸³ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1400

¹⁸⁴ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1400, see also, Wilson (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1483

¹⁸⁵ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1399

¹⁸⁶ John Edwards (Lab.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1398

4.5 Preliminary Conclusions for Britain

The debates in the House of Commons show that the predominant theme, as regards external policies, of non-involvement in continental affairs, which Britain had maintained for centuries through its imperial and worldwide connections, had been seriously undermined by the mid-1950s. The decolonisation process has been shown to be an important reason for the situation in which Britain found itself, the most revealing – and damaging – single event being the Suez crisis. This crisis also showed that Britain was no longer sovereign in the fullest sense of the word, but all too heavily dependent on the Western superpower, the United States of America. Economically, this had been obvious for a long time, witness, for example, Britain's heavy dependence on the Lend-Lease programme during the war and, later, its need for Marshall Aid, of which it received the biggest share of all European countries. However, in political terms, the realisation sank in only slowly and the awakening, again in the Suez crisis, was a sobering occasion.

These events had an impact on Britain's position vis-à-vis 'Europe' and on its attitudes towards a European integration process which, after the failure of the EDC (1954), had been successfully re-launched by the Six in the Messina process. In the early 1950s, Britain had repeatedly fallen back on the idea of independence which was an important reason why the country eschewed earlier supranational integration efforts, notably the ECSC. However, circumstances towards the end of the decade were different. Britain now could not but recognise the success of the new institutions and therefore placed stronger emphasis on European cooperation. Despite an original claim to a special position in the European framework, the changed circumstances eventually, in the early 1960s, led to a British application for full membership of the EEC.

The refreshing openness with which this gradual, not entirely painless, change of position was discussed in the House of Commons sheds much interesting light on the evolution of attitudes in the British legislature in this period. Cooperation with 'Europe' became integration into most European supranational structures, but never European unification, an aspiration close to the heart of many of the founding statesmen and espoused to varying degrees in some of the member states. Thus, the idea of 'Europe' has never attracted a policy consensus – much less popular support – in Britain, but rather remains an economic necessity with a decided emphasis on limited liability in the matter of actual political integration.

From the outset, despite Churchill's speeches (made when in opposition), Britain had been the Western European country least enthusiastic in matters of supranational European integration. Its belated decision to seek EEC membership, essentially – though not only – for economic reasons is, however,

clear evidence that the European integration process was successful enough to constitute another reason for Britain to abandon its formerly most fundamental policy of independence and move over to a considerable degree of acceptance of *interdependence* and significantly closer cooperation with European partners within a new and innovatory legal framework.

5. Conclusions

The conclusions are divided into two main sections. The first will provide some comments on discourse theory as well as necessary refinements of the theory for the analysis of the post war European context. The second part is dedicated to some concluding remarks on the three main chapters on Germany, France and Britain and their positions towards Europe.

5.1 Discourse Theory and European refinements

It may be recalled that Discourse Theory was the theoretical underpinning and the starting point of my historical analysis of the European integration ideas in France, Germany and Britain. Discourse theory is the latest brand of discourse analysis in political science into which Jacob Torfing has introduced some order in his book, *New theories of discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek*, not least into the relatively independent theoretical tools of Laclau and Mouffe.¹ ‘Hegemony’ and ‘nodal points’, core concepts of Chantal Mouffe and Ernest Laclau’s discourse theory, were introduced at the outset and led to the development of my analytical framework of four indicators. ‘Antagonism’ is the third major concept of their approach.² Mouffe, who took the lead in defining the concept in her book *The Return of the Political*,³ took important elements from Carl Schmitt, who argued that politics is all about friend-enemy relations. This means that social relations are made up of opposing positions or antagonisms. Political action triggers a reaction which is opposed to or at least critical of the earlier action. Mouffe, brings out the need for conflict in modern politics. However, this conflict must be set within the framework of liberal democracy and a certain set of rules in order to be socially beneficial.⁴ The very

¹ See Jacob Torfing, *New theories of discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999

² For the reasons why ‘antagonism’ the third key concept of Discourse Theory, has been put in the Conclusion see Methodology/The Indicator Scheme, footnote #114

³ Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, London, Verso, London, 1993

⁴ For the preconditions of antagonism to be constructive and not destructive for society see Helmut Dubiel, ‘Konsens und Konflikt’, in: Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), *Staat und Demokratie in Europa*, see also Gerhard Göhler, ‘Konflikt und Integration (Response to Helmut Dubiel)’, in: Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), *Staat und Demokratie in Europa*

essence of liberal democracy – mostly reflected in the constitution – has to be accepted by all competing parties. Still, antagonism between social forces defines their identity as well as the identity of society as a whole against the outside. This concept of antagonism is very general. It would gain greater leverage if it were refined with three additional dimensions which are discussed below.

Firstly, on the most general level, 'Political Antagonism' accounts for opposition of the West to the Soviet Union. Laclau's and Mouffe's antagonism explains neatly the formation and continuous opposition of the two blocs. The existence of the 'other' made the continuing differences within the blocs acceptable to its members and strengthened the unity within each bloc. It supported the communal identity among the members of each side and, once fully developed, it worked as a pillar of 'Eastern' and 'Western' integrity. Western identity is based on, therefore, or at least supported by, the opposition to the USSR. This opposition to the Soviet system in general and allegiance to Western liberal principles accounts partly for integration into the relatively loose western systems of cooperation, i.e. WEU and NATO. Although it is the weakest of the three refinements of Antagonism, Political Antagonism and this general commitment to Western values and institutions can be found in all three countries and can, indeed, be seen as a uniting bond between the three states.⁵ In France and Britain, it was a primary factor behind the conviction that West Germany must be included into the Western bloc as a full member, despite considerable reservations, in particular, in France.

Secondly, 'Historical Antagonism' accounts for the opposition against previous regimes or preceding generations. This can be summed up in the 'Never Again Effect', i.e. that political or even historical catastrophes attributed to the previous generation should never happen again. It was a reaction to inter-war politics, which led to World War II. It accounts for a loss of credibility of a political method or of a whole political system and certainly for the dismay on the part of the post war generation about the repercussions of such action on their lives.

In the French context the 'Never Again Effect' can explain the rejection of the Vichy regime and remaining structures associated in the Fourth Republic, such as the continued influence of Nazi-collaborators in the economy and the administration of the post war state. Such reservations are amply reflected in the strong Communist vote during the Fourth Republic, which underlined the credibility the Communists had reaped from their dominance of the *Résistance* against Nazi-occupation and Vichy-collaboration. On the right of the political spectrum, among the Gaullists, the rejection of the party system, which was seen as the reason for

⁵ See in particular National Security/Ideals and ideology, and Military Security/ Integrated Defences for all three countries

much of the chaos before the war in the Third Republic and indeed during the Fourth Republic, can also be explained on these grounds.

In the German context, Historical Antagonism clearly accounts for the rejection of the Nazi regime and its repercussions on Germany:

“A break between generations was expressed in mutual distrust. Young people felt their parents had betrayed them by bringing the Nazi dictatorship and its subsequent holocaust upon them; the older generation retaliated by denouncing the self-pity of a generation that seemed to accept the Nazi slogan, ‘After us, the flood.’⁶ This distrust accentuated the young people’s aversion to politics and their suspicion of yet another program of re-education.”⁷

Because of the strong emphasis the Third Reich and the generation which supported it had placed on overstretched nationalism, Historical Antagonism contributed to a weakening of the national paradigm in the German discourse.

In both the French and the German cases, the consequence of Historical Antagonism can be seen in the development of the European idea, the core values of which must be seen in anti-war and anti-isolationist attitudes. These are clearly reflected in the integration efforts that led to the ECSC, the EDC, the EEC and Euratom. Importantly, the first integration steps were meant to prevent any possibility of future war in the ECSC and the EDC, which further underlines the current of anti-war sentiment in early European integration. The British case is different from those of France and Germany, because of the rationale of Historical Antagonism embodying a rejection of disastrous behaviour and political action of the previous generation was ultimately connected to the experience of military defeat. Britain did not experience this and, therefore, Historical Antagonism remained relatively weaker in Britain. There is definitely an anti-war sentiment early on, but the outright victory in the last war gave the British state and democratic system a legitimacy and public credibility which were tarnished in both France and Germany.⁸ In turn, this could explain Britain’s reluctance to participate in the ECSC and the EDC.

⁶ German original: “Nach uns die Sintflut.”

⁷ F.R. Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe*, p. 44

⁸ The 1945 election defeat for Churchill was to some extent based on the opinion that Churchill would not be the right man to lead Britain during peacetime, in particular against the background that he had been such a widely accepted and successful war leader. However, the election defeat does not amount to a criticism against the whole of the British political system and is qualitatively different from the need for legitimacy the French and in particular the German state went through in the immediate post war years, which they found to some extent in the European institutions. For a closer analysis of the reasons

Thirdly, another form of Antagonism is opposition to military involvement. In a sense, it is a particular form of Historical Antagonism, but it is important in explaining, in particular, Germany's reluctance to develop a military potential and its rather passive role in all military organisations. This kind of antagonism can be seen as the post war reaction to past German militarism. It accounts for repercussions of the lost war dealt with under 'War Experience'; for German reluctance to participate in any post war military ventures. Particularly on the opposition benches, but also in the broader peace movement the resistance to German rearmament is reflected in this form of antagonism. Although France had similar experiences during the Second World War, this form of antagonism is, in the German case, not countered by the colonial and world-wide responsibilities which necessitated military engagement for France, which I see as the reason why French opposition to military involvement is not hampered by past experience. This form of antagonism is also a reflection of German abdication as a world power and as a great military power.

In the German case, antagonism to military engagement did not just result in the abstention from military action, outlined above, but also in a strong commitment to non-military integration, such as the ECSC. However, an even better example is the EEC because here economic co-operation is coupled with the commitment to political integration. Germany's leading role in the EEC can, at least in part, be explained by the unmistakably non-military nature of the EEC.

It is, indeed, this positive side of antagonism to military involvement which can be found also in France and Britain. For these two countries, the military defeats in Indo-China and Algeria were key factors in the French case, as well as Suez. But Suez, particularly in the British case, triggered a comprehensive strategic reappraisal and a weakening of the colonial and imperialist mindset and led to the 1957 Defence Review with its emphases on missiles and nuclear defence. In both countries, the defeats resulted in a strengthening of the political camp opposed to military action and also in a stronger commitment to European integration and even a swing towards Europe. Both the anti-war and the pro-integration trends can be attributed to a search for new strategic options and, not least, additional resources for the national treasuries drained by the wars. The European alternative fitted both bills and was a reasonable option for France and Britain, as is demonstrated, in particular, by Eden's re-consideration of the strategic options after the Suez crisis and during his last days as Prime Minister.⁹ The fact that Macmillan gave priority to the special relationship with America does not invalidate this observa-

for Churchill's defeat in the general election in 1945, see Paul Addison, *Churchill – the unexpected hero*, p. 214-5

⁹ See Britain/Military Security/Crisis/The Suez Crisis

tion. And his later turn towards Europe is, indeed, a strong indication that the above rationale was considered to provide Britain with strategic and a budgetary support which could not be ignored.

It is interesting to see that the Suez crisis, for France too, played an important role in lending support to the section of deputies who were opposed to military engagement. The link between the failed EDC and the Suez disaster was made mainly by the most fervent Europeanists of the MRP. The main argument was that had the EDC been in place in 1956, European troops would never have been sent against Egypt.¹⁰ In that sense it is perhaps not an antagonism against military engagement *per se*, as in the German case, but rather the reasoning that sensible European military structures might have prevented the Suez venture altogether, sparing France another military defeat and the battering of its international prestige and reputation. However, much more than the anti-war argument, the pro-integration, pro-European argument shows its strength in France's foreign policy in the second half of the 1950s. By that time, European economic integration had clearly become one of France's main economic pillars and provided formerly scarce resources in abundance, e.g. coal and steel under the ECSC. The French initiative at Messina had the clear goal of expanding this mutually beneficial cooperation to wider areas of the economy. The CAP is only the most prominent instance of the direct economic benefits France reaped from the economic integration process, which shows that European economic cooperation as a whole had become a key French policy, underpinning its economic policy and economic viability. It had manifestly provided a successful economic alternative to the dependency of metropolitan France on imports not just from the US, but more importantly from its colonial empire. This trend of a reduced dependency on colonial commodities, definitely contributed to a more relaxed policy towards these territories. Moreover, European integration provided a political alternative to the Empire, which also resulted in a more relaxed handling of independence movements, as can be seen in the Tunisian case under the Mendès-France government. National emancipation, independence and the freeing of Tunisian political leaders from French jails were implemented avoiding another colonial war.¹¹

Hence, the essence of this antagonism to military involvement can be seen in the consequences of lost military engagements in all three countries and in an increase in the motivation to search for alternative policy options and a stronger emphasis on peaceful settlements of conflicts. The credo of European integration – peace

¹⁰ See France/National Security/Territorial Integrity/The *Communauté Française*/Decolonisation

¹¹ Algeria is an exception to this pattern, mainly because so many French families had put down deep roots in this part of North Africa. See France/National Security/Territorial Integrity/The *Communauté Française*/Decolonisation

and prosperity – finds its reflection in this. The beneficial consequences of such policies have become felt in France, Germany and Britain, too.

5.2 Conclusions by Country

The indicators, as the main discourse theoretical comparative threads and the subheadings which grew out of the empirical work with the primary sources, provide a comparative network that is designed to provide a picture of the national discourses on European integration.¹² The purpose of the conclusions is to bind the theoretical threads together using the comparative layers, i.e. indicators and subheadings, as bridges between the national storylines on European integration.

5.2.1 *France*

The War Experience section in particular has shown France's search for security as the key characteristic of its immediate post war policy. The War Experience chapter shows clearly that immediately after the war French policy was internally rigid and by no means open-minded with regard to Germany. There were strong tendencies within the French political establishment to use the occupation regime as a means of holding Germany down, but this 'Poincaré type' of policy was discarded in favour of a more constructive policy of European integration. In Schuman's own words, it was a policy of 'control and reassurance'¹³, i.e. control by France and reassurance for France. However this policy was also mutually beneficial and built on the hope of a lasting alliance between all Western Europe, in particular between France and Germany. This policy has been analysed under the subheadings 'Reconciliation with Germany' and 'The European Ideal'. Apart from the idealism reflected in French initiatives for European integration, notably in the Schuman Plan, they must also be seen as the beginning of the European integration process, characterised by sophisticated European institutions, such as the High Authority, that went far beyond traditional alliances.

As can be seen in the subheadings, the striving for security from potential German aggression was always present. 'The Anglo-French Alliance' had traditionally been the major reassurance for French security. The reorientation towards this old link could still be felt after the rejection of the EDC and the rearrangement of defence provisions in WEU. The lack of trust and sometimes the old suspicion between

¹² For the reasons to focus on the national perspective see Introduction/Methodology

¹³ Schuman (MRP), in JO, 2ème Lég., 8/10/54, p. 46311

France and Germany are exemplified in the 'National Security' chapter and particularly in the 'Territorial Integrity' subheading, which touches on French security in the most concrete sense of frontiers and territorial attachment such as with the Saar. On the one hand, internal problems such as Nazi collaborators or the often denied inferiority complex, which have been dealt with under the National Security indicator in 'Internal Reform', on the other hand competing ideologies such as those offered by the Communists and the Gaullists, tore at the social fabric of France and influenced the course of the country in international affairs.

Despite notable problems in European integration, such as in the EPC or "little Europe", parliamentary debates suggest that European integration was seen and accepted as a solution to many of France's own political problems, not least the German one. Historically, the European integration effort was started during the Fourth Republic and it was usually backed by the majority of the political establishment. For several reasons¹⁴ most of this consensus remained intact after de Gaulle's accession to power. One important reason is that economic integration in particular served French interests.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the historical picture provided by parliamentary debates in the Fourth Republic is that European integration was politically motivated to guarantee French security by building trust.¹⁶ The post-war Franco-German relationship arising from this political decision might serve as an example for the validity of this political judgement and the importance this understanding had for European integration. This conviction of the beneficial effect of both political phenomena fed through to de Gaulle and became a cornerstone of his European policy. This was noted, too, in the European perspectives of Adenauer and de Gaulle in the subheading 'Political Europe' in the German and French 'National Security' chapter. The subheading '*Communauté Française*' was also used to suggest this as the French window to the wider world. The emphasis on world power status is definitely less pronounced than in the British case, as can be seen in the analysis of the Suez crisis, for France, as mentioned for Britain under 'Military Security'. The defeat in Indo-China was unequivocally accepted and the harsh consequences in terms of loss of blood and treasure were recognised. In that respect France seemed to handle the decolonisation and France's changing role in the world well, once it actually happened.¹⁷ The projected triangular balance in the EDC, between German rearmament, British engagement in Europe and French

¹⁴ See for example France/Economic Security/European integration/the European Economic Community

¹⁵ See Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, p. 208

¹⁶ See Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, p. 38, see also, France/War Experience/*La Grande Nation* finding its place in Europe/Reconciliation with Germany

¹⁷ The Algerian case is obviously an exception, which has been extensively dealt with under France/National Security/Territorial Integrity/The *Communauté Française*/Decolonisation

military commitments in Indo-China came to nought, but these commitments were only one reason for the failure of the integrated defence community for Europe. Again, the issue of the security of France itself was a decisive factor in the initial rejection of German rearmament and in the desire for British participation in European defence, i.e. WEU. The conclusion from the parliamentary debates is that the opponents of the EDC, who had put forward the well known uncompromising and sometimes illogical position against German rearmament, were themselves quite surprised when their opposition on principle was actually successful in bringing down a major international treaty. This might explain some of the political shock after the rejection of the EDC, but the loss of credibility for the French government on the international stage, the increased instability of the government majority in the *Assemblée Nationale* and the resulting increased insecurity of the government clearly comes out in parliamentary debates. Further, as has been shown under 'Decolonisation' in the 'National Security' section, the experience of *Diên Biên Phủ*, Suez and Algeria distanced France from the US and, indeed, from NATO. It was de Gaulle who reflected this drifting apart in removing France somewhat from the Western alliance framework by taking it out of the integrated command structure in March 1959. Again particularly French security concerns, in terms of freedom of action in respect of the ongoing 'pacification' campaign in Algeria, must be seen as the reasons for the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command structure as shown under 'The Atlantic Alliance'. The turn towards Europe, which gave the Messina process a new impetus, is another consequence of Suez and Algeria, in particular, and clearly shows the different reactions of France and Britain to the Suez disaster, as outlined in more detail under the respective sections on Suez.¹⁸

Under the subheading 'The ECSC', evidence suggests that this early European integration initiative very much fulfilled the function of providing security for France, while preparing the ground for closer co-operation for France and Germany, not Britain. The initiative for the re-launch of European integration in the Messina process came in part from France (Euratom) and was proudly conceived as giving new momentum to the integration process. Trust in the German ally had taken root and was regarded as an asset by the second half of the 1950s and despite initial wrecking efforts Britain came around, too.¹⁹ The process leading to EEC and Euratom, therefore marks a change of attitude towards European integration which is reflected in detail in both under the respective headings in the main chapters. Co-operation between France and Germany even in the sensitive area of nu-

¹⁸ See Britain/military Security/Crisis/The Suez Crisis, see also France/National Security/Territorial Integrity/The *Communauté Française*/Decolonisation

¹⁹ See Britain/Economic Security/Britain in Europe/The EEC

clear armament took place in the late 1950s, and although this was discontinued by de Gaulle completely, co-operation in European integration went on. Even for de Gaulle – one of the staunchest critics of the early integration process – it had become one of the pillars of French policy. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the corresponding close relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle may serve as one example.

Thus, European integration fulfilled, on the one hand, the French need for security in the early 1950s which, on the other hand, gave it a secure basis to become the lead nation for co-operation in continental Europe. It has been shown in the speeches of Robert Schuman among others, that this development and, in particular, the step towards Germany was carried to a considerable degree by idealism resulting from the hope of a better future and the horror of the last war. Although the realist evaluation of European integration must not be underestimated, the deliberate political choice of French leaders for the constructive policy of European integration was decisive for the development the Six took.

5.2.2 Germany

In the period after the war and the foundation of the Federal Republic, the guiding policy paradigm for Germany was equality. Although this is a term mostly associated with Schumacher and the SPD, Adenauer's co-authorship is unquestionable, not least because his CDU/CSU, the ruling party, took over the claim for equality and he implemented it in his policy towards the Western Allies. However, the reason for the policy aim was the undeniable fact that Germany was not an equal among the other European nations, but had lost its reputation, its status, its power and its friends in the last war. The question of guilt was difficult to tackle, particularly in the 1950s, so soon after the Germans had endured great loss and hardship. However, in the 1950s the decision was taken that never again would aggression emanate from Germany. Germany had to become an equal to the other European nations again. The commitment to the West and indeed European integration were the most promising road towards this political objective. By no means an undisputed position, the government coalition's support for this policy has been shown in the War Experience chapter and in particular under the subheading 'Western commitment'. In this chapter, the commitment to Franco-German reconciliation and its importance for the European integration has also been shown, and in many ways mirrored that of France. Equality emerged as the predominant theme in the 'National Security' chapter, too. The issue of the recovery of 'Sovereignty' and the step-by-step 'Peace Treaty', but also the 'Saar' question and its relevance to the membership of the Council of Europe and, indeed, to the Schuman Plan, bear

witness to the importance of equality as a primary policy objective. The same is true for the EDC and finally WEU and NATO membership. Beyond this, European integration was seen as the only way to bring about a peaceful settlement of Germany in Europe, as captured in the following quotation by an FDP Euro-enthusiast:

“There is only one way, if we want to reach an understanding with the East: that is the way via Europe. Only then I see a peaceful solution. Nobody is interested in a solution by force of arms. That would be our end. [...] That is why I want Europe and that is why I do not want to create a German Reich. No, I want to create a Europe in which Germany is an equal partner.”²⁰

This settlement clearly included the hope for a recovery of the territories lost in the East. It was an aspect that both France and Britain feared - and which sometimes made Britain wary and suspicious of this new concept of European integration, for it sometimes took on a too nationalistic tone for the British taste, as the following quotation by von Merkatz a right-wing conservative Euro-enthusiast shows.²¹

“It is the duty of European policy to shift the borders of Europe as far to the East as possible. (...) the parliamentary group of the German Party (DP) signs up to this with the explicit and clear commitment to the liberation of our people in the East German zone; liberation of Eastern Europe; unification of Germany through the unification of Europe!”²²

The potential dangers of a revival of extreme nationalism or recovery of these territories by force of arms have been covered for all three countries.²³ Against the

²⁰ von Rechenberg (FDP), in VDB, WP I, 169, p. 6988AB, original: „wenn wir zu einer Einigung im Osten kommen wollen, gibt es dazu nur einen Weg: das ist der Weg über Europa. Nur dann sehe ich eine friedliche Möglichkeit. An einer kriegerischen Möglichkeit ist niemand interessiert: das wäre unser Ende. [...] darum bejahe ich Europa, darum will ich kein deutsches Reich schaffen. Nein, ich will ein Europa schaffen, in dem Deutschland ein gleichberechtigte Teil ist.“, see also, von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 125, p.4768D

²¹ See National Security/Territorial Integrity, for the French and the British position see War Experience/Allied Responsibility and the German threat for both countries

²² von Merkatz (DP), in VDB, WP I, 68, p. 2493CD, original: „Es ist die Aufgabe der europäischen Politik, die Grenzen Europas so weit nach Osten zu verlegen wie nur irgend möglich!(...) Wenn wir von der Fraktion der Deutschen Partei dieses Ja sprechen, dann klar und deutlich in dem einen Sinne: Befreiung unserer Menschen der Ostzone, Befreiung Osteuropas, Einigung Deutschlands durch die Einigung Europas!“

²³ See War Experience/Allied responsibilities and the German threat for all three countries. See also, Germany/National Security/Territorial Integrity/The lost territories

background of early European idealism, later success and at least some support within the SPD for European integration- shown under ‘The European Ideal’ and ‘Political Europe’ – the rejection of all early European integration initiatives by the SPD was hard to justify and can only be understood on the basis of the ideological struggle between Capitalist- and Socialist Europe, set out under ‘Ideas and Ideology’.²⁴ In addition, equality has been shown to be most important to the SPD in the early 1950s, not least because of their uncompromising demand for a policy of early reunification, in the sense that Germany become once again whole and equal to the other European nation states. The SPD did not see that any pre-condition of equality was fulfilled in either the Schuman Plan or in the EDC. This was a judgment essentially built on the experience from the Ruhr Authority, the Saar and the Council of Europe. And the Western Treaties, as they were called by the SPD, contradicted their policy objective of reunification by binding the Federal Republic into the Western camp, which deepened the divide in Europe and Germany and made it virtually impossible for the Soviet Union to consent to early reunification. Add reservations such as ‘little Europe’ and the capitalist dominance of early integration in the ECSC, for example, and the SPD’s rejection of the early integration efforts becomes much more understandable. Similar reservations can be found among Socialists across Europe and have been shown in the French debates and more prominently in the House of Commons, too. That did not prevent the French Socialists supporting the votes on the European Communities, an important difference being that they were in government in the Fourth Republic most of the time. Despite their early opposition to integration, the British Labour Party discarded the SPD position as too nationalistic and ultimately untrustworthy.²⁵ The middle of the 1950s marked a turning point for German policy. Equality had been achieved via the recovery of full sovereignty in 1955, the General Treaty, NATO membership and the resulting rearmament in the *Bundeswehr*, while the situation in the GDR left few believing that reunification was possible on any acceptable terms. European integration in the Messina initiative was wholeheartedly supported, not just by the government, but also by the SPD. European integration had become the German policy consensus. The close relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle has been mentioned as an example that the relationship with France became paramount in this, despite America being a major export market and the reference point for defence. It has been shown that France had taken up a leadership role.²⁶ However, by the late 1950s this had turned into a much more

²⁴ See, for example, Ollenhauer (SPD), in VDB, WP I, 184, p. 7796D, “Our commitment to European co-operation is founded on our fundamental socialist attitude” Original: „Unsere Bekenntnis zur europäischen Zusammenarbeit ist in unserer grundsätzlichen sozialistischen Einstellung begründet.“

²⁵ See Britain/National Security/Ideas and ideology/The Socialist international

²⁶ See Germany/National Security/Ideas and ideology/Political Europe

mutual relationship as was shown by the reliance of de Gaulle's first government on Germany as an ally.²⁷ This is the foundation of what became known as the Paris-Bonn axis or, more positively, the motor of Europe.

5.2.3 Britain

In the early post war period, the guiding principle of British policy was independence. This is what Britain gained through its Empire, world power status and victory in World War II and ultimately also in the alliance with the US, seen in Britain as a partnership between equals. And that is what Britain did not want to lose, which is why the subheading 'Status Quo' was inserted into the British 'War Experience' chapter to underline the generally conservative policies - conservative in the sense of preserving or restoring what was or had been - followed by both parties, Labour and the Tories. The Empire and the role Britain saw for itself as a world power were dealt with under this subheading. The other major themes under the 'War Experience' indicator, as for the other two countries, were 'Occupational Rule' and the 'German question' which allow for a good comparison between the three countries in these fields. This was Britain's main European concern, firstly in fulfilling its duties as a consequence of winning the war and, secondly, in the 'hope for a peaceful future' by solving the German problem so that Britain could disentangle itself once again, from continental affairs. This kind of detachment would certainly not take the form of balance of power or disengagement into insular isolationism reminiscent of past centuries. The Cold War scenario and Britain's sense of responsibility for the wellbeing of Europe would not allow that. However, a certain aloofness and wariness against getting too closely involved with the continent is clearly reflected in Britain's striving for independence. The main reason why Britain was reluctant to underwrite commitments to Europe has been shown in its world-wide responsibilities. The perspective of Britain was not just Europe. It reached further and consciously so.²⁸

"The question that is often put to us by our friends in Europe is, 'Do you think that Britain is part of Europe?' The answer is, 'Yes, by tradition, strategic interest, culture, and everything else. We are part of Europe.' But that is not the whole answer, because we are more than just part of Europe. We have interests, duties, ties and obligations which stretch far

²⁷ See France/War Experience/*La grande nation* finding its place in Europe/Reconciliation with Germany

²⁸ See Mitchison (Lab.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1487

beyond Europe. (...) and, above all, we have our economic, political and family links with the Commonwealth.”²⁹

This strand of Commonwealth responsibilities is reflected in the discussion of ‘Territorial Integrity’ in the National Security chapter and shows clearly Britain’s emphasis on world-wide responsibilities rather than on European border-shifting in the early 1950s. This was much in contrast to France, the difference being mainly in the Saar issue with Germany, which has been extensively analysed in the National Security chapters of both countries. Britain’s sceptical view of the new European institutions must be seen against the background of the desire to preserve the primary British objective of keeping as much freedom of action as possible in order to be able to fulfil its international obligations. The Council of Europe and the OEEC were to no small extent British creations and were considered in the UK as historic achievements in terms of European integration.³⁰ But again Britain took a very pragmatic position. All international organisations and ultimately also the ‘UN’ – discussed under the same subheading – had to be judged according to their utility in the world.³¹ This world perspective was strong in British political considerations; purely European organisations ran the risk of being too limited in scope. Such European organisations became a lever which could be pulled in European circles; they were a reminder of the great European past, too, but there was considerable doubt whether they were big enough to solve the problems which had been the cause of World War II. Hence there was a reluctance in Britain to get involved in supranational European integration which could compromise its freedom of action outside of Europe. In addition, there is also a considerable element of pride in the resilience and reliability of the British democratic and constitutional arrangements which neither France nor Germany could muster: “(...) we are today enjoying a very refined quality of Parliamentary democracy to realise that it has taken us some 700 years to get where we have got, including a General Election and various other things.”³² This statement showed clearly the belief in the superiority and the higher stage of evolution the British polity had achieved, which was another argument for British independence and contributed to the caution as regards getting involved in European political integration, sometimes even regarded as a defeatist concept made by them and made for them only.³³ Last

²⁹ Reference to speech by Maudling (Con.), Paymaster-General, in: Grimond (Lib.), in Hansard 1958-59, 599, c. 1380

³⁰ See for example Deedes (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 725

³¹ See, Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1499, see also, Hall (Lab.), in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1426

³² Morrison (Lab.), in Hansard 1951-52, 494, c. 61

³³ See Britain/National Security/Ideas and Ideology/political Europe

but not least, Bevin – like all his successors in the Foreign Office – stressed the importance of the Atlantic Alliance:

“I understand the urge towards European unity and sympathise with it and, indeed, I did much to help bring the Council of Europe into being. But I also understand the new paradox that European unity is no longer possible within Europe alone but only within the broader Atlantic community. It is this great conception of an Atlantic community that we want to build up.”³⁴

America was considered vital for British security and, indeed, the security of Western Europe. All three were agreed on that, as became obvious in the three sections on NATO. However, the special relationship between Britain and the US is another example of the wider scope of Britain, i.e. world-wide responsibilities and not just Europe, with more examples given in the ‘Military Security’ section, such as ‘The Korean War’, the ‘Pacific Pact’ and the ‘Baghdad Pact’. The British policy to protect national freedom of action, as a reason for British reluctance to going wholeheartedly into the European integration process, is dealt with under the EDC subheading and is also reflected in the structure of the table of contents through the provision of particular subheadings in the British chapter, i.e. ‘The national Armies of Europe’, dealing with the German, the French and the British armed forces and individual rearmament efforts. The particular British subheading ‘The national armies of Europe’ underlined the point that while Britain was thinking either on a national or an international level in terms of defence, France and Germany were thinking much more on a European level – hence the subheading ‘Integrated Defences’. In particular Germany and to a lesser extent the Fourth Republic did not have such a stronger emphasis on exclusively national defences and could not afford to put a similarly strong emphasis on military strength in the international sphere, as Britain did.

Still very much in a World War II mindset, the Attlee Cabinet had set the following limit to integration with Europe: “(...) if Europe collapsed, Britain must be able to survive, and rebuild herself with American and Commonwealth support. Thus Britain could not commit herself to Europe so far that she lost her independent viability.”³⁵ Hence, British policy would be to support Europe as far as possible, but to avoid getting involved to a point of no return. The War Experience chapter and ‘the Soviet Threat’ in the Military Security chapter clearly show that this was

³⁴ Bevin (Lab.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1950-51, 481, c. 1173, see also, Ernest Davies (Lab.) Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in Hansard 1950-51, 480, c. 1397-8

³⁵ J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, p. 122, see also, p. 153

not an impossible scenario. In the early 1950s, the collapse of Europe was still a serious possibility. Britain could not run the risk of going down with the continent, if unhappily this should occur. The British policy was, therefore, a primary plan of Western and European integration and a backup plan of building an Imperial-Anglo-American recovery position, which again underlines the British determination to retain their freedom of action and clearly marks a difference from France and Germany in the policy options available to them. Britain might have been able to survive without the continent. France and to even a greater extent Germany really only had the chance of making European integration work.

The renewed success of European economic integration as a result of the Messina process had two consequences in Britain. Firstly, it caused some alarm at the prospect that Europe might eclipse Britain, even if only economically, and might end up in a dominant position.

“Now that there is evidently growing support for the proposed United States of Europe, or some kind of federation on the Continent, which is not something which could come overnight, but which looks as if it might come within twenty or thirty years, and if some kind of democratic federation of States on the Continent came about, growing slowly on sound economic foundations, it may well be that Britain would be afraid of it.”³⁶

This quotation by Boyd, a Labour backbencher with government experience that distanced him from extreme left-wing MPs, shows that, rather than seeing itself as part of the European integration process, there was a competitive stance in with Europe in the British position. The case that Britain was much happier with looser and potentially less successful European organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OEEC has been argued under ‘Britain and the European organisations’ in the ‘Economic Security’ chapter. FTA and EFTA mark the peak as well as the last attempt by Britain to shape the European integration process under its guise as an intergovernmental integration. They were proposed in opposition to the re-launch of the supranational integration effort in the Treaties of Rome, i.e. the EEC and Euratom. The detrimental consequences for Britain of staying outside these successful and predominantly supranational organisations have been dealt with under the ‘Schuman Plan’ and ‘The European Economic Community’ in the British chapter.

The second repercussion of the Messina process was Britain’s swing towards Europe. European integration came to be seen as potentially the only way out of the Cold War dilemma. The possible outcomes of any European policy were only

³⁶ Boyd (Lab.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 751

three: firstly, the continuation of the Cold War, with the high level of armament and expenditure connected with it. Secondly, a hot war which would have led to the apocalypse; or, thirdly, an understanding in Europe, of which European integration could be the beginning, finally unifying the continent in peace.³⁷ In the aftermath of the Suez crisis British engagement in Western Europe became closer, starting with FTA and later with the EFTA. The British applications for EEC membership submitted in the early 1960s finally put an end to the uncompromising British opposition to the supranational integration process of the early 1950s. The British preference to retain a certain freedom of political action, in particular, in foreign policy did not disappear and strong components of this trait remained active throughout the 1950s; obstruction and wrecking efforts against the EEC under the late Eden government can be seen as the most malign example of such policies to the detriment of European integration..³⁸ However, Britain had changed tack, not least because European integration had demonstrated its potential through the recovery of the European continent. Put in the old phrasing of the independence paradigm, continental Europe had become an economic force with which Britain had to reckon. Supranational communities such as the ECSC had made headway in unifying the continent politically to an extent which had previously been inconceivable. And it had militarily strengthened the Western defences, although arguably weaker under WEU than it might have been under the EDC. On the other hand, Britain's power was waning.

“The fact that Britain must now consider entering the Market is a demonstration that the attempt to maintain ourselves as an independent Great Power, which all parties have been making since the war, has come unstuck. Even three years ago no one was dreaming of proposing such a thing.”³⁹

There is no clearer evidence of the British loss of power than the ‘Suez Crisis’. The defeat by Nasser, the US-led Security Council resolution against Britain (and France) and the economic fragility of Britain drove home this message. As for France, it dealt a blow to the Imperial as well as the relationship with America. British world power seemed to have vanished and Britain was shown to be no

³⁷ For ideas into this direction see Eden (Con.), Foreign Secretary, in Hansard 1953-54, 533, c. 413-4, see also, Amery (Con.), in Hansard 1950, 473, c. 220

³⁸ For the different perspectives of France, Britain and of lesser importance Germany see Economic Security/The EEC and FTA for all three

³⁹ See quotation from a speech in the House of Commons June 1961 by Richard Crossman, in: J. Morgan (ed.), *Crossman Backbench Diaries*, Hamilton, London, 1981, p. 951, as quoted in: David Dutton, *Anthony Eden*, p. 311, see also, p. 386

longer an equal partner with the Americans. Britain did not turn away from the US and towards European integration as France did, but the growing importance of cooperation with European economic integration has been shown in the 'Economic Security' section. In contrast to France and Germany, where the limited nature of the EEC project was often criticised, for Britain such limitations were indeed one of the greatest merits of European integration: "It is noticeable that those movements towards union which have been comparatively successful have been less ambitious and more restricted; and on the economic side."⁴⁰ And, in the best tradition of progressive conservatism most of the British political establishment agreed with Robert Schuman that European integration was not a revolution, but an evolution which would need time and trust: "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity."⁴¹ In the spirit, of this concrete and gradual process, Britain was able to find its place alongside its European partners, although only in 1973. The British chapter has underlined in many examples that in contrast to France and Germany, European integration was not so much an idealistic endeavour. For Britain it was one out of many cooperation schemes the number of which listed in the British chapter was rather larger for Britain than either for France or Germany, if one wants to take this as an indication that Britain had more of a choice and more responsibilities in the world. Nevertheless, the success of European integration for France and Germany was recognised in Britain and brought the country round to regarding European integration as a scheme with positive potential in which Britain should also be represented as a member.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

In the debates the different positions of parliamentary parties on the European integration process have become tangible. Despite a greater fragmentation of the whole political spectrum, on the continent the parties supporting European integration in the 1950s were usually in government, while in Britain it is always the opposition which put forward ideas of European integration. A strong political consensus on European integration developed in France and in Germany, although parties on the extremes, i.e. the Communists in both countries and the Gaullists only in France, employed all political arguments at their disposal to prevent the initial steps. The British debates give the impression that, although European integration was discussed seriously, it was often used as a political weapon by the op-

⁴⁰ Maurice Macmillan (Con.), in Hansard 1957-58, 585, c. 743

⁴¹ 'The Schuman Declaration', in: Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union*, p. 64-65

position against the government, less therefore for its own sake but rather for opportunistic reasons - such as showing that the government was lacking behind the expectations of its closest partners in Europe. However, it was clear that most of the elements which acted as a brake on any British enthusiasm for European integration, such as the Commonwealth and colonial responsibilities, world power status and the transatlantic relationship, were shared as right and proper policies by almost the whole political establishment in Britain. This might, again, point to the reason why European integration initiatives were mainly supported by the opposition, because concerns about the impact of British involvement in European affairs on its extra-European relations were indeed shared by the government and the opposition, however, only the opposition could afford to demand a more Europhile policy. They did not have to implement such a policy and because of that they could afford neglecting the consequences on policies such as relations to the Empire and the US in order to use criticism of government policy towards Europe as a political weapon in the domestic debates.

It has also been shown that because of its comparatively well-to-do position, Britain at the beginning was rather cautious in following European integration initiatives which sometimes promised achievements which Britain had long reached, such as higher productivity in the Coal and Steel industry. The lack of the idealistic strand of the European integration argument in Britain supports the impression of the parliamentary speeches that Britain saw European integration rather from a standpoint of utility, starting clearly from a higher level of affluence than France or Germany.

As shown in more detail in the main chapters, Milward's argument that the most important reasons for European integration were of an economic nature must be seen to be one-sided. From what was shown in the French and the German chapters, there can be no doubt that leading politicians in both states, in particular in the early integration period, saw idealistic motivations for their European commitment, i.e. non-material reasons such as the prevention of war instead of a profit rationale behind economic integration which can be attributed to the British application for membership in the EEC. It may well be that idealistic reasons are less pronounced in the British case, although the most powerful idealistic motivation for European integration also applies in Britain, i.e. to prevent another war from happening, which has been shown to be one of the most important reasons for Britain's engagement in NATO. However, it has been shown that European idealism had a foothold in the German and the French people as well as in their political leaders. Frequent quotations of such positions, alongside the election results as in the 1957 German election and spontaneous showing of European enthusiasm of the French people as in the almost legendary Strasbourg rally, are proof of such a European commitment. Parliamentary debates in both countries have clearly

shown similar idealistic arguments which must surely be seen as pivotal to understanding the motivations of both countries to follow the policy of European integration, not least because of the additional and detailed political positions which have come out in parliamentary debates in this study.⁴²

Parliamentary debates have also discounted any idea of a permissive consensus in the 1950s, as put forward by Inglehart and Lindberg and Scheingold.⁴³ It can be argued that such a permissive consensus began to settle in after the Treaties on the European Communities in 1958, on the basis of three developments. Firstly, in Germany the SPD finally came around to giving up the opposition to the European integration process, recognising the potential in it and supporting it thereafter. This meant that there was almost a universal consensus in favour of European integration in Germany, from 1958 onwards. Secondly, a change of attitude towards European integration can be discerned in Britain during the later Messina process and the FTA negotiations, as pointed out above and in the British section on 'Economic Security'. This does not warrant an inclusion of Britain in the permissive consensus of the Six, but faltering opposition from the country which had been most critical of European integration could be seen as supporting the consensus within the Six. Thirdly, chronologically it does not coincide completely with the signing of the Treaties of the ECs, but the main chapters have shown that by the end of the 1950s the Communists had lost all credibility in West European parliaments. In Germany, they lost all seats in the 1953 election and although there were some peaks of their representation during the French Fourth Republic, they were drastically reduced in the first parliament of the Fifth Republic in 1958. With this loss of credibility and their reduction in actual numbers, the Communists' arguments against European integration also lost weight.⁴⁴ Once in government, the Gaullists turned out to be not as opposed to European integration. Because of the three reasons above, the earliest possibility for the development of a permissive consensus must be seen at the end of the 1950s. Before that the analysis of parliamentary debates has clearly shown that there were diverging positions on European integration and that a very lively political debate about individual components, the direction and the end of an integrated Europe took place.⁴⁵ The debates have, therefore, also shown that, a permissive consensus which might be seen to exist in later decades was based on a fully fledged political deliberation process in the 1950s, which included through the function of parliament as the representative of the people popular legitimacy, not least, because the European issue became

⁴² For a more detailed criticism of Milward's work see *Germany/Economic Security/European Integration/The Schuman Plan*

⁴³ See Introduction footnote #20

⁴⁴ See *National Security/Ideas and ideology/The Communists* for all three countries

⁴⁵ See *Methodology/Analysis of Speeches*

more and more an election issue, as has been shown for the 1957 election in Germany.⁴⁶

With regard to Germany, parliamentary debates have also comprehensively refuted the thesis the Adenauer was rather lukewarm, if not obstructive, towards early reunification, which has mainly been put forward by Hans-Peter Schwarz.⁴⁷ Apart from countless occasions where Adenauer contradicted such suggestions, his idea of reunification was developed along well-defined lines in his 'Unity in Freedom' argument, i.e. as a matter of principle he saw freedom and democratic liberties as fundamental essentials on which German unity must rest. This explains why free elections and the freedom to determine the military attachment of a reunited Germany were a *sine qua non* for Adenauer.⁴⁸

In addition to these contributions to the academic discourse, parliamentary debates add some new historical insights. On the one hand, there are the positions of parliamentary parties, such as the SPD's principal opposition against the ECSC and the EDC and their change after 1957; the MRP's opposition to WEU because of their conviction in the supranational principle embodied in the earlier rejected EDC; and Labour's breaking with the Macmillan government, accusing it of obstruction and active wrecking efforts against the EEC. Such positions of opposition parties clearly contribute to our historical understanding of the European integration process. They have been shown in the main chapter as extremely revealing historical facets. In addition, it has been shown that at important times in the continental European integration process, crucial British ministerial resources were bound up in Britain's world-wide responsibilities, the Commonwealth, or decolonisation wars as Suez or the narrow prevention of one over the Iranian oil crisis which did not just prevent Britain from leading European integration, but which hindered even constructive participation. During this period, parliamentary debates clearly show a focus on overseas affairs by government and a further neglect of European issues which have been shown to be generally regarded as of secondary importance.⁴⁹

It has to be admitted that the analysis of parliamentary speeches has shown one weakness. Secret government projects, such as the early British nuclear programme, which found its culmination in the first British A-bombs in 1952, cannot be found in public parliamentary debates. However, parliamentary debates add to

⁴⁶ See Germany/Economic Security/European Integration/The EEC

⁴⁷ See for example H.-P. Schwarz, 'Das Spiel ist aus und alle Fragen offen, oder: Vermutungen zu Adenauers Wiedervereinigungspolitik', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler

⁴⁸ For the 'Einheit in Freiheit' argument which shows Adenauer's line of reasoning regarding reunification see Germany/National Security/Territorial Integrity/ Reunification and the Soviet Occupation Zone

⁴⁹ See Britain/National Security/Territorial Integrity/Empire and Commonwealth

the discourse provided in more widely available secondary sources through providing a comprehensive picture of general political discourses such as a country's position towards the European integration process. International treaties of this type are especially well covered in parliamentary debates, because eventually they have to be voted through Parliament. Before binding the country in such a way, the preceding debates usually cover as many arguments as possible from the supporters as well as the opponents, which discounts any idea of a permissive consensus in the 1950s.⁵⁰ Rather, on the contrary, the European treaties have been shown to be a frequently discussed issue in all national parliaments throughout the early integration process. Parliamentary debates are therefore very well suited for a close analysis of the European integration process.

For France, the loss of the trend-setting function of parliament under the Fifth Republic became clear, in particular, with regard to foreign policy issues, such as European integration, which came to be one of the prerogatives of the president. This is a particularly marked difference to parliamentary debates from the Fourth Republic where Parliament was the dominant institution, the best example being the rejection of the EDC. The debates have also shown that Deputies in the *Assemblée Nationale* were less bound by party affiliation and seemed to be more able to express their individual position instead of toeing the party line as often happens in the House of Commons and to a lesser extent in the Bundestag. The downside of this tendency is, however, a high number of maverick Deputies in the *Assemblée Nationale* who changed their party affiliation frequently and even founded their own parties when necessary – as was the case for Chambrun and later de Gaulle himself. This provides one reason for a less stable and more fluctuating party system, which was reflected in a greater fragmentation of the political system of the Fourth Republic in general – often seen as one of its greatest weaknesses. Using parliamentary debates as primary sources has brought out such differences between the parliamentary systems and in particular the differing importance of MPs in them. The role individual MPs played in their parliaments reflects to some extent their ability to develop their own policy initiatives or take outside opinions into account, as has been shown for Jean Le Bail and Carlo Schmid proposing a Coal and Steel community between France and Germany well before the Schuman Plan was on the table. Both being Socialists, it is a reasonable assumption that such ideas were circulated in circles such as the Socialist International. However, Labour MPs did not bring up such ideas, which through the analysis of parliamentary debates shows again British separateness from continental politics and perhaps a more efficient and power-centric parliamentary structure which cut out idealistic dreaming of European integration to a greater extent than on the continent. A

⁵⁰ See Introduction/Methodology/Analysis of Speeches and Conclusion/Concluding Remarks

parliamentary system with two major parties and few, if any, smaller parties present was a result of the British electoral system – the majority system as opposed to proportional representation in the Fourth Republic and Germany – and seemed to result in greater party discipline and reduced desire to develop or pick up ideas on European integration. The imperial consensus in Britain also set other priorities than on the continent, but the difference in parliamentary culture has also been shown to bind MPs in the House of Commons much more to a policy consensus, to the extent that when Boothby went on advocating European integration idea, his fellow MPs soon only endured his speeches and finally ignored his ideas.

In addition, it has been shown that British interests were definitely much wider than just Europe in the 1950s. Hansard shows this clearly in that the headings for parliamentary debates span the whole world, from Aden to Malaysia, Antarctica and Kenya.⁵¹ Moreover, debates on Europe are much less focussed and normally connected to other topics such as the Commonwealth. There are undoubtedly two technical reasons for this. Given parliamentary procedure in the House of Commons, foreign policy debates were held on a regular basis. These were usually sessions where foreign policy was considered in its entirety. In this broad brush approach, Europe came up only as one item out of many, but usually in every single one of these debates so that there is a high number of entries. Furthermore, in the 1950s, there was no time limit on speeches in the House of Commons. This results in longer, sometimes less focussed, speeches. Beyond these technical reasons one additional conclusion was however supported by the primary evidence from the speeches: Britain was not too secure about its position towards Europe. The result was an intensive soul-searching process which endeavoured to give some order and direction to British policy towards Europe. Parliamentary debates have brought out these extended reflections on theory and practice of European integration in which the parliamentary parties tried to make sense of European integration and develop a position towards it.⁵²

In contrast, France can be assumed to have known its political objectives and what it wanted to achieve in and with Europe. Particular parliamentary sessions in France devoted solely to European issues such as the ECSC, the EDC or the EEC seem to support the argument of a more guided debate about Europe in France. Individual Parliamentary committees on every European community further support this argument. France had committed itself as a primarily European power and the leader of the young integration process.

⁵¹ See also, O. J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe, since 1945*, p. 106

⁵² See Britain/National Security/Ideas and ideology/Political Europe

Finally, it has been shown that the decision-making and opinion-forming process in Parliament has substantially influenced government policy towards Europe, which became most obvious in the participation of ministers in debates on European integration, their responses to backbench ideas, in the opinion-forming process taking place in these sessions, and finally in the advance of Europhile MPs into government office, e.g. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger who became the third German Chancellor. It has become clear from the parliamentary debates that in particular with such a complex topic as the European integration process, the traditionally separate roles of government and parliament become increasing intertwined, so much so that parliament acted in some instances as a forum to form a national position towards European integration – the Western treaties, the policy of Western commitment, Rearmament and with it the EDC are a good example for this in the German context. The impact of parliamentary opinion on the government became absolutely obvious. The more direct influence of the Fourth Republic parliaments on foreign policy has already been suggested. Other systems such as the German one work more through a committee structure where MPs and ministers meet regularly, enabling exchanges of ideas, accommodating parliamentary opinion and sometimes finding the most beneficial solution during this decision making process – as has been shown in this thesis for some of the European treaties. The party structure in the British system can be seen as another variation to lodge parliamentary influence on the executive. What remains the same in all three cases is the formal legislative function of parliament which has been shown to have a major impact on the national position towards European integration and which has formally facilitated European integration. In the debates it became clear that individual MPs had considerable impact on European policy and that parliament was crucial in the deliberation process, not least through providing a comprehensive picture of the national perspectives on the European integration process which if combined as in this thesis might amount to something close to a European discourse, not least because the convergence of the three national discourse in matters of European affairs has been shown to have increased towards the end of the decade. Mutual influence of parliamentary debates, political speeches and even media contribution on the debates in one national parliament on another House have been shown and warrant the position that by the end of the 1950s national discourses on Europe were coming closer to each other. Parliaments are therefore only one, but a good example for a remarkable preparedness to work together and an openness to take the positions of other national representations into consideration in one's own national decision making process. That is clearly one of the earliest signs of the positive development of European integration, overall.

6. Bibliography

6.1 Primary Sources

6.1.1 Parliamentary Speeches

Hansard 1950-1959, Vols. 472-628

Hansard Index 1950-1959

Journal Officiel, 1^{ère} à 3^{ème} Législature, 1946-1958, Assemblée Nationale, Paris, 1946-1958

Journal Officiel, 1^{ère} à 5^{ème} Législature, 1958-1973, Assemblée Nationale, Paris, 1958-1973

Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Sachregister, 1.-3. Wahlperiode, Bonn, 1949-1961

6.1.2 Primary Literature

K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965

K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1953-1955*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965

K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965

K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959-1963*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1965

W. Albrecht (ed.), *Kurt Schumacher, Reden – Schriften – Korrespondenzen*, Dietz, Berlin, 1985

Pierre Avril, Gérard Conac (eds.), *La Constitution de la République Française*, 2nd ed., Montchrestien, Paris, 1999

Rainer Barzel, *Ein gewagtes Leben Erinnerungen*, Hohenheim, Stuttgart, 2001

W. E. Beckett, *The North Atlantic Treaty, The Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations*, Stevens & Sons, London, 1950

W. Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, Siedler, Frankfurt a.M., 1989

CAB. 128/16, 129/37, 133/88, 134/1026

MA.C.(55)

C.M. (49)62

M. Couve de Murville, 'Konrad Adenauer und Frankreich', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belser, Stuttgart, 1976

C.P. (49)203

Josef Felder, *Warum ich Nein sagte Erinnerungen an ein langes Leben für die Politik*, Rowolth, Hamburg, 2002

F.O. 371/78134/11438

F.O. 371/134510

Charles de Gaulle, *La Discorde chez l'ennemi*, Paris, Pion, 1934, nouvelle édition, 1972

Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, Plon, Paris, 1970

A. G. Harryvan, J. van der Harst (eds.) *Documents on the European Union*, Macmillan Press, London, 1997

G. Hazlehurst, S. Whitehead, C. Woodland (eds.), *A Guide to the Papers of British Cabinet Ministers*, CUP, Cambridge, 1996

Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life: My Autobiography*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1998

Dennis Kavanagh, *A Dictionary of Political Biography*, OUP, Oxford, 1998

W.-D. Kirst, *Kurt Schumacher als Redner: eine rhetorische Analyse*, Schmitz, Gießen, 1981

- T.T. Mackie, R. Rose (eds.), *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 3rd ed., Macmillan, London, 1991
- Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*, London, 1971
- Reginald Maudling, *Memoirs*, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1978.
- J.Monnet, *Mémoires*, Fayard, Paris, 1976
- J. Monnet, *Memoires*, translation by Richard Mayne, Collins, London, 1978
- J. Morgan(ed.), *Crossman Backbench Diaries*, Hamilton, London, 1981
- H. P. Mensing (ed.), *Adenauer – Heuss Unter vier Augen Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren 1949-1959*, Berlin, 1997
- B.F. Nelson, A.C.-G. Stubb (eds.), *The European Union: readings on the theory and practice of European Integration*, Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1994
- S. Rokkan, J. Meyriat (eds.), *Guide internationale des statistiques électorales*, Mouton, Paris, 1967
- H.-P. Schwarz (ed.), *Adenauer, Reden 1917-1967, Eine Auswahl*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1975
- Robert Schuman, 'Pour l'Europe', in: René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, Fayard, Paris, 2000
- A.Spinelli, *The European adventure*, Charles Knight&Co, London, 1972
- A. Spinelli, *Il manifesto di Ventotene*, Guida Editori, Naples, 1982

6.2 Secondary Sources

- Paul Addison, *Churchill – the unexpected hero*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005
- M. Agethen, 'Rainer Barzel (1924-)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion. West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990*, OUP, Oxford, 2003
- R. Aldous and S. Lee, (eds.), *Harold Macmillan and Britain's World Role*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996
- R. Aron, 'Adenauers Außenpolitik', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- R. Augstein, 'Begegnungen mit Konrad Adenauer', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- Egon Bahr, *Der Nationalstaat: überlebt und unentbehrlich*, Steidl, Göttingen, 1998
- Terence Ball, *Ideals and ideologies: a reader*, Harper Collins College Publishers, New York, 1995
- Terence Ball, 'Political Argument and Conceptual Change', in: Terence Ball, *Transforming Political Discourse. Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988, No. 1, p. 1-21
- Terence Ball, J. Farr, R. Hanson, *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, CUP, Cambridge, 1989
- Terence Ball, *Transforming Political Discourse. Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988
- O. Bange, 'Grand Designs and the Diplomatic Breakdown', in G. Wilkes, (ed.), *Britain's Failure to enter the European Community in 1963: Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, Frank Cass, London, 1997
- Jacques Bariéty, 'Die Rolle der persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen Bundeskanzler Adenauer und General de Gaulle für die deutsch-französische Politik zwischen 1958 und 1963', in: H.-P. Schwarz (ed.), *Adenauer und Frankreich - Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1958 bis 1969*, Rhöndorfer Gespräche, 2nd ed., Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1990
- A. Baring, 'Grundlagen und Fernziele einer Kanzlerschaft', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army 1509-1970*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970
- N. Beloff, *The General Says No*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1963.
- Wolfgang Benz, 'Einrichtung der Besatzungsherrschaft', in: *Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Deutschland 1945-1949 Besatzungszeit und Staatsgründung*, No. 259/2002
- Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in: *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1969
- Michael Blackwell, *Clinging to Grandeur: British attitudes in Foreign Policy in the aftermath of the Second World War*, Greenwood Press, Westport CT, 1993

- Gérard Bossuat, 'The French Administrative Elite and the Unification of Western Europe, 1947-58', in: Anne Deighton (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe – National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63*, Macmillan, London, 1995
- Christian Bougeard, *René Plevin Un Français libre en politique*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 1994
- B. Bouvier, 'Erich Ollenhauer (1901-1963)', in: T. Oppeland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- W. Brandt, 'Gespräch über Konrad Adenauer', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- Ferdinand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, Penguin, London, 1994, translated by Richard Mayne
- Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell*, Richard Cohen Books, London, 1997
- J. Peter Burgess (ed.) *Cultural Politics and political Culture in post-modern Europe*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1997
- Michael Burgess (ed.), *Comparative Federalism and federation: competing traditions and future directions*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, London, 1993
- Michael Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000*, Routledge, London, 2000
- Michael Burgess (ed.), *Federalism and Federation in Western Europe*, Croom Helm, London, 1986
- Michael Burgess, *The British Tradition of Federalism*, Leicester University Press, London, 1995
- Michael Burgess, *The European Union as an Intellectual Puzzle: federal and con-federal elements in European political integration*, Centre of EU Studies, Hull, 1997
- L.J. Butler, *Britain an Empire, Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World*, I.B.Tauris Publishers, London, 2002
- M. Camps, *Britain and the European Community, 1955-63*, Princeton University Press, London/Princeton, 1964
- Simone Chambers, *Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse*, Cornell UP, London, 1996
- P. Chilton, *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 1996
- M. Christadler, H. Uterwedde (eds.), *Länderbericht Frankreich: Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 1999
- Alan Clark, *The Tories, Conservatives and the Nation State*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998
- Stuart Clark, 'The Annales historians', in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, CUP, 1985
- Peter Clarke, *A Question of Leadership*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1999
- Charles G. Cogan, *Charles de Gaulle A Brief Biography with Documents*, St. Martin's Press, Boston, 1996
- W. Conze, V. Hentschel (eds.), *Ploetz Deutsche Geschichte Epochen und Daten*, Ploetz, Würzburg, 1996
- B. Coxall, L. Robins, *British Politics since the War*, Macmillan, London, 1998
- Stuart Croft, 'British policy towards western Europe: 1945-51', in: Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe – European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991
- Oliver J. Daddow, *Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical perspectives on integration*, MUP, Manchester, 2004
- M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, Routledge, London, 1996
- Anne Deighton, (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-1963*, London, Macmillan, 1995
- W. Diebold Jr., *The Schuman plan: a study in economic cooperation, 1950-1959*, F.A. Praeger, New York, 1959
- S. Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955*, CUP, Cambridge, 1991
- Jean Doise, Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France: Diplomatie et outil militaire 1871-1991*, Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1992
- Helmut Dubiel, 'Konsens und Konflikt', in: Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), *Staat und Demokratie in Europa*, Opladen, Wiesbaden, 1992

- François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet - The first statesman of interdependence*, Norton, New York, 1994
- David Dutton, *Anthony Eden, A Life and Reputation*, Arnold, London, 1997
- James Ellison, *Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 1955-58*, Macmillan, London, 2000
- Trond Berg Eriksen, 'The European Self-Image', in: J. Peter Burgess (ed.), *Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern Europe*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1997
- R. J. Evans, *Fakten und Fiktion: über die Grundlagen historischer Erkenntnis*, Campus, Frankfurt a. M., 1997, translated by Ulrich Speck
- James Farr, 'Understanding conceptual change politically', in: Terence Ball et al. (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, CUP, 1989, p. 24-49
- Michel Foucault, *Short Cuts*, Zweitausendeins, Berlin, 2001
- E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community - A History*, Macmillan, London, 1980
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'Die Anthropologische Grundlage der Freiheit des Menschen', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Das Erbe Europas*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1989
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'Die Aufgabe der Philosophie', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Das Erbe Europas*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1989
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'Die Grenzen des Experten', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Das Erbe Europas*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1989
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'Die Vielfalt Europas Erbe und Zukunft', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Das Erbe Europas*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1989
- H.-G. Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, & Ethics*, Yale UP, New Haven, 1999, translated by J. Weinheimer
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'Myth in the Age of Science (1981)', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, & Ethics*, Yale UP, New Haven, 1999, translated by J. Weinheimer
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'Kant and the Question of God (1941)', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, & Ethics*, Yale UP, New Haven, 1999, translated by J. Weinheimer
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'The Ethics of Value and Practical Philosophy (1982)', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, & Ethics*, Yale UP, New Haven, 1999, translated by J. Weinheimer
- H.-G. Gadamer, 'The Ontological Problem of Value (1971)', in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, & Ethics*, Yale UP, New Haven, 1999, translated by J. Weinheimer
- H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer Philosophischen Hermeneutic*, 4th ed., Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, 1975
- James Paul Gee, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, theory and method*, Routledge, London, 1999
- S. George, *An Awkward Partner - Britain in the European Community*, 3rd ed, OUP, Oxford 1998
- S. George, *Britain and European Integration*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991
- Pierre Gerbet, *La Construction de l'Europe*, 3rd ed., Imprimerie Nationale Éditions, Paris, 1999
- Anthony Giddens, 'Jürgen Habermas', in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, CUP, Cambridge, 1985
- Gerhard Göhler, 'Konflikt und Integration (Koreferat zu Helmut Dubiel)', in: Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), *Staat und Demokratie in Europa*, Opladen, Wiesbaden, 1992
- David Gowland, Arthur Turner, *Reluctant Europeans - Britain and European Integration, 1945-1998*, Longman, London, 2000
- J.T. Grantham, 'British Labour and the Hague "Congress of Europe"', *Historical Journal (1981)*
- H. Grebing et al. (eds.), *Willy Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe*, J.H.W. Dietz, Bonn, 2000
- Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution The European Political Community, 1952-1954*, Federal Trust, London, 2000
- J. Goldstein & R. O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993
- Hans von der Groeben, *Aufbaujahre der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Das Ringen um den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union 1958-66*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1982

- A. Grosser, 'Die Rolle Konrad Adenauers in der jüngsten deutschen und europäischen Geschichte', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- E.B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisations*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964
- E.B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958
- J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Vols. 1,2, Suhrkamp, 1981
- J. Habermas, *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1991
- J. Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung, Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1998
- C. Hacke, 'Jacob Kaiser (1888-1961)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1995
- S. Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France*, OUP, Oxford, 1994
- Volker Hentschel, *Ludwig Erhard: Ein Politikerleben*, Ullstein, Berlin, 1998
- T. Hertfelder, 'Theodor Heuss (1884-1957)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG – Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000*, Macmillan, London, 1998
- Klaus Hildebrand, 'Der provisorische Staat und das Ewige Frankreich – Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1963 bis 1969', in: Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), *Adenauer und Frankreich - Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1958 bis 1969*, Rhöndorfer Gespräche, 2nd ed., Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1990
- Ulla Holm, 'The Struggle between the Political Nation and the Cultural Nation', in: J. Peter Burgess (ed.), *Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern Europe*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1997
- David Howarth (ed.), *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*, MUP, Manchester, 2000
- David Hoy, 'Jacques Derrida', in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, CUP, Cambridge, 1985
- R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977
- Susan James, 'Louis Althusser', in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, CUP, Cambridge, 1985
- H.-H. Jansen, 'Erich Mende (1916-1998)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Adam Jaworski, Nikolas Coupland (eds.) *The Discourse Reader*, Routledge, London, 1999
- Roy Jenkins, *Churchill*, Macmillan, London, 2001
- Wolfram Kaiser, *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans*, Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, Basingstoke, 1996
- K.-G. Kiesinger, 'Erinnerungen an Konrad Adenauer', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- D. Koerper, 'Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.) *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- H. Kohl, 'Konrad Adenauer – Erbe und Auftrag', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- H. Köhler, *Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie*, Vols. 1,2, Ullstein, Berlin, 1997
- Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), *Staat und Demokratie in Europa, 18. Wissenschaftlicher Kongress der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft*, Opladen, Wiesbaden, 1992
- G. M. Krause, 'Gustav Heinemann (1899-1976)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999

- D. Kroegel, 'Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1904-1988)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- D. van Laak, 'Franz Blücher (1896-1959)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970*, Harvill, London, 1992
- Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendes France*, Seuil, Paris, 1981
- Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Verso, London, 1985
- Ernesto Laclau, *The making of political identity*, Verso, London, 1994
- Ernesto Laclau, *The Politics of Rhetoric*, University of Essex, Colchester, 1988
- Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years, 1957-1963: the emerging truth*, J. Murray, London, 1995
- K. Larres, 'Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- S. Lee, 'German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration: German 'Europolitik' during the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations', in: Anne Deighton (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe – National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63*, Macmillan, London, 1995
- S. Lee, 'Staying in the Game? Coming into the Game? Macmillan and European Integration', in: R. Aldous and S. Lee, (eds.), *Harold Macmillan and Britain's World Role*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996
- René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman Père de l'Europe*, Fayard, Paris, 2000
- G. Lenz, 'Willy Brandt (1913-1992)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- A. H. Leugers-Scherzberg, 'Herbert Wehner (1906-1990)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- R.J. Lieber, *British Politics and European Unity: Parties, elites and pressure groups*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970
- L.N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1963
- W. Lipgens, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1982
- Christopher Lord, *Absent at the Creation: Britain and the Formation of the European Community, 1950-1952*, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996
- M-F. Ludmann-Obier, 'Les prélèvements unilatéraux en zone française d'occupation (1945-1946)', in: J. Jurt (ed.) *De la période d'occupation à la coopération franco-allemande*, Rombach, Freiburg, 1993
- Mairi Maclean, Jean-Marc Trouille (eds.), *France, Germany and Britain: Partners in a Changing world*, Palgrave, London, 2001
- G. Mann, 'Begegnung mit Konrad Adenauer', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- Peter Matthews, *A Short History of Structural Linguistics*, Cambridge, CUP, 2001
- Richard McAllister, *From EC to EU, an historical and political survey*, Routledge, London, 1997
- G. A. Meany, 'Konrad Adenauer – Erinnerung und Würdigung', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- B. Meissner, 'Die Ostpolitik Konrad Adenauers', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Stuttgart, 1976
- P. Merseburger, 'Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Peter Merseburger, *Der schwierige Deutsche Kurt Schumacher*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1995
- A. S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, 2nd Ed., Routledge, London, 2000
- A. S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, Methuen, London, 1984
- David Mitrany, *A Working Peace*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1966

- C. M. de Molènes, *L'Europe de Strasbourg: Une Première Expérience de Parlementaire International*, Éditions Roudil, Paris, 1971
- J. Moon, *European Integration in British Politics, 1950-63: a study*, Gower, Aldershot, 1985
- A. Moravcsik, *Choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*, UCL Press, London, 1998
- A. Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in: R.O. Keohane, S. Hoffmann (eds.), *The New European Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991
- A. Moravcsik, 'Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation', Harvard University Center for European Studies (Paper No. 52), 1994
- H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1985
- Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, London, Verso, London, 1993
- Daniela Münkel, 'Auf dem Weg nach vorn: Willy Brandt und die SPD', Vol. 4, in: H. Grebing et al. (eds.), *Willy Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe*, J.H.W. Dietz, Bonn, 2000
- Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, "'The Turk'" as Europe's Other', in: J. Peter Burgess (ed.), *Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern Europe*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1997
- N. Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, 3rd ed., Macmillan Press, London, 1992
- T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- T. Oppelland, 'Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- T. Oppelland, 'Heinrich Krone (1895-1989)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- William Outhwaite, 'Hans-Georg Gadamer', in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, Cambridge, CUP, 1985
- S. Padgett (ed.), *The Development of the German Chancellorship Adenauer to Kohl*, Hurst & Company, London, 1994
- S. Padgett, 'The Chancellor and his Party', in: Stephen Padgett (ed.), *The Development of the German Chancellorship Adenauer to Kohl*, Hurst & Company, London, 1994
- L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Britain Faces Europe*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1969
- W. Paterson, 'The Chancellor and Foreign Policy', in: Stephen Padgett (ed.), *The Development of the German Chancellorship Adenauer to Kohl*, Hurst & Company, London, 1994
- R. O. Paxton, *Vichy France – Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001
- Mark Philip, 'Michel Foucault', in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, Cambridge, CUP, 1985
- Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic*, Methuen&Co, London, 1960
- J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, Princeton UP, Princeton, 1975
- Ruggero Ranieri, 'Attempting an unlikely union: the British steel industry and the European Coal and Steel Community: 1950-54', in: Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe – European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991
- Rush Rhees, *Wittgenstein and the possibility of Discourse*, CUP, Cambridge, 1998
- Robert Rhodes-James, *Anthony Eden*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1986
- A. Robertson, *The Council of Europe, Its Structure, Functions and Achievements*, Stevens & Sons, London, 1961
- Hartmut Rosa, 'Ideengeschichte und Gesellschaftstheorie: Der Beitrag der 'Cambridge School' zur Metatheorie', *Politische Vierteljahres Schrift*, 35 Jg., 1994, p. 197-223
- Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, Palgrave, Houndmills, 2000
- R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Q. Skinner (eds.), *Philosophy in History: essays on the historiography of philosophy*, CUP, Cambridge, 1984
- E. Roussel, *Charles de Gaulle*, NRF Gallimard, Paris, 2002
- Alan Ryan, John Rawls, in: Q. Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, CUP, Cambridge, 1985

- Patrick Samuel, *Michel Debré: L'architecte du Général*, Arnaud Franel Editions, Suresnes, 1999
- T. Sauer, 'Eugen Gerstenmaier (1906-1986)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- H. Schelsky, (ed.), *Auf der Suche nach der Wirklichkeit; gesammelte Aufsätze*, Diederichs, Düsseldorf, 1965
- Helmut Schmidt, *Carlo Schmid 1896 -1979 : Vortrag vor dem Gesprächskreis Geschichte der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 1996
- Helmut Schmidt, *Die Selbstbehauptung Europas: Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert*, Ullstein, Munich, 2002
- P.C. Schmitter, 'A Revised Theory of European Integration', in: L.N. Lindberg, S.A. Scheingold (eds.), *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971
- H.-P. Schwarz, *Adenauer Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, DVA, Stuttgart, 1991
- H.-P. Schwarz (ed.), *Adenauer und Frankreich Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1958 bis 1969*, Rhöndorfer Gespräche, 2nd ed., Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1990
- H.-P. Schwarz, 'Das Spiel ist aus und alle Fragen offen, oder: Vermutungen zu Adenauers Wiedervereinigungspolitik', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belser, Stuttgart, 1976
- M. Seikmeier, 'Walter Scheel (1919-)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker 1949-1969*, Vol. 2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- P. Siebenmorgen, 'Franz Josef Strauß (1915-1988)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Anna Marie Smith, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, *The radical democratic Imaginary*, Routledge, London, 1998
- Q. Skinner, 'Language and Political Change', in: Terence Ball et al.(eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, CUP, Cambridge, 1989
- Q. Skinner, *Political discourse in early modern Britain*, CUP, Cambridge, 1993
- Q. Skinner, *The foundations of modern political thought*, CUP, Cambridge, 1978
- Q. Skinner, 'The idea of negative liberty: philosophical and historical perspectives', in: R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Q. Skinner (eds.), *Philosophy in History*
- Q. Skinner (ed.) *The Return of Grand Theory in the human sciences*, CUP, Cambridge, 1985
- Q. Skinner, 'The State', in: T. Ball et al, *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, CUP, Cambridge, 1989
- Q. Skinner, James. Tully (eds.), *Meaning and context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, Polity, Cambridge, 1988
- Julie Smith, *Europe's elected parliament*, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, 1999
- H. Soell, 'Fritz Erler (1913-1967)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- H. Soell, 'Helmut Schmidt (1918-)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Mark Speich, *Kai-Uwe von Hassel – Eine politische Biographie*, Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der RheinischenFriedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, Bonn, 2001
- Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe – European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991
- Susan Strange, 'International Monetary Relations', in: Andrew Shonfield (ed.), *International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959-1971*, OUP, London, 1976
- F. J. Strauss, 'Der Alte war ein Mann mit vielen Schichten...', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belser, Stuttgart, 1976
- R. Sturm, 'The Chancellor and the Executive', in: Stephen Padgett (ed.), *The Development of the German Chancellorship Adenauer to Kohl*, Hurst & Company, London, 1994
- R.R. Sullivan, *Political Hermeneutics The Early Thinking of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, Pennsylvania State UP, London, 1989
- Jacob Torfing, *New theories of discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999

- James Tully, 'The pen is a mighty sword: Quentin Skinner's analysis of politics', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 13, 1983, p. 489-509
- Maurice Vaisse, 'De Gaulle and the British "application" to join the Common Market', in: G. Wilkes, (ed.), *Britain's Failure to enter the European Community in 1963: Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, Frank Cass, London, 1997
- Peter Normann Waage, 'The Division and Integration of Europe', in: J. Peter Burgess (ed.), *Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern Europe*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1997
- H. Wallace, 'Politics and Policy in the European Union: the Challenge of Governance', in: H. Wallace, W. Wallace (eds.), *Policy-Making in the European Community*, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1996
- K. Waltz, *Theory of international Politics*, McGraw, New York, 1979
- M. Walzer, 'Citizenship', in: T. Ball et al, *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, CUP, Cambridge, 1989
- M. Walzer, *Vernunft, Politik und Leidenschaft. Defizite liberaler Theorien*, Fischer, Frankfurt 1999, translated by Karin Wördemann
- P. Weber, 'Carlo Schmid (1896-1979)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- Werner Weidenfeld, 'Die geistigen Grundlagen der Politik Konrad Adenauers', in: H. Kohl (ed.), *Konrad Adenauer 1876 / 1976*, Belsler, Stuttgart, 1976
- David Weigall, 'British perceptions of the European Defence Community', in: Peter M. R. Stirk and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe – European Unity and Disunity 1945-1957*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991
- J. C. Weinheimer, *Gadamer's Hermeneutics A Reading of Truth and Method*, Yale UP, New Have, 1985
- U. Wengst, 'Thomas Dehler (1897-1967)', in: T. Oppelland (ed.), *Deutsche Politiker, 1949-1969*, Vols. 1,2, Primus, Darmstadt, 1999
- A. Wiener, T. Diez, *European Integration Theory*, OUP, Oxford, 2004
- G.R. Wilkes, (ed.), *Britain's Failure to enter the European Community in 1963: Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, F. Cass, Ilford, 1997.
- G.R. Wilkes, *British Attitudes to the European Economic Community, 1956-63*, Cambridge, 2002
- Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2000
- B. Wilson, *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Guide*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998
- J.W. Young, *Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999*, 2nd edition, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000
- J.W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1984
- J.W. Young, (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-1955*, Leicester UP, Leicester, 1988